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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this research is to address the question of how false beliefs about the 
law should be dealt with by the criminal law. While there has long been discontent with the 
current position, I argue that proposals to deal with this issue in relation to the mens rea are 
inadequate, and that a more consistent approach to this problem can only be developed by 
exploring the place of knowledge of the law as an autonomous concept from mens rea. 
This approach thus aims to complement the traditional model of criminal responsibility 
based exclusively on volitional states (mens rea) with one based also on cognitive states. In 
doing so, this thesis develops a meaningful and operative account of the cognitive or 
epistemic conditions of criminal responsibility, analytically scrutinising the question of 
how the criminal law should treat those who act in ignorance of criminal prohibitions and 
who unwittingly break the law. 
 
Part I of the thesis looks at the conditions for the establishment of criminal 
responsibility from the perspective of an institutional theory of the criminal law. The first 
two chapters develop a critical account of the two current ways a false belief might be 
recognised as a defence – mistake of fact and mistake of law – and the ways that different 
theoretical accounts, characterised as legal positivism and legal moralism, have sought to 
address this problem. These chapters also survey the ways that a mistake of law defence 
might be currently recognised and examines the proposals of those authors willing to 
expand the conditions under which ignorance of law should exculpate. After that, in 
chapter III, the dissertation begins to develop a fresh approach based on an institutional 
framework for the criminal law. The chapter explores the connections between criminal 
law and interpersonal and institutional trust. The last chapter of part I argues that both 
volitional and epistemic/cognitive conditions are key in a correct account of deliberation or 
practical reasoning processes before action. Thereafter the Epistemic Condition on 
Criminal Responsibility (ECCR) is proposed as an algorithmic test, able to distinguish 
culpable from non-culpable ignorance. 
 
Part II of the thesis, rejecting the classical dichotomy of mistake of fact versus 
mistake of law, introduces a new kind of approach based on distinguishing between brute 
facts, institutional facts and institutional commands. Chapter 5 discusses and defends the 
feasibility of the distinction between brute and institutional facts, arguing that the 
	 IV	
perception process of both is dissimilar. Later, the chapter applies the ECCR to existing 
cases in common law jurisdictions related to false beliefs about brute facts. Chapter 6 
scrutinises the practical distinction between false mistakes about institutional facts and 
false mistakes about institutional commands and applies the ECCR to false beliefs about 
institutional facts. The last chapter puts the ECCR into practice to address false beliefs 
about institutional commands. Finally, a general point about false beliefs is considered: 
when the duty to seek legal advice becomes a right to rely on a trustworthy source. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Together, two friends purchase a mountain bike. A year later, one of them 
unilaterally decides to sell it, unaware that according to the law of moveable property the 
bike actually ‘belongs to another’. This false belief about the ‘belonging to another’ 
condition could have several different causes: a) the seller mixes-up the bike with another 
old, similar mountain bike she has in her shed; b) the seller thinks that because it is her 
own mountain bike, it does not ‘belong to another’; or c) she thinks that after two years in 
her shed, the other joint share in the property has prescribed and she can sell the mountain 
bike. Under the first hypothesis, the accused could be exculpated applying the defence of 
‘mistake of fact’. This category of defence exculpates the accused of criminal 
responsibility because the false belief impedes the accused from forming the mandatory 
mens rea element required for the crime of theft.1 On the other hand, criminal law in 
common law jurisdictions, on the basis of the assumption of mens rea, pursues a harsh 
approach against those who breach a criminal law but are unaware they have done so. 
Thus, in the other two hypotheses the accused would probably be convicted of theft.2 This 
dissertation proposes that both the asymmetric treatment of factual and normative false 
beliefs, and also the circumstances where false beliefs of law should be a defence, would 
be better analysed in terms of the epistemic conditions of the citizen rather than through 
notions of mens rea. Accordingly, this thesis proposes a model of responsibility based 
exclusively on volitional states with one based also on cognitive states. As a result, the 
citizen’s reasons for action are determined jointly by volitional and cognitive states. 
 
A common aspiration of legal philosophers and theorists, who want to define and 
frame criminal responsibility, is to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that 
must be met for a correct ascription of culpability. This is normally done by focusing on 
mens rea (fault). In this thesis I want to contribute to this by arguing for a broader 
approach that looks at the epistemic conditions rather than mens rea narrowly conceived. 
In doing so, this investigation shall analytically scrutinise the question of how the criminal 
law should treat those who act with a false belief about criminal prohibitions and who 
unwittingly break the law. False beliefs have been traditionally categorised, not without 																																																								
1 Theft Act 1968 S.1 (1) 
2 A defence may be available if the accused is able to relate the issue to an error of a concept of the civil law 
that negates mens rea. See R v Smith (1974) QB 354. 
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2	
controversy,3 as mistakes of fact and of law. Where the current law about mistakes of fact 
is undisputed, most contemporary legal commentators in common law jurisdictions are of 
the view that the circumstances under which ignorance of the law exculpates should be 
wider than they presently are.4 The adage ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ is widely 
known in most common law jurisdictions, though very much criticized. For that reason, 
although a comprehensive comparative legal survey is not the main contribution of this 
research, the main focus of this thesis will be ignorance of the law in common law 
jurisdictions.5 
 
Two prominent legal theorists have relatively recently raised the alarm about the 
untenable current situation of the penal justice in this area. Writing in 2011, Ashworth 
argued that the ‘ignorance of the law is no defence’ adage is a “… preposterous doctrine 
resting on insecure foundations within the criminal law and on questionable propositions 
about the political obligations of individuals and of the State”.6 He pointed out that to 
exclude any defence based on ignorance is “[…] manifestly unfair, given the diverse, often 
technical, and changing content of the criminal law “.7 Ashworth acknowledges that 
citizens have a duty to find out about the criminal law, but argues that this should be 
balanced against the state’s duty to adequately publish the law. Arguing that the criminal 
law must be prospective, certain and accessible, Ashworth thus proposes the recognition of 
a defence of reasonable ignorance of criminal law. Likewise, in 2016, Husak published a 
monograph on ignorance of law arguing that “[…] no core area of the substantive criminal 
law is more ripe for fundamental reform”.8 He defends the extension of mens rea to 
accommodate not only intention but also knowledge of the applicable law, contradicting 																																																								
3 L. Alexander “Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in Memory of 
Mike Bayles” Law and Philosophy (1993) 12:33 
4 A.T.H. Smith, “Error and Mistake of Law in Anglo-American Criminal Law” (1985) 14 Common Law 
World Review 3:32; P. Matthews, “Ignorance of the Law is no Excuse?” (1983) L.S. 3:174-192; D. 
O’Connor, “Mistake and Ignorance in Criminal Cases”  (1976) M.L.R. 32:644-662; B.R. Grace, 
“Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law” (1986) Columbia Law Review 86:1932-1416; D. Husak, 
“Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizens” (1994) L.S. 14:105-115; D. Husak and A. von Hirsch, 
“Culpability and Mistake of Law” in Action and Value in Criminal Law (S. Shute, J. Gardner and J. 
Horder (eds) (1996) pp157-174; D. Husak “Mistake of Law and Culpability” (2010). Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 4(2):135-159; D. Husak “Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry” (2016); A. Ashworth 
“Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it” (2011) Modern Law Review 74:1, pp1-26; R.G. 
Singer “The Proposed Duty to Inquiry as Affected by Recent Criminal Law Decisions in United States 
Supreme Court” (1999-2000) Buffalo criminal Law Review 3:701-754; K. Simons “Mistake and 
Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability” 81 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1990) 
pp447-517; J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (1987) pp150 ss 
5 That said, the arguments developed in the thesis have wider implications, including factual false beliefs. 
6 A. Ashworth “Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it” (2011) Modern Law Review at 
introduction, p1 
7 Ibd at p24 
8 D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A philosophical Inquiry (2016) at p2 
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the historical approach of the common law tradition to these questions. According to 
Husak, only the akratic accused, that is, those who believe that what they are doing is 
wrong and do it anyway, should be held fully responsible.9 He also defends the idea that 
those accused that do not recognise that their conduct is criminal but are aware of a risk 
that their conduct might be wrongful should have their culpability diminished. This 
formula basically clones the German dogmatic solution for mistake of law,10 where the 
mental element includes knowledge and a distinction is made between unavoidable and 
avoidable mistakes. In the former, the accused, completely unaware of the criminality of 
the conduct, is acquitted. In the latter, the accused has taken some substantial risk about the 
potential illegality of their conduct and, as result, a lesser degree of responsibility is 
attached than to one who knew the illegality of their actions. While they are highly critical 
of the existing law, neither Ashworth nor Husak offer a clear or detailed practical solution 
to the questions. Husak recognises that his proposal for “a theory of when ignorance of 
morality is exculpatory”11 is difficult to implement in the real world.12 This is mainly 
because the inculpatory and exculpatory work in terms of blameworthiness is done by 
morality. Thus, knowledge or ignorance of the law is immaterial because it does not 
introduce new arguments for conviction. Equally, Ashworth’s proposal of a “general but 
circumscribed defence of excusable ignorance of the law”,13 although a priori acceptable, 
only outlines a broad framework for the defence: a test that appraises what is reasonable to 
be expected from a citizen in the accused’s position, also taking into account “capacity-
based exceptions”.14 Thus, the major works to date on error of law both suffer from 
problems: Husak’s because it is not workable in practice and Ashworth’s because it is not 
comprehensive nor structured in principle. 
 In	terms	of	jurisdictional	focus,	although	some	of	the	arguments	of	this	thesis	could	be	perfectively	valid	in	continental	or	civil	law	jurisdictions,	the	thesis	is	mainly	
																																																								
9 See G. Yaffe “Is Akrasia Necessary for Culpability? On Douglas Husak’s Ignorance of Law” Crim. Law 
and Philosophy (2018) 12:341-349 
10 H. Welzel Das deutsche Strafrecht. Eine systematische Darstellung (1969) p168; P. Cramer and D. 
Sterberg-Lieben, in A. Schonke and H. Schroder (eds) Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2006); C. Roxin AT 
(2006); H. Rudolphi, In H. Rudolphi et al. (eds) Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch; F.C. 
Schroder in B. Jähnke et al. (eds.), Leipziger Kommentar (1994). M. Cerezo Curso de Derecho penal 
español. Parte general III. Teoría jurídica del delito/2 (2001) pp119, 131 and ss.; M. Diaz y Garcia 
Canlledo Error sobre elementos normativos (2008) pp173, 189, 215; P. Luzon Curso de derecho penal. 
Parte general I (1996) pp465 and ss; C. Muñoz Derecho penal. Parte general (2007)  pp383, 386.  
11 D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry (2016) at p256. 
12 Ibd at Chapter V 
13 A. Ashworth, “Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it” (2011) Modern Law Review 
74(1):1-26 at p6 
14 Ibd at p6 
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4	orientated	to	provide	a	solution	for	false	beliefs	in	the	common	law	environment.	The	aim	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 address	 the	 question	 of	 how	 false	 beliefs	 about	 the	 law	should	be	dealt	with	by	criminal	law.	Where	in	civil	law	jurisdictions	this	defence	of	“error	 of	 law”	 has	 been	 settled15,	 in	 common	 law	 jurisdictions,	 as	 Leverick	 and	Chalmers	pointed	out,	“it	is	difficult	to	think	of	another	defence	where	the	balance	of	academic	opinions	is	so	out	of	step	with	the	law	as	it	stands”16.	For	that	reason,	cases-law	and	doctrine	 from	 these	 jurisdictions	have	been	used	 to	 support	 the	proposals	made.	 	 However,	 the	 thesis	 can	 clearly	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 legal	 theory	 orientated	research.	 As	 a	 result	 this	 research	 has	 neither	 the	 exhaustive	 aim	 to	 provide	 a	complete	appraisal	for	every	particular	common	law	jurisdiction	nor	comprehensive	individual	 solutions	 for	 each	one.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 to	provide	 a	
fresh	conceptual	framework	for	false	beliefs.		
 
The way that the current law treats citizens who breach criminal laws under false 
normative beliefs is normatively indefensible. Lack of awareness of criminal laws can 
indeed diminish or exclude criminal responsibility, but it is not clear when or how it should 
do so. As we will see later, crucial theoretical disputes about the function and scope of the 
criminal law must be resolved before a coherent position can be identified. In particular, 
attention must be paid to the extent of knowledge of the law and the conceptual contours of 
criminal responsibility. For this reason, the dissertation starts by analysing two extant 
accounts of criminal law, which I shall term the legal moralist and legal positivist 
approaches. For those who defend a legal moralist stance, criminalization and punishment 
is morally justified when the accused has engaged in moral wrongdoing and not just 
violated a criminal norm. On this account criminal laws are a sub-category17 of morality 
that do not create any fresh moral obligation to conform to their mandate. Only culpable 
wrongs provide a desert base argument for punishment; thus criminalising new conduct is 
completely immaterial because it does not introduce new arguments for desert. Knowledge 
of the law is then irrelevant and “the true normative basis of exculpation is ignorance of 
the morality underlying law, and not ignorance of the law itself”.18  																																																								
15 See as an example art 17 German Penal Code:” If at the time of the commission of the offence the offender 
lacks the awareness that he is acting unlawfully, he shall be deemed to have acted without guilt if the 
mistake was unavoidable. If the mistake was avoidable , the sentence may mitigated pursuant to art 49 
(1) 
16 J. Chalmers and F. Leverick  Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006) at p262. See also A. 
Ashworth “Ignorance of the criminal law, and duties to avoid it” Modern Law Review (2011) 74(1):1-
26. Also D. Husak, Ignorance of law: A philosophical inquiry (2016) 
17 D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A philosophical Inquiry (2016) at p259 
18 Ibd at p263 
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Legal positivists hold a friendlier approach towards the relevance of knowledge 
arguing for, based on the rational and deliberative attitude of the agent, the prospective 
guiding function of legal norms. From this stance, criminal laws (not morality) are 
exclusionary reasons for action; conditions considered in our deliberation before action. As 
rational agents we should not be made responsible for failing to be guided by a reason we 
did not believe we had. Knowledge of the law is a sort of relationship or access to the 
command or prohibition of the criminal norm; thus, ignorance about its content must be 
relevant to some extent. In short, if ignorance corrupts the deliberation of the citizen who is 
willing to do what is required, actions performed in ignorance of the criminal law should 
be affect the attribution of criminal responsibility. 
 
I shall argue in this thesis that both accounts are too narrow in scope. Firstly, 
criminal law is more than a subcategory of morality and for that reason legality19 is always 
required to justify criminalization and punishment. Secondly, we are not only, as 
positivists claim, rational beings but are social creatures as well. In our deliberation we 
must not only take into account legal norms as a reason for action, but also the mental life 
of others. We have the cognitive capacity to recognise during our deliberation process that 
other agents’ deliberations will depend on assumptions about what we will do. In our 
deliberations we take into consideration that we count on the deliberation process of 
others, and that we have the expectation that others will comply with legal norms and 
behave accordingly. These arguments are the structural support for the institutional 
conceptual framework proposed in this thesis. As social creatures we collectively attribute 
certain status to persons or things for purposes beyond their mere physical structures, and 
we expect that this deontic institutional framework will be respected. A twenty-pound 
note, for example, is just a piece of paper, only able to perform its function as currency by 
virtue of the fact that it has a recognised status that enables it to perform functions in a way 
it could not do without collective recognition. Within this institutional conceptual 
framework, knowledge of the law is not mere understanding of legal norms but the 
awareness of complex institutional facts and institutional structures and the social order it 
brings about. Only by knowing the institutional framework, as reason responsive agents, 
can we interact without friction and trust others with the expectation that other users know 
the specific conduct anticipated.  
 																																																								
19 Understood as a variant of the nulla poenna sine praevia lege principle 
Introduction 
 
6	
My first concern in the thesis, once the relevance of knowledge has been 
substantiated, is how to identify those situations where the citizen fails to notice a criminal 
norm as a reason for action because he is under a false normative belief. There seem to be 
two possible options here. The first alternative would be to extend the mental element of a 
crime not only to volitional but also to cognitive elements. The second would involve 
developing an autonomous legal solution, separate from the mens rea. The first option is 
the route followed by the German law,20 explicitly suggested by Husak,21 and implicit in 
Ashworth’s proposal.22 This alternative would focus on the conceptual contours of mens 
rea. Three significant reasons have pushed my proposal towards an independent treatment 
(from the mens rea element) for cognitive conditions: first, the authoritative consensus 
existing in common law jurisdictions that knowledge about the relevant law is not part of 
the mental element. Second, including the cognitive condition in the mens rea element 
would confront a legal landscape that includes many thousands of strict liability offences 
currently in force. Due to the pivotal role that strict liability offences have in common law 
jurisdictions, it would be more realistic not to require intention to commit the criminal 
conduct, but to defend the evaluation of the cognitive condition outside (and in addition to) 
the mental element. This solution does not contravene or disrupt the current regulatory 
framework. Accordingly, it would be permissible to prima facie attribute criminal 
responsibility to an accused without proof of mens rea (cognitively-free), and later exclude 
responsibility because the accused lacks the epistemic/cognitive conditions necessary for 
conviction. Finally, my awareness about the (still unsettled) controversy existing in the 
German dogmatic between defenders of the ‘dolo theory’ (that proposes a concept of dolus 
malus that includes knowledge) versus the defenders of the “culpability (schuld) theory” 
(who defend a concept of dolus naturalis, and solves knowledge in the schuld category)”.23 
This unsettled dispute has generated a permanent instability in the categories of the 
German theory of crime.24 Therefore, to insist on the inclusion of the cognitive condition 
																																																								
20 See G. Artz “The Problem of Mistake of Law” BYU law review (1986) 3:8 
21 D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry (2016) at p2 
22 Any proposal of a general defence of excusable ignorance of law, as proposed by Ashworth, certainly 
requires reversing the “ignorance iuris nocet” presumption before giving a detailed account of those 
exceptions under which ignorance of law would not exculpate. As the German law example accredits, it 
is very complicated to achieve a general defence without a revision of the mental element that includes, 
in addition to intention, knowledge of the law 
23 In German see: E. Mezger Strafrecht. Ein Lehrbuch (1949); V.J. Bauman, V.J. Weber, W. Mitsch, 
Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. Lehrbuch (2003) p37 and ss; E. Schmishauser Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. 
Studienbuch (1984) p36, 90. In Spanish see: M. Rodriguez Derecho penal. Parte general (1978) Ch. 
XIII.A; L. Torio “El ‘Error Iuris’, Perspectivas Materiales y Sistemáticas” ADPCP (1975) p38, among 
others. A. Cobo del Rosal Derecho penal. Parte general (1999) p619 
24 Mainly between the limits and content of the Tatbestand and Schuld categories of the German theory of 
crime 
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within the mens rea element, as Husak proposes, would certainly generate more dogmatic 
problems than it solves. 
 
Having explored this possibility, and its limitations, the thesis moves then to the 
second feasible alternative, fleshing out an autonomous algorithmic test able to distinguish 
culpable from non-culpable ignorance. Or, in other words, a structured functional 
judgement to decide when an ignorant or unaware citizen would be held culpable for 
something he unwittingly did or brought about. To achieve this, the dissertation starts to 
interweave the fibres of what I term the Epistemic Condition of Criminal Responsibility 
(ECCR). Its cornerstone is the latent and updatable knowledge that the citizen possesses 
immediately before action. As reason responsive agents, we can only be held responsible 
when we disregard the suspicion, triggered by our latent knowledge, that our conduct could 
be criminal. The rest of the elements of the architectonical epistemic condition building 
will be set in reference to this initial knowledge.  
 
Another concern the thesis confronts is the unsettled traditional categorisation 
distinguishing mistakes of fact from mistakes of law. A detailed analysis of this 
classification identifies that in some situations some mistakes of law could receive the 
same treatment as mistakes of facts and vice versa without any coherent reason. This is 
mainly because mistakes of law can range from complete ignorance that the conduct is 
regulated at all, to lack of awareness of the extension of some normative element included 
in the description of the conduct. This thesis will argue for the replacement of this 
distinction with a more consistent categorisation. The gist of this fresh classification 
proposes a sharp distinction between the conduct under appraisal and the appraisal of the 
conduct (as criminal).  Criminal laws can always be broken down into the descriptions of 
the criminalised conduct on the one hand, and the appraisal of this conduct as criminal on 
the other. False beliefs can arise both about some element used in the description of the 
conduct, or about the appraisal as criminal of the conduct itself. In the latter, the false 
belief is about the existence of the prohibition or command of particular conduct. In the 
former, the agent acts with false beliefs about a component or factor that constitutes a 
definitional element of a criminal offence. Two types of facts are normally used to describe 
criminal conduct. Some descriptive components (for example ‘ownership’) only have legal 
or institutional meaning, whereas others do not (for example ‘human being’). This is the 
reason the thesis proposes a trilogy of ignorance, distinguishing between false beliefs about 
brute facts, institutional facts and the institutional command. 
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Before providing a summary of the organisational structure of the thesis, some 
methodological comments should be provided. Holmes, probably the most relevant and 
influential American jurist, in the 19th century noted that: “For the rational study of law 
the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of 
statistic and the master of economics”. 25   This research, although it could not be 
methodologically labelled as interdisciplinary, definitely follows the tendency proposed by 
Holmes. This thesis collects legal sources (both statutes and court cases) in order to 
interpret and address contradictions, but also abandons the notion of law as a self-
contained discipline. The reason I decided to incorporate perspectives, concepts, arguments 
and theories from non-legal disciplines are diverse, but I would say that the main reason is 
the desire to avoid an insular atmosphere that might be predominant within the current 
methodologies and vocabularies between those scholars who discuss core criminal law 
issues. If my intuition is correct, this intellectual orthodoxy would hinder the detection and 
debate of fundamental blind spots, in a discipline that we should not forget is, by nature, 
founded on precedent and shared assumptions. For that reason, the deliberate inclusion in 
this research of input and vocabulary from disciplines like psychology, sociology or 
economics can have a disruptive effect on the somewhat enclosed approaches of current 
debates about the criminal law.  
 
Building bridges between criminal law and other disciplines always implies 
challenges. Potential risks like a wrong understanding of the other discipline, or choosing 
irrelevant commentators are always present. Aware of these pitfalls, during the research I 
have tried to select significant commentators and undertake a solid understanding of the 
topics in the incorporated disciplines. The use of language could be a revealing example of 
my approach. Criminal law vocabulary routinely revolves around words like 
‘wrongdoing’, ‘accused’, ‘blameworthiness’, ‘culpable’, ‘retribution’, ‘wrongdoer’, ‘mens 
rea’, ‘mistake’, ‘retribution’, ‘punishment’, ‘deterrence’, ‘desert’, etc., most of them with a 
suspicious, moralistic element. This shared vocabulary not only facilitates and induces the 
consolidation of standards and categories that eases internal communication or debate 
between academics, practitioners and lawmakers, but also, exemplifies the intellectual 
orthodoxy highlighted above. This vocabulary is intentionally avoided and rarely used in 
this dissertation where, in contrast, words like ‘expectation’, ‘trust’, ‘deliberation’, 
‘institutional’, ‘fact’, ‘citizen’, ‘sociological’, ‘belief’, ‘legality’, and ‘legal norm’ are key. 																																																								
25 O. Wendell Holmes Jr. “The Path of the Law” Harv. L. Rev. 10:457 (1897) p469 
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 Finally,	 several	 terms	 that	 will	 be	 used	 in	 the	 ensuing	 discussions	 and	proposals	are	in	need	of	clarification.	Three	different	words	are	traditionally	used	in	this	context:	error,	mistake	and	ignorance.	In	ordinary	usage,	error	and	mistake	bear	the	same	meaning.26	They	admit	some	knowledge	but	imply	or	suggest	some	grade	of	inadvertency	missing	in	such	a	case.	Ignorance,	on	the	other	hand,	implies	total	lack	of	knowledge	of	the	subject	matter.	In	the	legal	environment,	however,	the	distinction	has	not	been	recognised.27	Sometimes	 the	 terms	have	been	related	 to	 “ignorance	of	law”28	and	sometimes	to	“mistake	of	fact”29	and,	on	occasion,	the	words	ignorance	or	mistake	have	been	applied	to	both	types	of	error30	-	 indeed,	 in	Dotson	v	State31	both	were	combined.	Nor	do	authors	make	univocal	use	of	the	terms.32	Given	this,	and	the	epistemic	approach	of	this	thesis,	where	knowledge	and	rationality	of	belief	are	key,	I	use	the	term	“false	belief”.	This	approach	is	consistent	with	the	belief-based	account	of	 awareness	 defended	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Awareness	 always	 requires	 belief,	 but	 true	justified	belief.	It	seems	incongruous	to	defend	that	awareness	of	a	particular	fact	is	possible	if	this	particular	fact	is	false.	For	example,	I	cannot	be	aware	that	there	is	a	snake	 in	 the	 dinning	 room	 if	 it	 is	 just	 a	 painted	 rope.	 Awareness	 requires	 then	 a	double	dimension:	a	subjective	dimension	(belief)	and	an	objective	dimension	(truth).	The	practical	argument	 for	using	 “false	belief”	 rests	on	 the	 fact	 that	knowledge	and	belief	form	the	basis	of	action:	it	is	only	appropriate	to	treat	A	as	a	reason	for	action	if	and	only	if	you	know	A.	Only	true	justified	beliefs	can	be	proper	reasons	for	action.33	For	that	reason,	this	thesis	will	determine	the	conditions	under	which	a	“false	belief”																																																									
26 Both terms are interchangeable, but it could be argued that, in some contexts, an error is more appropriate 
than a mistake. For example, it is highly accepted to use the term “error” in a technical, computing, 
coding and processes context. In other contexts, error could describe a more severe miscalculation than 
mistake 
27 P. Keedy “Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law” Harvard Law Review 75 (1908) 22(2):75-96 
28 United States v One Buick Coach Automobile, 34 F (2d) 318, 320 (N. D. Ind. 1929) 
29 Hunter v State, 158 Tenn. 63, 73, I2 S.W. (2d) 361,363, (1928) 
30 Reynolds v United States 98 US 145 (1878); Hamilton v State, 115 Texas Cr C 96,97 29 SW (2d) 777,778. 
31 “[…] Ignorance or mistake, as to these facts […] absolves from criminal responsibility.” 25 Minn. 29, 38 
(1878) 
32 A. Ashworth for example uses “ignorance or mistake of law” (A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 
(2009) ch. 6.5). F. Leverick and J Chalmers name the defences as “error of facts” and “error of law”, see 
Chapter 12, 13 in J. Chalmers and F. Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006); A.P.  
and G.R. Sullivan use the terms “mistake of fact” and “ignorance and mistake of law” (Chapter 18.1 and 
18.2 in A.P. in A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan Criminal Law, Theory and Practice (2007)) 
33 A prominent view in contemporary epistemology holds that practical reasoning is governed by an 
epistemic norm. See D. Fassio ,”Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning? Philosophical studies 
(2017) 174(9):2137-2166; J. Brown “Knowledge and practical reason” Philosophy Compass, (2008) 
3(6):1135–1152; J. Brown (2010) “Fallibilism and the knowledge norm for assertion and practical 
reasoning” in J. Brown and H. Cappelen (eds) Assertion (2010) pp153–174; N. Arpaly and T. 
Schroeder “Deliberation and Acting for Reasons” Philosophical Review (2012) 121(2):209–239 
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10	should	excuse	an	actor	of	criminal	 responsibility.	 “False	belief”	encompasses	 in	 this	research	 both	 a	 complete	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 (ignorance),	 or	 some	 kind	 of	 deficient	knowledge	 (mistake	 or	 error),	 and	 also	 includes	 factual	 and	 normative	 beliefs.	Finally,	 existing	 legal	 classifications	 (in	 the	 common	 law	 approach)	 typically	distinguish	 between	 mistake,	 ignorance,	 etc.	 and	 certain	 topics	 as	 mistaken	 self-defense	have	generated	an	enormous	literature.	My	term	“False	belief”	is	intended	to	cut	 across	 these	 classifications.	 But	 while	 this	 might	 then	 have	 implications	 for	approaches	to	(say)	error,	 I	won’t	be	addressing	these	here.	 	 “False	belief”	could	be	counterpoised	 to	 “mistaken	belief”	understood	as	 those	situations	where	a	citizen´s	conduct	 is	 criminal	 because	 he	 mistakenly	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 permissible	(justifications).	Currently	these	situations	are	discussed	under	the	heading	of	mistake	about	a	defence	or	putative	defence.	Among	putative	defences,	mistaken	beliefs	about	self-defence	 in	 particular	 are	 a	 highly	 controversial	 topic	 that	 has	 attracted	 an	enormous	amount	of	 academic	attention.	 I	will	 intentionally	avoid	 this	 topic	 in	 this	thesis,	since	 it	probably	requires	a	thesis	by	 itself.	Even	though	it	 is	not	going	to	be	properly	fleshed	out	in	this	research,	at	the	end	of	the	thesis	it	will	be	argued	that	any	future	research	about	mistaken	belief	about	defences	could	be	accommodated	within	the	institutional	conceptual	framework	suggested	in	this	thesis34.	
 
This thesis consists of two parts. Part I contains four chapters and reviews the 
contemporary solutions proposed for ignorance of law before providing a new institutional 
conceptual framework for criminal law in general, and ignorance in particular.  Chapter 1 
sets out an analytical overview of the two current ways a false belief might be recognised 
as a defence: mistake of fact and mistake of law. Both defences are granted when the 
mistake negates the mens rea element.  This traditional categorisation works satisfactorily 
in situations of mistake of fact, but the “ignorantia Juris non excusat” maxim has been 
widely censured as manifestly unfair. Chapter 1 introduces the argument for its unfairness 
that is then fleshed out in later chapters: as rational creatures we can only be held 
criminally responsible by virtue of our capacity to respond and be guided by reasons. 
Citizens can be guided only by the criminal laws available to them in their deliberation 
process. Therefore, to attribute the same level of culpability to the citizen who is aware of 
the criminal law as to those who, acting under ignorance, are unable to take the law as a 
reason for action is manifestly unfair. After review of the traditional rationales that support 																																																								
34 At p239 
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the irrelevance of normative false beliefs, the chapter discusses the proposal of those 
authors willing to expand the conditions under which ignorance of law should exculpate. It 
also surveys the ways that a mistake of law defence might be currently recognised. One of 
them, situations where a mistake of civil law negates mens rea, is a generalist defence. The 
last procedural solution, officially induced mistake, only applies in very specific 
conditions. Finally, the ‘duty to know’ the law proposed by Ashworth is scrutinised.  
 
If citizens can only be guided by criminal laws available to them during their 
deliberation process, knowledge of the law is key. For that reason, chapter 2 scrutinises the 
legal moralist and legal positivist accounts of the law and their inferences for knowledge. 
The chapter, after an exhaustive revision of the position of a wide range of influential legal 
moralist commentators discussing ignorantia iuris, explains the reason why knowledge of 
the law has been historically peripheral in its account of responsibility. Thereafter, the 
legal positivist account of law and its conclusions for knowledge is set out. The chapter 
provides a revision of the most relevant positivist authors and their positions on 
knowledge.  The positivist ‘guidance view’ is proposed as a sufficient condition for 
responsibility: we can only be held responsible for behaviours guided by our capacities as 
rational agents, and performed and guided for what we believe to be adequate reasons.  
Therefore, false beliefs are crucial in the attribution of criminal responsibility. Finally, the 
chapter also highlights the insignificance of the sociological dimension of law in the 
positivist account, emphasising that we are not only rational but social agents.  
 
Once the moralist framework is rejected and the positivist partially accepted, 
chapter 3 provides a fresh institutional framework for the criminal law. The proposal 
initially rests on the theory of social institutions formulated by John Searle and developed 
in the legal domain by MacCormick and Ota Weinberger. I defend the position that 
modern societies exist within a constellation of institutional facts, like currency or borders. 
For functions beyond mere biological or physical structures (brute facts), we collectively 
attribute certain statuses to persons, objects or other entities (institutional facts). The 
institutional structure derived from the status function encloses a waterfall of deontic-
normative powers, rights and duties, that provides status holders with a common reason for 
action in our practical reasoning. Institutional facts guide us but also disclose to others 
what they can expect from us. Only within normative frameworks of reciprocal 
expectations can we interact, cooperate and trust strangers. The chapter then moves on to 
scrutinise and introduce an interesting connection between criminal law and trust. The 
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result of this connection is a dual dimension in the link between criminal law and trust: the 
behavioural descriptive side of criminal laws endorses or reassures interpersonal trust 
where criminal punishment has the function to reinforce and reaffirm institutional trust. 
Finally, before illustrating the relevance of knowledge in the institutional framework, this 
chapter defends a fresh account of criminal responsibility and a new classification of 
offences.  
 
The aim of chapter 4 is to flesh out the Epistemic Condition of Criminal 
Responsibility (ECCR). Of its six main sections, section 4.2 criticises those retributivist 
accounts of criminal law that reject any relevance of criminal norms in the agent’s 
deliberative process. Section 4.3 defends the argument that both volitional and 
epistemic/cognitive conditions are key in correct deliberation or practical reasoning 
processes. It also justifies wider excusatory consequences for false beliefs. Therefore, in 
those situations where the deliberative mechanism works correctly but the citizen fails to 
notice or respond to legal reasons because he acts under a false belief, it is fair to consider 
an exoneration of responsibility. Section 4.4 develops the different stages of the ECCR. 
The ECCR is articulated over two disjunctive momentums: first, criminal responsibility is 
directly attributed when the citizen acts knowingly; later the ECCR discusses the 
possibility to attribute responsibility to the unwitting citizen who was culpable of his false 
belief. After that, the chapter discusses different alternatives to ascertain under which 
circumstances the agent’s ignorance is culpable. Finally, a deontic/normative proposal for 
culpable ignorance is provided.  
  
Part II, rejecting the classical dichotomy of mistake of fact versus mistake of law, 
introduces a fresh trilogy of potential false beliefs, as noted above. Section 5.2 of chapter 5 
discusses and defends the feasibility of the distinction between brute and institutional facts.  
The chapter argues that the perception process of both is different: instantaneous in the 
former but evaluative in the latter. To support the differentiation, the work of Kahneman35 
about fast/slow thinking is introduced. Once the feasibility of the differentiation is 
evidenced, the chapter explains in detail the features of false beliefs about brute facts. 
Finally, the chapter applies the ECCR to existing law cases in the Anglo-American 
jurisdiction related to false beliefs about brute facts. 
 
																																																								
35 D. Kanehman Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) 
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Chapter 6 begins by analysing the practical distinction between false mistakes 
about institutional facts and false mistakes about the institutional command. To do so, 
firstly, the chapter explores in more depth the differentiation between brute and 
institutional facts. It shall be explained that often false beliefs about brute facts deal with 
the existence of the fact, whereas false beliefs about institutional facts deal with the 
extension of the fact. As perception about false beliefs about the command also requires a 
similar evaluative assessment, differentiation between false beliefs about the command or 
the institutional fact could be unrealistic. In order to provide a realistic differentiation, the 
chapter highlights the difference between the evaluation that conduct is criminal on the one 
hand, and the description of the evaluated conduct.  A false belief about the command 
relates to the former, whereas a false belief about the institutional command corresponds to 
the latter. The rest of the chapter applies the ECCR to false beliefs about institutional facts. 
 
Finally, chapter 7 contains two different parts. The first is dedicated to false beliefs 
about the institutional command. I attempt to illustrate what kind of (standard of) 
knowledge is required to determine that the citizen acts with full awareness of the 
recognised institutional framework. Three forms of awareness are discussed: knowledge 
about the immorality, illegality and criminality of the conduct. The conclusion is that only 
when the citizen was aware that his conduct was criminal can any excusatory effect be 
precluded. Later, the chapter applies the ECCR to false beliefs about the institutional 
command. The last part of the chapter discusses the issue of when the duty to seek advice 
becomes a right to rely on a trustworthy source. 
 
 
 
 
	
 
 
 
 
PART I 
 
	
CHAPTER 1 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SOLUTIONS CONCERNING 
FALSE BELIEFS 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The	main	aim	of	 this	chapter	 is	 to	acquaint	 the	reader	with	both	the	current	solutions	provided	by	 courts	 and	 the	 excusatory	 frameworks	proposed	by	 scholars	towards	 false	 beliefs	 in	 the	 common	 law	 jurisdictions.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 preferred	solution	has	been	to	utilise	the	binomial	“mistake	of	law”	or	“mistake	of	fact”	defence	scheme.	With	 few	exceptions,	exculpation	 is	only	granted	 if	 the	 false	belief	 impedes	the	 accused	 from	 forming	 the	mandatory	mens	rea	 element	 required	 for	 the	 crime.		The	 outcomes	 of	 this	 method	 have	 been	 commonly	 accepted	 in	 cases	 of	 factual	mistake.	However,	the	widely	accepted	exclusion	of	cognitive	conditions36	within	the	mental	element,	along	with	 the	potential	unfairness	 that	 this	brings,	has	caused	the	mistake	of	law	defence	to	become	a	controversial	topic:37 as rational agents, we ought 
only to be held responsible on the basis of our capacity to respond and ability to be guided 																																																								
36‘Cognitive conditions’ are understood here as the various states of knowledge that the agent may possess 
excluding cognitive impairments. Most common law jurisdictions have insanity/mental disorder and 
diminished responsibility defences.  
 
37 For authors who defend the error of law rule see: R.M. Perkins “Ignorance and mistake in criminal law” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1939) 35:70; L. Hall and S. Seligman “Mistake of Law and 
Mens Rea” University of Chicago Law Review (1940-1941) 8:641-683; E. Keedy “ Ignorance and 
Mistake in Criminal Law” Harvard Law Review (1908-1909) 22:75-96; J. Hall “Ignorance and Mistake 
in Criminal Law” Indiana Law Journal (1957) 33:1-44. For authors who defend that the scope of the 
defence should be wider see: A.T.H. Smiths “Error and Mistake of Law in Anglo-American Criminal 
Law” Common Law World Review (1985) 14:3-32; P. Matthews “Ignorance of the Law is not Excuse?” 
L.S. (1983) 3:174-192; D. O’Connor , “Mistake and Ignorance in criminal cases” M.L.R. (1976) 32:644-
662; B.R. Grace “Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law” Columbia Law Review (1986) 86:1932-
1416; D. Husak “Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizens” L.S. (1994) 14:105-115; D. Husak and A. 
von Hirsch “Culpability and Mistake of Law” in Action and Value in Criminal Law (S. Shute, J, 
Gardner and J. Horder (eds) (1996) pp157-174. D. Husak, “Mistake of Law and Culpability” Criminal 
Law and Philosophy (2010) 4(2): 135-159. D. Husak “Ignorance of Law: A philosophical Inquiry” New 
York: Oxford University Press (2016). A. Ashworth “Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to 
Avoid it” Modern Law Review (2011) 74(1):1-26. R.G Singer “The Proposed Duty to Inquiry as 
Affected by Recent Criminal Law Decisions in United States Supreme Court” Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review (1999-2000) 3:701-754; K. Simons “Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability” 
Journal of Criminal law and Criminology (1990) 81:447-517; J. Dressler Understanding Criminal Law 
(1987), pp150 ss 
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by reasons. Citizens can only be guided by those criminal norms available to them in their 
deliberation process. Thus, to attribute the same level of culpability to those citizens who 
are unaware of the law, and do not have access to those guiding reasons, is manifestly 
unfair.	
 As	much	of	the	following	chapter	will	be	dedicated	to	analysing	the	arguments	concerning	the	contentious	topic	of	mistake	of	law,	it	would	be	necessary	to	introduce	the	 problems	with	 the	 current	 law	 on	 error	 of	 fact	 that	 will	 be	 addressed	 later	 in	chapter	 5.	 One	 of	 the	 problems	 arises	 identifying	 whether	 the	 mistake	 which	 the	accused	 claims	 he	 has	made	 is	 one	 of	 criminal	 law	 or	 fact38.	 This	 is	 the	 argument	claimed	 by	 Alexander	 who	 points	 out	 that	 the	 distinction	 would	 be	 arbitrary:	“…because	 all	 legal	 prohibitions	 consist	 of	 facts–such	 as,	 that	 this	 legislative	 body	passed	this	law	that	contains	these	words	that	have	this	intended	meaning––and	that	because	 all	 mistakes	 of	 fact	 are	 also	 mistakes	 about	 whether	 the	 law	 prohibits	 a	particular	token	of	conduct,	all	mistakes	of	law	could	be	looked	at	as	mistakes	of	fact,	and	vice	versa”39.	Furthermore,	the	current	solution	for	error	of	fact	as	denials	of	the	
mens	 rea	 element	 is	 controversial.	 Where	 intention	 or	 subjective	 recklessness	 in	relation	to	some	elements	of	the	actus	reus	is	required	for	conviction,	an	error	of	fact	which	prevents	either	mental	state	will	be	excused40.	However,	as	Alldridge41	and	Tur	42pointed	out,	this	subjectivist	approach	could	be	overly	simplistic	in	cases	of	sexual	offences.	Accordingly,	this	will	be	expanded	upon	in	chapter	5	of	this	research	where	two	 particular	 issues	 in	 the	 sexual	 offences	 field	 will	 be	 discussed43:	 “honest	 and	reasonable	belief	about	consent	to	intercourse”	and	“strict	liability	offences	as	to	the	age	of	the	complainer”.	
 
This chapter contains five parts that describe the current law in common law 
jurisdictions, as well as the proposals made by scholars for reform of this area. Section 1.2 
introduces both defences and raises the ontological and practical difficulty of segregating 
legal from factual elements in the definition of a crime. Section 1.3 introduces the range of 																																																								
38 See D. Ormerod Smith’s and Hogan’s Criminal Law (2008) at p320. See also the case Lee [2001] Cr App 
R 293  
39 L. Alexander “Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in Memory 
of Mike Bayles” Law and Philosophy (1993) 12:33 
40 See DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182  
41 P. Alldridge Relocating Criminal Law (2000) at p88 
42 R. Tur “Subjectivism and Objectivism: Towards Synthesis” In S Shute, J Gardner and J Horder  (eds) 
Action and Value in Criminal Law  (1993) at p213. 
43 See chapter 5.2 
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rationales historically offered by scholars to support the irrelevance of cognitive 
conditions. Both substantive and procedural proposals have been made by courts and legal 
philosophers to mitigate the severity and unfair consequences of the current ignorantia 
iuris dogma. Section 1.4 of the chapter presents the proposals for a substantive defence 
defended mainly by Ashworth and Husak. The procedural defence of “officially induced 
error of law” is explored in section 1.5. This procedural category only applies where the 
accused sought advice about the law. Therefore, where the two previous categories are 
general solutions, officially induced error applies only in a very specific category of cases. 
Section 1.6 critically examines these proposals and, in disapproving the “duty to know the 
law”44 doctrine, proposes a more appropriate “burden to know the law” perspective. 
 
 
1.2 False beliefs that negate mens rea 
 
Criminal law, within the conventional offences/defences conceptual framework, 
has traditionally treated false beliefs through the mens rea element.45 As a result, false 
beliefs do not operate as a conventional, substantive defence, but rather as a ‘failure to 
proof’, also referred to as ‘absence of an element defences’46 or ‘evidential defences’.47 
This category of ‘defence’ exculpates the citizen of criminal responsibility because the 
prosecution fails to prove an essential element of the offence, specifically the required 
mental state (or mens rea).  
 
The exculpatory consequences of a false belief can be found on either a factual or 
legal element of the crime. An example of the former would be the hunter who kills 
another hunter honestly mistaking them for a deer. As murder requires the intentional or 
wickedly reckless48 killing of another human being, the hunter’s responsibility might well 
be excluded because, on the facts, he does not display sufficient mens rea for murder. 
Since the commission of a crime requires both the actus reus and the mens rea elements to 
be present, to convict the factually mistaken hunter would involve punishing him without 																																																								
44 The ‘duty to know’ doctrine has been discussed by both of the most dynamic academics in this field, A. 
Ashworth and D. Husak. See: A. Ashworth, “Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Cuties to Avoid it” 
Modern Law Review (2011) 74(1):1-26; D. Husak  “Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizens” L.S. 
(1994) 14:105-115 
45 Procedural remedies have also been proposed by legal philosophers and applied in some cases by courts. 
See below at section 1.5. 
46 See P.H. Robinson, “Criminal Law Defences: a Systematic Analysis” Columbia Law Review (1982) 
82(2):199 at p204. 
47 V. Tadros Criminal Responsibility  (2015) at p103. 
48 Drury v HM Advocate 2001 
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the mental state required for the crime. The case of R v Smith,49 on the other hand, provides 
a good example of a normative false belief excluding criminal responsibility. In this case, 
the appellant was a tenant that, with the consent of his landlord, purchased some electrical 
wiring and speakers and installed them in the conservatory. The tenant ended up causing 
damage to the equipment when he later removed them. He was cognizant that his reckless 
action could damage the equipment. Nevertheless, he was unaware that in fixing the items 
to the wall he had made them fixtures and hence property of the landlord. In this case, the 
appellant was mindful of section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 that established 
that “A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to 
another […] or being reckless as to whether any such property belongs to another shall be 
guilty of an offence”. However, he was mistaken about the extension of the legal concept 
“belonging to another”. The trial judge, considered at first instance that the appellant´s 
false belief about the transferred consequences of fixing the equipment was a mistake of 
law, and subsequently irrelevant. Later, the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction 
holding that his false belief about ownership prevented the appellant forming the relevant 
mens rea requirement for the crime.  
 
Of course, even where a person is exonerated of a crime when an essential element 
is not satisfied, they could nevertheless be convicted of an alternative crime if they were, 
for example, careless or reckless in the evaluation of the risk taken. For example, in the 
Scottish case HMA v Williamina Sutherland,50 the court discharged the accused of murder 
but held them guilty of culpable homicide for folding up a bed unaware that a child was 
then sleeping in it. The main argument of the court was that the accused “did not give the 
thought she ought to have done before folding up the bed” 51. 
 
Additionally, this traditional solution,52 founded on the negation of the mens rea 
element, prima facie appears to operate appropriately for false beliefs about factual 
elements required in the descriptions of some crimes. The a priori reasoning for the 
suitability of “failure of proof” defences in cases of factual mistake, resides in the 
																																																								
49 (1974) QB 354 
50 (1856) 2 Irv. 455  
51 Ibd at 456 
52 A detailed account of the current controversial approach towards error of fact will be provided in chapter 
VI when an account of false beliefs about brute facts will be presented. Particular attention will be given 
to two topics related with error of fact: “honest and reasonable belief” about consent; and statutory rape 
or, more generally, strict liability offences as to age (under 13) 
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“inexorable logic”53 that a false belief about a definitional element of a crime (actus reus) 
precludes foresight or intention to commit the crime. The crime so defined, is not 
committed because the accused lacks the guilty state of mind (mens rea) that criminal 
liability requires.54 However, even this apparently settled area nevertheless encounters 
difficulties concerning the controversial subjective/objective mens rea test. In the case B (A 
minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions55 the court decided that in order to convict an 
accused under the Indecency with Children Act 1960, the prosecution had the burden of 
proving the absence of a genuine belief in the accused that the victim was over the age of 
14. In this case the accused was a 15-year-old boy who attempted to coerce a 13-year-old 
into oral sex. At trial he argued that he honestly believed that the girl was over 14 and tried 
to apply the defence of mistake of fact. On appeal, the House of Lords stated that mens rea 
was always to be regarded as an essential element of a crime unless Parliament indicated 
the contrary. Thus, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the absence of a genuine 
belief held by the accused, which did not have to be on reasonable grounds, that the girl 
was over 14. In some areas statutory provisions, creating offences of strict liability, have 
resolved to fix the issue.  For example, section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 200356 creates 
a strict liability offence of intercourse with a child under the age of 13. But the recent 
decision in the Scottish case HMA v Daniel Cieslack57 highlights that statutory outcomes 
could be disproportionate or unfair and, as a result, inapplicable. In this case, to be 
discussed again below in chapter 5, the High Court in Glasgow took the decision not to 
sentence, and instead discharge absolutely, a 19-year-old boy who plead guilty of raping a 
girl under the age of 13. Thus, the current solutions to errors of fact about a definitional 
element of an offence range from conviction to acquittal through absolute discharge, 
without a consistent principled framework. In any case, the current solution, based on mens 
rea negation, ignores what is key in cases of false belief: the epistemic position of the 
accused. That is, whether or not the citizen knew or should have known of the existence of 
any factual elements in his action that resembled the description of a criminal offence. 
 
Contrariwise, in relation to false normative beliefs an outcome focused on whether 																																																								
53 See DDP v Morgan (1976) AC 182 at p214, where the inexorable logic that the accused should be 
acquitted even if the mistake was unreasonable was defended by Lord Hailsham. 
54 An exception to this rule could be crimes where recklessness can constitute the mens rea, or strict liability 
offences. 
55(2000) 1ALL ER 833 
56 Section 18 Sexual Offences Act 2009 uses similar terms to criminalize sexual activities with children 
under 13  
57 HMA-v-Daniel-Cieslak Unreported 17 Mach 2017 
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the belief negates mens rea is manifestly unjust58. The main reasons for its failure is that in 
common law jurisdictions,59 knowledge about the illegality of the act or awareness that the 
conduct was contrary to the criminal law,60 is not part of the mens rea element. In these 
jurisdictions, courts and legislators alike have categorically proclaimed that the state of 
knowledge of the citizen is irrelevant for his criminal responsibility.  As Justice Brennan 
emphatically proclaimed in United States v Freed, mens rea “[…] does not require 
knowledge that the act is illegal, wrong or blameworthy”.61 The consequences of this 
restrictive doctrine is that ignorance of the law only excuses when it negates a fault 
element. This is, for example, the position proclaimed in the draft English Criminal Law 
Code when it provides that “ignorance or mistake as to matter of law does not affect 
liability to conviction except… (b) where it negatives the fault element for the offence”. In 
similar terms, the US Model Penal Code in section 2.02 (9) establishes that “[n]either 
knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether a conduct constitutes an offence 
or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an 
offence is an element of the offence, unless the definition of the offence or the Code so 
provides”. Though section 2.02 does not mention explicitly the mens rea requirement, the 
provision emphasizes that knowledge is not part of the mental element of an offence unless 
the definition of the offence incorporates clauses like “ knowing it was forbidden” or 
“knowing it was a crime”. When a clause of this kind is included in the definition of the 
crime, only an accused with knowledge of the illegality of his conduct can be said to 
possess the necessary mens rea to perpetrate the crime. However, as clauses of this kind 
are rarely stipulated in the actus reus of offences, those citizens who are mistaken about 
whether their conduct is criminal are nevertheless regarded as possessing the mens rea 
required for the crime.62 
 																																																								
58 As rational creatures we can only be held criminally responsible by virtue of our capacity to respond and to 
be guided by reasons. Citizens can be guided only by criminal laws available to them in their 
deliberation process. Therefore, to attribute the same level of culpability to the citizen who is aware of 
the criminal laws as to those who, acting under ignorance, are unable to take the law as a reason for 
action, is manifestly unfair. 
59 Curiously, a debate about whether knowledge of the illegality of the conduct is part of the mental state 
(dolo) or not, has been at the heart of the concept of crime in continental jurisdictions. Where for the 
defenders of the “dolo theory” the knowledge about the illegality resides in the rechtswidrigkeit (second 
element in the tripartite structure of a crime) for the defenders of the “culpability theory”, knowledge 
resides in the schuld; the third element. 
60 Civil Law jurisdictions recognize that the mental element “dolo” implies both, intention and knowledge. 
See G. Artz “Ignorance or mistake of law” American Journal of Comparative Law (1976) 24:646-679; 
R. Yungs “Mistake of Law in Germany-Opening up Pandora’s Box” J.C.L. (2000) 64:339-344; M.E. 
Badar “Mens rea –Mistake of Law and Mistake of Fact in German Criminal Law: A Survey for 
International Criminal Tribunals” International Criminal Law Review (2005) 203-246. 
61 401 US 601, 612 (1971) 
62 Law Commission N 177 A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989) cl 21 
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The same rule has been set out in case law. As a result, the maxim ignorance iuris 
neminem excusat has become a widespread totemic mantra. An extended rule accepted 
among common law jurisdictions, it is well encapsulated in the words of Lord Bridgewhen 
when he affirms: "The principle that ignorance of the law is no defence in crime is so 
fundamental that to construe the word 'knowingly' in a criminal statute as requiring not 
merely knowledge of the facts material to the offender's guilt, but also knowledge of the 
relevant law, would be revolutionary and, to my mind, wholly unacceptable”.63 Indeed, if 
belief that one is breaking the law is rarely an element of the mens rea, the first obvious 
drawback is that mistakes or false beliefs about the illegality of the conduct hardly excuses. 
But a solution based on the mens rea element also raises other unresolved puzzling 
structural questions: when does an element (factual or legal) negate mens rea? Which 
normative or legal elements do negate mens rea? How should we segregate legal from 
factual elements in the definition of a crime? Is a specific clause in the definition of an 
offence mandatory to excuse the legally mistaken citizen as the Model Penal Code 
provides? Or, as it was held in Smith, is it enough that a false belief about a legal element 
negates the intention required in the crime?  
 
The difficulty in answering these questions resides first in ascertaining precisely 
when the false belief negates the mens rea required in a particular crime. In those offences 
where the statutory provision contains a particular clause identifying which element 
requires knowledge, the solution is clear: only when the citizen is ignorant of that 
particular element will they be excused. As mentioned above, in the Model Penal Code 
only those offences in which the actus reus provides a clause of the kind “knowing it is 
illegal” can a citizen plead a lack of the required mens rea. On the other hand, if no clause 
exists then, under the conventional principles of mens rea suggested in Smith, a mistake or 
false normative belief only negates mens rea in relation to an element of the actus reus 
when the law requires the existence of that particular element in the offence definition. 
This was the main argument excusing Smith. His belief that the property was his own 
prevented him from possessing the required intention or recklessness as to the particular 
element “belonging to another”, required in the actus reus. Thus, only in those crimes 
where the law requires mens rea for a specific definitional element can a false belief about 
it be used as a defence. The problem with this approach is that the definition of any crime 
is a compendium of normative (and factual) statements/elements, and it is not always 
crystal clear which particular element, if mistaken, could negate intention.  																																																								
63 Grant v Borg (1982) 2 All ER 257 at p263 
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This standard focus on mens rea not only offers difficulties about when the state of 
mind is negated or absent, but also presents the challenge of distinguishing legal elements 
from factual ones as Kadish’s classical hypothetical case illustrates.64 In this case, the 
hypothetical Mr. Law and Mr. Fact each wrongly believe they are breaking the law by 
going hunting on October 15. Mr. Law is wrong because he believes that the hunting 
season doesn’t start until the first of November when it actually began on the first of 
October. Mr. Fact is wrong because he looked at the wrong page on the calendar and 
believes it is September; he knows that hunting season begins on October 1. Alexander, for 
example, argues that “[…] all legal prohibitions consist of facts––such as, that this 
legislative body passed this law that contains these words that have this intended meaning–
and that because all mistakes of fact are also mistakes about whether the law prohibits a 
particular token of conduct, all mistakes of law could be looked at as mistakes of fact, and 
vice versa”.65 Others, like Simonds66 and Westen,67 defend that such a distinction is 
feasible. In any case, a closer look at the definition of any crime reveals that the actus reus 
is a compilation of factual and normative elements which are often not easy to isolate and 
classify. For example, section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, referred to above, 
establishes that “A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property 
belonging to another […]”. It might appear settled that “belonging to another” is a 
normative element, but is it equally certain that the concept of person is a normative 
concept as well? In some ways all the elements present in the definition of a crime are 
normative. Even the more empirical or descriptive elements of the actus reus are 
impregnated with some form of legal nuance.  So, not only is it difficult to ascertain which 
normative elements are relevant to mens rea, it is equally difficult to distinguish factual 
elements from legal ones. More about this distinction will be provided later in chapter 4. 
 
To constrain the number of legal elements present in the actus reus that could 
negate the mens rea requirement, courts have introduced imaginative headings like ‘error 
of civil law’ or ‘claim of right’. The former encapsulates those relevant circumstances 
related to forbidden actions belonging to the civil law, like “property belonging to another” 
																																																								
64 S. Kadish and S. Schulhofer Criminal Law and its Processes  (2001) at p599 
65 L. Alexander “Facts, Law, Exculpations, and Inculpation: Comments on Simons” Criminal Law and 
Philosophy (2009) 3:243 
66 K. W. Simons “Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and Defending the Distinction” 
Criminal Law and Philosophy (2009) 3:213 
67 P. K. Westen “Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2008) 
5:523–565 
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or “the status of being married”.68 When the definition of a crime includes normative 
elements regulated in the civil law and the citizen is mistaken about its scope, if the 
element negates the men rea requirement, the citizen is exculpated.  A “claim of right”, on 
the other hand, is raised where a person holds an honest belief of legal entitlement. It 
usually applies in relation to property offences where the mistake negates the fault 
element. It is explicitly excluded as a possible defence in those offences where force is 
used.69 Thus, for example, the citizen who honestly believes that he is entitled to retain the 
property of his debtor (when he is not) could plead such an error of law defence, based on 
his mistaken ‘claim of right’. Obviously, the extent of when a claim of right can be used is 
limited by the nature of the crime, and thus it may be used as a defence to theft but not, for 
example, violent crimes like assault. 
 
These imaginative exceptions have the advantage of corresponding with the 
predisposition of criminal courts generally for being more lenient with civil mistakes than 
criminal ones. It is probably for that reason that these standards, although lacking solid 
principled or theoretical arguments, have been historically successful among criminal 
courts: probably because they offer an apparent fair solution to the case in front of them. 
However, the fact is that the definition of a crime often requires references to other sectors 
of the legal system (civil, administrative…). In fact, a definition of an offence could 
include a description of any concept incorporated in its definition (regressus ad infinitum). 
Therefore, to make the existence of the mens rea element dependent on the way or manner 
the legal prohibition was regulated or clarified by the lawmaker seems inconsistent, 
ambiguous and indefensible. 
 
In fact, the courts themselves have been erratic in the application of these headings 
or standards. In Morrisette v United States70 the defence of error of law was accepted. In 
this case, a scrap metal dealer removed apparently abandoned bomb casings from a 
government bombing range. The scrap dealer sold the scrap material and later was charged 
with knowingly converting government property (an obvious mistake of civil law). The 
accused claimed that he believed the casings were abandoned. The Supreme Court held 
that the accused must be proven to have had knowledge of the facts that made the 
conversion a crime: in other words, they required knowledge or awareness that the 
property was not abandoned by its owner. Justice Jackson, discussing the issue in terms of 																																																								
68 See Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 
69 See Australian Criminal Code ss 9.5(3)  
70 342 US 246,247 (1952) 
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mens rea, reaffirmed the importance of intent in Anglo American criminal law 
emphasising that a crime is “constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind 
and evil-doing hand”.71 Thus, the absence of an evil-meaning mind should result in the 
absence of a crime. However, in Cooper v Simmonds72 the false belief of a boy that the 
death of his master relieved him from the obligations of his apprenticeship (clearly a civil 
law mistake) did not exculpate him from the crime of unlawfully absenting himself from 
his apprenticeship. 
 
1.3 Traditional rationales to justify the irrelevance of normative false beliefs73 
 
Regardless of the manifest inequality and unfairness created by treating equally 
those who break the law aware of a prohibition and those who break the law unknowingly, 
those citizens who act with false normative beliefs are not granted a defence if criminal 
intention is not affected. This understanding is summarized in the aforementioned totemic 
maxim “ignorantia iuris neminem excusat”, considered to be a fundamental principle of 
common law jurisdictions. Numerous justifications have historically been provided in 
defence of the irrelevance of the citizen’s knowledge about his legal position74 as grounds 
for a defence. The most extensive, oldest and influential argument to justify this rule rests 
in the presumption of universal knowledge of the law. This argument has been defended in 
common law jurisdictions for centuries75 and was categorically defended by Blackstone in 
the following terms: “every person of discretion […] is bound and presumed to know the 
law”.76 The foundation for this argument lies in the affirmation of the affinity and 
correspondence between morality (moral wrongs) and criminal law. For the promoters of 
this presumption, law reflects the mores of the community and thus it should be presumed 
that its citizens know what the law forbids and allows within their jurisdiction. This 
presumption of knowledge becomes a citizenship duty to know the law which presupposes 
at least negligence in the citizen if unfulfilled. However, the doctrine of universal 
knowledge of the law has been criticised since its inception at the end of the nineteen-
century by both theorists and judges. John Austin described the presumption of universal 
																																																								
71 342 US 246 (1952) 
72 (1862) 26 JP 486 
73 For an exhaustive historical analysis see D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry (2016) at 
p69 ss 
74 See C. Ronald “Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Re-examined” WM & Mary L Rev (1976) 17:671, p685. 
L. Hall and S.J. Seligman “Mistake of Law and Mens Rea” U. Chi. L. Rev.(1941) 8:648-651 
75 See M. Hale Pleas of The Crown 42 (1680); In Scottish tradition see Hume, I , 25  
76 W. Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769) Book 4, Chapter 2  
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knowledge as “notoriously and ridiculously false”,77 and the Judge J. Fitzjames suggested 
that the presumption sounded like “a forged release to a forged bond”.78Commentators of 
the first half of the twentieth-century have also criticised the rule, proclaiming the 
presumption as “indefensible as a statement of fact”79 or simply “absurd”.80 However, 
contemporary scholars, like the influential Ashworth, have defended the argument that 
citizens have a (non absolute) duty to know the law. 81 An extensive critical (and 
alternative) approach to this purported duty to know the law will be provided at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
 Another unpersuasive, utilitarian justification for the irrelevance of false 
beliefs was introduced by Blackstone,82 reaffirmed by Holmes83 and ratified by Perkins: 
84the maxim promotes deterrence and encourages knowledge of the law among citizens. 
According to Holmes admitting the defence of ignorantia iuris “would encourage 
ignorance where the law maker has determined to make man know and obey”85 However, 
these arguments, as Husak points out, could be “marshalled against any excuse, each of 
which can be thought to erode the deterrent efficacy of the penal law”.86 Indeed, the 
conviction of blameless citizens for the instrumental reason of increasing deterrence would 
contravene the Kantian “end-in-itself” categorical imperative not to treat human beings as 
a means to an end, but rather as an end in themselves.87 
 
Professor Austin introduced another new procedural and consequentialist 
justification to support the rationale of the rule: the difficulty of proof. Ascertaining a 
citizen’s knowledge or ignorance would involve courts investigating and solving insoluble 
and impracticable problems.88 The objection of Professor Austin highlighted the obvious 
problems inherent in interpreting the knowledge of the law of the citizen in the moment of 
action. The weak theoretical foundation of this argument confronts the strength of its 																																																								
77 J. Austin Lectures in Jurisprudence (1885) at p482 
78 J. Fitzjames History of Criminal Law in England  (1883) p95  
79 L. Hall and S.J. Seligman “Mistake of Law and Mens Rea” U. Chi. L. Rev. (1941) 8648-51 at 646 
80 E. Keedy “Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law” Harvard Law Review (1908) 22(75):80  
81 See A. Ashworth and J Horder Principles of criminal law (2013) at p220. Also A. Ashworth “Ignorance of 
the Criminal law and Duties to Avoid it” MLR (2011) 74:1; R. Goodin “An Epistemic Case for Legal 
Moralism” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.  (2010) 30:615 
82 W. Blackstone Commentaries (1769) pp45-46 
83 O. Holmes The Common Law (1881) 79, 144  
84 M. Perkins “Ignorance and Mistake in Crimininal Law” U. PA. L. REV. (1939) 88(35):40-41 
85 O. Holmes The Common Law (1881) at p48 
86 D.Husak Ignorance of Law: A philosophical Inquiry (2016) at p78 
87 I. Kant Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals (2007) at p90 
88 J. Austin Lectures on Jurisprudence (1869) p498-500. See also L. Hall and S.J. Seligman “Mistake of Law 
and Mens Rea” U. Chi. L. Rev. (1941) 8:648-51 at p647 
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practicality. Ignorance is no more or less difficult to prove than other concepts, as for 
example error of fact. Holmes disproved this proof/procedural objection asserting “If 
justice requires the fact to be ascertained, the difficulty of doing so is no ground for 
refusing to try … Now that parties can testify, it may be doubted whether a man’s 
knowledge of the law is any harder to investigate than the many questions which are gone 
into ”.89 Facilitating this procedural issue raised by Austin, Holmes proposed a shift in the 
burden of proof: “The difficulty, such as it is, would be met by throwing the burden of 
proving ignorance on the law-breaker”.  Nevertheless, the fear that an exculpatory 
ignorance of the law defence could place the “administration of justice under arrest”90 
explains the firm defence of the maxim that judges have maintained, regardless of its 
arbitrariness and unfairness.  
 
Finally, it is relevant to point out that different approaches towards the principle of 
legality have produced divergent outcomes towards the justification of the maxim. Hall, 
for example, argues that the introduction of the defence would contravene the legality 
principle. According to this argument, if the defence were admitted, “whenever a 
defendant in a criminal case thought the law was thus and so, he is to be treated as though 
the law was thus and so, […] but such a doctrine would contradict the essential requisites 
of a legal system, the implications of the principle of legality”.91 In contrast, Ashworth 
defends the introduction of a substantive defence of ignorance of the law, claiming, “[…] 
the element of notice or fair warning is seen as crucial to criminal liability”.92 This 
adequate argument supports, for example, the reason retroactivity is a salient principle 
stemming from the legality principle, because an accused cannot be convicted for conduct 
that was not a crime at the time the action was performed. A similar argument has been 
defended by Meese and Larkin who pointed out that “the government must supply 
everyone with ‘fair notice’ of forbidden conduct before someone can be criminally 
punished for having committed it”.93 However, the emphasis by Ashworth and Meese (as 
well as others like Gardner)94 on the importance “not to be ambushed” by the law of fair 
notice in the attribution of criminal responsibility could nevertheless be short-sighted. The 
relevance of the legality principle here is not about the unfairness of being punished 																																																								
89 O. Holmes The Common Law (1881) at p45 
90 J. Austin Lectures on Jurisprudence (1869); L. Hall and S.J. Seligman “Mistake of Law and Mens Rea” U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 8:648-51 (1941) at p483 
91 J. Hall “Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law” Indiana Law Journal (1957) 33:1-44 at p19 
92 A. Ashworth “Ignorance of Criminal Law and Duties to Avoid it” Modern Law Review (2011) 74(1):1-26 
93 E. Meese and P. Larking “Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defence” Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology. (2012) 102(3):725-784 at p763 
94 J. Gardner “Introduction” in H.L.A. Hart Punishment and Responsibility (2008) 
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without notice or warning. The significance here (and connection with the non-
retroactivity principle) comes from the fact that only citizens who have been warned or 
informed about the illegality of particular conduct can take the prohibition or mandate of 
the legal norm into consideration in their deliberation process before acting. More about 
this argument will be provided in the following chapters.95 
 
1.4 False normative belief as a substantive defence. 
 
The restrictive excusatory effects (in policy terms) of the recognition of knowledge 
of criminal law as part of the mens rea, has made it necessary to identify other exculpatory 
principles, in terms of fairness or justice to the accused, to mitigate the severity and 
draconian consequences such an approach brings. For centuries, the tough rule was strictly 
applied, irrespective of how reasonable or even feasible it was for the citizen to know that 
their conduct was forbidden by the criminal law. In Esop96, for example, an ottoman native 
was charged and convicted with the sexual offence of buggery committed on board of an 
English ship. It was irrelevant for the conviction that the conduct was not an offence in his 
own country and, being a foreigner, he had no reasons to think that English criminal law 
would forbid this kind of sexual conduct.  Arguments about fair warning have also been 
regularly ignored. For example, pleas of ignorance of a newly passed statute breached 
while the accused was on high seas and beyond communication with England, rendering it 
impossible that any notice of the statute’s passing could have reached the vessel, have been 
systematically disallowed.97 
 
As pointed out above, some statutes include a defence of ignorance of law within 
their wording. In these cases, the lawmaker expressly guarantees that criminal 
responsibility cannot be attributed to the citizen that held false normative beliefs in the 
moment of action. However, this legislative technique of requiring express awareness or 
knowledge of the law in some crimes and not in others is inconclusive and perhaps unfair. 
It seems that the rationale of such drafting recourses responds more to legislative caprice 
than to substantial, principled, theoretical arguments. Other legislative solutions have been 
offered, for example, by the Model Penal Code98 or the Statutory Instruments Act 196499 
in cases of poor warning or notice to the citizen. Defences grounded in this legislative 																																																								
95 See chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis 
96 R v Esop (1386) 7 C&P 456 
97 R v Bailey (1800) Russ & Ry 1 
98 s 2.04 
99 s 3 (2) 
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technique apply in two conceptually different fields. The first refers to those cases where a 
statutory instrument or statutory norm has not been appropriately publicised or otherwise 
reasonably made available before the alleged conduct took place.  The second applies in 
situations of reliance on an erroneous official statement about the law. More about these 
two exceptions to the irrelevance of normative mistakes will be said in the next section.  
  
Legal philosophers, convinced that capricious drafting or legislative techniques 
cannot provide a principled solution to the severity that results from an implacable rule that 
excludes excusatory effect for false normative beliefs, have recently attempted to find legal 
and policy arguments to support an affirmative case for a general defence of excusable 
ignorance of the la 100  Furthermore, the process of over-criminalization and the 
proliferation of regulatory law (also known as mala prohibita) compel scholars and courts 
to provide a fair and workable substantive defence. Two lines of argument have been 
proposed by legal theorists to allow the accused to raise a mistake of law substantive 
defence (excuse). Ashworth in the United Kingdom and Meese and Larkin in the United 
States lead the first line of thought founded in the principle of legality. A second one, 
resembling the German “culpability theory”, is proposed by Husak modelling a concept of 
“gradual” culpability.  
 
Thus, as mentioned above, legal philosophers and courts have attempted to find 
arguments to support and defend the case for a substantive defence of mistake or ignorance 
of the law. The first proposal that provides an excuse to citizens who act unaware of the 
illegality of their conduct, grounds its argument in the principle of legality. More 
specifically, the foundations of this theory headed by Ashworth rests on three pillars 
related to this principle: first, a purported “duty to know the law” or to take reasonable 
steps to discover the law; 101 secondly, the “void for vagueness doctrine” and finally the 																																																								
100 A.T.H. Smiths “Error and Mistake of Law in Anglo-American Criminal Law” Common Law World 
Review (1985) 14:3-32; P. Matthews “Ignorance of the Law is not Excuse?” L.S. (1983) 3:174-192; D. 
O’Connor “Mistake and Ignorance in Criminal Cases” M.L.R. (1976) 32:644-662; B.R. Grace 
“Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law” Columbia Law Review (1986) 86:1932-1416; D. Husak 
“Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizens” L.S. (1994) 14:105-115; D. Husak and A. von Hirsch 
“Culpability and Mistake of Law” in Action and Value in Criminal Law (S. Shute, J, Gardner and J. 
Horder (eds) (1996) pp157-174. D. Husak “Mistake of Law and Culpability” Criminal Law and 
Philosophy (2010) 4(2):135-159. D. Husak “Ignorance of law: A philosophical inquiry” (2016). A. 
Ashworth “Ignorance of the criminal law, and duties to avoid it” Modern Law Review (2011) 74(1):1-
26. E. Meese and P. Larking “Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defence” Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology (2012) 102(3):725-784; R.G Singer “The Proposed Duty to Inquiry as Affected by Recent 
Criminal Law Decisions in United States Supreme Court” Buffalo criminal Law Review (1999-2000) 
3:701-754  
101 See A. Ashworth “Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it” Modern Law Review (2011) 
74:1; A. Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (1991) at pp220-221 
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“fair notice principle”. The first pillar affirms that we should expect citizens to make a 
reasonable effort to know the law. Thus, it is correct and consistent with the principle of 
legality to impose a duty in the citizenship to know the law.102 This argument (which will 
be analytically criticised later in this chapter) corresponds with the presumption of 
universal knowledge of the law defended by Blackstone. Ashworth, a defender of this 
purported duty to know the law, suggests however that this duty should not be absolute for 
two reasons. Firstly, the lawmaker needs to have flexible standards of legality103 and as 
result the law sometimes needs to be uncertain.  The span of this standard is left to the 
judges a posteriori criteria, so the citizen only has to be aware of the practical scope of the 
norm, employing a “reasonably foreseeable test”. Secondly, Ashworth affirms that the duty 
should not be absolute because the state sometimes does not live up to its obligation to 
make a new criminal norm knowable to the public.104 In these cases, some exceptions to 
the duty should be provided to preserve the respect for individual autonomy; the defence 
would be one of them.  
 
The counterpart of the duty to know the law doctrine, as mentioned above, implies 
that the state has also a duty to make the criminal law reasonably accessible, certain and 
prospective. This duty finds its operative force in the other two pillars, the “void for 
vagueness” doctrine and the “fair notice” principle illustrated above. The legality principle 
recognized that the criminal law couldn’t be retroactive. A criminal norm enacted after the 
performance of previously legal conduct cannot serve as a foundation for criminal 
punishment because the citizen needs to understand clearly what the law expects from him. 
Founded on this argument, a pre-existing criminal norm cannot be the basis for punishment 
if the citizen cannot understand clearly what the norm prohibits or permits. Criminal law 
cannot be as ambiguous or vague as to prevent the citizen from ascertaining the boundaries 
between prohibited and permitted. This void for vagueness doctrine can clearly be equated 
with the due process doctrine in the American case Connally v Gen. Constructio. Co,105 
when it was held that a criminal norm “ […] which forbids or requires the doing of an act 
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process”. The American 
Supreme Court later stated that, “to enforce such a vague statute would be like sanctioning 
																																																								
102 A. Ashworth “Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it” Modern Law Review (2011) 74:1 at 
p5 
103 A. Ashworth Principles of criminal law (1991) at pp220-221 
104 Ibd 221 
105 269 US 385,391 (1926) 
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the practice of Caligula, who published the law, but it was written in a very small hand, 
and posted in a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it”.106 
 
The “void for vagueness” doctrine introduces the third central pillar of this theory 
to support an excusable defence of mistake of law: the “fair notice” principle. Under 
retributive grounds, criminal conviction can only be imposed when the state is able to 
prove the blameworthiness of the accused.107 This rationale underlines that to do so, the 
state must supply everyone with fair warning in advance about what is criminally wrong, 
so that people can plan their lives avoiding criminal conduct. Fair notice has been defended 
as essential for criminal responsibility by Gardner who emphasizes that “according with 
the ideal of the rule of law, the law must be such that those subject to it can reliably be 
guided by it, either to avoid violating it or built the legal consequences of having violated it 
… People must be able to find out what the law is and to factor it into their practical 
deliberations. The law must avoid taking people by surprise, ambushing them, or putting 
them into conflict with its requirements in such a way as to defeat their expectations and 
frustrating their plans.108 
 
The extension of the principle of legality explained above ‘cuts both ways’ 
according with Ashworth. It imposes a duty in citizens to know the law and a counterpart 
duty on the state to carry out its legislative functions in a prospective, certain and 
accessible manner in order to provide citizens with the information they need about the 
ambit of the existing criminal law. The puzzling question to resolve in this theory is 
establishing when the duty imposed on citizens could undermine their individual 
autonomy, as well as delimitating what consequences the ignorance should have when a 
fair warning has not been provided by the state, because citizens should not be 
automatically excused every time they are not properly warned. The solution according to 
Ashworth is that ignorance excuses only when reasonable. In this way, the excuse only 
operates when the state has not sufficiently informed citizens about the way to organize 
their conduct, avoiding breaking the law but allowing also exceptions to the individual 
autonomy principle.  In similar terms, Meese and Larking109 claim that the defence would 
exculpate only when the mistake was reasonable but, for them, reasonableness relates to 																																																								
106 Screws v United States, 325 US 91,96  (1945) 
107 E. Meese and P. Larking “Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defence” Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology (2012) 102 (3):725-784 at p764 
108 J Gardner “Introduction” in H.L.A. Hart Punishment and Responsibility (2008) 
109 E. Meese and P. Larking “Reconsidering the mistake of law defence” Journal of criminal law and 
criminology (2012) 102(3):725-784 at p763 
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morally wrong action (mala in se crimes). People may not know of the technical details of 
such crimes, but they are aware of the general prohibition. As Yochum highlights, “[…] 
Evil is fundamentally known…. Ignorance that murder is a crime is no excuse…”.110 
 
Husak defends the second proposal for an excusable defence of ignorance of law. 
In a paper published in 2010 he was aware that recognizing knowledge of the criminal law 
as part of the mens rea element would be a major departure from the common criminal law 
tradition. In this work he proposes an exculpatory alternative to mistake of law which 
explores the relationship between culpability and mistake of fact. He recognized that his 
theory lacked a principled explanation for his “intuitions”. Furthermore, he even 
recognized that the outcomes of his proposal would be highly impractical and “could prove 
to be a legislative and prosecutorial nightmare”. 111  Nonetheless, he insists that an 
exculpatory solution for mistake of law should be achieved not by a simple yes-or-no 
judgement, but by reflecting on the degrees of culpability previously incorporated into the 
elements of the offence. He presumes that mistakes of fact and of law should be treated 
symmetrically. Husak starts his argument defining culpability as “the conditions under 
which persons should be blamed for their wrongful conduct”112 in a clear presumption that 
the content of criminal law should conform to morality. After that, he analyses the 
effective relationship between culpability and mistake of fact in order to deploy and model 
a parallelism between his theory of culpability and mistake of law. His proposals are 
peculiar because he attempts to build his arguments on the understanding that mistake of 
fact is not resolved in the culpability element, but rather by negating mens rea. For that 
reason, mistake of fact is consensually categorized as a failure of proof defence owing to 
the accused’s lack of mens rea required in the definition of the crime.  
 
Fleshing out his arguments, Husak suggests that in committing a crime, different 
degrees of culpability could arise: the defendant may have purposely violated the law, or 
he knew he was violating the law, or he was reckless, or negligent, or unaware of the risk, 
or even strictly liable.113 After identifying these culpable states, he concludes that in order 
to attribute exculpatory force to error of fact we need to identify: what elements the 
mistake is about; the level of culpability required to satisfy this element; and the degree of 
																																																								
110 M.D. Yochum “The death of a Maxim: Ignorance of the Law is no Excuse (Killed by Money, Guns and a 
Little Sex)” St Johns’s J Leg. Com. (1999)13:635-636  
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culpability involved in the mistake.114 Finally, he proposes that mistake of law should be 
modelled and structured reflecting this archetype. What makes Husak’s theory highly 
impractical is that the exculpatory significance of ignorance of law must be incorporated 
into the elements of offences. He stresses that it is not about multiplying the number of 
offences, “but decreasing the severity of the punishment imposed on defendants who 
commit crimes with lower degrees of culpability about their awareness of the wrongdoing”. 
115 This solution would involve changes to the substantive law to reflect judgements of 
relative or gradual levels of culpability. Therefore, says Husak, for each type of mistake 
the legislature should modify (or create additional offences) “to reflect the degree to which 
different kinds of offenders are culpable”.116  
 Husak	has	recently	published	a	monograph	about	error	of	law.117	In	this	book,	most	of	his	 initial	arguments	have	now	been	modified.	He	now	defends	the	German	approach	that	the	“mens	rea	of	criminal	offences	should	be	constructed	to	require	not	only	knowledge	of	the	relevant	facts	but	also	knowledge	of	the	applicable	law”.118	His	argument	 rests	 squarely	 on	 the	 retributivist	 tradition	 and	 for	 that	 reason	 the	backbone	of	 his	 thesis	 is	 based	on	his	 account	of	moral	 responsibility.	 	As	 a	 result,	when	it	comes	to	evaluating	how	harshly	a	citizen	who	acts	 in	 ignorance	of	 the	 law	should	be	punished,	what	 is	most	 relevant	 according	 to	Husak119	is	 not	whether	or	not	 the	 citizen	 knows	 the	 law	 but	 rather	 if	 he	 was	 unaware	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	conduct	was	morally	wrong.	Another	relevant	argument	 in	Husak’s	new	book	 is	his	claim	 that	 criminal	 law	 should	 treat	 ignorance	 of	 law	 and	 ignorance	 of	 fact	symmetrically.	In	fact,	Husak	proposes	replicating	the	rules	and	doctrines	that	apply	to	error	of	fact	to	mistake	of	law	as	well.	Thus,	the	criminal	law	would	no	longer	have	difficulty	handling	or	coping	with	 the	puzzling	question	of	whether	a	given	mistake	needs	 to	 be	 categorized	 as	 error	 of	 fact	 or	 law.	 Five	 of	 the	 six	 chapters	 of	Husak’s	book	develop	the	argument	that	we		“are	responsible	agents	by	virtue	of	our	ability	to	respond	to	moral	reason.”120		As	a	result,	we	can	be	responsible	(blameworthy)	only	when	we	intentionally	disregard	the	moral	reasons	against	acting	in	the	way	we	do.	He	 acknowledges	but	 contests	 the	modern	 account	 of	moral	 responsibility	 recently																																																									
114 Ibd at p146 
115 Ibd at 156 
116 Ibd at 157 
117 D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A philosophical Inquiry (2016) 
118 Ibd at p2 
119 Ibd at p31 
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33	proposed	by	philosophers	who,	like	Zimmerman121	and	Rosen,122	base	their	position	on	a	“quality	of	will“	argument	of	moral	responsibility.	123	These	philosophers	defend	the	idea	that	a	citizen	is	responsible	not	when	she	acts	against	her	judgment	of	what	morality	requires	but	rather	when	her	action	expresses	an	attitude	or	judgement	that	gives	 insufficient	 weight	 to	 moral	 reasons.	 One	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 Husak´s	account	of	moral	responsibility	is	that	a	terrorist	who	willingly	kills	innocent	people	while	mistakenly	believing	 that	killing	 innocent	people	 is	morally	correct	should	be	excused.124		
 
But beyond this “Achilles heel”125of his theory of moral responsibility that is 
recognized by Husak himself several times, 126 another weakness of his argument is his 
claim that mistake of law is a surrogate for mistake of morality. He argues, “[…] the true 
normative basis of exculpation is ignorance of the morality underlying law, and not 
ignorance of law itself”.127 This proposal comes from his overall conception of statutory 
law as a surrogate of morality.128 He contends that the main reason we use legislation is to 
avoid legal officials remaining uncertain about our moral duties, and because to directly 
use morality to attribute liability and punishment would be divisive and uncertain. It seems 
rather inconsistent that a monograph about mistake of law makes such assumptions 
without an extensive discussion or debate of this central argument in his theory. 
 
1.5 A procedural (rather than substantive) defence for false normative beliefs 
 
A final specific category of false normative beliefs is largely recognized in those 
cases where the citizen mistakenly commits a crime induced by an official or civil servant. 
This defence is only a solution to the subset of cases where the accused held a false belief 
after seeking advice about the law, and it has received massive support from 
commentators. 129  Courts in the common law jurisdiction have also used different 
																																																								
121 M. Zimmerman Ignorance and Moral Obligation (2014) 
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procedural mechanisms130 to recognize and apply the defence in practice: in Scotland it has 
been considered a substantive defence.131 In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada132 does 
not recognize reliance on official advice as a substantive defence but rather as a stay of 
judicial proceedings. Finally, in English courts133 it is dealt with as an abuse of process.134   
 
The theoretical rationale for this procedural defence is outlined by Ashworth as a 
purported fidelity to the legal values that form part of a sensible political morality with 
integrity.135 It would be unfair to the accused to be tried as a result of misconduct 
generated by the state. This kind of unfairness would offend the court’s sense of justice 
and propriety.136 Ashworth offers three arguments for recognizing the claim.137 The first 
stresses the reasonableness of the accused’s conduct: the state should recognize and value 
as good and welcome behaviour situations where citizens seek and follow official 
guidance.  The second argument connects the defence with the principles of legality and 
fair warning as explained in the previous section. The last argument condenses the 
procedural nature of this claim. When officials of the state endorse or authorize a particular 
view about the law, it is unfair to later bring a prosecution based on a different approach to 
that law. In such cases an estoppel defence should prevent the state from prosecuting any 
citizen who was informed and advised erroneously. For this reason it is considered a 
procedural defence because in cases of induced official error no prosecution should be 
allowed. 
 
Other authors, to justify the defence, appeal to the Lockean-Rousseaunian “social 
contract” argument that imposes rights and obligations on citizens and state alike.138 The 
social contract argument implies that both sides ought to fulfil their part of the contract. 																																																																																																																																																																							
Law Review (1993) 565-588; J.Parry “Culpability, Mistake and Official Interpretation of the Law” 
American journal of Criminal Law (1997) 25:1-78 
130 Procedural guidelines have been produced to encourage the Prosecution Services to avoid prosecution in 
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edit), para 5.10 (c) 
131 William Roberts v Local Authority of Burgh of Inverness (1889) 17 R (J) 19 
132 R v Jorgensen [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55 
133 In a number of previous cases the defence was ruled out, see Surrey County Council v Battersby [1965] 2 
Q B 194; Cambridgeshire and the isle od Ely County Council v Rust [1972] 1QB 426; R v Bowsher 
[1973] Crim. L. R. 373; R v Arrowsmith (1975) 1 QB 678. 
134 Postermobile  v Brent LCB [1998] Crim. L.R. 435 
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136 A. Powell  “Abuse of Process in Criminal Cases” NZLJ (2006) at p386 
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The state cannot expect citizens to fulfil their duties if they have not made the criminal law 
knowable. This claim connects the “fair warning” argument and the principle of individual 
fairness. Where the citizen has fulfilled their part of the bargain its sounds 
disproportionately severe to prosecute him for a mistake that the state is responsible for. 
Denying excusatory consequences to such mistakes would clearly weaken social 
confidence in the advice that the officials give to the citizens. 
 
As aforementioned, the judicial and legislative responses in common law 
jurisdictions to such a defence have tended to approach this issue differently from the 
theoretical argument just discussed. The big exception is the Model Penal Code that 
provides for a partial defence of officially induced error of law.139 The defence is available 
when a citizen relies on advice or information which presents an erroneous statement of 
the law, provided by a body or official responsible for the interpretation or enforcement of 
the law. The Code only requires that the reliance should be reasonable. In England, the 
court responses have been contradictory not only in the extension of the defence but about 
its effects. In Postermobile v Brent London Borough Council, 140  a prosecution for 
displaying artefacts without planning consent, the Division Court held that advice provided 
by an “inexperienced” official should have the effect of staying the proceedings. The 
argument was that citizens should be able to rely on the statements provided by officials. 
The court argued that although the official who provided the advice was probably 
inexperienced, he was from the planning department and therefore in a position of 
authority that the accused could rightly rely on their advice. In Arrowsmith141 the accused 
was charged with endeavouring to seduce a member of Her Majesty’s forces (distributing 
leaflets) from his duty or allegiance to Her Majesty.142 She defended herself alleging that a 
letter she had received from the Director of the Public prosecution would have led any 
reasonable person to believe that the distribution of leaflets did not breach the Incitement 
to Disaffection 1934 Act. In fact, the Court of Appeal rejected that the excusatory effects 
of induced official error should result in the accused’s acquittal. Instead, Lawton LJ 
recommended that the induced error should be relevant to sentence, suggesting a 
mitigation solution for an officially induced error of law.  
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The high Court in Australia, in Ostrowski v Palmer,143 has recently rejected the 
defence of officially induced error. In circumstances where a fisherman was provided with 
manifestly faulty information about the fishing of rock lobster by the responsible state 
government department, the court nevertheless resolved that recognizing the defence 
would undermine the rule enacted in section 22 of the Criminal Code that determines that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse. The cited section provides that ignorance of the law 
cannot afford any excuse that would constitute an offence unless knowledge of the law by 
an offender is expressly declared to be an element of the offence. In New Zealand, the 
Crimes Act 1961 does not recognize any error of law as a defence. Section 25 of the Act 
provides that “the fact that an offender is ignorant about the law is not an excuse for any 
offence committed by him”. Nonetheless on a couple of occasions New Zealand courts 
have shown some flexibility to the harshness of the rule.144  On other occasions, New 
Zealand courts have recognized a diffident form of exculpation and recommended 
discharging the appellant because the police had previously tolerated instances of the 
activity performed by the accused.145 In one case, the court in obiter recognized that a 
proper instrument to cope with cases of induced official error could be the doctrine of 
abuse of process as a result of the way in which officials dealt with the accused prior to 
charging him.146 
 
Finally, it merits mentioning the way the Canadian judiciary has been dealing with 
officially induced error. On paper, section 19 of the Criminal Code categorically sanctions 
that ignorance of law is not a statutory defence. Also, Section 8(3) only preserves those 
common law defences not altered or inconsistent with the criminal code, so ignorance 
clearly is not one of them. In short, both, common and statutory law provide few options to 
recognize the excusable effects of ignorantia iuris. However, Canadian courts have been 
very keen and responsive to those cases where the citizen has been mislead by the state. 
The Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario Court of Appeal have been receptive to 
recognising the defence as early as the mid-1980s. The Supreme Court in MacDugal147 and 
the Ontario Court in Cancoil Thermal Corporation148 allowed the defence when the 																																																								
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accused had reasonably relied on the erroneous opinion of an official who was responsible 
for the administration and enforcement of the law. Later, in the mid-1990s the decision 
held in Jorgensen149 provided a turning point in the recognition of induced error of law in 
Canada. The court endorsed the arguments highlighted previously by Ashworth 
theoretically comparing this excuse with entrapment, because in both cases “the accused 
has done nothing to entitle him to an acquittal, but the state has done something which 
disentitled it to a conviction.150 This statement in Jorgensen was thereafter affirmed in 
Levis v Tetreault.151 In this case, Bel J ratified Lamer CJC’s obiter statement and held that 
officially induced error constituted a legitimate exception to the exclusionary rule that 
ignorance of law is not defence, on a procedurally similar basis to entrapment and, as a 
result, the accused would be entitled to a procedural remedy in the form of a stay of 
proceedings rather than an acquittal.152 
 
Despite the above, advice provided by a private lawyer is generally not accepted as 
a defence.153 The rationale is based on an extension of the argument that private lawyer’s 
advice would not be enough to stay proceedings as the information has not come from an 
official. The trend in this field reflects the Model Penal Code that only recognizes the 
defence when provided by a public officer or body.154 There is likely a strong reluctance to 
extend the defence to the advice of private lawyers on the basis of the potential for 
abuse.155 
 
1.6 Critique to the current proposals: burden versus duty to know the law 
 
 The solutions examined above have been unable to provide a strong case for a fair 
and principled solution. In fact, the rule that ignorance or mistake of law is not an excuse is 
now, aside from a few well-known exceptions,156 fully enshrined in our criminal law. 
Courts and scholars seeking to create such exceptions have been incapable of isolating 																																																								
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granted in Scotland in the case MacLeod v Hamilton 1965 S L T 305, that recognized the defence of 
mistake of law on the basis that the law in question (parking restrictions) had not been adequately 
publicized. 
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under which circumstances a false belief about the law should serve as a defence or as a 
mitigating factor to criminal responsibility.157 Instead, a set of exceptions have been 
proposed or applied without questioning the general principle. As shown above, these 
(often ingenious) unprincipled approaches taken towards the issue have resulted in the 
court reaching for any legal possibility to provide a solution which delivers a fair response 
on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The exculpatory consequences of the first solution we examined, based on a failure 
of proof defence were minimum from a policy point of view. As noted above, a belief that 
one is breaking the law is rarely an element of the mens rea, so false beliefs hardly ever 
exonerate the accused under this method. Furthermore, identification of normative 
elements which would negate intention could be problematic. Moving the excusatory 
effects of false beliefs to the actus reus proved just as complex, where it was difficult to 
segregate normative from factual elements in the description of the crime. We noted that 
the arbitrary and manifest inequality in policy terms of this restricted defence forced 
academics and courts to identify other legal fields which might offer a more charitable 
solution. 
 The	purported	general	but	circumscribed	excusable	ignorance	of	law	defence	proposed	 by	 Ashworth	 and	 Husak	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 principled	 argument	 either.		Husak	himself	recognizes	that	his	proposal	is	highly	impractical	due	to	the	countless	number	of	changes	 in	 the	substantive	 law	that	his	 theory	requires.	Modifying	every	offence	 in	order	 to	reflect	 the	degree	 to	which	different	 types	of	offender	would	be	culpable	is	impracticable.	But	his	most	vulnerable	argument	in	the	book	comes	from	his	 claim	 that	 “Mistakes	 of	 fact	 and	 mistakes	 of	 morality	 have	 the	 same	 effect	 in	practical	 reasoning”158.	 To	 defend	 this	 view,	 Husak	 who	 supports	 in	 this	 book	 a	Scanlonian	 reasons-responsiveness	 theory	 of	 responsibility159,	 holds	 that	 defects	 in	reason-responsiveness	 should	 be	 measured	 by	 the	 subjective	 standards	 of	 the	agent160,	no	matter	how	mistaken	his	standards	might	be.	As	a	result,	the	agent	who	does	not	give	reason-given	weight	to	a	moral	proposition	of	which	he	is	not	aware	is	as	blameless	as	the	agent	who	fails	to	respond	to	a	factual	proposition	he	ignores.	In	asserting	that	“no	rational	person	can	be	faulted	for	failing	to	respond	to	a	reason	he																																																									
157 D. Husak “Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizens” L.S. (1994) 14:105-115 at p105 
158 D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A philosophical Inquiry (2016) at  p153 
159 See Chapter 4.6 of this thesis. 
160 D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A philosophical Inquiry (2016) at  p153 
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39	is	 unaware	 applies	 to	 his	 conduct”,161	Husak	 endorses	 the	 argument	 that	when	 the	agent	does	 the	best	with	 the	 reasons	he	has,	we	 cannot	hold	him	morally	 culpable.	Only	 those	 agents	who	act	 against	 the	balance	of	moral	 reasons	 (akatric	 agents)	 of	which	they	are	aware	can	be	held	responsible.	As	a	result,	the	potential	terrorist	who	willingly	 kills	 innocent	 people	 mistakenly	 believing	 that	 killing	 innocent	 people	 is	morally	correct	is	not	responsible.			This	 subjectivist	 position,	 as	 Yaffe	 has	 recently	 pointed	 out162,	 is	manifestly	inappropriate	 and	 should	 be	 substituted	 by	 accuracy	 as	 the	 optimal	 (objective)	standard	 attributing	moral	 responsibility.	 If	 an	 agent	 gives	 in	 his	 deliberation	 less	reason-given	weight	to	a	fact	or	moral	proposition	than	it	actually	provides,	his	mode	of	transaction	with	reason	is	manifestly	defective163.	In	fact,	excuse	of	false	normative	beliefs	makes	sense	only	when	important	aspects	of	the	agent’s	mode	of	transaction	with	reasons	are	not	manifested	in	the	action,	although	we	thought	they	were.	Being	unaware	of	a	particular	fact,	the	agent	shows	that	his	tendency	to	add	or	discount	the	reason	 given	 force	 of	 this	 particular	 fact	 is	 not	 reflected	 in	 his	 action.	 Thus,	 his	behaviour	is	not	as	culpable	as	it	would	have	been	had	the	behaviour	indeed	reflected	that.	 The	 agent	 who	 gives	 less	 reason-given	 weigh	 to	 a	 moral	 proposition	 than	 it	actually	provides	is	fully	culpable.	As	will	be	argued	in	this	thesis,	the	reason	Husak’s	assertion	 is	 criticisable	 resides	 in	 the	 purported	 social	 function	 of	 any	 moral	appraisal.	Only	objective	standards	can	shelter	and	build	social	bonds.	It	is	only	under	an	objective	standard	that	social	expectations	about	mutually	respectful	interactions	between	people	can	be	evaluated.	Therefore,	the	agent	who	does	not	think	that	killing	innocents	is	criminal	is	fully	culpable	because	the	function	of	the	criminal	law	is	not	just	 to	 guide	 agent’s	 conduct	 but	 also,	 to	 build	 interpersonal	 trust,	 to	 protect	 the	expectations	of	other	citizens.	
 
A deeper consideration, however, was given to the second proposal of an excusable 
ignorance of law defence led by Ashworth.  First, Ashworth’s argument that only 
reasonable mistakes of law can excuse is purposeless without a proper theoretical 
discussion of the circumstances under which ignorance will be qualified as ‘reasonable’: a 
theoretical discussion that he did not deliver. Furthermore, upholding that reasonableness 																																																								
161 Ibs at p152 
162 G. Yaffe “Is Akrasia Necessary for Culpability? On Husak’s Ignorance of Law Criminal law and 
Philosophy (2018) 12:341-349 
163 Ibd at p344 
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depends only on whether the state fulfils its duty to make the law knowable to citizen looks 
intuitively insufficient. Perhaps there are cases where the law is made accessible but it is 
nevertheless reasonable to excuse the accused. On the other hand, the procedural defence 
defended by Ashworth for official reliance cases would exclude trust in private lawyers or 
academics. The massive number of legal norms in our modern societies make knowing all 
of them impracticable. For that reason even private lawyers need to specialise to be able to 
provide accurate information to their clients. Citizens should be encouraged to seek advice 
from private lawyers or agencies about the current legal framework. To exclude non-
official advice from the scope of the defence would undermine the necessary trust that 
citizens need to have in seeking legal advice. All of the sub-categories of ‘reliance on 
official advice’ will be discussed extensively in chapter 7 where the quality of the 
information that could exonerate the accused will be clarified.  
 
Finally, this chapter contributed to a debate held by Husak and Ashworth about a 
purported “duty to know the law”. Ashworth argues that there is a duty (although not 
absolute) on each citizen to take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the criminal law. 
Originally, he claimed “that it is wrong to be ignorant or mistaken about the law” and for 
that reason “a person might be (fairly) convicted despite ignorance of law”.164 More 
recently,165 Ashworth has fine-tuned his argument, referring to the rule of law principle, by 
suggesting that the citizen’s duty to take measures to know the criminal law should be 
contrasted and balanced against the state’s duty to adequately announce criminal laws. His 
explicit recognition of the citizen’s duty to know the law is tempered with the appreciation 
of reasonable exceptions. On the other hand, Husak has criticised the defence of such a 
duty.166 According to Husak, citizens who act under ignorance breach two distinct moral 
requirements: a general duty to know the law; and the obligation not to commit a crime. 167 
He argues that a duty to know the law does not exist arguing two deficiencies: first that it 
does not prove that the accused ignorant of the law is in any way blameworthy and 
secondly because even if some degree of blameworthiness could be established the duty 
fails to prove that “he is blameworthy to the appropriate extent”. 168 On the other hand, the 
argument that will be introduced below differs from both authors and suggests that there is 
not a duty, but rather a burden to know the law. 
 																																																								
164 A. Ashworth “Principles of Criminal Law” (1991) p299 
165 A. Ashworth “Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it” Modern Law Review (2011) 74-1. 
166 D. Husak “Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizens” L.S. (1994) 14:105-115 
167 Ibd at p109 
168 Ibd at p108 
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Husak appropriately highlights that Ashworth does not provide an account of the 
alleged “duty of citizenship”.169 Explanations as to its sources, if it applies equally to all 
citizens, or the extension of the duty have not been provided. Thus, as the lack of 
theoretical discussion about the extent of this claimed duty to know the law is remarkably 
missing in the legal or criminal literature,170 I shall try to expand on what a supposed duty 
to know the law would mean in legal terms. Allow me to name this proposition the ‘duty to 
know theory’. Presumably this theory would hold that the requirements of a duty to 
conform to the law are not satisfied when a citizen only avoids acting for a reason that 
looks subjectively prima facie illegal. Before acting, the citizen has a duty to find out 
whether or not his action is permitted or prohibited by the law. His doubts, if any, should 
be resolved by personal deliberation or by searching for information from reliable sources. 
Therefore, for this theory, it is the omission or transgression of this duty to search for 
information that makes the citizen responsible and excludes any legal relevance to 
ignorance iuris. This supposed theory is as flawed as any formula that demands a duty to 
search for legal information. Such a duty does not exist alongside a duty to avoid illegal 
acts and conform according to the law. The duty to avoid illicit conduct is entirely fulfilled 
when a citizen acts according to the law. The way the citizen has decided to conform is 
legally irrelevant. He could conform as a result of a thoughtful and meticulous search of 
legal information or just by chance or blindness if the search for information seems tedious 
to him.  
 
This leads us to the most inadequate consequence of this supposed theory: the 
irrelevance of potential information, particularly in the context where such information is 
manifestly incorrect.171 In this context, potential information is the evidence of illicitness 
that the citizen would have achieved if he had searched for advice in a reliable source. 
According to “the duty to know theory”, the transgression of the duty to become informed 
about the illicitness of conduct makes the citizen criminally responsible. The breach of the 
duty would be satisfied by a mere request for information, without any consideration for 
the suitability or correctness of the information that had been achieved from the enquiry. 
Under this theory, the citizen would be criminally responsible because he breached a 
purported duty, irrespective of whether or not the information provided could have helped 
																																																								
169 Ibd at p107 
170 From Blackstone to Ashworth it has been defended but remarkably never properly explained of discussed. 
171 For a Dogmatic German account of hypothetical information see H J. Rudolphi Unrechtsbewubtsein 
Unrechtsbewusstsein, Verbotsirrtum und Vermeidbarkeit des Verbotsirrtums (1969) at p194  
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him to conform to the law using his practical reasoning. This outcome of the theory is 
fallacious and makes “the duty to know theory” logically indefensible. This is because in 
those cases where the information relied upon is incorrect, the citizen can neither identify 
the illegality of his conduct in advance, nor can he conform with the law as his only duty. 
Therefore, logically, his conduct is not reproachable and the citizen should not be 
criminally responsible. 
 
The facts of the Scottish case William Roberts v Local Authority of Burgh of 
Inverness172 serve to explain and expand on this argument. In this case Mr Roberts was the 
tenant of a farm in Dell of Inshes (in the county of Inverness) and the owner and occupier 
of a dairy business within the burgh of Inverness. It was his practice, in the conduct of his 
business as a dairyman, to send his cows from his premises in the burgh of Inverness to his 
farm in Dell of Inshes during calving time, and bring them back after they had calved. On 
such occasions, Mr Roberts would apply to Mr Thomson, a veterinary surgeon with 
authority to grant the licenses required for the removal of cows under the Contagious 
Diseases (animals) act 1878, for the necessary documents to remove his cows. When Mr 
Roberts applied again for a declaration form, Mr Thomson informed him that, due to an 
amalgamation of the local authorities of the county and the burgh, a license was no longer 
necessary and cows could now be moved without licenses.  Neither, the Local Authority, 
the magistrates of the burgh, the clerk, the Chief constable of the county of Inverness or 
the police were aware of these contraventions of the regulations. In fact, it was at that time 
a common practice between dairymen to take their cows into grazing from the burgh to the 
county district in the mornings and return into the burgh in the evening without licenses. 
On the 18th July 1889 Mr Roberts moved one milch cow, apparently in good health, 
although it was later found to be afflicted with pleuro-neumonia, without any license 
authorizing the removal. He was accused and convicted of an offence against the cited 
regulation by the Sheriff-substitute. Later it was held on appeal that Mr Roberts had a 
lawful excuse and his conviction was set aside. 
 
It is beyond doubt that Mr Roberts, in moving the milch cow without license, 
contravened section 61 of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act 1878. What has to be 
ascertained next is whether Mr Roberts’ transgression of the norm was also reproachable 
or culpable. To do so, it is only required to verify whether or not Mr Roberts (a priori a 
																																																								
172 (1889) 17 R (J) 19 
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loyal law follower but a puzzled or ignorant man in Hart terms173 who is willing to do what 
is required) could have contemplated the norm as a reason for action and subsequently 
conformed to the norm requirement. This verification is totally independent of the fact that 
he could infringe any purported duty to know the law. At the end, Mr Roberts is a mere 
selector of reasons. According to both the ‘duty to know theory’ and the position held in 
this paper, the decision of the Court of Appeal was correct, but for different reasons. The 
discrepancy would arise and be apparent in the hypothetical scenario where Mr Roberts 
had not requested information from a reliable source and, with a false belief about the 
content of the law, he had contravened the legal norm contained in the cited act. In this 
hypothetical case, under the “duty to know theory” Mr Roberts should be made criminally 
responsible because he broke his duty to become informed about the law. On the other 
hand, his conduct is not reproachable or culpable because the only duty Mr Roberts has is 
to select the norm as a reason for action and act according to the norm. In this case, even if 
Mr Roberts had informed himself from a reliable source, he could neither have identified 
his conduct as anti-normative, nor could he have adapted his conduct accordingly. His 
conduct is, therefore, not culpable and consequently not to be viewed as criminally 
responsible.  
 
Conduct is reproachable when a citizen does not conform to the norm when he 
could. That is, the citizen has recognized and turned the norm into a reason for action. 
Even though the citizen transgresses a supposed duty to inform himself, from this it cannot 
be concluded that he could have known the norm and guided his behaviour accordingly. 
This case is illustrated by those potential cases where the citizen, even informing himself, 
would not have acknowledged the illegality of his action because the source they relied on 
was giving the wrong information. The gist of the reproach exists in the opportunity that 
all rational citizens have to act according to the norm. What would have been reproachable 
is if Mr Roberts had been given proper, accurate advice; he would have been informed that 
the movement of cows required a license. A contrario sensu the criminal reproach is 
excluded when Mr Roberts has been informed incorrectly. In this case, neither the citizen 
could have identified the illicitness of his conduct in advance and, subsequently, nor he 
could have conformed to the law using his practical reasoning. The verification that the 
omitted consultation would have pointed the author to the knowledge of the illicitness is a 
necessary requirement to be criminally responsible.  
 																																																								
173 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (1994) at p39 
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44	The	 obvious	 objection	 which	 could	 be	 argued	 by	 a	 defender	 of	 the	 duty	 to	know	the	law	would	be	that	a	normative	link	is	necessary	between	the	citizen	and	the	acquisition	of	 legal	knowledge.	Without	this,	 the	conduct	of	any	citizen	who	has	the	possibility	of	acquiring	knowledge	and	intentionally	omits	to	become	informed	would	not	be	culpable.	Any	dairyman	moving	cows	would	argue:	 “I	 could	have	known	 the	law	 but	 it	 was	 not	 my	 duty.	 	 My	 duty	 is	 to	 take	 the	 norm	 into	 account	 in	 my	deliberation	process	before	acting	and	conform	according	to	the	norm.	Unfortunately	I	 could	not	 take	 the	norm	 into	account	 in	my	practical	 reasoning	because	 the	norm	was	 unknown	 to	 me”.	 The	 objection	 is	 sound.	 We	 need	 a	 normative	 connection	between	the	citizen	and	the	acquirement	of	legal	knowledge.	However,	the	normative	link	should	not	be	understood	in	terms	of	a	duty,	but	as	a	burden.	Burdens,	a	familiar	concept	 in	 procedural	 criminal	 law,	 are	 an	 imperative	 established	 in	 favour	 of	 the	citizen	 obliged	 by	 it;	 it	 is	 an	 obligation	 that	 the	 citizen	 has	 with	 himself.	 For	 that	reason	 its	 fulfilment	 cannot	be	 required	by	 third	parties.	Only	 the	 citizen	 in	whose	favour	the	burden	was	established	can	require	its	fulfilment	-	nobody	else.	Of	course,	a	burden	can	be	 left	unfulfilled	but	 the	 legal	 consequence	 is	 that	 the	 citizen	cannot	dissent	about	the	inconvenience	thereby	caused.	In	terms	of	false	normative	beliefs,	the	citizen	does	not	have	a	duty	but	he	bears	a	burden	to	acquire	enough	knowledge	to	 ascertain	 that	 his	 conduct	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 legal	 norm(s).	 In	 the	hypothetical	case	where	the	citizen	does	not	fulfil	his	duty,	the	consequence	is	that	he	cannot	 invoke	his	 deficit	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	 defence	 in	 order	 to	 support	 his	 lack	 of	awareness	of	the	law.			In	 conclusion,	 an	 absolute	 or	 “reasonable"	 duty	 to	 know	 the	 law	 such	 as	Ashworth	 defends	 does	 not	 exist.	 The	 fundamental	 test	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 the	citizen	is	criminally	responsible,	regardless	of	his	lack	of	knowledge	of	the	norm,	is	to	assess	whether	or	not	the	citizen	had	fulfilled	their	burden	to	know	the	law.	This	is	to	ask	whether	the	the	citizen	had	a	responsibility	to	acquire	knowledge	about	the	legal	valuation	of	his	conduct	and	ignored	this	burden	by	neglecting	to	become	informed.	Only	 after	 that	 does	 the	 citizen	 become	 disqualified	 from	 pleading	 that	 he	 was	incapable	 of	 conforming	 with	 the	 law	 because	 he	 ignored	 the	 norm.	 Without	transgression	of	the	burden	to	acquire	knowledge	about	the	legality	of	the	conduct	it	is	 not	 possible	 to	 attribute	 criminal	 responsibility	 for	 any	 anti-normative	 conduct	performed	under	false	beliefs.	
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In any case, the burden to acquire knowledge is not unlimited or unrestricted 
otherwise the citizen would always be able to become informed from another source in a 
regressus ad infinitum. In the development of this thesis,174 the realm and boundaries of 
the burden will be “normatively” determined.175 What is relevant at this stage is that only 
the transgression of the burden to know the law disqualifies the citizen from utilising 
ignorantia iuris to exonerate his anti-normative conduct. Therefore, a contrario sensu, 
once the citizen has fulfilled the burden in the way demanded, ignorantia iuris releases the 
citizen of any purported criminal responsibility. How does this affect the receiving of 
potential information? How would this affect Mr Roberts if instead of a duty he had a 
burden to know the law? Apparently, the conclusion is identical: Mr Roberts could not 
plead a defence since having the burden to inform himself he did not do it. But the 
difference is made by the application of the ultra posse nemo obligatur176  and ad 
impossibilia nemo tenetur 177  principles. The existence of a burden presupposes the 
individual possibility of its performance. Therefore, the burden of avoiding mistakes ends, 
or perhaps does not even start, when the citizen is not able to obtain the correct knowledge. 
Mr Roberts has a priori the burden to become informed about the norms that control the 
movement of cows. But in the hypothetical case that he did not inform himself and the 
information had been manifestly incorrect and misleading, as it had been the case, he is 
qualified to use a defence to release him from criminal responsibility because the law 
cannot require from him to do (or know) the impossible.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted the patchy and unprincipled solutions that the current 
law for false normative and factual beliefs provides through the “mistake of law” and 
“mistake of fact” twofold structure. It has also raised the complications that this binary 
solution involves due to the difficulty of differentiating between factual and 
legal/normative elements present in the description of criminal conduct. After introducing 
the substantive and procedural solutions proposed by courts and scholars alike, this chapter 
has criticised and disapproved these alternative frameworks. Finally, the chapter has 																																																								
174 See chapter 7 
175 Factually it will always be possible to resort to another source. 
176 No one is obligated beyond what he is able to do. 
177 Nobody is obliged to do the impossible. 
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criticized the purported duty to know the law defended by Ashworth. Instead, the 
normative connection between the citizen and the acquirement of legal knowledge has 
been categorized as a burden, one that always implies the individual possibility of its 
performance. Thus, according with the ultra posse nemo obligatur principle, in those cases 
where it is not possible to access the legal knowledge about the illegality of the conduct, 
the burden cannot operate and consequently the citizen should be discharged. 
 
The conclusion, if the position held in this chapter is correct, is that regardless of 
the contemporary judicial and academic awareness about the deficient, inconclusive and 
unjust nature of the present law, and irrespective of the unquestionable disposition 
displayed by renowned legal philosophers and academics to delineate a fair and practical 
solution for false normative and factual beliefs, the response to this challenge so far has 
been a fiasco. Instead of producing a principled solution and a set of possible exceptions 
under which the general principle could be discharged, the doctrinal upshot has been to 
expand the number of exceptions without challenging the general rule. This state of affairs 
suggests first that the solution is perhaps not straightforward, but also insinuates that the 
roots of the problem are more profound than they seem at first sight.  Locating a coherent 
solution perhaps requires revising the current conceptual framework from which the 
present proposal has been formulated. Also, providing a consistent and principled answer 
to false beliefs requires rethinking the legitimation and function of the criminal law in 
modern societies. This will be the aim of the next two chapters. Chapter 2 will scrutinize 
the dominant conceptual framework, attempting to identify the reasons behind its 
incapacity to allow a consistent and fair answer to false beliefs to flourish. Thereafter, 
chapter 3 will explore and defend a fresh conceptual framework that revises the traditional 
legitimation and functions attributed to criminal law and criminal punishment.  
 
	
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
After reviewing the range of patchy, inconclusive and unsettled formulas, 
doctrines, proposals and arguments delivered by courts and legal scholars about false 
beliefs, the obvious question to put forward is why a coherent, principled, convincing and 
fair solution has been so evasive and problematic. Why have generations of eminent 
scholars, jurists, and judges been unable to provide a consistent and principled answer to 
this problem when most contemporary commentators are of the view that the false beliefs 
defence should be wider than it presently is in common law jurisdictions? In short, what 
makes the attribution of criminal responsibility so tricky in those cases where a direct link 
between the wrongness of the agent’s conduct and her cognizant and informed will is 
missing? 
 
Some scholars argue that the undeveloped state of affairs is due to the lack or 
deficiency of research about the topic. Husak blames legal theorists because they have not 
done the “spadework” necessary to resolve the issue.178 At the same time, he suggests that 
the reasons for the failure are methodological. According to Husak, scholars habitually 
present a range of examples about ignorance iuris and, after consulting their moral 
intuitions, they formulate principles that allegedly justify these intuitions. Husak suggests 
that these outcomes could be defective because intuitions about the topic are too 
ambivalent and ambiguous. Thus, the principles formulated to justify our intuitions are 
only as strong as the judgement on which they rest and, with respect to this topic, they are 
weak and frail. 179 Nonetheless, the claim that longer and more extensive research produces 
better outcomes only works if the line of investigation is correct and the starting point is 
appropriate. Chapter 1 outlined the controversial rationales that have been historically 
suggested to justify the irrelevance of false normative beliefs. More extensive research 																																																								
178 D. Husak “Mistake of Law and Culpability” Criminal Law and Philosophy (2010) 4(2): at 142 
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from the same starting point is redundant. The consequentialist perspective of considering 
ignorance iuris within the offences/defences framework through the mens rea element has 
been fruitless: proposals that attempt to consider false normative beliefs as a defence or a 
negation of mens rea have proved to be inconclusive and inadequate. The arguments 
founded on this conceptual framework are already exhausted and this failure signifies that 
the problem is in the conceptual framework itself – in the assumptions or baseline where 
the proposals originate. The search for a principled solution seems to require a fresh 
perspective towards the criminal law itself and the authentic weight that knowledge of the 
law certainly has. 
 
Criminal law evolves as with any other social phenomena. Criminal law is at a 
permanent crossroads between its purpose to provide stability in a society in continuous 
transformation and being simultaneously a response to change. Without an update on our 
perspective towards the criminal law, the new challenges that criminal law as social 
phenomena has to confront will continue to be problematic. This new, required perspective 
demands more than a methodological change. It requires a new and up-to-date theoretical 
conceptual framework and a modern understanding of the criminal law since it does not 
provide the same role and functions today as it did in the Victorian ages. The rest of the 
chapter is going to examine and reject two conceptual frameworks before moving on to 
propose a fresh conceptual, institutional framework. We must first explain and revise the 
legal moralist dominant framework, exploring the reasons behind its incapacity to provide 
a contemporary solution which better fits the purposes of the criminal law in the 21-
century in general, and with false beliefs in particular. Then, the legal positivist 
prospective ‘guidance view’ theory, which upheld that the main function of the law is 
guidance, not only for officials but also for ordinary people, will be analysed. Once the 
legal positivist theory has been discussed, the chapter proposes the convenience of a more 
sociological approach to legal guidance: law seeks to guide and organize the behaviour of 
individuals in social groups.  
  
This chapter, still focused on false normative beliefs, has five sections. Section 2.2 
introduces the dissimilar influence and authority that legal positivism and legal moralism 
have in criminal law theory. Section 2.3 explores the position of a wide variety of 
influential legal moralist commentators and explains why knowledge of the law has 
historically been peripheral in such accounts of responsibility. For those who support a 
legal moralist stance, “culpable wrongdoing provides a desert-based reason for punishing a 
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responsible agent”. 180  The accused must have engaged in moral wrongdoing to be 
convicted. Criminal laws within this account are a subsidiary of morality – they do not 
play any role in the deliberation process of citizens before they act. Thus, if criminal norms 
do not create any fresh moral obligation to conform to their mandate, neither are they 
reasons for action, and knowledge of the law or false beliefs about them should be entirely 
irrelevant. Then, in section 2.4, the legal positivist account of law and its conclusions for 
knowledge are drawn. The chapter provides a meticulous revision of the most relevant 
positivist authors and their positions about knowledge.  The positivist ‘guidance view’ is 
proposed as a sufficient condition for responsibility: we can only be held responsible for 
behaviour guided by our capacity as rational agents and performed and guided for what we 
believe to be adequate reasons.  Therefore, false beliefs are crucial in the attribution of 
criminal responsibility. The role played by legal norms in our practical reasoning before 
action, and its implications for false normative beliefs, are discussed in section 2.5. Section 
2.6 argues that the guiding role that law plays in our practical reasoning, defended by legal 
positivism, does not embrace the idea that law seeks to guide individuals in social groups, 
thus introducing a sociological account of the law. This part emphasises that we are not 
only rational but also social agents. 
 
2.2 Legal moralism versus legal positivism. 
 
Two divergent intellectual legal traditions subsist historically in legal theory: legal 
moralism and legal positivism. Legal positivists proclaim that legal validity is a matter of 
social fact; a norm is a valid legal rule of a given legal system when it is enacted, practiced 
and enforced by an appropriate authority. For legal positivist, legal norms are content-
independent reasons for action. The main difference between them concerns whether a law 
must pass a merit-based test in order to be valid (moralist), or whether its mere enactment 
by a legitimate authority or political institution should be enough to validate it (positivist). 
In practical terms this translates to whether judges should, in a given case, respect the rule 
of recognition as a legitimate source of obligation to follow the law, or   instead test its 
validity using moral arguments.  
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In criminal law theory the influence of legal positivism is residual and its proposals 
are barely developed or taken forward.181 On the other hand, the legal moralist tradition 
has historically found a fertile field in criminal phenomenon to flourish, where theorists 
have defended a purported incontestable convergence between criminal law and morality. 
More recently, the legal moralism tradition has found in the so-called “criminal 
philosophers” a new revival. This heterogeneous group of philosophers understands 
criminal law as a subspecies of moral theory focused on moral wrong182 or different levels 
of wrongdoing183 rather than in legal norms. The concept of wrong (and desert) becomes 
central to both the process of criminalization and the internal structure of the criminal law. 
In this context, criminal norms have the subordinate and secondary function to declare the 
wrongfulness of the prohibited conduct.184According to this approach, legality (or the 
principle of legality itself) is simply an advantageous tool that serves to avoid the 
ambiguity and insecurity that direct appeals to morality would imply. These legal 
moralistic arguments have been recently summarized by Husak when he asserts, “[…] on 
the planet we inhabit, we have ample reason to employ surrogate for morality. This 
surrogate, of course, is statutory law […] The main (but not the only) reason to employ 
legislation is that laypersons and legal officials alike remain uncertain and divided about 
the content of our moral duties, and an authoritative device is needed to allow the political 
process to function while these disputes are ongoing […] The state uses statutory law 
rather than morality to identify persons eligible for liability and punishment because direct 
recourse to the normatively relevant factor –morality itself- would be too divisive and 
uncertain”.185 
 
Nevertheless, relevant figures of both traditions have drifted from the orthodoxy of 
their established intellectual positions towards a more eclectic attitude. Amongst the legal 
moralists is the influential philosopher Duff who, although in earlier woks upheld a moral 
content-dependent approach for his concept of crimes as ‘public wrongs’ and intensely 
criticized potential conduct guidance of the criminal law,186 has since revised his account 
																																																								
181 Aside from the isolated analysis about criminal responsibility or causation developed by HLA Hart, or the 
more contemporary (and theoretically weak) attempt by Paul Robinson to devise a criminal code from a 
positivist/utilitarian perspective, criminal theory has been resistant to inspiration from legal positivism. 
182 See M. Moore Placing Blame: A general Theory of criminal Law (1997) 
183 See A. Duff’s concept of public wrongdoing: A. Duff  “Towards a Modest Legal Moralism” Criminal law 
and Philosophy (2013) 8(1):217-235 at p218 
184 See A. Duff (2002) “Rule-Violation and wrongdoing” in Criminal law Theory: Doctrines of General Part 
(2002) at p55 
185 D. Husak Ignorance of law: A philosophical inquiry (2016) at p259 
186 Ibd. at p54 
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to a more process–orientated and quasi-positivist account.187 This conversion is the result 
of the insuperable difficulty that legal moralists have encountered historically to allocate 
regulatory offences, also known as mala prohibita, in any morally based criminalization 
theory. Such a theory of criminalization becomes less moralistic and more process-
orientated. At the other end of the spectrum, legal positivists, like Shapiro with his recent 
planning theory, 188 have recently embraced a more sociological conception of positivism. 
If norms are social plans, Shapiro says, it is obvious that the legal phenomenon necessarily 
has something to do with a given social and political context. This sociological 
methodology is not new in the legal positivist tradition. Hart himself proclaimed in The 
Concept of Law that his work “may also be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology” 
(never expanded).189 Nonetheless, some relevant legal positivist authors have refused and 
contested utilising a sociological approach to legal theory.190 
 
What appears to be indisputable is that both traditions have driven legal theory 
towards what Lacey appropriately labels “philosophical imperialism”. 191 From the legal 
moralist tradition, law is a subspecies of moral theory. For legal positivists it is an 
exclusive system able to autonomously organize its propositions about legality. A system 
exclusively focused, as Kornhauser 192 suggests, on the legal order and its prohibitions and 
permissions, disregards its legal institutions, political pluralism and the structures of global 
governance. However, that also ignores the new social functions of the law, not just as a 
negative coercive guardian of the patterns of conduct, but as an active political and positive 
player in the deployment of social policies. This new interventionist regulative model is 																																																								
187 See F. Meyer “Towards a Modest Legal Moralism: Concept, Open Questions and Potential Extension” 
Criminal law and Philosophy (2012) 8(1):237- 244. See also L. Farmer “Criminal wrong in historical 
perspective” The Boundaries of Criminal Law (2010) at p223 
188 See S. Shapiro Legality (2011) 
189 See N. Lacey “Analytical Jurisprudence versus Descriptive Sociology Revised” Texas Law Review 
84(4):945-982  at 981 where Lacey identifies in Raz’s discussion of identity in legal systems this 
attitude of Hart and others to add socio-legal aspects to a positivist outlook. He does this when he makes 
a distinction between momentary and non-momentary legal systems, stating that in the latter; identity is 
fixed by its (moral) content, rather than through any formal criteria of legal validity understood as legal 
standards. 
190 Kelsen in his pure theory of law rejects any relation between law and morality but also with others social 
sciences. See also J Raz, “The authority of law: essays on law and morality, the institutional nature of 
law” at pg105 where he argues that a legal theory must be true of all legal systems. Such a theory has to 
identify general and abstract features and disregard those functions that some legal systems fulfill in 
some societies because of the special social, economic, or cultural conditions of those societies. Legal 
theory must fasten only to those features of legal systems that they must possess regardless of the 
special circumstances of the societies in which they are in force. For Raz, philosophy is concerned with 
the necessary and the universal whereas sociology is concerned with the contingent and the particular. 
191 See N. Lacey “Analytical Jurisprudence versus Descriptive Sociology Revised” Texas Law Review 
84(4)945:982 at p948 
192 See L. Kornhauser “Governance Structures, Legal Systems and the Concept of Law” Chicago- Kent Law 
Review (2004) 79:355 at p375 
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substantively characterized by economical, political, technical and axiological criterion, 
not by moral wrongs. 
 
A more extensive scrutiny of both schools is far beyond the aim of this research. 
This research endeavours to find a principled and coherent solution for false beliefs; for 
this reason this study will be focused on the significance of the concept of knowledge of 
the law for both schools of thought. The Platonic account of knowledge193 as justified true 
belief has been accepted by philosophers and scholars for centuries.194 Therefore, a rational 
way to analyse the legal relevance of false normative beliefs is by scrutinising the 
approach that different scholars and legal traditions have taken towards the concept of 
legal knowledge. The reason for this operational formula is that false normative beliefs and 
knowledge of the law are mutually exclusive concepts. Thus, it can hardly be expected that 
a fresh approach to false (normative) beliefs could be achieved without a thoughtful 
scrutiny of the significance of knowledge of the law.  
 
2.3 Knowledge of the law in the legal moralist tradition 
 
In the legal moralist tradition the “law requires man at their peril to know the 
teachings of common experience, just as it requires to know the law”.195 This position 
would probably be defensible if, as legal moralists believe, law has a moral base. Under 
this argument, it can be presumed that everybody should know the moral principles 
inherent to their society. Let me begin by considering the historical reasons behind this 
irrelevance of legal knowledge in the attribution of criminal responsibility. The concept 
and nature of crime provided by those early legal moralists who emphasized the role of 
Divine grace and benevolence in the explanation of crime could be seen as a precedent for 
this approach. Take, for example, the New England Puritans who preached in their 
sermons the Divine origin of morality and the share of it that every person has. This 
position, in relation with crimes, can be condensed in John Bradford’s proverbial saying 
when seeing criminals being led to execution: “There but for the grace of God go I”.  For 
the New England Puritans, crime is a product of the fallen nature that all human being 
share.196 They explained crime in terms of a loss of God‘s free grace previously given. 
																																																								
193 G. Fine “Introduction” in Plato on Knowledge and forms: selected essays (2003) p5 
194 A major challenge of the standard view comes from Gettier. See E. Gettier “Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?” Analysis (1963) 23(6):121-123 
195 O. Holmes The Common Law (1881) at p57 
196 See K. Halttunen Murder Most foul: The Killer and the American Gothic Imagination (1998) at pp8-32 
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Criminal execution of (public) punishment is justified as the “theatre of mercy”197 where 
the members of the community share the moral failure of the convicted as inheritors of the 
original sin.198 It is reasonable to assume that for the New England Puritans, knowledge of 
the law was irrelevant and any purported injustice caused by a wrong or incorrect 
application of the ignorantia iuris would be a replication of the shared human imperfection 
and loss of grace.  
 
In the same tradition, the American Lawyer and scholar Bishop also emphasizes 
Divine benevolence and explicit Christian explications of the law of crimes. For Bishop 
the “law was written in our hearts”.199 It seems difficult to find a better argument to uphold 
the irrefutability of the presumption of universal knowledge of the law and its counterpart 
duty to know it.  Bishop identifies law as “[…] the offspring of God; and, like him, [it] is 
everywhere”.200 He understands Law as “[…] God’ s abstract right”201 and the courts of 
justice as closely directed by God. Bishop was, however, embedded in 19th century 
Victorian moralism and, for that reason, he provides in his Commentaries on the Criminal 
Law202 an account of criminal liability based more on individualistic responsibility than 
did John Bradford. He emphasises individual responsibility identifying crime with the 
particular “wrongful intent” and the “criminal mind of the offender”.203 Bishop was 
probably influenced, in his position of individual responsibility as axiomatic, by 
Blackstone who, a century earlier, reflected on the significance of criminal will or intent as 
an affirmative essential element of crime.204  With this argument, Bishop proposed a 
comprehensible solution for ignorantia iuris and knowledge of the law: “[…] most 
indictable wrongs are mala in se, and if so offenders do not know that the law of the land 
forbids their acts, they are conscious of violating the law written in their hearts. And they 
have little cause to complain when unexpectedly called to receive, in this world, some of 
the merited punishment they had hoped to postpone to the next”. 205 Where for the New 
England Puritans crime was the product of a common shared fate, Bishop, rooted in a 
																																																								
197 Ibd at 23 
198 See G. Leonard “Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code” Buffalo criminal Law 
Review (2002-2003) 6:692 at p737 
199 See J.P. Bishop Commentaries on the Criminal Law (1858) at p1 
200 Ibd at p1 
201 Ibd at p2 
202 Ibd 
203 Ibd at p259-60 
204 “All the several pleas and excuses, which protect the committer of a forbidden act from the punishment 
which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced to this single consideration, the want or defect of 
will”. J.P. Bishop Ibd at pp207-212 
205  Ibd at p239 
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Victorian moralism era that vindicated the existence of individual moral choice, proposed 
that crime was the result of the private and individual choice to act immorally.206 
 
More in line with the secular perspective demanded by the age of Enlightenment 
was the work of Blackstone.207 Blackstone set out to change English law from a system 
based on actions, with people uncertain as to what the law was, to a system of substantive 
law. He proclaimed that criminal law in England needed reform, revision and amendment. 
He argued for criminal law as a principled branch of law “[…] founded upon principles 
that are permanent, uniform, and universal; and always comfortable with the dictates of 
truth and justice […] thought sometimes may be modified, narrowed or enlarged, 
according to the local or occasional necessities of the state which it is meant to govern”.208 
Blackstone, for example, pointed out that there was no room in eighteenth century criminal 
law for capital crimes like “[…] to break down (however maliciously) the mound of a 
fishpond, whereby any fish shall scape”. He was conscious that these outrageous penalties 
were occasionally inflicted and “[…] hardly known by the public: but that rather 
aggravates the mischief, by laying a snare for the unwary”.209  
 
His acknowledgement, three centuries ago, that the expansion of mala prohibita 
offences, unknown by the public, were a “snare for the unwary” is remarkable. However, 
instead of aligning his ideas with the more libertarian principle of prospectivity proposed 
by the codification movement, identifying the guidance function of law, Blackstone also 
advocated a purported duty or presumption of universal knowledge of the law: ”every 
person of discretion […] is bound and presumed to know the law”. 210 Behind this 
intellectual spin resided his concept of criminal law as a matter of public policy and 
interest211. Accordingly, when a person misunderstands or ignores the law and commits an 
unintentional harm that confronts the public, i.e “public wrong”, that person is a legitimate 
object for criminal punishment. Punishment is justified as far as its rationality sustains the 																																																								
206 M. Benedict “Victorian Moralism and Civil Liberty in the Nineteenth Century United States” in 
Constitution, law and American Life, Critics aspect of the ninetheenth-century Experience (2011) at 
p108 
207 Blackstone affirms that a norm that does not conform with natural law cannot be legally valid: “this law 
of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to 
any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any 
validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, 
mediately or immediately, from this original”. W. Blackstone Commentaries on the law of England 
(1769) book 4 at p47 
208  W. Blackstone Commentaries on the law of England (1769) book 4 at p3 
209 Ibd at p4 
210 Ibd at p24 
211 Blackstone asserts “the function of the criminal law was to secure to the public the benefit of society, by 
preventing every breach and violation of those laws”. Ibd at p5 
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integrity and the security of the public. This position looks apparently inconsistent with his 
acknowledgement of the abundance of ‘snare for the unwary’ offences, but it emphasizes 
the relevance and pre-eminence of a concept of crime as public wrong: “Wrongs, or crime 
and misdemeanors, are breaches and violations of the public rights and duties, due to the 
whole community, […]”.212 Around this duty to know the law, Blackstone proposed the 
consequentialist solution that “Ignorantia iuris in criminal cases is no sort of defence”.213 
He initiated the tradition of considering ignorantia iuris as another potential plea which, if 
successful, could protect the committer of a forbidden act from punishment if he does not 
display a vicious will:214 “All the several pleas and excuses, which protect the committer of 
a forbidden act from the punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced 
to this single consideration, the want or defect of will”. 
 
Contemporary scholars like Duff and Horder have also defended this legal moralist 
perspective towards knowledge of the criminal law. They challenge the ability of any 
guidance to produce results based on predictions of the law because they are too simplistic 
and disregard the moral complexity of the criminal law. The premise of the argument for 
these legal moralists rests on the difference between mala in se and mala prohibita crime. 
In mala in se crimes, the line of reasoning holds that few would be motivated to refrain 
from crime only in order to respect the authority of the law. Legal norms understood as 
content-independent reasons for action cannot be motivationally effective against those 
who are not motivated to refrain from crime due to the pre-legal wrongfulness of such 
conduct.215 What justifies the law prohibiting mala in se crimes, Duff says, is not its 
motivation/guidance but the fact that such crimes constitute “public wrongs”. 216 Declaring 
their public wrongfulness, the law puts forward content-dependent reasons for action that 
represent the values of the community. It is by the ex post facto censure in public trials of 
those who have committed such wrongs that criminal law finds its justification. To deal 
with the vagueness of the concept of ‘public wrong’, criminal philosophers incorporate the 
theoretical concept of “determinatio”217 developed by Finnis. In both, mala in se and mala 
prohibita crimes the law provides concrete “determinations”: legal specifications to the 
required legal degree of exactness that the pre-legal public wrongfulness is unable to 
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specify. In controversial issues like euthanasia,218 these criminal legal moralists use this 
concept of “determinatio” to legitimate that legal authority can mark-off the conduct as 
wrongful. In such cases where some citizens defend the wrongfulness of conduct while 
others believe it to be permissible, legal authority can resolve the controversy by 
“determination”. Duff says that “In such cases, what the law says to those who dissent 
from the stand it takes is not simply and unqualifiedly that the conduct in question is 
wrong, but rather that this is now the community’s authoritative view: even if they dissent 
from its content, they have an obligation as members of the community to accept its 
authority—to obey the law, even if they are not persuaded by its content, unless and until 
they can secure a change in it through the normal political process”. 219 As a result, they 
affirm that the criminal law should address citizens in terms of substantive pre-legal values 
using a ‘moral language’ that identifies crimes as public wrongs not by the prohibitions, 
permissions and commands usually inherent in the language of legal norms. As mentioned 
above, Duff’s views seem to be changing towards a more procedural positivistic 
attitude.220 
 
Moreover, Horder accuses the supporters of the purported legal positivist “guiding 
view” of having maliciously reconstructed, for their own intellectual benefit, the concept 
of “determinatio”221. Legal positivists elevate the mala prohibita model of prohibition as 
being the dominant example of criminal law. This approach, according to Horder, 
misrepresents the close connection that crimes (or at least mala in se) have with (public) 
wrongfulness. In this way, he argues, legal positivists attempt to defend the idea that 
lawmakers creating law have discretion, free from moral constraints, to shape prohibitions 
in an instrumental way. Such an argument attempts to replace moral with legal guidance. 
This kind of tactic is misleading, according to Honoré who asserts that “where morality is 
insufficiently determinate the law must step in ex catedra, by creating mala prohibitum”.222 
But he points out that this use of “determinatio” by lawmakers should be exceptional. For 
example, there is a moral reason to drive safely and respect traffic regulations. However, 
there is no moral obligation to drive below 30 miles per hour. The accurate specification of 
the limit, whether it be 30 or 50 miles per hour, is not a moral issue and can be 
discretionally fixed by the law ex catedra. 																																																								
218 A. Duff “Rule Violations and Wrongdoing” in Criminal Law: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at p55 
219 Ibd at p55 
220 Ibd at p4 
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Indeed, within this difficulty to accommodate mala prohibita in modern criminal 
law resides one of the main flaws of legal moralist thinkers about the crucial significance 
of knowledge of the law. Despite the change initiated by the Criminal Law Consolidation 
Acts 1861223 in England and what was known as the “inspection fever”224 in the mid-
nineteenth century, the bulk of English criminal law is to be found, due the absence of a 
criminal code, in dispersed statutes or in often inaccessible case law. Although different 
statutes have created new offences, or amended or repealed existing ones, the number of 
true criminal offences remain reasonable controlled. On the other hand, the use of criminal 
law by legislators to help achieve regulatory ends has increased the number of criminal 
offences to levels that have stunned scholars, politicians and even the public alike. This 
expansion of the criminal law has been exponential in the last few decades. In 2006, the 
political editor of the Independent newspaper, Nigel Morris, published an article claiming 
that during Tony Blair’s New Labour government, 3023 new offences had been created 
since May 1997: 1169 by primary legislation and 1854 by secondary legislation.225 Prior to 
the publication of this article, JUSTICE carried out a survey in 1980 that acknowledged the 
existence of at least 7208 criminal offences in the statute book.226 In 2008, Chalmers and 
Leverick suggested that more than 10,000 offences existed in English law.227 Andrew 
Ashworth warned that there could be around 8000 criminal offences in the statute book 
and at common law. 228 In any case, Chalmers and Leverick have empirically demonstrated 
recently that the rate of creation of criminal offences could be even faster than previously 
assumed.229 
 
This over-proliferation of criminal offences is in large part due to the regulatory 
framework.230 In this context, primary legislation often provides that criminal offences can 
																																																								
223 These are Acts of the UK Parliament that consolidate provisions and common law with the aim to 
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be created by secondary legislation (regulations or orders).231 Secondary legislation is by 
far easier to enact than statutes are. In fact, once laid before parliament secondary 
legislation normally becomes law if no one objects to it within a specific period of time. 
The result is that around 3000 pieces of secondary legislation are created annually 
(obviously not all of them create criminal offences). This legislative mechanism also 
entitles government agencies created by statute (primary legislation) to pass criminal 
offences needed to enforce the standards of behaviour appropriated to that particular 
agency.  As a result, criminal offences can be created directly by government ministers 
(using both primary or secondary legislation) or by government regulatory agencies 
created by statute using secondary legislation. 
 
Facing this scenario, it is also relevant to point out that there are now more than 60 
national regulators to which the government has granted powers to create and regulate 
standards of behaviour.232 These agencies share their law-making powers with the 486 
current local authorities in the United Kingdom and other trading standard authorities with 
powers granted to create criminal offences.233 Thus, not only it is impossible to know 
exactly how many offences we have in the statute book, it is also equally arduous to 
ascertain how many legislative bodies have been granted powers to create criminal 
offences. 
 
In order to confront this situation, in early 2009 it was agreed between the Ministry 
of Justice and the Law Commission to undertake a project with the broad aim of 
introducing rationality and principle into the structure of the criminal law. In particular, 
this involved the provision of non-statutory guidance by the Law Commission to all 
governments departments involved in creating criminal offences. 234  Following the 
recommendation of the Law Commission, the 2010 Coalition‘s Programme for 
Government introduced a ‘gateway clearance’ mechanism to prevent the proliferation of 
unnecessary new criminal offences, and repeal, amend and re-enact any existing 
ones.235The new Criminal Offences Getaway was established within the Ministry of 
Justice.236 Additionally, the Ministry of Justice is also to publish annual statistics counting 																																																								
231 A. Lilly, H. White and J. Haigh Parliamentary Monitor 2018 Institute for Government (2018) at p45 
232 Law Commission Consultation Paper N 195 (fn.18), para 1.21. 
233 Ibd. 
234 The Law Commission Consultation Paper N 195 
235 HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (HM Government 2010) 11. 
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commitment of the government to prevent the proliferation of unnecessary offenses, so new behaviour is 
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new criminal offences created by governments in England and Wales,237 But in 2015 the 
government agreed to discontinue the criminal offences gateway. After that, the Ministry 
of Justice, through the Home Affairs Committee clearance process, now scrutinises the 
creation of new offences. Those departments proposing new offences have to complete a 
Justice Impact test238 and clearance will not by given for unnecessary or disproportionate 
offences.239 The practical consequences of the state of affairs described above are, as 
Chalmers argues, 240  that even for experienced lawyers and even prosecutors it is 
sometimes difficult to know or ascertain the law. In R v Chambers,241 changes in the law in 
relation to the confiscation of the proceeds of crime that were more favourable to the 
defendant were unknown by both the prosecutor and defence lawyers, despite the fact that 
the change in the law occurred five years prior. Although the Court of Appeal recognized 
and criticized the unsatisfactory confusing situation of the criminal law that was not often 
practically accessible,242 it explicitly confirmed the totemic slogan “ignorance of law is no 
excuse”.  
 
Most of the approximate 10,000 valid offences in the UK are regulatory,243 content-
independent or mala prohibita. There are no statistics about the number of these offences 
that could be categorized as mala prohibita (in the sense that they do not obviously tie in 
with common understandings of morality). Furthermore, some of them prohibit conduct 
that most people would have no problem regarding as morally wrong, e.g. discharging 
poisonous waste into rivers, or prohibiting the use of toxic ingredients in food.  However, 
we can certainly assume that knowledge of the legal norms that regulate this conduct are 
key. Our modern multicultural, globalised and sophisticated society shares a mixture of 																																																																																																																																																																							
new criminal offences only where he is satisficed that the proposed offences are necessary, although no 
test of necessity has been established. 
237Date reveals a reduction in the number of offences created in the periods 2010 to 2013 after the creation of 
the Gateway mechanism (see: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-criminal-offences-
statistics-in-england-and-wales--2) specially compared with Scotland where the Gateway instrument 
does not apply (See: J. Chalmers and F. Leverick “Scotland: Twice as much Criminal Law as England?” 
Edinburgh Law Review (2013) 17(3):376-381. Statistics also show that 712 offences have been created 
in 2010, 174 in 2011 and 292 in 2012. Source: Ministry of Justice New Criminal Offences: Englad and 
Wales (2009-2012) 
238 Ministry of Justice Justice Impact Test (2016) 
239 Ministry of Justice Advice on Introducing or Amending Criminal Offences and Estimating and Agreeing 
Implications for the Criminal Justice System (2015) 
240 J. Chalmers “Frenzied Law-Making: Overcriminalization by Numbers” Current Legal Problems (2014) 
67:438 
241 (2008) EWCA Crim 2467  
242 At para 64 
243 We do not have statistic about the number of regulatory offences that could be categorized as mala 
prohibita (in the sense that they do not obviously tie in with common understandings of morality) and 
some of them prohibit conduct that most people would have no problem in regarding as morally wrong 
e.g. discharging poisonous waste into rivers, not using toxic ingredients in food.  
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morality, social practices and standards of behaviours. Different citizens have different 
approaches to the same issues or practices where wrongdoing has just an ancillary role, if 
any. Animal cruelty is a good and current example. Starting with the London Police Act 
1839244 and now with the Animal Welfare Act 2006,245 animal abuse or animal cruelty has 
been proscribed and prohibited. Animal cruelty can take different forms, but should 
exercising culinary practices like plunging live lobsters into boiling water, as Swiss law 
recently banned,246 be a criminal offence? Or should lobsters be stunned before being put 
to death? Or should it be prohibited to store lobsters on ice in a restaurant kitchen, as 
French law recently decided,247 because it causes them unjustified suffering before they are 
cooked? Or none of them? Different members and groups of the society will have different 
views about the way that our social life should be organized and about the expectations we 
have relating to the behaviour of other citizens. It is imperative then to mark the point 
where private values or standards become a compulsory and required standard for all 
members of the society. Only by sharing normative expectations can we trust others 
(included chefs) because we can forecast their future behaviour and adjust our actions 
accordingly. Legality provides both an ascertainable way of guiding and creating expected 
behaviour, while also protecting these expectations. In this picture, a purported irrelevance 
of knowledge of the current law is a preposterous presumption.    
 
Another ontological argument is at stake here. For those who support a legal 
moralist stance, “culpable wrongdoing provides a desert-based reason for punishing a 
responsible agent”.248 The accused must have engaged in a moral wrong if an adequate 
justification for punishment is to be provided. He must have committed moral wrongdoing 
to be convicted. Or, as Husak reflects, “[..] if morality does all the inculpatory and 
exculpatory work as regards blameworthiness, what role is left for law? […] why do care 
about the law at all?”249 Criminal laws are no more than a surrogate for morality.250 
Legality does not have any role in in the attribution of responsibility. Therefore, the acute 
normative argument of exculpation is “ignorance of the morality underlying law, and not 
ignorance of law itself”.251 Legality and knowledge of the law or false beliefs about it 
should be entirely irrelevant.  																																																								
244 Metropolitan Police act 1839 
245 Animal Welfare Act 2006 
246 E. Saner Switzerland rules lobsters must be stunned before boiling (2018) 
247 Reuters News Agency Italian Court Rules Lobsters must no Catch Cold Before Cooking (2017) 
248 D. Husak “What's Legal about Legal Moralism” San Diego L. Rev. (2017) 54:381  
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2.4 The prominence of knowledge of the law in the legal positivist tradition 
 
From the perspective defended by legal positivists, knowledge of the law and its 
relevance in practical reasoning before acting is salient.  The ‘guidance view’, as it is 
named in this paper, denotes the ability of the law to rise above merit-based, moral 
discussions and guide citizens ex ante; the ability to guide indeed becomes impossible if 
we get stuck debating conflicting moral considerations for guidance.252 At the other end of 
the spectrum is the libertarian prospective approach towards the law that is at the heart of 
the codification movement. Although like them, legal positivists nevertheless contend that 
criminal law, above all, must be genuinely accessible to citizens as a tool for governing 
their conduct. This right to know the law goes beyond a “fair notice” principle to provide 
prospective wrongdoers a fair opportunity to avoid the hardships inherent in punishment. 
To know the law is a right of the citizens because otherwise they cannot take it into 
consideration in their deliberation process before action: the law is not written in our 
hearts.  For that reason, any legal system has to have cognoscible rules of action which can 
guide conduct.253 This position should not be taken to imply support for the existence of 
only codified or statutory law, in the way that earlier positivists like Bentham have firmly 
and fiercely denounced judge-made law as ‘dog-law’:254" […] It is the judges (as we have 
seen) that make the common law. Do you know how they make it? Just as a man makes 
laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he 
does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is 
the way the judges make law for you and me. They won't tell a man beforehand what it is 
he should not do - they won't so much as allow of his being told: they lie by till he has 
done something which they say he should not have done, and then they hang him for it". 
According to the positivist account, criminal responsibility, and consequently punishment, 
should be restricted only to those cases where the citizen has adequately taken notice that 
her liberty has been authoritatively circumscribed. Only knowing violations of the law 
should be prosecuted, consistent with modern principles of liberty and autonomy. Thus, the 
statement made by the codifier E. Livingstone “[…] to be free a people must know the law 
by which they were governed”255 is still effective. 
 																																																								
252 See J. Raz The authority of law (1979) at pp50-51 
253 JP. Shofield and J. Harris (eds) The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Legislator of the World: 
Writings on Codification, Law and Education (1998) at p19 
254 J. Bentham Truth versus Ashhurst; or, Law as it is, Contrasted with What it is Said to Be (1792) at 235 
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The forward-looking guidance not only of officials, as defended by Kelsen,256 but 
of ordinary people was intensely endorsed by HLA Hart. Hart highlighted his prominent 
function of the law in clarifying how to act to its followers: “law […] should be concerned 
with the ‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant man’ who is willing to do what is required, if only he 
can be told what it is”257 He underlined that the guidance view was essential in order to 
understand criminal law as a mean of social control. Rejecting Austin’s imperative concept 
of law, Hart claimed that laws are legitimate standards of conduct that good citizens could 
comply with, irrespective of the punishment associated with default. He held that […] it is 
of course very important, if we are to understand the law, to see how the courts administer 
it when they come to apply its sanctions. But this should not lead us to think that all there 
is to understand is what happened in courts” […]“as a mean of social control are not to be 
seen in private litigation or prosecutions, which represent vital but still ancillary provisions 
for the failure of the system. It is to be seen in the diverse ways in which the law is used to 
control, to guide, and to plan life out of court”.258 He also explained that the purpose of 
criminal law “…is to designate by rules certain types of behaviour as standard for the 
guidance of the members of society … they are expected without the aid or intervention of 
officials to understand the rules and to see that the rules apply to them and conform to 
them […] in this sense they apply the rules themselves to themselves”.259 After all, what 
Hart vindicates is that rules should be put in practice by the citizens and not merely 
suffered by them.  
 
Joseph Raz defended a similar position in his recognized theory of rules as 
“exclusionary reasons”. Raz argues that we are guided by a rule when we take the rule as a 
reason that excludes other reasons for action. “Conflicts of reasons are resolved by the 
relative weight or strength of the conflicting reasons which determines which of them 
overrides the other”. 260  But not all conflict of reasons are of the same kind. Raz 
differentiates between first and second order reasons. First order reasons favour or refrain 
us from performing a certain action. Second order reasons refrain us from performing the 
action favoured by first order reasons. Exclusionary reasons are second order reasons to 
refrain from acting on the balance of reasons if the reasons favouring the balance are 
																																																								
256 Although the “guidance principle” is usually attributed to legal positivists, for one of its most fervent 
architects, Hans Kelsen, “law is the primary norm which stipulates the sanction” See H. Kelsen 
General Theory of Law and State (1999) at p63 
257  H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (1994) at p39 
258 Ibd at p39 
259 Ibd at p38 
260 J. Raz Practical Reasons and Norms (1975) at p35 
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excluded by an exclusionary reason.261 Even though a balance of reasons might incline us 
to opt for a particular preferred action, as rule-followers we ignore that favoured action and 
favour the action endorsed by the rule. Exclusionary reasons are reasons for “not being 
motivated in one’s actions by certain (valid) considerations. They are not reasons for not 
conforming with the reasons. They exclude reasons from being one’s motivation for action 
[…]”.262  As a result we can only be held responsible for behaviours guided by our 
capacities as rational agents and performed and guided for what we believe to be an 
adequate reason. We cannot be guided for a reason we are unaware of. Therefore, 
knowledge of the law (and false beliefs about it) are crucial in the attribution of criminal 
responsibility.  
 
Raz’s disciple, John Gardner, appealing to the rule of law principle and the 
relevance of the rules in our practical reasoning, also supports the “guidance view” when 
he says that “[…] according to the ideal of the rule of law, the law must be such that those 
subject to it can reliably be guided by it, either to avoid violating it or to build the legal 
consequences of having violated it into their thinking about what future actions may be 
open to them. People must be able to find out what the law is and to factor it into their 
practical deliberations. The law must avoid taking people by surprise, ambushing them, 
putting them into conflict with its requirements in such a way as to defeat their 
expectations and frustrate their plans.”263 He transfers specifically the ‘guidance principle’ 
to criminal law by asserting:“[…] those of us about to commit a criminal wrong should be 
put on stark notice that that is what we are about to do”. 264 Finally, it should be 
highlighted that even moral scholars like Dworkin have recognized the relevance of the 
guidance view in the adjudication process. He considers criminal law as an exception to his 
general thesis that responsibility derives not only from statute or explicit set out case law 
decisions, but also from the principles of personal and political morality.265 Dworkin 
recognizes that criminal law is very close to unilateralism,266 and “[…] no one should be 
found guilty of a crime unless the statute or other piece of legislation establishing that 
crime is so clear that he must have known his act was criminal, or would have known if he 
																																																								
261 Ibd at p39 
262 Ibd at p185 
263 J. Gardner “Introduction” in H.L.A. Hart Punishment and Responsibility (2008) at xxxvi; and see also the 
use of Hart’s arguments by A.T.H. Smith, n 17 above, 23.  
264 J. Gardner “Wrongs and Faults” in A.P. Simester (ed) Appraising Strict Liability (2005) pp69-70 
265 R. Dworkin Law’s Empire. Cambridge (1986) at p96  
266 Unilateralism implies that an obligation must be clear from the moment of legislative enactment. See J. 
Raz, “Intention in interpretation” in The Autonomy of law: Essays on Legal Positivism (2012)  at p252 
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had made any serious attempt to discover whether it was.267 His words clearly emphasise 
the relevance of knowledge of law in the attribution of responsibility.  
 
2.5 The guidance view and practical reasoning 
 
The acceptance of the guidance view means that law (and consequently its 
knowledge) plays an essential role in the practical reasoning of the agent in the moment of 
action: that is, it entails recognising law as a consideration that has different effects on our 
thoughts and behaviour, whether as a subjective source of motivation or not.268 The norm 
that defines and punishes theft is perhaps not a source of motivation for conformity with 
the law by itself. As Raz says, “I will feel insulted if it were suggested that I refrain from 
murder and rape because I recognize a moral obligation to obey the law”.269 We are not 
guided by a legal rule every time we act. The agent is guided also by their personal values, 
moral principles or fears, although they obviously know (or should know) the legal rules 
that prohibit stealing. The rules of theft only guide my actions when it makes a difference 
in my practical reasoning qua legal norms, not qua moral principles or values. Does this 
mean that the purpose of the criminal law pointed above by Hart as “... to designate by 
rules certain types of behaviour as standard for the guidance of the members of society” is 
wrong? Are legal moralists correct when they assert that the actual motivation is only 
provided by the pre-legal wrongfulness of the conduct? Should the criminal law be 
addressed then to Holmes’ bad man instead of the ordinary citizen, or the puzzled or 
ignorant man “who is willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what it 
is?”.270Beyond the above uncertainties, as it will be illustrated below when explaining the 
position held by one of the leading positivist scholars, laws guide us because they are the 
only source of legitimate information about legality.  
 
 According with legal positivist thinkers, as rational beings we engage in a balance 
of reasons before acting and law is a relevant factor to our practical reasoning. Another 
issue is the way in which different legal philosophers argue about how the outputs of the 
citizen’s practical reasoning are affected by law.  For classical positivists like Austin or 
Bentham our practical reasoning is affected mainly by the external coercion attached to 
non-conformity with the rule. Later positivists like Hart affirm that an agent is guided by a 																																																								
267 R. Dworkin Law’s Empire (1986) at p96 
268 See below externalism versus internalism debate. 
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social rule if he acts with a critical manner.271 They consider the rule as a social standard of 
conduct- as social practices. Divergence from this social standard will be subject to social 
criticism. Raz, from a different perspective, and in his recognized theory of rules as 
“exclusionary reasons” mentioned above, argues that we are guided by a rule when we take 
the rule as a reason that excludes other reasons for action.  
 
The field is broadly controversial. The capacity of practical reason to give rise to 
intentional action divides even those who agree that norms are reasons for action: for 
internalists like Williams272 reasons for action must be grounded in an agent’s prior 
motivation, “our subjective motivational set”; externalists like Parfit273 reject this picture, 
contending that one can have reasons for action that are independent of one’s subjective 
motivational set. Therefore, normative reflections are taken independently of our 
motivational set and capable of opening up new motivational possibilities. Finally, scholars 
like Korsgaard274 hold that a rational person who judges compelling reasons to act for a 
particular reason normally forms the intention to act in that particular way. His judgment is 
sufficient explanation, without the need to appeal to additional forms of motivation beyond 
the original judgment and the reasons it recognises. 
 
A profound study about how the outputs of the addressee’s practical reasoning are 
affected by rules belongs to the field of psychology and exceeds the aim of this paper. 
Nevertheless, for present purposes we can accept the basic premise that we all learn from 
the law our legal obligations, rights and our duty to conform to the law. Legal rules are the 
source of legitimate information about legality, and in this way they guide us. We learn 
some of our expected patterns of behaviour from our parents, teachers and so on, but this 
does not prevent legal rules from being the source of information about our expected legal 
standard. In our modern and sophisticated societies legal norms inform citizens about their 
legally expected conduct. But legal authorities demand from us conformity with the legal 
standard irrespective of whether our motives to accomplish are based on morality, personal 
values, tradition or fear of punishment. The reason for this is that lawmakers are only 
interested in the external conduct, not in the citizen’s motivation. 
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 Shapiro’s analysis and discussion of Hart’s “internal point of view”, 275 
distinguishing between epistemic and motivational guidance, could be illuminating here. A 
rule, says Shapiro, regulates one’s conduct and gives us a reason for action in at least two 
ways: “The rule can motivate action simply by virtue of the fact that the rule regulates the 
action in question. Or it can inform the person of the existence of certain demands made by 
those in authority, and as a result, that conformity is advisable”.276 In the first alternative 
he names ‘motivational guidance’, the rule-addressee is motivated to follow the rule 
because of the rule: he believes that the rule is a legitimate standard of conduct. The 
addressee acts on this belief and, for that reason, the rule is his unique source of motivation 
for conformity. ‘Epistemic guidance’, on the other hand, implies that the addressee may 
not conform to the rule because of the rule. Epistemic guided addressees may only 
conform to the rule because they want to avoid punishment, social stigma or other personal 
reasons. However, even for them the legal norm is a source of information regarding what 
counts as conformity. A person is epistemologically guided by a legal rule when he learns 
from it his legal duties and conforms to them. As Shapiro points out, this concept of 
epistemic guidance was what Hart had in mind when he declared, “the principal functions 
of the law as a means of social control are… to be seen in the diverse ways in which the 
law is used to control to guide and to plan life out of court”.277 Legal rules are the source of 
legitimate information about legality. When we want to know if the law regulates specific 
conduct we have to look at legal rules to ascertain if the conduct is regulated and the way 
the legal rule regulates it. The ordinary citizen, the puzzled or ignorant man and Holmes’ 
bad man are all “epistemically” guided by legal rules. We all learn from these legal rules 
both our legal obligations and our duty to conform to the rule because of that knowledge 
without engaging in further normative deliberation. 
 
As mentioned above, modern multicultural societies share a blend of moral values, 
principles and standards of behaviour. Different members and groups of the society will 
have different views about the way that social life should be organized. Different members 
have distinct approaches concerning the content of our social duties and responsibilities, 
but also about the expectations we have relating to the behaviour of other members of the 
society. It is crucial then to distinguish between those private values and standards of 
behavior held by different members and groups of society in a personal capacity, versus 
those values and standards of behavior which are compulsory and a required standard for 																																																								
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all members of the society, despite any conflicts these values may have with those of 
private groups. Legal rules provide ascertainable ways of guiding behaviour and publicly 
self-applying standards of conduct because they have been declared valid by the legal 
authority. This declaration of validity implies that the legal rule has been marked as an 
authoritative ruling. By doing so the law determines which standard of behaviour fits better 
to its primary function of assuring social co-operation. As Raz emphasises, law “…does so 
and can only do so by providing publicly ascertainable ways of guiding behaviour and 
regulating aspects of social life. Law is a public measure by which one measure one’s own 
as well as other people’s behaviour. It helps to secure social co-operation not only through 
its sanctions providing motivation for conformity but also through designating in an 
accessible way the patterns of behaviour required for such co-operation”. 278  This 
‘behaviour designation’ made by legal institutions binds members of the society – not 
because the chosen standard is justifiable on moral or private views – but because legal 
institutions select them as a legally obligatory pattern. Only in this way can law guide 
members of the society ex ante.  
 
This approach raises the question of why someone should pay more attention to the 
marking-off rule rather than his moral reasons; why is a citizen apparently better 
conforming to the reasons that apply to him if he follows the guidance supplied by the 
legal authority than if he does not; why should citizens conform to ‘law’s exclusionary 
reasons’ instead of acting on the balance of their first-order moral reasons? The answer to 
these questions takes the debate towards the topic of legal authority. Raz provides a partial 
answer in his ‘service conception’ of legal authority. Law performs the service of 
mediating between the ordinary citizen and the first-order reasons which apply to him. As 
a result, the ordinary citizen would conform better to the reasons that apply to him if he is 
guided by the authority’s directives than if he is not.279 Raz illustrates this premise with 
examples of regulations regarding dangerous activities: “I can best avoid endangering 
myself and others by conforming to the law regarding the dispensation and use of 
pharmaceutical products. I can rely on the experts whose advice it reflects to know what is 
dangerous in these matters better than I can judge for myself, a fact that is reinforced by 
my reliance on other people’s conformity to the law, which enables me to act with safety in 
ways that otherwise I could not. Of course, none of this is necessarily so. The law may 
reflect the interests of pharmaceutical companies, and not those of consumers. If that is so 																																																								
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it may lack authority over me because it fails to meet the normal justification condition. 
But if it does meet the normal justification condition it is likely to meet the independence 
condition as well. Decisions about the safety of pharmaceutical products are not the sort of 
personal decisions regarding which I should decide for myself rather than follow authority. 
They do not require me to use any drugs, etc., and in that they are unlike decisions about 
undergoing a course of medication or treatment where we may well feel that I should 
decide for myself, rather than be dictated to by authority”.280 
 
2.6 The guidance view of individuals in social groups 
 
The above argument justifies why the law addresses us in terms of legal rules in 
order to guide us to behave in certain ways without considering whether it is morally 
correct or not to do so. A valid rule emanating from a legal authority is a “content-
independent’ reason for action.281 Its validity does not depend on the quality of its 
substantive content, or the moral value of what it asks us to perform. It gives the addressee 
a reason to comply irrespective of whether the citizen has reasons to act on its content. The 
fact that the rule requires that an act must be done or refrained from is both the right kind 
of reason and, at the same time, a reason to avoid the process of weighing the reasons for 
or against following the rule. But Raz’s ‘service conception’, as well as the rest of the legal 
positivist thinkers, misses a crucial point about law proven in this research: its social 
dimension. We are rational but also social creatures and law seeks to guide and organize 
the behaviour of individuals in social groups. 
 
 By offering legal guidance the law makes it more likely that my actions will be 
coordinated with the rest of the society than a personal attempt to balance the content-
dependent reasons by myself could. Consider my decision-making process when I am 
shopping across town when I am meant to be working and my boss calls me for an 
immediate meeting in his office. The likelihood that my boss fires me, my solid driving 
skills and my knowledge of the way back to the office may be compelling reasons to drive 
faster than 30 miles per hour or to skip a red light. On the other hand, the risks of injuring 
others or myself may be reasons to drive respecting the speed limit. Even the threat of a 
£100 fine, an a priori reason for conforming, could be easily overridden by my desire to 
keep my job. But to take the legal speed limit as another ordinary reason is not the best 																																																								
280 J Raz “The Problem of Authority: Revising the Service Conception” Minnesota law review (2006) 
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way to harmonize social cooperation and interaction. The rest of the members of the 
society expect me to follow the standard of conduct prescribed by the legal rule and they 
will behave according with this predictable expectation. The aim of the legal rules relating 
to driving generally is to guide and harmonize the behaviour of the whole group of drivers 
in order to achieve a safe and efficient driving environment. 
 
This sociological dimension of law, which Joseph Raz’s account misses, has been 
perhaps better acknowledged by Shapiro in his planning theory of law282 where he affirms: 
“Legal institutions plan for the communities over whom they claim authority, both by 
telling their members what they may or may not do and by authorizing some of these 
members to plan for others”.283 Moreover, the planning theory not only argues that legal 
activity is an activity of planning but social planning: “[…] legal activity creates and 
administrates norms that represent communal standards of behaviour”. 284  Shapiro’s 
planning theory, loyal to the roots of the analytic legal positivist tradition, attempts to show 
that in the realm of planning, norms can be discovered through social, not moral, 
observation.285 He builds his theory assuming that rules in a legal system are plans because 
they structure legal activity and citizens can coordinate their activities and attain goods 
otherwise unachievable. In fact, his central argument is that rules themselves constitute 
plans or ‘plan-like’ 286  institutionalized plans. 287  And in one sense his resemblance 
approach is correct: we do not make plans if we do not use them to guide and evaluate our 
conduct. So ‘plan-like’ legal rules are entities that allow or permit or compel us to act in a 
certain way under certain circumstances.  
 
Law guides us and organizes our behaviour in order to achieve ends that we would 
not be able to achieve otherwise. This is the aim or social goal of the substantive content of 
a legal rule. A genuine content for legal rules does not exist, its content are fixed in the 
context of the regulation in order to achieve a social aim. In criminal law (as in private 
law) the factual validity of a legal rule is also symmetrical: the potential perpetrator has to 
respect the legal rules and the potential victim should be confident enough that her 																																																								
282 Shapiro’s Theory is based in Michael Bratman theories about planning and intentionality. See, e.g., M.E. 
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expectations are going to be respected and act accordingly. Legal norms are reasons for 
action but also institutionalized social expectations. It is Luhmann in his autopoietic theory 
of social systems that introduces this concept (undervalued by legal positivists) in the legal 
arena. Luhmann pointed out that law, as any other system does, processes normative 
expectations. The law cannot guarantee that the expectations will not be disappointed. But 
it can guarantee that they will be maintained as expectations, even in the case of 
disappointment. The norm communicates this in advance. Thus, for Luhmann normativity 
from a sociological point of view is counterfactual stability: the law protects our 
expectations.288 From this sociological perspective a crime is the non-fulfilment of the 
social institutionalized expectations established in the legal norms that guide social 
conduct. Punishment is the social reaction against this non-fulfilment, disallowing the 
offender’s behaviour and reinforcing the norm. If law provides the normative structure of 
the society, crime jeopardizes this normative structure. The punishment becomes an 
expression of the restitution of the validity of the law and it is justified post factum when 
the dissuasive aspiration content in the norm fails. This approach, it should be clear, is not 
suggesting that the normative restitution of norm validity is enough to avoid crime. 
Nobody believes that legally banning theft and punishing non-dissuaded offenders results 
in a theft-free society. Expectations should also be cognitively protected, and for that 
reason bicycles should be properly secured and locked to avoid theft, regardless of the fact 
that a norm protects our expectations that our bicycles are not going to be unlawfully 
taken. Put differently, nobody will rely on the validity of a norm which is regularly 
violated. Law cannot guarantee that our expectations cannot be frustrated. What law can 
guarantee is that our expectations will be maintained, as expectations, even in cases of 
disturbance and it will act accordingly. 
 
Let me explain this sociological concept of norms as institutionalized social 
expectations, taking rape as a prototypic crime at the nucleus of criminal law. Those legal 
moralists who speak in terms of declarations of public wrongdoing and ex post facto 
censure in public trials as justification for the enactment of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) 
Act 2009 have a distorted view of the function of the criminal law. The primary function of 
the law is not justification of punishment. The primary function of the Act, according with 
a more sociological approach, is to prevent and reduce rape and other sexual offences 
guiding sexual behaviour. After the enactment of the Act, men in particular found 																																																								
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themselves “epistemologically guided” about the new standard of normative 
institutionalized conduct expected in their sexual relations. In the new broader definition of 
rape the range of circumstances where, for example, consent will not be considered to be 
present imposes new non-optional duties in sexual behaviour in order to control, guide and 
to plan living out of court.289 According with the sociological approach here defended it 
could be interpreted that the primary aim of the new legislation290 was to meticulously let 
citizens know the normative institutionalized sexual behaviour expected from them. The 
factual symmetry of legal rules highlighted above implies that males have to conform to 
the new range of circumstances where consent will not be considered present (regardless of 
their personal beliefs about the public wrongfulness of the conduct). But additionally, and 
more importantly, potential victims can act with assurance that their expectations about 
male behaviour will be accomplished or otherwise the validity of the norm will be restored 
by punishment. 
 
This was, for example, the aim of the rape prevention campaigns launched in 
Scotland coordinated with the enactment of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009. The 
campaign “we can stop it” highlights the changes in the Act which attempt to reverse the 
popular trend of focusing rape prevention messages at victims, instead focusing the 
message on potential offenders.  As a counterpart, the campaign “this is not an invitation to 
rape me” reinforced women’s sexual freedom. The campaign stated that a woman can 
expect males to conform to the new prescribed sexual conduct regardless of the clothes she 
is wearing, her drinking behaviour or the ‘mixed signals’ given after consenting to any 
level of sexual activity. This implies that knowledge of the valid law is not only highly 
relevant for potential rapists but for potential victims as well. Only knowing the valid legal 
framework can we build up flawless expectations about others citizens´ behaviour. In 
conclusion, we have first categorically rejected the legal moralist approach towards the 
irrelevance of legal knowledge. We then partially backed the legal positivist argument that 
knowledge of the law is essential in a proper deliberation process. Finally, highlighting the 
significance of the sociological dimension of law lacking in the positivist account, we 
formulated a new conceptual framework where legal norms are not only reasons for action 
but also institutionalized social expectations.  
 
 																																																								
289 See section 12-15 of the Sexual Offences Scotland Act 2009 
290 In addition to the new case law emanates from courts after its enactment 
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter 1 have discussed the diametrically opposite approaches that legal 
moralists and legal positivists have towards the significance of knowledge of the law. It 
has been explained why retributivist/moralistic accounts, founded on the connection 
between wrongdoing and punishment, have pushed any cognitive conditions into the 
background.. The flaws of the argument that culpable wrongdoing (no legality) justifies a 
desert-based reason to punish were also fleshed out. Finally, a comprehensive historical 
review of the position held by moralists about cognitive conditions as well as a criticism of 
this attitude was conclusively expounded.  
 
Then, the chapter supported the ability of the law to rise above merit-based 
discussions and ex-ante guidance to citizens. The positivist ‘guidance view’ argument was 
also supported on the basis that, as rational beings, it is undeniable that we engage in a 
balance of reasons before acting, and law is a relevant condition to our practical reasoning. 
At the same time, the excessive prominence that both the coercive dimension of law and 
the concept of authority have in positivist accounts has been denounced: we are 
deliberative agents but also social beings. The chapter concluded by postulating a new 
sociological core for the construction of a modern criminal law. Legal norms are reasons 
for action but also institutionalized normative social expectations. A reassurance that our 
expectations will be maintained even if thwarted is the baseline for frictionless social 
interaction and the minimum threshold for interpersonal trust.  
 
The suggested socially grounded institutional understanding of the criminal law 
sketched above requires nonetheless a solid justification and expansion. To claim an 
indispensable sociological dimension of the criminal law is a vague and broad purpose that 
demands theoretical maturity in order to be feasible.  This new conceptual framework is 
the aim of the next chapter where a proposal founded on the theory of social institutions is 
introduced. This new institutional theory of law needs, additionally and in order to 
succeed, to provide new meaning to cognitive conditions. In doing so, this renewed 
account should be able to provide a fertile theoretic basis where a principled, fair and 
coherent solution where false normative and factual beliefs can thrive.  
	
CHAPTER 3 
 
CONCEPTUAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the last chapter the differing approaches taken by the legal moralist and positivist 
schools of thought towards the relevance of knowledge of the law was scrutinised: whereas 
for the latter knowledge was key, for the former it was irrelevant. It was criticised that law 
was neither a divine gift written and innately understood in our hearts, nor are legislators to 
be regarded as intrinsically knowing what is right or wrong. We were equally sceptical of 
the aprioristic and merely rational theory of knowledge grounded exclusively in the model 
of legal norms. As an alternative to quid sit iuris (what is law), a more sociological-
normative perception was proposed. This chapter aims to set out a fresh institutional 
framework expanding on that proposal by implementing an institutional approach to law 
and its knowledge. From the institutionalist concept of law here defended, knowledge of 
the law is not mere understanding of legal norms but the awareness of complex 
institutional facts and institutional structures and the social order it brings about.  
 
This proposal is based on the theory of social institutions formulated by Searle291 
and embraces institutional legal positivist arguments developed by MacCormick292 and 
Weinberger.293 By doing so, the paper engages with the current trend of some scholars, like 
Lacey294 or Farmer,295 to take a more sociological approach to legal phenomena. With this 
structural shift, these scholars bring back sociology and other social sciences from 
empirical fieldwork to the legal theoretical arena. In the criminal field, and focused in 
theories of criminalisation, Farmer has also defended the salient relevance “of what makes 
																																																								
291 J. Searle The Construction of Social Reality (1995); J. Searle Making the Social World: The Structure of 
Human Civilization (2010) 
292 N. MacCormick Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (2007). MacCormick “Law as Institutional 
Fact” in MacCormick N, and Weinberger O, An Institutional Theory of Law (1986). See also the essays 
in M. Mar and Z. Bankowski (eds) Law as Institutional Normative Order (2009) 
293 O. Weinberger Law, Institution and Legal Politics (1991) 
294 See N. Lacey “Institutionalizing Responsibility: Implications for Jurisprudence” Jurisprudence (2013)1:7. 
N. Lacey In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests and Institutions (2016).  
295 L. Farmer Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (2016) 
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the law criminal, or the distinctive character or aims of the criminal law”.296 After asserting 
that the current theories of criminalisation have failed “to attend the purpose of criminal 
law”, he stresses the unavoidable social functionalist perspective that any theory of 
criminalisation must bear. Consequent with this viewpoint, Farmer frames his theory of 
criminaliszation in the understanding of law as an “institutional normative order”,297 
supporting the legal institutional theory of law developed by MacCormick.298 A proposal 
of this kind, within the boundaries of a “sketchy”299 and lofty purpose of securing the 
conditions of civility and social peace,300 will verify the relevance of the function in the 
identification of criminal law qua criminal law, and not only the way the functions are 
fulfilled.  This purposive approach reinforces Lacey’s proposal that sociological changes in 
the legal phenomena have to have an impact in law’s modality.301 This thesis, grounded in 
the sources referred to above, attempts to formulate an innovative institutional theory of 
law that operates as the theoretical framework for a fresh solution for false beliefs. 
 
The research starts by defending the view that modern societies exist within a 
constellation of institutional facts. For purposes or functions beyond mere biological or 
physical structures (brute facts), we collectively attribute a certain status to persons, 
objects or other entities. The institutional structure derived from these status-functions 
encloses a waterfall of deontic-normative powers that provides status holders with a 
common reason for action in our practical reasoning. Institutional facts guide us but also 
disclose to others what they can expect from us. Only within normative frameworks of 
reciprocal and conventional expectations can we interact, cooperate and trust strangers. But 
recognition and reciprocal acceptance is not everything. Where some institutions can 
effectively subsist under the normative structure provided by social habits or conventional 
expectations, others, in order to achieve their function, need a more formal authority-based 
																																																								
296 L. Farmer “Criminal law as an institution: Rethinking Theoretical Approaches to Criminalization” in A. 
Duff, S. Marshall M. Renzo , V. Tadros Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law 
(2014) at p2 
297 L. Farmer Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (2016), Chapter 2 
298 See N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law. An Essay in Legal Theory (2007). N MacCormick “Law as 
Institutional Fact” in MacCormick N, and Weinberger O, An Institutional Theory of Law (1986). See 
also the essays in M. Mar and Z. Bankowski (eds) Law as Institutional Normative Order (2009). See 
also O. Weinberger Law, Institution and Legal Politics (1991); M. la Torre Law as Institution (2010). 
See also N. Lacey “Institutionalizing Responsibility” Jurisprudence (2013) 1:7 
299 L. Farmer Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (2006) at p26 
300 Some authors highlight the descriptive nature of the concept of civil peace and its limited or too nebulous 
to provide guidance in the identification of law. See M. Ulväng “Criminal Law and Public Peace” in M. 
Mar and Z. Bankowski Law as Institutional Normative Order (2009) at pp137-141. See also V. Tadros, 
“Institutions and Aims” in M. Mar and Z. Bankowski Law as Institutional Normative Order at p93 
301 N. Lacey In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests and Institutions (2016) 
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normative structure in place. These formal/legal rules institutionalise new expectations of 
these previously informal practices 
 
Thereafter, the chapter explores the uncharted potential connections between 
trust/trustworthiness and the criminal law. An innovative conception of the deliberation 
process is at the basis of the link between both notions. Citizens are rational thinkers with 
the ability to conform their behaviour to reasons, but also to consider the mental life of 
others in their deliberation.302 We have the capacity to recognise that the deliberation of 
others will depend on expectations about what we will do. Thus, if we count on the 
deliberation process of others we can build up our plans based on our expectations of their 
responsiveness. This is the gist of interpersonal trust. But trust, although grounded in 
normative expectations, is not enforceable (or it would not be trust). Within specific 
institutional frameworks, normative expectations also need a mechanism of institutional 
reassurance to allow the institutional framework to survive. This function is performed by 
criminal punishment reaffirming institutional trust. Against those expectations whose 
disruption can jeopardise the institutional configuration of the society, criminal punishment 
reassures that the institutional framework is still valid even in cases of isolated violations. 
The legitimation of criminal law in this picture is defined later as the guarantor who 
secures the institutional identity of the society against those instances of conduct that 
contravene the general normative model of orientation or guidance in social interaction 
that the institutional structure defines.  
 
If the main function of the criminal law is neither deterrence nor the justification of 
punishment, but instead the protection of institutionalised expectations and to reassure the 
institutional framework, a fresh account of criminal responsibility needs to be deployed. In 
doing so a particular emphasis should be given to the allocation of status that reshapes the 
concept of personhood in law. Only when an event happens within the status framework 
can the status-holder be held responsible for it. Status defines prospectively the 
responsibility of the holder in two ways: negatively, he is responsible for configuring his 
ambit of action by avoiding causal processes that, in creating a non-permitted risk, 
jeopardise the ambit of action or planning of others (neminem laede principle); positively, 
the holder is responsible for the deficient performance of any institutional function when 
interacting with others. This structure also embeds the two dimensions of trust: a) trusting 																																																								
302 This ability is known as the “Theory of Mind” and implies that we are able to attribute mental states to 
others (or oneself): we are able to understand that the rest of the members of the society have beliefs, 
emotions, intentions that are different from one’s own.  
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somebody and b) trusting somebody in a particular domain.  The conclusion of this scheme 
is a new classification of offences: offences of association and offences of dissociation.  
 
Finally, the research illustrates the distinct ways knowledge of the law is relevant in 
the conceptual institutional framework proposed here: to interact in any institutional 
framework, the citizen needs to be aware of its deontic framework. To plan and organise 
our life around the expectations of others requires a deep knowledge of the social 
framework and equally the legal norms that shape it. But knowledge is also essential in the 
attribution of criminal responsibility. Criminal responsibility will be directly attributed 
when the citizen acts aware of the illegality of his behavior. But, when a lack of knowledge 
(normative or factual) precludes deliberation by the actor that their behavior could be 
criminal, the attribution of criminal responsibility can be challenging.  
 
3.2 Natural, gregarious and Institutional structures 
 
Reality, ‘the state of things as they actually exit’, can be split into those qualities or 
features whose existence are autonomous from the perception of the observer, and those 
that are dependent on human attitudes towards the physical phenomena.303  Frequently, the 
same reality can be constituted, at the same time, by qualities dependent and disassociated 
from the perception of the spectator. A ceilidh dance is a succession of physical 
movements performed by the physical bodies of the participants, but it is also the result of 
the attitudes and purposes of the dancers according with rules consensually pre-
established. We can designate, following Searle304 and Anscombe,305 brute facts as those 
facts disassociated from the perception or belief of the witness, and institutional facts, as 
those phenomena related to the awareness of the spectator.306 
 
Let me delve into this ontological approach of reality by scrutinising the alignment 
of objects or entities.307 Intermolecular attraction (or repulsion) is a natural fact that occurs 
between neighbouring particles due to their different electric or magnetic dipole. Dipole 																																																								
303 G.E.M. Anscombe “On Brute Facts” Analysis (1958) 18:69–72.  J.R. Searle Speech Acts (1969). J.R. 
Searle’s work continues through Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (1979); 
with D. Vander-veken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (1985), and The Construction of Social 
Reality (1995). 
304 J Searle Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (2010)  
305G.E.M. Anscombe “On Brute Facts” Analysis (1958) 18:69–72 
306 It is unnecessary to say that only one reality actually exists. 
307 I should highlight the intentional similarity of the examples used here with MacCormick’s seminal 
queuing example. 
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electrostatic interactions tend to align the molecules to increase attraction, thus, the 
positive end of a polar molecule will attract the negative end of the other molecule and 
influence its position. A good example of alignment of particles and its effects is frozen 
water; liquids always shrink when cooled down but water surprisingly always expands. 
Water always increases volume when frozen due to the special nature of hydrogen atoms: a 
physicochemical phenomenon known as a hydrogen bond.308 When cooled down and 
frozen, water expands because of the special alignment hydrogen and oxygen atoms take 
that allows empty spaces between them. For that reason, orderly frozen water occupies 
more space than disorderly warm water. Under the laws of science or nature we describe 
such phenomenon as natural structures. 
 
Migratory birds, like geese and ducks, also align themselves. They use V-shaped 
flight formations to boost the efficiency and range of flying. The upwash from the wingtip 
vortices of the bird ahead assists each bird behind to support its own weight, thus assisting 
each bird to fly except for the one at the very front. In contrast to hydrogen bonds, every 
bird of the flock collaborates intentionally (or perhaps, instinctively) in the collective 
action of flight. In order to spread the flight fatigue among the flock members, birds flying 
at the tips relieve cyclically those at the front of the formation. In a V-shape formation, the 
birds make available to the whole flock their body as a mere physical structure, with the 
purpose of improving efficiency and increasing the range of flight. The same behaviour 
might be found in a group of trekkers who, during the night, align their sleeping bags 
together to generate body warmth in cold weather. In each example the physical structure 
of the bodies are resourcefully used. We can name such instances of this phenomenon as 
gregarious structures.  It cannot be mathematically formulated like the hydrogen bond 
because some element of freedom and self-determination is involved. No obligations, 
duties, rights or expectations are created among the members. Any goose or trekker is free 
to join the group and share the benefits of the cooperative conduct, or leave the structure to 
migrate or sleep alone at his own risk.  
 
We also intentionally align ourselves sometimes for purposes beyond our physical 
or biological features or mechanical structure. A recognized and successful practice in our 
crowded societies is queuing or waiting in line. Like our previous examples, a queue is the 																																																								
308 The special nature of hydrogen atoms, which do not have an inner shell of electrons, makes it easily 
accessible for strong dipole interaction with the lone pair of electrons of the atom of oxygen. This 
interaction is called a hydrogen bond and exists between a molecule that contains a hydrogen atom 
attached to an electronegative element and another molecule containing a lone pair of electrons on an 
electronegative element, oxygen in the case of water. 
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result of the alignment of biological bodies or physical entities. Nonetheless, in the case of 
forming a queue, the purpose or function assigned cannot be performed just by virtue of 
the physical or biological features but also necessarily by the collective attribution of a 
certain status to the human body.  Only once this status has been collectively recognised 
by a certain society or community or group of people can the function can be successfully 
performed. In the mutually coordinated practice of queuing, the “function-status”309 
collectively assigned to a line of human bodies is that of “first come, first served”. The 
function assigned to the queue is operative insofar as the people involved in a particular 
activity, for example queueing for a bus, recognise and accept that a line of human bodies 
has the function-status of “first come, first served”. Its existence is not autonomous from 
the users but rather depends on the perceptions and attitudes that observers (or anyone 
willing to take the bus) have towards the physical phenomena. In Searle’s terminology this 
assignment of status and functions takes the form “X counts as Y”.310 When the practice to 
consider X as Y becomes collectively recognised it constitutes an institutional structure.311 
 
Institutional structures are fictional and thus ontologically subjective.312 They only 
exist in so far as they are collectively believed to exist and cannot subsist unless a 
community collectively recognises them as existing. Slavery illustrates a good example of 
an institution that was once recognised and accepted but collapsed when the social support 
for the institution vanished. On the other hand, same-sex marriage might provide a current 
example of an institutional structure that collective intentionality has promoted to 
materialise as an extension of genuine equal rights across the entire community.  This 
allocation of status-function is an exclusive human feature. Only humans can impose that 
the union of two persons generates a special status where the holders can perform 
functions beyond their physical or biological structures.  Geese can create gregarious 
structures but only humans can create institutional facts that exist only within human 
institutions.  
 
The allocation of functions beyond the physical structures of persons, objects and 
other kind of entities allows human societies to expand the efficiency and range of human 
existence. Without institutional structures we would be a gregarious society/structure but 
not an institutional one. Our reality, without institutions, institutional structures and 																																																								
309 J. Searle (2005) “What is an Institution?” Journal of Institutional Economics (2005) 1: 1-22 at 7. 
310 J. Searle Making the social world: The Structure of Human Civilization (2010) at p10 
311 Ibd Chapter 5 
312 In contrast, natural reality is ontologically objective. 
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institutional facts, would be constituted by mere physical objects (brute facts), valued only 
by their substantial or biological or mechanical features. Institutions, thus, are essential 
devices for the creation, regulation, cooperation and organisation of relationships between 
humans. Property, marriage, courts, the Crown Prosecution Service, but also bank 
holidays, the Edinburgh Marathon, the football league, friendship, love affairs and 
citizenship are all common institutional structures in our modern societies. According to 
the above propositions we can claim that human societies have an institutional identity 
where “status-functions” are the glue that holds human societies together”.313 
 
What, then, is the content of an institutional structure if it exists beyond the 
biological or physical features of the person or object that constituted it? We emphasised 
above that institutional structures are fictional and its ontology subjective. In fact, a 
specific group of people who usually queue to take the bus can mutually agree to assign 
the function-status “first come, first served” to their umbrellas when it rains. The function-
status assigned now to the ‘queueing’ umbrellas, if a minimum threshold of compliance is 
reached, allows the passengers to orderly queue while taking shelter as a disorganised 
group of equals. In Spain, where queues are not always seen as an efficient way to organise 
users who want to be served, it is common for the server to begin the custom by asking 
who is first, with that customer then “passing over” to the next person who arrived after 
them who will in turn pass over to subsequent arriving customers, etc. The function-status 
can be attributed, subsequently, to persons or objects or even simple spoken phrases, 
insofar as a particular society assigns them some status and their performed function is 
accepted and recognised as a result of the assigned status. The first to come and orderly 
leave their umbrella in the line will have priority over those who arrive behind him in the 
formation. Aside from the weather conditions, very little changes! 
 
From the above examples detailing the (re)allocation of function-status, we can 
conclude that what is salient in building institutional structures is the deontic framework 
they create.314 The function “first come, first served”, allocated to an object or person to 
give it an institutional function, produces a waterfall of rights, duties, expectations, 
responsibilities, permissions, requirements and so on. This deontic structure will be held to 
be valid and situated within society as far as they are generally recognised, irrespective of 
those outlier cases where certain individuals act motivated not by the deontic structure, but 																																																								
313 J. Searle “What is an Institution?” Journal of Institutional Economics (2005) 1:1-22 at p9 
314 See J. Searle Making the social world: The Structure of Human Civilization (2010) at p8 
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by their own personal agenda. In fact, habitually, even those who purposely behave outside 
the institutional deontic framework recognise as worthy the status-function they 
contravene. A thief certainly recognises property as a positive social institution and expects 
others to respect his belongings, despite his concurrent motivation to steal, brought about 
by the personal benefits that stealing brings to him.  
 
This deontological framework provides members of the society with a reason for 
action in a particular way. Institutional deontology influences our behaviour. Any time a 
member of society rationally deliberates, as a reflective agent, about what to do or what 
they ought to do, the institutional structures provides a reason to act in the way allocated 
by that structure because it is the manner in which this particular society has collectively 
recognised how to act. When we recognise a line of human bodies as the legitimate mode 
to queue for a bus, we are ruling out other alternatives at the same time as limiting our 
range of freedom. The recognition of the deontological nature of these institutional 
structures constrains our options for acting within the specific institution. Nevertheless, at 
the same time it allows other users to know what they can expect from us. This mutual 
recognition and participation in the institutional framework strengthens its deontic 
structure. 
 
Institutional structures play a primary role in our practical reasoning and 
deliberation in the moment of action. They are considerations that we take into account in 
our thoughts as sources of motivation;315 they guide us about how to behave in society but 
also disclose what others can expect from our behaviour, necessarily prescribing our ambit 
of responsibility. As Weinberger emphasises, institutions are frameworks of human action 
determined by information.316 Undoubtedly, not everybody is motivated to act within the 
deontic framework defined by the institution. Some citizens skip the queue; other citizens 
are dishonest with friends and some citizens rape. But these behaviours, despite existing 
outside the deontic framework, are not incompatible with the recognised institutional 
deontology.  
 
It goes without saying that some kind of organised coercion or enforcement may be 
necessary to support and sustain some institutional frameworks. But the success of our 
sophisticated institutional reality does not just depend on the coercion or enforced 																																																								
315 More was said above in chapter 2 about motivation and reasons for action and externalism v externalism.  
316 O. Weinberger Law, Institution and Legal Politics (1991) at p21 
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punishment of those who behave outside the institutional framework. Institutional 
frameworks thrive and achieve their goals because we expect that the rest of the status 
holders will behave within the deontic institutional framework as well. The success of bus 
queuing resides in the expectation we have that other bus users will behave in the same 
way and not just in the conviction that queue-jumpers will be punished.  
 
3.3 Categorical, conventional and institutionalised/normative expectations 
 
Water always expands when frozen. The way we as humans are, and our biological 
constitution, is very much like the hydrogen bond’s natural structure. As human beings 
there is nothing we can say (or do) to change or to constrain it. We can only cognitively 
adapt our existence and behaviour to natural facts, like the hydrogen bond. Hydrogen and 
oxygen electrons will always act in the same way under specific conditions of temperature 
and pressure. In this respect we might say that they are ’not free’, and this assumption 
restricts its range of possibilities. For example, we can causally control the way water 
freezes. That is, we can add salt to fresh water to modify the hydrogen bond effects. We 
can, then, conclude that natural structures produce categorical expectations in the 
observer. The observer cognitively processes these expectations, developing an 
understanding of the phenomena and modifying their future behaviour accordingly. The 
expectation is created without any other input.  
 
On the other hand, institutional structures do not limit the freedom of citizens in 
the same way. This is because despite the collective recognition of a status function by 
society, citizens may nevertheless be motivated by reasons to act other than those provided 
by the institutional framework in specific circumstances. Some citizens may accept the 
status function collectively recognised but they are motivated to act by personal, self-
interested advantages in a given situation. The collective acceptance and recognition of the 
deontic institutional framework does not prevent free conscious citizens from violating the 
rules when using the institutional framework. In this way, institutional structures produce 
in the observer or user conventional expectations: the expectation that users of the 
institution will respect, and consequently behave within, the deontic framework provided 
by the institutional structure.  
 
So far, we have mentioned and discussed an essential and everyday institutional 
structure grounded in mutual and reciprocal recognition and acceptance: queuing. The 
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deontic structure inherent to the status function of this institution is based on reciprocal 
social conventions. Any accountability or authority relationships are deregulated. Some 
institutions can exist, and effectively and efficiently subsist, under the deontic structure 
provided by conventional expectations, social habit, norms of etiquette, or good manners 
without further formalities. Nevertheless, our modern sophisticated society is far more 
complex than the conventional and unregulated bus queuing practice. Collective 
recognition and acceptance is not everything. As MacCormick illustrates,317 queuing is not 
only an informal order grounded in social reciprocal acceptance.  
 
In some environments, to achieve the function ‘first come, first served’, some 
progression from merely informal practices to more formalised ones have been put in 
place. For example, when travelling by air it is common to find both priority and non-
priority queues, so that the last to come might be the first to be served. Numbered tickets 
can be provided in order to deliver more freedom of movement and avoid disputes. Also, a 
person assuming authority can be put in place to deal with repeated problems or to resolve 
disputes between users. Furthermore, someone in a position of authority can establish oral 
or written formal rules and procedures that must be known by the users in order to 
appropriately use the institution. Thus, various layers of overlapping pre-assigned function 
statuses form our complex human society. We live in a world institutionally pre-conformed 
where we need to learn the way institutions work to subsist and progress. A deficit of 
knowledge of the deontology of institutions will affect our ability to succeed, and thus 
success in life depends enormously on our ability to successfully know, comprehend and 
learn the deontic framework provided by institutions. In our airline example, those who 
ignore that the recognised way of boarding a plane is by queuing in the correct line will 
probably be prevented from boarding until they joined the appropriate queue. The same 
result will await those who erroneously believe that some other non-recognised practice 
will allow them to board the plane. 
  
These sophisticated and official rules differ formally from the original constitutive 
rules of the institutional structure. Formal rules are issued by someone with authority and 
are usually mandatory in order to use the institution. There could be, subsequently, at least 
two kinds of rules in developed institutional structures: informal, implicit, constitutive 
rules that signify conventional expectations; and precise, explicit, decision-making 
																																																								
317 Chapter 2 
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authority rules that signify normative (institutionalised) expectations.318 These explicit, 
authority-based rules institutionalise expectations that were formerly merely implicit, 
constitutive rules (conventional expectation) or issues that developed and institutionalised 
new institutional expectations: new layers of overlapping function status. Of course, 
conventional expectations can also remain unchanged and valid within the institutional 
structure because they are recognised but not formally institutionalised. In short, in some 
institutional structures, the initial conventional deontic structure can evolve (although some 
can remain unaffected) towards a formal-explicit institutional framework grounded in 
authority-based rules.  
 
 MacCormick’s concept that this transition from mere conventional to institutional 
expectations is the substrate of law as an institutional normative order319 is probably true. 
Besides the informal and conventional expectations generated by the practice itself, there 
also arises the practice of authorising some decision-making individuals to make explicit 
and formal decisions. As MacCormick claims, “There are now, we may say, deciding-
about-queuing norms, as well as the queuing norms themselves”.320 In our terminology, the 
latter generate conventional expectations and the former legal (institutionalised) 
expectations. This transition also implies a conversion from an informal, deontic 
framework to a more prescribed, normative framework. In this structured, more-than-one-
tier setting proposed by MacCormick, however, new formalised practices (rules) are not 
discoverable in nature (like the hydrogen bond mentioned above), they are also a status-
function whose deontic powers derive from a collectively recognised and accepted status. 
The function that the ticket roll accomplishes, the “authority” that a taxi-marshal 
organising taxi-queues performs, and the formally articulated rules enacted or enforced by 
those with the status of authority are examples of status-function itself: they are institutions 
within institutions. However, conventional and normative–institutionalised expectations 
require citizens to have a particular kind of attitude towards one another in the institutional 
structure for it to endure. Mutual, reciprocal and recognised acceptance would not be 
possible without some degree of reliance or confidence on each other.  
 
3.4 Expectations, trust and criminal law 
 																																																								
318 MacCormik refers to this structure as two-(or more than two) normative tier. See N. MacCormick, 
Institutions of Law. An Essay in Legal Theory (2007). at p23 
319 M. Mar and Z Bankowski (eds) Law as Institutional Normative Order (2009) 
320 MacCormik refers to this structure as two-(or more than two) normative tier. See N. MacCormick 
Institutions of Law. An Essay in Legal Theory (2007) at p23 
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Imagine a world without trust – it would certainly be a world without institutional 
structures. Trust is an essential attribute of the institutional organisation of modern 
societies. The concept of money provides a good example. Only in an atmosphere of 
mutual interpersonal trust can institutional structures succeed. We are social creatures and 
human coordination and cooperation depends on trust because we cannot do everything at 
every time and everywhere by ourselves. However, trust, understood as a kind of reliance 
attitude, always implies making ourselves vulnerable to others. Trust always brings the risk 
of being unwarranted. We can only assess our expectations about the trusted matter 
because, once we trust, we lose control over the actions executed (or not) by the trustee. In 
fact, if we had the absolute guarantee that the trustee would perform the trusted matter, we 
would not have the need to trust him. With trust being such a complex attitude, can the 
(criminal) law endorse the atmosphere of interpersonal trust that the institutional structures 
need to succeed? In other words, can the (criminal) law make us appear trustworthy to 
others? Or finally, can the (criminal) law reassure the institutional structure itself? 
 
Both the philosophical interest and literature about trust have grown massively in 
the last few decades.321 The idea of trust as a key element in civility or social order has also 
been a recognised topic in sociology from early thinkers like Durkheim322 or Simmel,323 to 
consecrated sociologists like Luhmann. 324  However, no consistent conceptual 
interconnections have been made between trust and law. Literature about this topic is 
normally focussed or deals with aspects of legitimacy related with procedural criminal 
justice or police.325 In any case, both legal moralists and positivists would restrict the 
influence of trustworthiness to the effects of criminal punishment. MacCormick has 
discussed interpersonal trust in his account of law as a normative order. He connects trust 
with civility when he affirms that “[…] peaceful relations among persons who can trust 
relative strangers to avoid violating their persons or their property are fundamental 
conditions of civility”.326 For MacCormick, civility or civil society is the opposite to the 																																																								
321 A.C. Baier “Trust and Antitrust” Ethics (1986) 96(2):231–260. D. Gambetta “Can We Trust Trust?” 
in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (1988) pp213–237. T. Govier Social Trust and 
Human Communities. Montreal (1997). R. Hardin Trust: Key Concepts in the Social Sciences (2006). M. 
Hollis Trust within Reason (1998). M. Kohn Trust: Self-Interest and the Common Good (2008) N. 
Luhmann Trust and Power: Two Works. Translated by H. Davis, J. Raffan, and K. Rooney (1979). O. 
O’Neill A Question of (2002) 
322 E. Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society (2013(1893)) 
323 G. Simmel The Sociology of Georg Simmel (1950) The Philosophy of Money (1990)  
324 G. Luhmann Trust and Power (1979 (1968))  
325 N. Persak Legitimacy and Trust in Criminal Law, Policy and Justice: Norms, Procedures, Outcomes 
(2014) 
326 MacCormik refers to this structure as two-(or more than two) normative tier. See N. MacCormick, 
Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (2007) at p208 
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Hobbesian “state of nature”,327 it is a condition where complete strangers can interact and 
cooperate “having no special reasons to fear violence from those they happen to meet”.328 
In this orderly environment complete strangers can take part in trade, exchange or political 
debate, and their divergences can be solved without resorting to self-help violence. Farmer, 
in the conclusion of his book, also proposes that the criminal law secures civility“[…] 
establishing measures for building and reinforcing trust between individuals. In substantive 
terms, this order has been secured by establishing rules for the conduct of social of life in 
an increasingly diverse range of activities. This might take the forms of a response to 
actual or threatened disorder, or clarifying responsibilities in relation to potentially harmful 
conduct, or establishing rules for coordinating complex social interactions”. 329  But 
theoretical reconsideration about the relevance of a potential interdependence between 
trust and substantive criminal law is missing in the criminal law literature. This section will 
attempt to contribute to this debate, and to do so, we need first to dissect the complex 
concept of trust and thereafter explain the way the criminal law endorses trust within the 
institutional framework. 
 
We discussed above that we can causally control natural structures. They generate 
categorical expectations that any observer needs to cognitively process and understand in 
order to successfully exist, but nothing else. In any case, natural structures have neither the 
ability to control their own behaviour nor the ability to anticipate the behaviour of others. 
Conversely, migratory birds have the capacity to modify their behaviour, taking in account 
the behaviour of others. Ducks and geese align themselves instinctively or when they 
perceive some physical signals from other birds in order to boost the efficiency of flying. 
They can modify their conduct reacting to the behaviour of the rest of the flock. This 
anticipatory comportment can be evidenced both in the interaction between ducks but also 
with others. If, for example, the flock notice the presence of humans with guns in a 
particular area, they may modify their route of flight. This ability opens up complex levels 
of interactivity between migrating birds. In fact, these levels of interactivity and 
anticipatory behaviour are common within the animal kingdom.  
 
However, there is a sharp difference between the deliberation process of humans 
and animals: humans not only make decisions anticipating the behaviour of others, but are 
also able to take into consideration the mental life of others in their practical reasoning.  At 																																																								
327 Ibd at p73 
328 Ibd at p73 
329 Ibd at p299 
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zebra crossings a dog will always stop if a car is approaching whereas a human will cross. 
We as humans can take into consideration in our practical reasoning that we can count on 
the deliberation process of others,330 and for that reason we can build our plans on the 
expectation of their mutual responsiveness. Coming back to the guidance view proposed 
by legal positivists, we can conclude that it does not provide an answer to this puzzling 
theoretical environment. Upholding that legal norms are (exclusionary) reasons for action 
in our deliberation process is short-sighted in scope. In our deliberation process we are also 
able to take into consideration the mental life of others. When making our own 
deliberations we can count on the deliberation process of others with the expectation that 
they will comply with the legal norms and behave accordingly with this expectation. This 
is the sociological essence missed by legal positivists and precisely the gist of 
interpersonal trust.  
 
 This argument is well condensed in Jones’ concept of trustworthiness when she 
asserts that only we as humans “[…] have the cognitive capacity to take into account in our 
deliberation the fact that another agent’s deliberation rests on assumptions about what we 
will do […].331  We are social creatures and our attitudes towards one another are essential 
to foster trust. As reflective beings we understand this; we are aware that others can be a 
source of opportunity or betrayal. Regardless, we need others because we can only survive 
in cooperative social environments. As deliberative beings, we also have the ability to take 
into consideration, in our own practical reasoning,332 the expectations and intentions of 
others. In other words, we can take into consideration in our deliberation process before 
action the fact that others count on us.333 The direct consequence of this capacity is that the 
achievement of our plans sometimes depends on the conduct of the person we count on. 
We make ourselves vulnerable to them and at the same time they are aware that the 
achievement of our goals is contingent on the actions they take. At the end, each of us 
know that the other is able to take into account the ways in which the success of our 
actions depend on what others will do.334 As a result, we consider in our future actions that 
others will respond to our manifested dependency on each other.335 Trustworthiness 
represents an aptitude to take certain other’s trust in you as a reason to act as trusted. The 																																																								
330 See T. Scanlon Promises and Contracts. Reprinted in The Difficulty of Tolerance (2003) at pp239-240 
331 See K. Jones “Trustworthiness” Ethics  (2012) 123:61–85 at p63 
332 See P. Pettit The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (1993) pp54–76 
333 K. Jones “Trustworthiness” Ethics 123 (October 2012): 61–85 at 64 
334 Ibd at p64 
335 This account of trustworthiness is known as trust responsiveness. There are also other accounts of 
trustworthiness to justify trust, like those that focus on goodwill. A wider debate about such accounts is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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fact that I am trustworthy to someone is a reason for me to react to the other person’s 
dependency in the way he relies upon me. Thus, my trustworthiness (to you) and your trust 
becomes a trigger for me to act as trusted. 
  
However, trustworthiness requires something more than just positive (or predictive) 
expectations that others will respond to our recognised dependencies. If my neighbor 
usually prunes our common bush fence every spring without any formal agreement I could 
be disappointed if, one year, he decides not to do it, but I should not feel betrayed. To trust 
others we need more than potential projections of habits or predictive expectations. We 
take some stance336 towards others that demands a particular behavior from them because 
this is what they should do. To trust we need normative expectations, which implies some 
link of accountability between the expectation and our reliance;337 a reassurance that our 
expectations will be protected in case they are not lived up to by others. This element of 
responsibility is well conveyed in Walker’s concept of trust:338 “[…] a kind of reliance on 
others whom we expect (perhaps only implicitly or unreflectively) to behave as relied upon 
(e.g. in specified ways, in ways that fulfill an assumed standard, or in ways so as to achieve 
relied-upon outcomes) and to behave that way in the awareness (if only implicit or 
unreflective) that they are liable to be held responsible for failing to do so or to make 
reasonable efforts to do so”. Trust implies then the possibility to act negatively, attaching 
blame (not just disappointment) in cases where the trustee does not live up to expectations. 
Trusting implies a judgement that the other will act in the way relied upon because he 
realises that this is how he should act.339 Therefore, trustworthiness requires both the 
knowledge that we can rely on others, and cognisance that we can be held responsible if 
we do not live up to others’ expectations. Moreover, Jones, in her ‘responsive’ concept of 
trustworthiness,340 points to this normative extension of trust in particular domains: “B is 
trustworthy with respect to A in domain of interaction D, if and only if she is competent 
with respect to that domain, and she would take the fact that A is counting on her, were A 
to do so in this domain, to be a compelling reason for acting as counted on.” This 
compelling element ‘to behave as relied upon’ links the fulfillment of the expectation with 																																																								
336 R. Holton “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1994) 72(1):63– 
76. P. Hieronymi “The Reasons of Trust,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2008) 86(2):213–236. 
V. McGeer “Trust, Hope, and Empowerment” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2008) 86(2):237– 
254.  
337 Relevant is the work of Scanlon on promises (there he picks out fidelity as the ground of promissory 
obligations). See: Scanlon T, “Promises and Practices” Philosophy and Public Affairs, in (1990) 
19(3):199-226 
338 M.U. Walker Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing (2006) at p80 
339 N .Eisikovits The Conceptual Neighborhood, Suffolk University (2015) at p77 
340 K. Jones “Trustworthiness” Ethics (2012) 123(1):61-85 
Chapter 3: Conceptual institutional framework 
 
88	
the potential attribution of responsibility and the consequent blame in case of default. The 
implications of the two dimensions of trust distilled above – the neighboring (two-place 
trust structure) described by Walker and the ‘three-place trust structure’ defined by Jones – 
will be fleshed out later when a fresh account of personhood in law and criminal 
responsibility is defended.  
 
Institutional structures require adherence to this reliance attitude to survive. 
Derived from the status function, they enclose a waterfall of deontic-normative powers that 
provide status holders with a common reason for action in their practical reasoning in two 
ways: institutional frameworks guide us but also disclose to others that they “count on us”. 
Within the institutional framework we all know that the success of our actions and the 
success of the institution’s structure depend on what others will do. Only within normative 
frameworks of reciprocal and conventional expectations can we interact, cooperate and 
trust strangers, because we know that others consider the ways in which the success of our 
actions depend on what they will do. Furthermore, not living up to the normative 
expectations generated can lead to the attachment of negative consequences like blame or 
censure by other members of the institution. Some institutional frameworks can effectively 
subsist under the normative structure provided by ‘pure’ trust, social habits or conventional 
expectations. Social blame or censure should be a proportional response. However, for 
other more sophisticated institutional frameworks, in order to achieve their function, they 
need a more formal, authority-based normative structure in place. These formal/legal rules 
institutionalise new expectations or previously informal practices, conveying the 
compelling/responsibility element highlighted by Walker and Jones. However, they also 
incorporate, in some cases, new and more severe ways to protect our now institutionalised 
expectations.  
 
Take the example of driving; an everyday social practice. We drive to work every 
morning surrounded by complete strangers who interact with us in a risky environment. 
Every driver is a biological human, a risky entity with its own degree of freedom of action. 
Nevertheless, we trust them. Irrespective of this a priori dangerous and uncertain driving 
environment, most of us are conscientiously calm drivers. We do not trust in each of the 
individualities we meet on the road with their purposes, preferences or personal reasons, 
nor could we trust the anarchy of completely anonymous strangers. Trust between drivers-
status-holders arises because we share a deontic framework and it is expected that 
everybody will comply with it because we each know that others are counting on us to do 
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so. We assume that others will recognise and respond to our mutual and reciprocal 
dependencies. In this way, the driver-status-holder becomes someone distinctive for us. He 
becomes a driver who drives among drivers and, as result, we trust him because we expect 
him to act within the deontic framework. We are also aware that some negative effects 
could arise if the stranger trustee does not behave as relied upon. In some cases, 
administrative sanctions or criminal punishment could be attributed. 
 
This dual dimension requires highlighting the distinction between the aim of 
criminal (behavioural) norms and the aim of criminal punishment. Criminal norms merely 
reformulate expectations. They are then a system of status functions that institutionalises 
expectations. The behavioural side of any criminal norm institutionalises the deontic 
powers inherent in any institutional structure. This institutionalising process implies a 
more meticulous and accurate description of the command or prohibited conduct than the 
mere recognised practice. For example, rule 195 of the Highway Code341 outlines the 
obligation of a driver approaching a zebra crossing to give way when a pedestrian has 
“moved onto a crossing”. Thus, the institutionalised conduct implies that drivers have no 
legal obligation to give way to pedestrians until they have stepped onto the road. Everyone 
using the institutional structure knows now the specific conduct expected. Institutional 
structure users are thus aware that the success of their plans depends on what those driving 
will do; in this case to stop when they step on to the road. In this way, criminal norms 
reassure and endorse interpersonal trust as we plan our behaviour according with the 
expectation that others will comply with the legal norms.  
 
Criminal law also provides sanctions due to another inherent duality of the 
institutional deontic framework: a necessary collective acceptance as well as an 
acknowledgement of freedom of action among its users. Not every institutionalised 
normative expectation carries criminal punishment. Some kind of gradation exists in the 
process of institutionalisation. As aforementioned there are institutions with a highly legal 
pre-configuration, whereas others can only remain under conventional expectations, social 
censure and social blame. Compulsory enforcement, penalties, administrative sanction, or 
nullity of certain acts similarly ensures the validity of institutional expectations. Criminal 
law cannot guarantee that the expectations will be fulfilled. However, criminal norms 
communicate in advance that normative expectations will be maintained as expectations, 
even in cases of violation. Against those expectations whose violation can jeopardise the 																																																								
341 The Highway Code Department of Transport 1st October 2015 
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institutional architecture of the society, criminal punishment is justified. Criminal 
punishment has then the function to preserve, reaffirm and reinforce institutional trust: 
trust in the institutional structure itself. The essential nature of institutional structures for 
human societies justifies that, in order to reassure and endorse institutional trust, 
normative-institutionalised expectations will be maintained even in cases of violation of 
the deontic/legal institutional framework. Criminal punishment in this picture, attains its 
legitimation from the need to secure the institutional identity of the society against those 
forms of conduct that contravene the general normative model of orientation or guidance in 
social interaction that the institutional structure defines.  
 Finnis	 openly	 claims	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 understand	 the	 law	 requires	 an	understanding	 of	 its	 functions342.	 It	 seems	 evident	 that	 in	 order	 to	 recognize	 the	extension	and	nature	of	 the	 law	 it	 is	essential	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	hypothetical	functions	that	the	law	can	accomplish.	However,	knowledge	of	the	potential	functions	of	criminal	law	is	not	only	key	to	understanding	the	nature	of	criminal	law	but,	more	importantly,	 is	 essential	 in	 order	 to	 appraise	 its	 quality.	 Ascribing	 functions	 to	criminal	law	therefore	establishes	a	standard	by	which	its	success	can	be	evaluated.	Only	 when	 the	 functions	 of	 criminal	 law	 have	 been	 fulfilled	 can	 we	 endorse	 its	excellence	(or	not).	The	range	of	potential	functions	attributable	to	criminal	law	are	as	diverse	as	they	are	normative,	because	they	depend	on	the	ideological	background	of	 the	 observer:	 deterrence,	 punishment	 of	wrongdoers…	The	 above	 claim	 that	 the	main	function	of	criminal	law	is	the	protection	of	institutional	expectations	does	not	exclude	other	potential	functions	or	effects	of	criminal	law	although,	in	any	case,	the	research	claims	that	this	is	the	primary	function	of	criminal	law.	
 
This fresh approach to the function of the criminal law requires unpacking. If the 
main function of the criminal law is neither punishment justification nor deterrence but the 
protection of legal-institutionalised expectations, a fresh account of criminal responsibility 
should be provided. This new interpretation should reflect the institutional framework 
deployed above. In doing so, particular attention should be given to the allocation of status 
that triggers the validity of the deontic institutional framework. Ascription of status 
reshapes the concept of personhood in law and the attribution of criminal responsibility 
itself. However, it must also reflect the two dimensions of trust highlighted above: Walker 
introduces what can be named as a ‘two-place trust structure’, defined as a kind of 																																																								
342 J. Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights (2011) pp6-8 
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neighboring concept of trust, or simply a ‘trusting somebody’ view of trust. Although we 
very frequently ‘trust somebody’ in Walker’s account, we often do not trust the same 
person to perform, for example, a specific task. We maybe trust our neighbors or friends 
but it does mean that we will trust them to perform the urgent appendectomy we may 
require. This ‘three-place trust structure’343 framed by Jones based on competence in the 
domain, emphasised that often reliance rests in the necessary abilities, knowledge or skills 
of the trustee. The next section will deal with the allocation of status within the 
institutional structure followed by a section returning to the attribution of criminal 
responsibility derived from the allocation of status. 
  
3.5 Personhood in law and institutional status 
 
At the beginning of this this chapter it was claimed that deontic and legal powers 
derive from the allocation of status to persons, objects and other entities. Judges, friends, 
brothers, citizens, lovers and marathon runners all have recognised institutional status. 
Status is the salient concept in the institutional structure because its extension guides both 
the holder and those who interact with him, and it is also a key point in the attribution of 
criminal responsibility. In this part we will focus our attention first on the allocation of 
status to persons and later we will return to the attribution of responsibility derived from 
status. The term status is usually used in jurisprudence as a legal expression to define 
grounds for differentiations of capacity like age, gender or nationality.344 Status in the 
sense here advanced as a role, status-role, or role-attribution, has generally been neglected 
in legal literature. To find a developed theory of role-status we need to move on to the 
study of the social structures developed in the sociological field by American 
sociologists.345 In the European debate,346 the concept of social role was first introduced by 
the German-British sociologist and philosopher Dahrendorf, 347  who illustrated the 
difference between position and status-role: position is the place that an individual 
occupies in the social structure: husband, teacher, judge, etc. Status or role would be the 
constellation of expectations relating to a particular position. According to this approach, 																																																								
343 K. Jones “Trustworthiness” Ethics (2012) 123(1):61-85 at p62  
344 See N. MacCormick Institutions of Law. An Essay in Legal Theory (2007) at p97. O. Weinberger Law, 
Institution and Legal Politics (1991) at p193. See also H.L.A. Hart Punishment and Responsibility: 
Essays in the Philosophy of Law (2008) at pp211-230  
345 See K. Lumpkin The Family: A Study of Members Roles (1993); R. Parks “Behind our masks” Survey 
(1926) 56:135 
346 R. Dahrendorf “Homo Sociologicus” in Uni-Taschenbucher. VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenzchaften, 
Wiesbaden (1964) 
347 Ibd at pp11-12 
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status brings together the collection of expectations related to the holder of a particular 
position. Status then becomes a cluster of conduct guidance for the holder as well as for 
those who interact with him. This line of argumentation, previously proposed by 
Durkheim348, was introduced to the legal arena by Parsons349 and especially by his disciple, 
Luhmann.350 The German sociologist distinguished psychological systems from social 
systems, with ‘communication’ being a salient element in society. Law reduced chaos and 
disorder in communication stabilising with minimum standards and excludes other options 
that perturb social interaction. Chaos is stabilised by expectations that transform the 
contingent social coexistence by the order of the expected. In the communication the actors 
will know which expectation others have and what they can expect from them. We can 
only speak of society where law provides an expected normative oriented scenario. 
 
From a more legal theory orientated approach MacCormick, dealing with 
personhood, distinguishes two kinds of normative attributes: normative position and 
normative relation. A human being (or a group of them) can have a normative position by 
the simple fact of being human, thus law interprets the biological human entity as a person 
in the legal sense.351 This attribution provides the grounds, for example, for the recognition 
of Universal Human Rights. The other normative attributes are relational and reflect a 
logical connection between rights and obligations. Relational attributes imply that there is 
someone else with a corresponding counterpart attribute. MacCormick gives marriage as a 
good example of this relational normative attribution, except he affirms that it is a common 
feature of most normative attributes such as buyer/seller, employer/employee and so on. 
The one thing that is certain in MacCormick’s suggestion is that personhood in law is a 
matter of institutional fact.352 Furthermore, when he affirms, “[…] within the law, persons 
are defined and can occupy a variety of ever-changing legal positions and relation. To 
know of these is to have knowledge of institutional facts”,353 he is also claiming the social 
relevance of status in an institutional framework. 																																																								
348 Similar arguments are implicit in Durkheim’s idea of social order as normative consensus and division of 
labour: A system of rules and standards that define appropriate behaviour to avoid anarchy based on 
self-interest. 
349 For Parsons deviation means non-conformity with others’ expectations justifying the attribution of 
responsibility. Deviation is not negatively defined as a conduct or behaviour, but implies a social 
relation between persons in conflict. Parsons’ social action thesis states that social action arises as a 
result of interaction between actors. The actor plays a role (e.g. student or father) and the roles changes 
in different social scenarios. 
350 N. Luhmann Law as a Social System (2004) at p185. See also N. Luhmann Social System (1995) at 
pp292-294 and 303–307 
351 N. MacCormick Institutions of Law An Essay in Legal Theory (2007) at p53 
352 Ibd at p76 
353 Ibd at p76 
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Other legal philosophers have recognised the significance of status (roles) in our 
society. In Punishment and Responsibility Hart, in his categorisation of responsibility, 
identifies and describes roles and role responsibility extensively. For Hart, however, role 
has a very limited meaning that involves only duties or tasks to provide for the welfare of 
others, or to advance the aims and purposes of an organisation.354 Following the same line 
of thought Baier defines role narrowly as a task or obligation to promote the wellbeing of 
another.355 Both philosophers, defending this restricted concept of role as place or office in 
a social organisation or as a simple ‘social role’, disregard a salient feature of our social 
dimension: that in all the conduct we execute socially we are performing a status. 
Weinberger developed a more elaborate account of (legal) status,356 recognising that 
individuals in groups take on certain roles in the community which are determined by 
normative regulations: “This role-play is a complex mixture of what must be done and 
what may be done, of tasks and authorisations, of demands and expectation, of taking and 
active part and adapting to others.”357 He presents role-play as the deontic framework here 
defended, but his concept suffers the effects of Hart and Baier’ influence and its perception 
of status as a restricted ‘social role’ where we enter citizenship either automatically or by a 
deliberate act of will.358 It is worth mentioning that Weinberger recognised that role-
players are not only merely expected to adhere to specific standards of conduct, but it is 
also demanded of them.359 
 The	institutional	concept	of	status	defended	here	rests	on	the	fact	that	within	our	 modern	 heterogeneous	 societies	 we	 are	 ‘ordered	 freedom’.	 The	 ambit	 and	extension	 of	 our	 freedom	 is	 precast	 by	 social	 institutions.	 Freedom	 does	 not	 arise	from	 our	 individual	 choice	 alone	 but	 is	 conditioned	 by	 a	 world	 previously	institutionally	 constituted	 (although	 susceptible	 to	 modification	 and	 change).	 We	must	 learn	 how	 this	 institutional	 reality	 operates	 before	 interacting	 with	 it.	 It	 is	during	 this	 learning	 process	 that	 some	 degree	 of	 our	 genuine	 personal	 identity	vanished	 as	 the	 price	 of	 being	 allocated	 with	 a	 status	 entitling	 us	 to	 the	 use	 of																																																									
354 H.L.A. Hart Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (2008) at pp211-230  
355 Ibd at pp212-4 
355 K. Baier Responsibility and Action (1986) at p104 
356 Ota Weinberger uses the concept of role instead of status. See O. Weinberger Law, Institution and Legal 
Politics (1991) at p193 
357 Italics introduced by the author himself. See O. Weinberger Law, Institution and Legal Politics (1991) at 
p254 
358 Ibd at p254 
359 Ibd at p194 
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94	institutions	and	the	enjoyment	of	its	inbuilt	deontic	powers.	This	approach	endorses	in	some	way	an	institutionalized	concept	of	personhood	or	at	least	legal	personhood.	The	institutional	structure	of	human	society	starts	with	this	allocation	of	status.	This	recognition	of	status	implies	the	attribution	of	legal	rights	and	duties	inherent	to	the	status.	 Institutional	 functions	can	only	be	performed	 if	 the	 status	 is	 recognised	and	secured;	 conversely,	 only	 status-holders	 are	 authorised	 to	 perform	 institutional	functions.	 Human	 societies	 need	 these	 socially	 created,	 objective	 structures	 to	develop	institutional	functions	and	establish	social	standards	and	patterns	for	human	conduct.	 As	 pointed	 out	 above,	 only	 within	 the	 deontic	 framework	 created	 by	function	 status,	 fostering	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 mutual	 and	 interpersonal	 trust,	 can	interactions	between	strangers	take	place.	By	assigning	a	particular	status	a	stranger	becomes	known	and	reliable	to	us.	As	a	result,	those	who	do	not	act	according	to	what	is	expected	will	be	seen	socially	as	misappropriated	and	diverted.	Depending	on	the	manner	 with	 which	 the	 status	 functions	 are	 performed	 by	 the	 holder,	 he	 can	 be	regarded	with	 social	 antipathy,	 socially	 excluded	 from	 the	use	of	 the	 institution,	 or	legally	sanctioned.	
 
The inactive dimension grounded in the neminem laede principle substantiates the 
first category of criminal responsibility and the first principle of trust. The expectation 
exists that in the exercise of our individual orderly freedom we will take significant 
choices respecting others. In this inactive dimension the first intuitive standard would 
probably be that the agent behaves as a reasonable person. Gardner has illustrated how 
controversial this regularly assumed standard could be.360 This anthropomorphic legal 
fiction, inheritor of the Roman bonus paterfamilias, represents the body of standards of 
care shaped by courts through case law. The reasonable person delineates a hypothetical 
person who exercises average judgement and care. Thus, it could serve as a comparative 
standard for determining criminal responsibility. However, this comparative standard 
reflects a majoritarian behavioural approach within a particular society and perhaps does 
not replicate the expectation that particular users of a particular institutional framework 
have. For that reason, it seems more acute to articulate a test that encompasses the 
minimum updatable knowledge required to interact legitimately in the institutional 
framework: a collateral institutional user test. In applying this test, judges and juries must 
take into consideration the institutional framework where users are interacting. In fact, they 																																																								
360 For an extensive discussion about the reasonable person see: J. Gardner “The Many Faces of the 
Reasonable Person” LQR (2015) 131:25 
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should position themselves within the institutional framework. From this perspective, as 
collateral institutional users, they must decide if the accused has lived up to reciprocal 
institutional expectations in the particular case under examination. Therefore, in those 
cases where new inputs do not trigger doubts in the agent’s perception process about his 
beliefs, the applicable test should be an institutional user’s standard. It should be decided 
through this objective/normative appraisal whether the behaviour of the agent falls below 
the standard of the ordinary user in his situation. Where in the first ECCR’s requirement 
the appraisal was absolutely psychological, taking into account any characteristic of the 
citizen, the test proposed in the second requirement outlines a normative standard. So, in 
those offences of dissociation where the citizen disregards suspicions raised during the 
perception process about beliefs of brute facts, the agent will be criminally responsible. 
Where he persists on performing the on-going action he will be criminally responsible for 
the results of his action. Furthermore, when the information available to the citizen 
(updated with new stimuli) is insufficient to cast doubts or raise suspicions about his 
beliefs, the citizen will only be exonerated under a normative test. This normative test 
states that an accused will only be exonerated if the conduct of an ordinary institutional 
user with similar knowledge and under similar circumstances to the defendant would have 
had the same (false) belief. 
  
Modern human societies are also founded on active social interaction and 
cooperation. Vital structures in our contemporary societies like political participation, 
social cooperation, financial transactions or business trading would not be possible without 
securement that their implementation is done professionally and competently. The 
proactive dimension of status implies that in planning our lives interacting with others or 
the natural environment it is necessary to secure the proficient and orderly development of 
the essential institutions. We need to trust the engineer who designs our car as much as he 
needs to trust his dentist. However, the status holder must also guarantee the existence of 
the institution and its continuity. For that reason, the status holder will be made responsible 
for a deficient performance of their institutional function(s). As a result of the above 
arguments, in this research we defend that in the case of offences of association the test 
should be stricter than the collateral institutional user test.  Acting in the proactive 
dimension of status requires more skill and ability than the average institutional user. 
Consequently, the test applicable in cases where new inputs did not give rise to doubts in 
the accused about his beliefs should be in line with the standards required for a competent, 
skilful and proficient user of the institutional structure. However, opinions about a 
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competent and practiced use of the institutional structure can differ. In these cases the issue 
is again about the standard required. The solution should be in accordance with the 
function of the criminal law of protecting user’s expectations. Thus, it should be enough to 
show that the decision taken was reasonable in the circumstances, regardless that other 
users’ opinions could differ about the choice. As far as the expectations about the 
institutional structure are protected the choice should be admitted as adequate. This 
approach differs in tempo from the test applicable to offences of disassociation: the test for 
the former type of offences has a descriptive nature; it is about ‘what was actually done’ 
and whether or not the standard show was proficient. In disassociation offences the test is 
normative. It is about what should be done in order to fulfil the standard. 
 
The exercise of our ordered freedom as status holders can be categorised into 
inactive and proactive dimensions. The inactive dimension, directly linked with the two-
place structure of trust, implies the planning and performance of our conduct and actions 
according to the functions inherent in our status without disturbance of the circle of 
planning and organisation of others. Planning and acting within our status framework 
reaffirms to others that their framework of organisation will be respected. As status holders 
we must configure our ambit of action to avoid processes of action that intrude on the 
circles of planning of others. An expectation exists that in the exercise of our individual 
orderly freedom we will take significant choices respecting others. In this inactive 
dimension the first intuitive standard would probably be that the agent behaves as a 
reasonable person. Within this obligation to respect others and right of non-interference, 
condensed in the Roman neminem laede principle,361 rests the essence of civil peace and 
social order. This inactive dimension (present in any status) assures the other members of 
the society that we will not create non-permitted risks that can jeopardise their orderly 
freedom. In this way we design and configure our quotidian conduct according to our 
categorical and normative institutionalised expectations.  
 
Besides this constraining deontic/normative spectrum, as MacCormick highlighted 
above, status holders also have relational normative attributes. In fact the whole point of 
the creation and regulation of the institutional reality is to create and regulate relationships 
between people. Human institutional society is not just about people or objects invested or 
allocated with status, it is about people cooperating in performing and implementing social 
acts; it is about people’s relationships and interaction within the deontic/normative 																																																								
361 Injure no one. 
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institutional framework. Nevertheless, contrary to the inactive dimension, the substantive 
content of these relational normative attributes is dynamic and proactive. The holder, 
performing the functions assigned by their status, intentionally intervenes in the planning 
and action of others voluntarily and proactively. This proactive dimension of status implies 
that in planning our lives interacting with others or the natural environment it is necessary 
to secure the proficient and orderly development of the essential institutions. We need to 
trust the engineer who designs our trains as much as he needs to trust his dentist. However, 
the status holder must also guarantee the existence of the institution and its continuity. For 
that reason, the status holder will be made responsible for a deficient performance of their 
institutional function(s). This proactive dimension of the status is interconnected with the 
“three-place trust structure”362 framed by Jones based on competence in the domain. Often, 
trustworthiness is directly linked to the necessary abilities, knowledge or skills of the 
trustee. In this relational attribute, the institutional expectation is not the creation of non-
permitted risks, but that the function status will be performed competently and proficiently 
“in [the] domain of interaction D”.363 The expectation is generated by the function 
assigned to the status; we expect that the status-holder will perform their functions as 
allocated by the status-function. As Weinberger argued, status is more than standards of 
behaviour put in practice; they “[…] are rules stipulating how these people are to conduct 
themselves in their roles”.364 The proactive functions inherent to a particular status involve 
improving, cooperating and expanding the ambit of planning and acting of other status 
holders. From the proposal here defended, this institutionalised expectation of the 
intervention of status holders in each other’s ambits can be divided between a general and 
singular sphere. The former, based on inter-subjective solidarity, would legitimate the 
action in cases of serious risk for the integrity of others. Its performance would not require 
a big effort to implement and would be fundamental for the creation of a potential offence 
of pure omission that is actually criminalised.365 The latter encompasses those proactive 
functions specifically included in the status function that the holder is obliged to 
implement efficiently. The supposed transgression of the function can be either the result 
of an action or an omission. Perhaps it is appropriate to clarify at this point that the inactive 
and proactive dimensions of status here defended do not have a straightforward relation 
with omissions or actions. Theft can be committed by active appropriation or by keeping 
																																																								
362 K. Jones  “Trustworthiness” Ethics (2012) 123(1):61-85 at p62 
363 Ibd at p63 
348 O. Weinberger Law, Institution and Legal Politics (1991) at p87 
365 A topic which goes beyond this research 
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the found property without forming a belief that the owner could not be found.366 What is 
significant is the intervention in the ambit of organisation of others in the former case or 
the deficient or incorrect implantation of the functions allocated to the status in the latter.  
 
3.6 Institutional responsibility 
 
Responsibility has traditionally been conceptualised within the framework of 
wrong behaviour as the ability to respond or to answer. This concept of responsibility as 
accountability or answerability is for example claimed by Duff and Gardner. Duff, for 
example, argues that criminal responsibility should be constructed in terms of the reasons 
provided by the agent to his fellow citizens (relational responsibility) in relation to those 
wrongs that violate fundamental values of the political community (public wrongs).367 
Gardner, on the other hand, also supporting responsibility in terms of answerability, rejects 
the relational perspective defended by Duff, asserting that “all reasons are ultimately the 
same for everyone”. 368  Even from a tepid institutional attitude towards criminal 
responsibility, Lacey also defends criminal responsibility as a social practice of calling to 
account.369 
 
At least etymologically, those who defend a retrospective account of responsibility 
as the ability to respond are wrong. Re-spons-ibility derives from the Latin verb 
“spondere” meaning to promise, to offer, or to bind oneself, and sponsio is an older word 
to designate an obligation. Of the three forms of promise370 known in Roman law – 
sponsio, fridepromissio and fideiussio – sponsio was the oldest. It was characterised by the 
expression “spondeo”, after the question “idem dari spondes?”. Words like “sponsare” that 
mean betroth and “sponsi” which means engaged share the same roots. Indeed, English 
words like spouse or sponsor etymologically derive from the word spons. Additionally, the 
prefix re- that specifies ‘back to the original place again’, reinforces the idea that 
responsibility is the quality to be able to make good on our promises. In any case, at least 																																																								
366 Theft by finding occurs when someone chances upon an object which seems lost or abandoned and takes 
possession without taking any steps to find out if the object is really abandoned or merely lost. See T 
Joycey, “finding of property” in P. Cane and J. Conaghan (eds) The New Oxford Companion to Law 
(2008) 
367 R.A. Duff Answering for Crime. Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (2007) at  p47 
368 J. Gardner “Relations of Responsibility” in R. Cruft, M.H. Kramer and M. Reif (eds) Crime, Punishment 
and Responsibility. The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (2011) pp87,89 
369 N. Lacey The jurisprudence annual lecture 2013 Institutionalizing Responsibility: Implications for 
Jurisprudence 11. For a recent revision of principles and practices of criminal responsibility see N. 
Lacey In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests and Institutions (2016) Chapter 2. 
370  Forms of promise 
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etymologically, re-spons-ibility371 denotes prospectiveness. The account of responsibility 
proposed here is related with this etymological concept. Law is concerned with 
establishing what our responsibilities are, telling us how to behave, guiding us and 
promoting interpersonal trust, more than it is about holding us to account for the way we 
have behaved. In this approach responsibility is the quality to accomplish the material 
functions contained in our status. Status determines the ambit of responsibility of the 
holder.  Thus, a status holder is not to be understood as someone who can produce or 
prevent an event or incident, but rather one who can be responsible for it. Only when the 
event happens within the material domain of the status framework can the holder be held 
responsible. In consequence, we are only responsible for those events that happen within 
the framework of our status in the exercise of the assigned function. Attribution of criminal 
responsibility is not a historical verification of the existence of a naturalistic cause-effect 
link between a particular action and its result. Criminal responsibility can only be 
attributed to the status holder when he acts outside his inactive dimension, disturbing 
another holder’s expectations, or in the performance of his proactive dimension, when he 
does not accomplish his status functions proficiently. As Cane correctly affirms, historic 
responsibility understood as the ability to respond, is the pathological form of legal 
responsibility.372 
 
We are not responsible for any occurrence which is causally connected with us. In 
fact, we are usually responsible for a very limited amount of happenings in the relational 
world we live. The status-based concept of responsibility defended here deploys a filter to 
determine whether a specific action or behaviour has institutional significance or not. In 
the same way as society rewards those who efficiently perform their institutional functions, 
responsibility will be attributed when the institutional expectations allocated to our status 
have not been fulfilled. Attribution of responsibility requires then that the action or 
behaviour performed, aside from violating the institutional normative structure was within 
the inactive or proactive dimension of the status.  
 
It was stated above that criminal law secures the institutional identity of the society 
against conduct that disregards the deontic model of guidance that the institutional 
structure defines. This institutional identity of human societies is secured as far as its 																																																								
371 Curiously, “respondere” had a procedural use in Roman law as one of the three activities that Roman 
jurists performed, understood as the giving of an opinion on legal problems, usually ratified by a judge 
verdict known as “response” 
372 P. Cane Responsibility in law and morality (2002) at p35 
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members act within the framework of his status. An institutional reinstatement is not 
required when the event occurs outside the ambit of planning or action of the status holder 
because no institutional expectations have been fulfilled. If some harm results from an 
event causally linked with the status holder but outside his status framework, it should be 
attributed to other status holders or to a natural event or accident but not to the holder who 
acts according with his status. The social order or civility that criminal law contributes to 
preserve is not altered when the holder acts without generating a risk socially assumed in 
the performance of the functions assigned to the status. In the end, the harm of property or 
persons is criminally relevant only insofar as it undermines a deontic institutional structure. 
 
Institutional responsibility reflects both dimensions illustrated above. The inactive 
dimension, grounded in the neminem laede principle, substantiates the first category of 
criminal responsibility and the first principle of civility. There exists the expectation that in 
the exercise of our individual orderly freedom we will make significant choices respecting 
others. As a counterpart, the status holder has to assume and respond for the consequences 
of a defective planning of his ambit of action. In this balance between individual orderly 
freedom and responsibility for the faulty consequences resides the first principle of civility: 
normative-institutionalised expectations and ‘two-place trust structure’ between strangers 
could not be secured without the attachment of responsibility to the free exercise of 
planning. Free will without institutional responsibility is pure randomness and 
incompatible with institutional order. We shall call those breaches where the status holder 
does not live up to the institutional expectations generated by the inactive dimension of 
status offences of disassociation.  
 
But social order and civility is just the primary stage of an institutional order. 
Modern human societies are founded on active social interaction and cooperation.  Vital 
structures in our contemporary societies like political participation, social cooperation, 
financial transactions, or business trading would not be possible without securing that their 
implementation is done professionally and competently. We buy shares in equity markets 
or ready-cooked meals in supermarkets expecting that those in charge follow the standards 
and procedures in place. The proactive dimension of status implies that in planning our 
lives interacting with others it is necessary to secure the proficient and orderly 
development of the essential institutions. Only in this way can the ‘two-place trust 
structure’ exist. The status holder has to guarantee the existence of the institution and its 
continuity, thus he will necessarily be made responsible for a deficient performance of its 
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institutional functions. We can therefore name those breaches where the status holder does 
not live up the institutional expectation grounded in the performance of the function 
attributed to his status offences of association. The relevance of offences of dissociation 
and offences of association will be crucial in the attribution of criminal responsibility in 
cases of false beliefs and its dissimilar relevance will be expanded on in Part II of the 
thesis.373 
 
3.7 Knowledge of the law within the institutional framework 
 
The legal moralist tradition does not contemplate human beings as able to take 
legal norms in their deliberating process as a consideration or reason for action. It is the 
fact that the citizen has done something wrong (whatever his deliberation process has 
been) that triggers criminal responsibility. If the wrongdoer can provide no justification for 
his wrongful action he will be held responsible. What is relevant is the extent of the moral 
wrong committed. In any case, knowledge of the law is irrelevant.  On the other side of the 
spectrum, for legal positivists, knowledge of legal validity and its relevance in the practical 
reasoning before action is key. The law is not ‘written in our hearts’. Any legal system 
must have cognoscible and knowable rules of action to guide conduct.374  
 
Within the institutional framework here defended, knowledge not only of the law 
but of the institutional framework is essential. The institutional approach, recognising the 
relevance of deliberation, goes further in its range or extent. Not only do we consider legal 
norms in our practical reasoning but we also take into account that we count on the 
deliberation process of others. We expect that others will contemplate in their practical 
reasoning legal norms as a reason for action. We have the capacity to consider in our 
deliberation the fact that the deliberation of others is founded on expectations about what 
we will do. As a result we consolidate our plans based on the expectation of that 
responsiveness. In organising our lives, we normatively expect that others will take the 
institutional framework and criminal norms (if any) as a reason for action. With this 
expectation in mind we socially interact with unknown people in our two-dimensional 
status: active and inactive. To plan and organise our life over the expectations of others 
requires a deep knowledge of the social framework at an institutional user level. We need 
to know how the institutional framework operates, its content and limits, as well as any 																																																								
373 See Chapter 6. 
374 J.P. Shofield and J. Harris (eds) The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Legislator of the World: 
Writings on Codification, Law and Education (1998) 
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potential exceptions or excusatory conditions. Only in this way we can interact with others 
without relying on groundless prospects. 
 
But knowledge is essential as well in the attribution of criminal responsibility. 
Criminal responsibility will be directly attributed in those cases where the citizen notices 
and recognises that he is acting illegally. But in those situations where he is not, attribution 
of criminal responsibility could be challenging. The first issue to solve is the minimum 
threshold required to exclude any excusatory consequences of false beliefs. Whether this 
threshold has a moral, institutional, legal or criminal extension will be widely discussed in 
chapter 7. But beyond the establishment of a minimum threshold, knowledge is critical in 
the attribution of criminal responsibility. As deliberative agents we attain reasons from 
facts and grant them weight. Only true facts can be known, thus a false belief will be a 
deceptive consideration in our practical reasoning. For those reasons, cognitive capacities 
are essential in the attribution of criminal responsibility. It would be relevant to highlight at 
this point that cognitive conditions of criminal responsibility have been widely disregarded 
by legal philosophers. Scholars have been keener to discuss more appealing cognitive 
conditions like free choice, self-determination, and autonomy. Examining these conditions 
will precisely be the goal of the rest of this thesis. The research will undertake the task of 
providing a meaningful and operative solution for cognitive or epistemic conditions. This 
undertaking is readily apparent in those cases where the citizen is aware of the illicitness of 
his action but becomes more complex in situations where the result was not contemplated 
ex-ante by him. The solution would imply a revision of the practical reasoning mechanism 
of the acting citizen. As deliberative beings we have to notice and respond to legal reasons, 
like legal norms, in our deliberation. However, in particular situations, although our 
deliberation machine works properly, a citizen fails to notice (and consequently to 
respond) as expected, because he has a false belief. Several different variables will have to 
be taken into account to provide an algorithmic solution, and knowledge in our account of 
responsibility conditions is essential. In those situations where the cognitive position of the 
citizen does not trigger in his deliberation doubts or suspicions that his action could be 
criminal, the attribution of responsibility seems challenging. However, establishing a 
minimum standard of awareness is not an easy task either, and in any case, it should take 
into account the inactive and active dimensions of status. At least intuitively, it seems that 
some difference of standards should be introduced between the more specialised active 
dimension of the status and the more generalist inactive dimension. Either way, the 
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conclusion is that knowledge is critical in both the correct interaction in the institutional 
framework and in the attribution of criminal responsibility. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Each of the six main sections of this chapter has proposed a set of singular but 
interrelated concepts. The overall idea has been to provide a fresh conceptual framework 
for the criminal law, far apart from the moralistic/retributivist dominant scholarship. To 
avoid consolidated (and almost totemic) moral arguments, section 3.2 proceeded from the 
very beginning: the state of things as they really exist. Reality was then split between brute 
and institutional facts and this opening allowed the deployment of the almost illusory 
institutional dimension of the world we share. Modern societies would be unimaginable 
without institutional structures – a world grounded merely in expectations. Expectations 
that once reformulated and institutionalised receive an extra coat of legal protection. 
Determining the position of the whole institutional structure, interpersonal trust becomes 
its foundational stone. The fact that the trustworthy will be responsive to the fact that we 
are counting on them generates an expectation of responsiveness. In fact, beyond blame, 
disapproval, sanctions, fines or criminal punishment, our modern institutionalised societies 
work because we trust each other in order to achieve goals unreachable by ourselves.  
 
In section 3.5 and 3.6 I hope to have done enough to introduce the reader to the 
practical consequences of the relationship between interpersonal trust and criminal law: the 
dichotomy between offences of disassociation and offences of association. Both sections 
introduced the concepts and made a sketch of the ambits of both categories. A deeper 
discussion is beyond the scope of this research. Interwoven in a coherent manner was the 
double dimension of status with the two and/or three place structure of trust, categorising 
the constellation of expectations related to any attribution of status that demarcates our 
ambits of responsibility. The relevance of both kinds of offences will be discussed later in 
Part II when an operative solution for false beliefs is introduced.  
 
Finally, this chapter explained the relevance of knowledge of the law within an 
institutional framework. On one hand, knowledge is essential to interact with others in the 
use of an institution. We can only have reasonable expectations about the behaviour of 
others if we know the limits and extensions of the institutional framework we interact in. 
On the other hand, knowledge is critical in the attribution of criminal responsibility. As 
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deliberative agents we attribute criminal responsibility when we do not respond to legal 
reasons in our practical reasoning. But a potential lack of responsiveness could be the 
result of a false (factual or normative) belief.  In situations where the citizen decides to act 
on a balance of reasons, but without notice of a particular relevant issue, it needs to be 
ascertained when the failure to know the truth will exculpate or inculpate the agent. An 
appraisal of responsibility seems incomplete without discussing the weight or significance 
that must be given to those mental conditions, such as what the citizen knew or believed, 
before action. But at the same time, as I have discussed chapters one to three, it is not an 
easy and uncontroversial task to achieve. The following chapter begins with the difficult 
task of developing an algorithm able to provide principled outcomes to cognitive 
conditions of responsibility.  
	
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE EPISTEMIC CONDITION ON CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
We are social deliberative creatures. The last chapter was mainly focussed on 
the social moment of deliberation: as rational thinkers we have the cognitive capacity 
to recognise that the deliberation of others will depend on expectations about what we 
ourselves will do. This chapter is predominately focussed on moments of fault in our 
practical reasoning and the consequences in terms of criminal responsibility. The 
introductory section 4.2 will criticise those retributivist approaches that challenge the 
idea that criminal norms could be reasons that inform our practical reasoning. For 
these thinkers, what is relevant is the final result of the action and, exceptionally, the 
existence of any justification to the behaviour. This research contends that what is 
significant is whether or not the agent took criminal norms as exclusionary reasons for 
action. Later it is asserted that to balance reasons properly the agent must be in 
optimal conditions of freedom and knowledge. Section 4.3 of this chapter will 
develop the argument that volitional and cognitive/epistemic conditions are essential 
to perform correct practical reasoning. As reason-responsive agents, in those 
situations where the deliberative mechanism is impaired by coercion, insanity or 
analogous situations, the agent’s ability to be guided by reasons is diminished. 
Consequently, his potential responsibility is also mitigated. Likewise, in situations 
where the agent’s deliberative mechanism works satisfactorily but he fails to notice 
and respond to legal reasons because he acts under a false (factual or normative) 
belief, a feasible exoneration could be contemplated.  
 
Section 4.4 begins to flesh out the content of an algorithmic definition of an 
epistemic condition on criminal responsibility (ECCR); in other words, a test to 
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decide when an ignorant or unaware citizen will be held responsible for something he 
did or brought about. The first obvious stage of the test attributes full responsibility to 
the citizen who acts wittingly.  The second stage opens the possibility to be equally 
responsible in cases where the citizen was unwitting of some features of the action but 
is nonetheless culpable for his ignorance. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 scrutinise two kinds of 
potential culpable ignorance situations: those cases where the current ignorance traces 
back to some previous culpable act; and non-tracing situations where the current 
ignorance must be attributed to its own merits. After ruling out both kinds of such 
cases, section 4.7 introduces a tailored deontic/normative proposal to delineate 
culpable ignorance. The citizen will be culpably ignorant when he was indifferent to 
the suspicion, raised by his latent knowledge, that his action could be criminal. Or, in 
cases where suspicions where not raised, there is the expectation that according with 
his standard of awareness as a status holder, their suspicions should have been raised, 
provided the citizen’s capacity to seek additional information was not affected by 
physical or intellectual circumstances. 
 
4.2 Introducing responsibility conditions 
 
In a recent paper about excuses, Moore introduces a purported difference he 
observes in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics375 between cognitive excuses such as 
ignorance or mistake, on the one hand, and conative (volitional) excuses such as 
duress, on the other.376 However, this dual ‘excusing condition’ reading of Aristotle, 
without any reference to a theory of responsibility, could be misleading. It might be 
helpful to re-read the Nicomachean Ethics passage referred to by Moore to recognise 
that it is not written in an excusatory tone, but rather one of responsibility. In the text, 
Aristotle distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary passions and actions. Only 
voluntary actions receive blame or praise. Others (involuntary actions) receive pardon 
or pity. Finally, Aristotle clarifies that involuntary passions and actions could be 
performed under compulsion or through ignorance.  
 
																																																								
375 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (350 BCE) Book III, Ch.1  
376  M. Moore “The can't/won’t distinction and the nature of volitional excuses” Northwestern 
University Legal Theory Workshop (2013) 
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Even as an introduction about volitional excuses made by a devoted 
retributivist like Moore, the unfinished arguments presented above could be too 
shallow. A more genuine and accurate interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics is 
proposed by Fisher and Ravizza reading Aristotle’s thoughts in the tone of 
responsibility.377 According to them, responsibility should be attributed only when the 
agent does not recognise or weigh his reasons for action properly. In order to properly 
balance reasons, the agent must satisfy two necessary conditions. The fist condition, 
named by Fisher and Ravizza as the ‘cognitive condition’, includes the idea that the 
agent is responsible only when, as well as intention, he has knowledge about those 
facts adjoining his action. The second condition, termed as ‘freedom relative’, stresses 
the idea that the agent is responsible only when he acts freely. Of course, any theory 
about responsibility should also accommodate excuses (exceptional situations). For 
that reason, ignorance (or mistake) and force or duress are usually recognised 
defences. But defences are simple exceptions that confirm the existence of the rule 
but not the other way around. 
 
We can concede then that this topic is better presented in terms of conditions 
of responsibility, rather than exclusively in terms of excusing conditions (exceptions). 
The essential issue to elucidate is what is necessary for someone to be endorsed as 
(criminally) responsible. In other words, what conditions must be met by the agent in 
order to be responsible for any happening he brings about by his actions. Only once 
such conditions are met can those significant excusing conditions that undermine the 
attribution of responsibility, like force/duress/fear or ignorance, be accommodated. 
Thus, and in accordance with the Nicomachean Ethics, any theory about criminal 
responsibility must envisage two types of conditions of responsibility: the first 
condition relates to the will of the agent; the second relates to his knowledge. The 
cognitive condition states that an agent is responsible only when he knows the 
particular facts (brute and institutional) proximate to his action. The second, the 
conative condition, states that the agent is responsible only if he acts freely when he 
acts intentionally. As mentioned above, the cognitive condition relates to the excuse 
of ignorance where the conative condition relates to the volitional excuses cited by 
Moore; those where the agent acts under compulsion. Once this discrepancy is 																																																								
377 M. Fisher and M. Ravizza Perspectives on MoralRresponsibility (1993) at p8 
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clarified, we can entirely agree with the statement made by Moore that “moral 
philosophers and criminal law theorists […] have struggled to make sense of this 
second kind of excuse (conative). I shall continue that effort”.378 The criminal 
literature about volitional excusing conditions are indeed vast and exhaustive379. Free 
will and determinism have played a fundamental role in the academic discussions 
about criminal responsibility for decades. In contrast, cognitive/epistemic conditions 
have traditionally received very little attention by criminal scholars. Cognitive 
requirements have essentially been ignored from the criminal academic debate for 
decades. 
 
Responsibility conditions in any case provide the structural framework for the 
justification of criminal law and punishment in our liberal societies. Traditionally, 
inquiries into criminal responsibility have been concerned with freedom, self-
determination, autonomy, control or free choice. These lines of thought are supported 
in the principles of human capacity. The agent is criminally responsible because he 
‘chooses’ to act (intentionally, knowingly, recklessly in the way he did (illegally). The 
principle of individual autonomy that summarises most of the above arguments, is 
frequently emphasised by legal theorists as a fundamental concept in the justification 
of criminal law and criminal liability:380 agents should be respected as capable of 
choosing their acts and treated as responsible only for their own behaviour.  
 
This recognition of the ability ‘to do otherwise’ plays a relevant role both in 
the process of criminalisation and in the attribution of criminal responsibility:  it is 
commonly defended among legal theorists that in our liberal societies freedom of 
choice must be fostered and supported. As citizens we have the right to decide 
autonomously how to live our lives, which faith to follow, which sexual habits we 
practise, or which hair colour we wear. The fact that this right of self-determination 
must be promoted and respected implies that any purported restraint by the criminal 
law on the ambit of freedom or individual interests must be strongly justified. On the 
other hand, this self-determination and control condition is equally at the essence of 																																																								
378 M. Moore “The Can't/Wan’t Distinction and the Nature of Volitional Excuses” Northwestern 
University Legal Theory Workshop (2013) at p1 
379 See G. Sher Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness (2009) at p4 
380 A. Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (2009) at p23. See A.P. Simester and G. Sullivan 
“Simester and Sullivan Criminal law, Theory and Doctrine” (2013) at p7 
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criminal responsibility.381 The capacity and fair opportunity to do otherwise is a 
recognised precondition of legitimate criminal responsibility and for that reason, those 
processes that diminish or exclude control or self-governance of the agent over his 
own actions mitigate criminal responsibility. It is this kind of freedom or controls that 
infants, insane or coerced agents do not possess and therefore justifies their discharge 
from their a priori criminal actions.  
 
Recently, some writers on criminal responsibility have proposed alternative 
fields to rest criminal responsibility. These theorists, broadening the role of morality 
in criminal law, have revived the Aristotelian idea that criminal responsibility must be 
related to the moral character of the agent’s display of behaviour.382 They argue that 
criminal responsibility is supported in the judgment that the agent’s behaviour is 
evidence of wrongful, wicked, dissolute or immoral character. This approach moves 
responsibility away from the illicit action or wrongful behaviour, instead directing the 
inquiry towards the character or virtue of the agent. In the more moderate model, 
character-responsibility defenders support that conviction of the agent manifests the 
kind of character that is worthy of moral criticism or indifference towards criminal 
law. This conception of the moral agent as qua agent in general, rather than in relation 
with the action performed, envisages the agent as a reasoning being responsible for 
his desires and beliefs and other emotional responses at the time they occurred. 
Desires and motivations must reflect his system of values as agent. Thus, what makes 
a response relevant in terms of responsibility is not what the agent voluntarily chose 
to do or the elements he has under his control, but rather that it reflects his own values 
qua agent.  
 
As highlighted above, while proposals and discussions about criminal 
responsibility have been predominantly focused either on free choice, capacity or 
character, 383  cognitive/epistemic conditions of criminal responsibility have been 
neglected among criminal theorists. Although it would be very plausible intuitively to 
assume that, in some situations, a failure to know the truth or a false belief might 
exculpate the agent (whereas perhaps in other conditions it would inculpate him), the 																																																								
381 H.L.A. Hart Punishment and Responsibility (2008) at chapter 6 
382  See V. Tadros Criminal Responsibility (2005) 
383 N. Lacey In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests and Institutions (2016)  
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field has been theoretically disregarded. It seems challenging to theorise about 
criminal responsibility without discussing the weight or significance that must be 
given to those mental conditions, such as what the citizen knew or believed, before 
action. This is the aim of this chapter: to provide a principled account of the 
cognitive/epistemic conditions on criminal responsibility. In doing so, the research 
opens a fresh and novel account for ascertaining under which circumstances the agent 
was culpably ignorant about his illegal behaviour.  
 
4.3 The deliberation process before action 
 
I shall start by fleshing out my account of epistemic/cognitive condition of 
criminal responsibility, expanding the central argument proposed in the last chapter 
about the process of deliberation through which the agent reaches a decision to act in 
a particular way. The argument rests on the certainty that citizens are rational thinkers 
with the ability to conform their behaviour to reasons. This human feature of reason-
responsiveness is the cornerstone of responsibility, the critical point to take into 
consideration to determine the extent citizens could be held responsible. It was 
suggested in the previous chapter that what is salient about institutional structures is 
the deontic framework they create. This framework provides members of the society 
with a reason to act in a particular way: i.e. the manner in which that particular 
society has collectively recognised to behave which, at the same time, also discloses 
what others can expect from our behaviour, prescribing and outlining our ambit of 
responsibility. Citizens are responsible for their actions only if it is reasonable to 
expect them to conform their behaviour to the appropriate institutional standard. This 
expectation can only be sustained if the agent has the capacity to behave accordingly 
as a result of implementing his rational conditions, that is to say, by way of a 
reasoning process. 
 
Appropriate deliberation, according to Yaffe’s arguments,384 is a complicated 
process that depends first of all on whether or not the citizen: a) extracts the correct 
reasons from the facts she has under consideration; and b) considers properly the 
reasons distilled, granting them their precise weight.  When the agent identifies from 																																																								
384 See G. Yaffe “Excusing mistakes of law” Philosophers imprint (2009) 9:2 
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the facts the correct reasons and also weights them properly, then if the citizen acts 
accordingly the action is acceptable and non-reproachable. Contrario sensu, an 
inaccurate recognition of reasons could lead to an unacceptable outcome that exposes 
the agent to disapproval and criticism, regardless if the weighting of reasons in the 
deliberative mechanism works well. To be responsible implies that the citizen fails to 
notice a fact as a reason or she fails to properly consider (weigh) the identified 
reasons in her deliberation process, not responding to (or refraining from) the legal 
reasons under consideration. As a result, we can establish, according to Yaffe, two 
different sources of momentum in the appraisal of liability: first, when the wrong 
action is the result of a deficient recognition of reasons from the facts; and secondly, 
when the wrong action is the result of a deficient allocation of weight to the reasons 
extracted. Consequently, the outcome of the deliberation can be perverted by the 
premises of reasoning considered or by the deliberation process itself.385  
 
Deliberation is also a complex, psychological norm-governed process. It 
implies the formation and reconsideration, using inductive and deductive principles of 
reasoning, of beliefs in light of emerging evidence available to the citizen. When we 
deliberate we extract reasons from the facts that we confront and we grant them 
weight. Transposing these arguments to the legal arena, deliberation involves the 
recognition and weighting of legal reasons for action. We extract legal reasons from 
the facts we face and weigh these legal reasons in order to ascertain what we should 
do. Criminal responsibility arises only when the citizen fails to notice (recognise) or 
respond (refrain) to the exclusionary reasons for action provided by criminal norms 
(in contrast to moral ones).  
 
However, in some circumstances the failure to notice does not trigger criminal 
responsibility straightaway. In some situations, the citizen cannot be held criminal 
responsible because: a) the citizen’s deliberative mechanism is impaired in the 
moment of action – he cannot respond to reasons because his ability to respond and be 
guided by reasons is damaged or diminished (recognised examples are insanity, non-
age and intoxication; or b) the agent’s deliberative mechanism works properly but the 
citizen fails to notice (and consequently to respond) because he has a false belief or 																																																								
385 See G. Yaffe “Excusing mistakes of law” Philosophers imprint (2009) 9:2 
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acts ignorantly. This is the most significant argument of this research. As reason-
responsive agents, in these situations where we fail to notice or refrain from acting on 
institutional/legal reasons because we act under a false belief, there is potential room 
for exoneration.    
 
Finally, before moving on it is important to highlight that although in any 
deliberation process we might hold false beliefs, belief formation (false or true) is a 
passive matter not in the control of the agent’s will.386  This approach about beliefs, 
rejecting doxastic voluntarism or the philosophical view that we can control what we 
belief, is controversial387 but assumed in this research. In order to act in a way 
consistent with the results of our explicit practical deliberations we need to operate 
with our actual representations and information.388 Only the conscious information 
personally available to the agent can guide him; any other behaviour would amount to 
pure chance or accident. Thus, when we decide what to do (deliberate), only those 
representations and information that we are conscious of are available for rational 
consideration: we only deliberate about what we are aware of. Of course, unwitting 
reasons can also play a role in our deliberation process – they can shape the content of 
our reasons for action – however they cannot be the content of our reasons for 
																																																								
386  G. Rosen “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility” Philosophical Perspectives (2004) 18(1):302.  
387 See Pamela Hieronymi who argues against this assumption offering an account of responsibility 
compatible with the doxastic volitionist position that we can believe at will. She claims that 
beliefs have their own distinctive form of responsibility (answerability), different from 
responsibility for witting actions. When the agent acts intentionally he is responsible for reasons 
that he takes to show something good about so acting. However, in responsibility about beliefs the 
agent is responsible for the reasons he takes to show the belief to be true.  See P. S. Hieronymi 
Responsibility for believing (2008) pp161-357. See also C. Ginet “Deciding to Believe” 
in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty (2001) pp63-76. See also, J. Montmarquet “The Voluntariness of 
Belief” Analysis  (1986) 46:49-53. 
388 Neither beliefs nor false beliefs are voluntary, but we are liable for them. Responsibility for them is 
attributed because there is some sort of rational connection between what we observe and what we 
estimate to be significant or relevant when it reflects an objectionable evaluative attitude. In some 
failure-to-notice cases, the agent could also be responsible when he demonstrates an insufficient 
concern about the probability to injury or damage others. Scanlon, for example, affirms that the 
agent is responsible if “[…] she has governed herself in a way that would not be allowed by any 
principles that no one could reasonable reject”. (T Scanlon. What we owe to each other, (Belknap 
Press 1998) at 268). This responsibility comes from a defective self-governance that includes two 
kinds of fault in the reasons the agent identifies: “First, and most obviously, if any principles that 
no one could reasonably reject would count certain considerations (the likelihood of harm to 
others, for example) as conclusive reason against a certain course of action, then a person acts 
wrongly when he or she decides to follow that course anyway, in full awareness of these 
considerations. But, second, a person also acts wrongly when he or she simply fails to take notice 
of considerations that these principles hold to be relevant (for example, fails to take note of the 
fact that his or her course of action involves a risk of serious harm to others) T. Scanlon What we 
owe to each other (1998) at 269 
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action.389 Unconscious beliefs or attitudes shape our consciousness and may even 
affect a citizen’s deliberation process, but we cannot reasonably expect them to guide 
their behaviour precisely because we are unaware of them. In our practical reasoning 
we only consider those features of the facts of which we are currently consciously 
aware. When we deliberate about what we should do, we weigh the strength of the 
reasons for and against the various alternative actions that are available to us. 
Deliberation, as a psychological practice, involves considering our conscious beliefs 
in a way that unaware beliefs are not. As deliberating citizens, it is only our conscious 
beliefs that provide us with feasible possibilities of action.  Thus, perhaps we can only 
be fairly made responsible of those decisions that we were prospectively aware. 
 
4.4 Two psychological momentum in the epistemic condition on criminal 
responsibility 
 
If the above argument is correct and our beliefs are something that happens 
within us or to us, we could suggest that we are not straightforwardly responsible for 
our beliefs. On the contrary, what we can emphatically affirm is that we are 
responsible for that which we are aware of or is under our control. Reflecting on this 
categorical feature, we can formulate the first psychological momentum of the 
epistemic condition of criminal responsibility: 
 
The citizen who performs a criminal act is criminally responsible when, 
satisfying other conditions for responsibility,390 he is aware that the action was 
illegal.391  
 
This straightforward psychological momentum of the epistemic condition is as 
uncontroversial as it is simple. It basically attributes responsibility to the citizen 
because the action was under his conscious control. The citizen’s decision to act in the 
way he did reflects those reasons for action that constitute his will. As the act was 
under his voluntary control he was undeniably responsible for it. However, being 
obvious and apparent does not discharge this first momentum of legal significance in 																																																								
389 See N. Levy “The importance of awareness” Australian Journal of Philosophy (2013) 91:2 at 13 
390 Generally conative or volitional conditions 
391 Illegality at this stage includes illicit actions carried out while holding false beliefs about brute, 
normative or institutional facts 
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terms of responsibility; it emphasises the relevance that knowledge and will have on 
the attribution of criminal responsibility. The citizen who knowingly and willingly 
behaves criminally is responsible because he actually notices and recognises that he 
was acting illegally.  
 
 The first momentum proposed in the epistemic condition raises an obvious 
question: is the agent only responsible for what he is aware of doing? Certainly, this 
restrained first momentum of the account of responsibility excludes actions that at 
least we intuitively recognise as manifestly the responsibility of the agent. It excludes, 
essentially, those actions where the agent is not directly or indirectly in control of 
their action because he fails to notice that his act was illegal. The first moment of the 
epistemic condition disregards any responsibility for our false beliefs or ignorant 
actions when we intuitively acknowledge these as wrong. Building our account of the 
epistemic condition, we must incorporate under what circumstances the agent is also 
responsible for his ignorance or false beliefs. 
 
At this point, it is appropriate to stress that for the sake of our argument, 
although the failure to notice can be the result of a false belief or plain ignorance, we 
treat both phenomena in the same way. False beliefs and ignorance are clearly two 
different psychological and philosophical phenomena. Ignorance involves a negative 
status where the agent completely lacks knowledge or representation about some fact. 
On the other hand, mistake implies a positive status: the mistaken agent has a false 
belief about some fact. For our purposes, we include both phenomena under the 
generic concept of ignorance, because what is relevant is that they affect the 
deliberation process in the same way. Then, as aforementioned, due to the undisputed 
but constricted first momentum proposed above, the epistemic condition must 
accommodate or include those cases where the agent acts ignorantly. To do so, the 
condition should clearly identify and categorise the potential dissimilarity between 
irreproachable ignorance and culpable ignorance. Furthermore, and being consistent 
with the intuitive suggestion offered above, the structure of the condition should 
provide a principled proposition that equalises culpable ignorance with conscious 
acts. Condensing the entire requirement discussed above, we can implement a second 
psychological moment in the epistemic condition of criminal responsibility: 
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The agent who performs a criminal act is criminally responsible when, 
satisfying other conditions for responsibility, he is either aware that the action was 
illegal or he was culpably ignorant about some feature of the criminal act. 
 
Both momentums could easily be theoretically accepted as a basis for criminal 
responsibility. The theoretical dispute would obviously arise in defining the contours 
of blameless ignorance from culpable ignorance. The reason for the disagreement has 
a double dimension: first, the outcome will equalise (in responsibility terms) culpable 
ignorance with a conscious and knowingly illegal act; secondly, the agent who 
performs a criminal act on the basis of blameless or non-culpable ignorance does not 
comply with the requirements of the epistemic condition and subsequently he is not 
criminal responsible for the action.  
 
4.5 Clarifying the epistemic condition: the alternative tracing thesis 
 
 Chapter 2 highlighted the reasons that the moral legalism approach, dominant 
in the criminal legal theory, has disregarded any potential necessity for an epistemic 
condition in an account of criminal responsibility. As a result, knowledge conditions 
have not received the examination and consideration they merit. In fact, as discussed 
in chapter 1, no proposal exists for an epistemic condition in the criminal literature. 
This lack of contextual theoretical debate can only be overcome by scrutinising and 
exploring how hypothetical alternatives might resolve the culpable or irreproachable 
ignorance puzzle. Thus, instead of starting by defending my own account of culpable 
ignorance, this chapter will suggest and discuss potential alternative frameworks for 
culpable ignorance. Only then can we uphold a (hypothetically) contextualised 
proposal for an epistemic condition of criminal responsibility. In order to delineate 
culpable ignorance, three feasible alternative views will be suggested for 
consideration and scrutiny. These three views share in common the argument that the 
agent acts illegally because he failed to notice in the past some important aspect of his 
prospective behaviour. From this perspective, a current ignorant act inherits its 
culpability from an earlier conscious choice of the agent. If the agent’s false belief can 
be traced back to a prior action over which he was in control or he conscientiously did 
she is culpably ignorant. 
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4.5.1 The actio libera in causa alternative thesis 
 
The first suggestion for culpable ignorance introduced here will be based on 
the actio libera in causa doctrine.392 This doctrine applies to involuntary actions when 
performed (non-free in themselves) provided the citizen was responsible for causing 
the conditions of non-freedom (free in their causes). The doctrine includes cases 
where the evaluative judgement of the citizen is diminished in the moment of action, 
but the cause of this state can be attributed to him. The doctrine is especially 
appealing in cases where the citizen, impaired in the moment of action, demonstrates 
some kind of previous negligence or carelessness that directly causes his subsequent 
illegal actions. For example, consider the citizen that impermissibly takes his sleep-
inducing prescriptions before then driving to the city centre where, upon falling asleep 
at the wheel as a result of the consumption, runs over and kills someone that 
otherwise he would have noticed. In cases like this, the conscious prior action (T1) 
leads the agent to cause harm unwittingly in the moment of action (T2).  As a result, 
although the agent might not be criminally responsible for (T2) his responsibility is 
attributed to the previous (T1). 
 
Our first version of tracing cases for culpable ignorance could provide then 
that ignorance is culpable if it can be traced to a prior conscious free act of the citizen. 
Nonetheless, in order to fine-tune the proposal, we should distinguish between those 
prior free acts in which the citizen intentionally creates the conditions from those 
cases in which the citizen generates the conditions under which she performed a 
criminal action involuntarily. We might differentiate those involuntary cases where 
the citizen was aware that their conscious action involved a foreseeable risk to later 
outcomes from those that do not involve such a risk. We could conclude that 
responsibility arises only in cases of foreseeable risk. Perhaps we can determine that 
responsibility can be attributed regardless of the potential anticipation of a feasible 
risk if the agent acts involuntarily.  Such considerations go beyond our purposes in 
this section which only attempts to outline realistic alternatives to culpable ignorance. 
If my thoughts were consistent and convincing enough it follows that from the actio 
																																																								
392 For an account of the doctrine see S. Dimock “Actio libera in causa” Criminal law and Philosophy 
(2013) 7(3):549-569 
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in libera causa doctrine (perhaps) a coherent and credible account of culpable 
ignorance could be achieved.  
 
4.5.2 The akratic alternative thesis 
 
The next proposed alternative of culpable ignorance rests on the doctrine of 
akrasia. According to this account, culpable ignorance would require a previous 
action for which the agent is evidently culpable because it was performed with the 
belief that it was wrong.393 To assign criminal responsibility to an ignorant agent 
would imply, so states this approach, holding him responsible for his akratic 
actions.394 According to this account, the agent’s responsibility in T2 is the result of a 
chain of culpability traceable to an original behaviour T1 done without ignorance for 
which the agent is responsible. At that point, the continual search down the chain of 
culpability ends. Once this novel failure to notice is identified, its culpability transfers 
downstream to the current act T2. The problematic feature of this proposal is how to 
identify when an akratic action is in itself culpable because the action was performed 
with the belief that it was wrong. A viable option could be to demand from the agent 
(as a status-holder) to fulfil some kind of standard of prudent procedural epistemic 
obligation.395 This epistemic obligation would be connected with both the inactive 
and the proactive dimensions as status-holder. The agent (status-holder) who has 
obligations to perform or to refrain for doing certain actions will fail to comply with 
his procedural epistemic obligations when he omits to do some required precaution to 
prevent the formation of these kinds of false beliefs. Such an approach does not 
involve being responsible for the false beliefs themselves, but rather for failing to 
guarantee that when he has to act or refrain from action, he will know which 
prudential steps he ought to be aware of.  
 																																																								
393 For an account of akratic moral responsibility see N. Levy “Culpable Ignorance and Moral 
Responsibility: a Reply to Fitzpatrick” Ethics (2009) 119(4):729-741. See also.  M. Zimmerman 
“Moral Responsibility and Ignorance” Ethics (1997) 107(3):410-426.  H. Smith “Culpable 
ignorance” The Philosophical Review (1983) XCII(4):543-71. H. Smith “Varieties of Moral 
Worth and Moral Credit” Ethics (1991) 101:279-303. H. Smith “The ‘Prospective View’ of 
Obligation” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2011) 
394 The state of mind in which someone acts against his or her better judgement through weakness of 
will. 
395  See G. Rosen “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility” Philosophical Perspectives (2004) 
18(1):301 
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4.5.3 The benighted alternative thesis 
 
The final tracing thesis proposed suggests that an agent will be culpably 
ignorant if he has performed a prior benighted act.396 In these cases, the cognitive 
position of the agent in the moment of action is impaired as a result of a previous 
culpable act. This earlier act could be a wrong assumption or conclusion that causes 
the agent to acquire wrong or untrue information.  The agent could have attained the 
correct information, but he culpably fails to do so. The prior benighted act causes the 
agent to be dispossessed in the moment of action of the evidence that would have 
directed him from refraining from the unwitting act. The correct information is not 
then an available option to the agent at a later time. The unwitting act of the agent is 
then justified taking into account the agent’s actual belief but he is culpable of 
performing the benighted act. Here again maybe we should consider, in order to 
strengthen the thesis, whether the unwitting act fell under a known or foreseeable risk 
of the agent or not. Take, for example, a farmer that declined or forgot to read the 
recommendation letters sent by the Department of Rural Affairs about identification 
and recording of livestock because he is too busy milking his cows.  If later, in his 
deliberative process of making judgements he comes to hold false beliefs about the 
movement of livestock he could be held culpably ignorant. The attribution of 
responsibility arises from the previous benighted act of ignoring the warning letters. 
The farmer, in avoiding his professional duties (as status holder), can be held 
culpable. Another question is whether to demand from citizens a feasible awareness 
about the risk of performing the benighted act. 
 
The appeal of this thesis resides in the fact that it emphasises the significance 
of previous knowledge, information or evidence where the agent can later infer the 
risk or purported illicitness of the conduct. Unobjectionable deliberation processes 
require actual and updated information.  Before acting the agent always has some 
latent and essential knowledge from the evidence available to him. The capacity to 
notice or recognize future risks or potential illicitness depends on whether or not in 																																																								
396 See H. Smith “Culpable ignorance” The Philosophical Review (1983) XCII(4): 543-71. H. Smith 
“Varieties of moral worth and moral credit” Ethics (1991) 101:279-303. H. Smith “The 
‘Prospective View’ of obligation” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2011) 
Chapter 4: The epistemic condition on criminal responsibility  
 
	
119	
the moment of deliberation the agent has access to up to date information. When the 
deficit of information is attributable to a benighted act, the ignorant agent’s action is 
culpable. Latent and updatable knowledge is a salient feature in the epistemic 
condition in its own right and shall be considered later in this chapter. The agent 
confronting a particular situation always acknowledges some factual context about the 
world around him. This consciousness could be fractional, considering both legal and 
brute facts. This latent and updatable knowledge should trigger in the agent the doubt 
or suspicion, during his deliberation process, that his action requires first the 
expanding of his basis of knowledge or information.  When the latent knowledge does 
not exist or is not enough to activate in the agent the suspicion that the action requires 
further investigation or additional information, the action is not in the ambit of 
responsibility of the agent. 
 
4.5.4 Conclusions about the tracing theories 
 
 The attractiveness of the three suggested alternative theories resides in the 
association of culpable ignorance with a previous conscious choice of the agent that 
flows downstream to the current fact; in other words, it requires that the previous act 
must be blameworthy. In such cases the agent’s current state of culpable ignorance 
stems from a prior, conscious choice, for which the agent is evidently responsible. All 
three accounts of culpable ignorance connect the ignorant agent with conscious 
choices adopted in the past. It is therefore implicit in all the alternatives that culpable 
ignorance requires some kind of choice or control by the agent. This control or choice 
restrains any attempt of attribution of responsibility for actions not under our 
conscious control. Regardless of how this control moment is traced backed up to an 
initial choice, the alternatives provide a guarantee that the agent will only be held 
responsible for actions under his conscious will. But in order to be blameworthy, 
some kind of foreseeability is also required. To categorise the ignorance as culpable, 
the citizen must be aware (even in a potential way) that his present behaviour could 
lead to a later criminal act done in ignorance. This feature maybe affects the practical 
outcomes of the proposed alternatives. The agent would probably be responsible for 
too little if some foreseeability is mandatory.   
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As a result, the conceptual formulation of our epistemic condition demands us 
to widen the window of responsibility to include outcomes of actions not consciously 
chosen. Further, accounts of responsibility outlined by the tracing thesis fail because 
by attributing culpable ignorance to an earlier act, they disregard the evaluative 
attitudes or mental state of the agent in the moment of deliberation. The gist of 
culpable ignorance is transferred to the libera in causa, akratic or benighted act. This 
methodology disregards the mental state of the agent in the actual moment of 
deliberation. This could be an appropriate way of appraising the responsibility of 
agents whose mental conditions are impaired in the moment of action if the actual 
mental deficiency is the result of a previous action. It could also be a sensible way to 
attribute responsibility for actions which are not free in themselves, but free in their 
causes, provided the agent was responsible for causing the conditions of non-freedom, 
as in cases where the earlier actio libera in causa was the ingestion of alcohol or 
drugs. In these situations, although the evaluative judgement of the agent is 
diminished in the moment of action, the cause of his state can be attributed to him (or 
a third part). The conscious former action leads him to act unwittingly and to cause 
harm. Being mentally impaired at the moment of deliberation and having his 
evaluative judgement diminished could imply the consideration of an excusatory 
condition in the appraisal of the agent’s act.  Unless we can connect his actual mental 
state with a previous act under his control, the agent should be relieved of criminal 
responsibility.  
  
In those specific cases of diminished mental states in the moment of action 
attributable to a previous conscious action, the tracing thesis could provide a 
controversial but feasible alternative. However, when the actual mental state of the 
agent in the deliberation process is normal, the tracing thesis fails to deliver a correct 
alternative. In those situations of mental normality, the situation of ignorance must be 
related or reflect the satisfactory rational evaluative judgement of the agent in the 
moment of action. Agential activity, understood as the constellation of evaluations 
and judgements concerning what attitudes or actions to perform, must have a role in 
the attribution of responsibility. Perhaps as a working exploratory hypothesis, it could 
be sustained that ignorance is only culpable when it stems from this rational 
evaluative judgement of the agent in the deliberation process.   
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4.6 Clarifying the epistemic condition: Non-tracing thesis 
 
The alternative to the tracing thesis attaches the current state of ignorance not 
up to an earlier choice, but to the defective evaluative judgements of the citizen in the 
moment of performing the illegal action. From this second perspective the citizen is 
culpably ignorant in their own right at the moment of action. If correct and 
persuasive, the outcome of this second perspective would deliver an account of 
culpable ignorance that reflects the identity of the agent as a practical agent. As a 
result, the agent would be culpable for his ignorance on its own right and not as the 
result of a previous choice or an earlier conscious act under the agent’s control. 
 
This account of responsibility has been consistently defended by Scanlon who 
argues that an agent is responsible for those actions that reflect his judgements about 
what he has reasons to do (or believe). Scanlon calls this sense of responsibility 
“responsibility as attributability”397 and requires that the attitudes that make the agent 
responsible can in fact be attributed to him as “his”.398  Responsibility in these terms 
does not require the agent choosing to hold or avoiding those attitudes. Substantive 
responsibility can be attributed if the person had adequate opportunity to avoid the 
particular and actual situation under appraisal. On this account, ignorance is culpable 
if it reflects an objectionable and reprehensible attitude in the moment of deliberation. 
It cannot be endorsed if the agent was brainwashed or sleepwalking but will be if the 
failure to notice was the result of indifference or conscious legal blindness. This 
failure does not need to be the result of a conscious earlier choice but rather due to 
faulty self-governance.399  
 
Starting from Scanlon’s concept of “judgment-sensitive attitudes”400 we can 
construct an ‘attributionist’ alternative thesis to culpable ignorance. Our beliefs and 
other attitudes are not always under voluntary control, 401  but instead may be 
																																																								
397 T. Scanlon What we Owe to Each Other (1998) at p249 
398 T. Scanlon Moral Dimensions (2008) at p202 
399 T. Scanlon What we Owe to Each Other (1998) at p269 
400 Ibd at p21 
401 M. Smith “Control Responsibility and Moral Assessment” Philosophical Studies: An international 
Journal for Philosophy in the Analitical Tradition (2008) 138(3):369-370 
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“unbidden without conscious choice or decision”.402 Nevertheless, as far as they are 
“up to us”403 they reflect our rational judgement irrespective of whether they are our 
own conscious election. The agent qua rational agent is responsible to acknowledge 
the judgements implicit in their reaction to the world around them.404 Ignorance 
inculpates criminally, according with this attributionist thesis, because the agent fails 
to take notice of considerations that no one could reasonably reject.  
 
Take, for example, a farmer that declines or forgets to read the 
recommendation letters sent by Department of Rural Affairs (DEFRA) about new 
regulations for the identification and recording of livestock because he is too busy 
milking his cows.  If, later, in his deliberative process of making a judgement he 
comes to hold false beliefs about the movement of livestock he would be held 
culpably ignorant. The attribution of responsibility does not arise from a previous 
benighted act or actio libera in causa to ignore recommendation letters. His false 
current beliefs are the outcome of two evaluative judgements: first, from his 
evaluative attitude that to milk cows was a more efficient management of time than 
spending his time reading confusing and demanding letters from the Department for 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA); and second, his actual false belief 
about the movement of unrecorded livestock (if this is the case), reflects his 
judgement that the actual knowledge he had validated his belief that movement of 
unrecorded livestock is legally correct. The farmer’s false beliefs are then the result of 
both evaluative judgements - his indolence towards reading about the new regulations 
and what he has to do later, evaluating the information and evidence available to him. 
These false beliefs or ignorance, following the attributive thesis proposed, are within 
the responsibility of the farmer or, in Scanlon’s terms, he is culpably ignorant because 
he fails to notice or disallow considerations that stem from principles that any farmer 
(status-holder) should reasonably reject or ignore. In any case, the ignorance is 
culpable. 
 
The problem with the outcome of an alternative attributionist thesis is that 
another careful and meticulous farmer who, despite his commitment to reading 																																																								
402 T. Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other (1998) at p22 
403 Ibd at p22 
404 M. Smith “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life” Ethics (2005) 115(2): 
256 
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DEFRA letters, fails to notice the accurate information provided, will have an 
objectionable outcome and his evaluative judgement will be equally legally wrong. At 
least intuitively, it seems sensible to assume that any thesis about non-culpable 
ignorance must differentiate between the diligent and the inattentive farmer.  In fact, 
an attributionist approach would render no one responsible for what he did. If the 
agent is responsible only for those attitudes and actions that reflects evaluative 
judgements about reasons, those agents that form judgements about whimsical or 
unusual reasons cannot be qualified as responsible. Think, for example, of the 
patriotic British farmer who believes that DEFRA’s introduction of European 
Regulations should be ignored. His conscious repudiation of DEFRA is a reason for 
him to ignore their letters and norms.  
 
A potential way to overcome this weakness could be the attributionist thesis’ 
incorporation of the recognised distinction introduced by Dancy between normative 
and motivating reasons. Perhaps the reasons the farmer had for acting as he did 
(motivating reasons) can be distinguished from whether there was a good reason to 
act in that way (normative reasons). This distinction may provide a line of inquiry to 
surpass the pointed weakness. Thus, only the farmer who acts for good reasons can be 
excused of his current ignorance. The exploration of this or other possible solutions 
again goes beyond present purposes. The evident result is that a thesis for culpable 
ignorance that only considers the agent’s judgement about his reasons fails, as the 
tracing thesis did, because of minimalism and simplicity.  
 
4.7 The deontic moment of the epistemic consideration 
 
The scrutiny of the different psychological alternative theses revealed their 
inability to provide an account of culpable ignorance that lives up the ascription of 
criminal responsibility that we intuitively expect. The inadequate outcome provided 
by a psychological momentum requires us to consider the insertion of a 
deontic/normative requirement in the epistemic consideration. The agent is not only 
criminally responsible when he is aware of the illicitness of his action, but also when 
he should be aware. The incorporation of the deontic momentum should introduce 
many new unknowns that the psychological momentum does not need to address. Our 
proposal of culpable ignorance will attempt to create three requirements that can 
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distinguish culpable ignorance from irreproachable ignorance: the latent and 
updatable knowledge of the agent; whether his failure to notice fell below the 
standard expected as status holder; and finally his physical and intellectual capacities. 
 
The citizen who performs a criminal act is responsible when, satisfying other 
conditions for responsibility, he is either aware that the action was criminal or he was 
culpably ignorant about some feature of the criminal act when he should have noticed 
it, considering: 
 
a) The latent and updatable information available to him; 
b) The standard of awareness expected as status holder;  
c) That internal or external circumstances do not diminish those individual 
intellectual and physical capacities required to notice the illicitness. 
 
The rest of this section will flesh out the factors that model the deontic 
‘should’ introduced: 
 
a) The latent and updatable information available to the deliberative agent 
 
Any citizen confronting a particular situation always acknowledges some 
factual context about the world around him. This consciousness could be hazy and 
fractional about both legal and brute facts, but it is still present. This latent and 
updatable knowledge should trigger in the agent the doubt or suspicion, during his 
deliberation process, that his action requires first expanding his knowledge of or 
information on the situation.  When the latent knowledge does not exist or is not 
enough to arouse suspicion in the agent that the action requires further investigation 
or additional information, the action is not in the ambit of responsibility of the agent. 
This latent knowledge affects both dimensions of the status holder: active and inactive 
although, as will be discussed in Part II, latent and updatable knowledge plays a 
different role in offences of association and offences of disassociation.  
 
Every time we interact with others (or the environment) we are aware of our 
surroundings. This ability to properly evaluate our context is essential for our adaptive 
success as a species. We identify the realities around us and we compare with our 
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memories in order to decide whether or not they are reliable or a source of risk, for 
example. Notice however that as Stark pointed out “a person cannot be said to be 
aware of a specific risk attendant upon a particular token of –ing without believing 
that that specific risk exist405.  Using these previous memories and knowledge we can 
project or foresee how a particular new input can perform and accommodate our 
behaviour in a way to better achieve our objectives. Without memories or previously 
stored knowledge it is impossible to successfully interact with the world around us. 
Before any action this basic knowledge is updated with new inputs during the 
perception process. We process all this information in our deliberation before 
deciding to act, or how to act, or to abort an imminent action.  Thus, it is specifically 
this latent and updatable knowledge that actually triggers doubt or suspicion in the 
agent that his action requires increasing their basic knowledge further.  
 In	 terms	 of	 awareness	 of	 risk,	 latent	 and	 updatable	 knowledge,	 also	referred	 to	 as	 “passive	 knowledge”406,	 “experimental	 knowledge”407	or	 “latent	knowledge” 408 	has	 commonly	 been	 contrasted	 by	 authors	 to	 “actual”	knowledge409.	 In	 Duff’s	 terminology,	 for	 example,	 latent	 knowledge	 of	 a	 risk	implies	the	general	knowledge	that	a	citizen	has	that	can	be	transferred	or	called	upon	to	ascertain	whether	a	specific	risk	exists	(or	not)	in	relation	to	a	particular	action.	 Latent	 knowledge,	 in	 Duff’s	 account,	 is	 present	 in	 a	 citizen’s	 memory	whether	he	is	making	use	of	it	or	not.	For	example,	a	citizen	who	knows	how	to	play	chess	has	a	latent	knowledge	about	chess’	rules	regardless	of	the	fact	that	he	is	 not	 using	 that	 knowledge	 when	 swimming.	 When	 this	 latent	 knowledge	 is	called	upon,	this	knowledge	becomes	“actual”.			The	concept	proposed	of	latent	and	updatable	knowledge	in	this	research	has	a	more	dispositional	substance410	than	the	“latent	knowledge”	proposed	by																																																									
405 At p93 
406 See V. Tadros  Criminal Responsibility (2005) at p257 
407 E. Colvin  “Recklessness and Criminal Negligence” University of Toronto Law Journal (1982) 
32:345 at p361 
408 R.A. Duff “Caldwell and Lawrance the Retreat from Subjectivism”(1983) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 77,  at 80 
409 See A. Duff, “Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law” 
(1990)  at pp159-160 
410 See S. Garvey  “What is Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter” Texas Law Review (2006-2007) 
85:333 at 344 
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Duff.	 It	 is	 more	 in	 line	 with	 what	 Duff	 defines	 in	 earlier	 papers	 as	 “tacit	knowledge”411.	 It	 refers	 to	 the	 “coherence	 of	 the	 agent’s	 behaviour	 […]	 with	manifestations	 of	 a	 relevant	 dispositional	 stereotype”412.	 The	 proposed	 latent	and	updatable	knowledge	here	directly	connects	with	the	second	requirement	of	the	ECCR:	“the	standard	of	awareness	expected	as	status	holder”	from	the	citizen.	Latent	 and	 updatable	 knowledge	 in	 this	 context	 relates	 to	 the	 expectations	 of	coherence	of	the	citizen	according	to	his	stereotyped	status.	The	citizen	holds	the	sufficient	 latent	 and	 updatable	 knowledge	 required	 to	 trigger	 doubts	 or	suspicions	 that	 his	 action	 is	 criminal	 if	 a	 relevant	 number	 of	 epistemic	dispositions	 in	 his	 actions	 in	 accordance	with	 his	 status	 have	 been	 previously	manifested.		
 
If this is correct, the citizen must reflect on his action or seek additional 
information before action or, alternatively, abort his planned action altogether. The 
ECCR emphasises the relevance of this updatable knowledge to determine whether or 
not the agent is culpably ignorant. The agent must use his abilities to ascertain the 
truth. If the agent, ignoring or disregarding his doubts, persists on performing the 
action, his conduct will be inexcusable. When the latent knowledge of the agent, 
updated with new stimuli, casts doubts or raises suspicions about his beliefs, he must 
stop the action in course altogether and further scrutinise the situation. What is 
relevant, in terms of excusatory consequences, are the epistemic/cognitive 
circumstances of the citizen. This additional knowledge is not incriminatory by itself, 
but present knowledge should be enough to prompt (during the perception process of 
recognition of a target, for example) the citizen to update his initial knowledge or 
abandon the action altogether. If the citizen persists on carrying out the on-going 
action he could be declared culpably ignorant, if, according with his latent knowledge, 
he could have inferred doubts that revealed the need to expand his initial knowledge.  
 Special	 considerations	 are	 required	 in	 those	 cases	 known	 as	 “wilful	blindness”,	 where	 the	 citizen	 chooses	 not	 to	 investigate	 or	 seek	 further	
																																																								
411 A. Duff  ”Caldwell and Lawrance the Retreat from Subjectivism” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
(1983) 77 at 88 
412 F. Stark Culpable Carelessneww (2016) at p114 
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information	in	cases	where	a	properly	motivated	citizen	would413.	Some	authors,	like	 Moore,	 have	 asserted	 that	 these	 cases	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 equivalent	 to	recklessness414.	 Others,	 like	 Galligan415,	 claim	 that	 wilfully	 blind	 agents	 act	within	 the	standard	boundaries	of	 recklessness.	 	Recently,	Stark	has	countered	that	these	cases	should	be	distinguished	from	recklessness416	and	categorized	as	a	kind	of	negligent	behaviour.	The	case	R	v	Parker417	provides	a	good	example	of	how	controversial	the	current	solution	for	false	beliefs,	founded	in	the	mens	rea	element,	is	in	this	topic.	In	this	case,	the	accused,	after	failing	to	place	a	telephone	call	 in	 an	 outdoor	 payphone,	 slammed	 the	 plastic	 handset	 onto	 the	 telephone,	causing	 damage	 to	 the	 latter.	 On	 appeal,	 the	 appellant	 argued	 that	 he	 had	 not	contemplated	the	risk	of	damage	to	the	telephone.	He	argues	that	his	 failure	to	contemplate	 the	 risk	 of	 damage	 prevented	 him	 from	 being	 found	 responsible	under	the	recklessness	head	of	s	1	of	the	Criminal	Damage	Act	1971.	The	Court	of	Appeal,	 modifying	 the	 Cunningham	 concept	 of	 recklessness418 	(which	 solely	requires	 foreseeability	 of	 the	 harm	 that	 occurred)	 held	 that	 the	 test	 for	recklessness	 should	 also	 include	 “closing	 one’s	 eyes”	 to	 an	 obvious	 risk419	and	consequentially	 the	 appellant	 should	 be	 considered	 reckless.	 Stark	 challenged	the	Court	of	Appeal’s	decision	arguing	that	it	is	difficult	to	defend,	as	the	Court	of	Appeal	did,	for	the	reason	that	when	the	infuriated	Parker	raised	the	telephone	handset	 he	 “decided	 to	 put	 a	 belief	 out	 of	 his	 contemplation”420.	 It	 should	 be	more	 realistic	 to	 conclude	 that	 Parker’s	 fury	 prevented	 him	 from	 forming	 the	correct	belief	about	the	risk	linked	to	his	action.	Stark	claims	that	the	gist	of	this	case	should	be	whether	or	not	we	can	have	expected	Parker	to	have	done	more	to	 form	 a	 correct	 belief.	 Accordingly,	 he	 sustains	 that	 Parker	 is	 not	 a	 case	 of																																																									
413 see D. Lanham “Willful Blindness and the Criminal Law” Criminal Law Journal (1985) 9:261 at 
p267. R.M. Perkings “Knowledge as a Mens Rea Requirement” Hastings Law Journal (1977-
1978) 29:953 at pp962-63. D.N. Husak and C.A. Callender “Willful Ignorance , Knowledge and 
the ‘Equal Culpability’ Thesis : A Study of the Deeper Significance of the principle of legality” 
Wisconsin Law Review (1994) 29 at p54 
414 See M. Moore and H. Hurd “The Culpability of Negligence” in R. Cruft, M. Kramer and M. R. 
Reiff (eds) Crime, Punishment and Responsibility: the Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (2011) at 
p311  
415 D J Galligan “Responsibility for Recklessness” Current Legal Problems (1978) 31:55 at 68 
416 F. Stark Culpable Carelessness, Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law (2016) at p243 
417 (1977) 1WLR 600 
418 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 
419  “…a man certainly cannot escape the consequences of his action in this particular set of 
circumstances by saying ‘I never directed my mind to the obvious consequences because I was in 
a self-induced state of temper’ R v Parker at 604. 
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wilful	 blindness	 or	 its	 equivalence	with	 recklessness,	 as	 defended	 by	 Galligan,	but	a	clear	case	of	negligence421.	 In	any	case,	 this	research	does	not	attempt	 to	engage	 in	 disputes	 about	 a	 potential	 elasticity	 of	 the	mens	 rea	 element422,	 in	particular:	a)	whether	or	not	recklessness	should	include	those	situations	where	the	 accused	 “closes	 his	 mind”	 to	 a	 particular	 risk;	 b)	 whether	 or	 not	 wilful	blindness	 cases	 are	 equivalent	 to	 recklessness;	 c)	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	inappropriate	 to	 state	 that	 Parker’s	 action,	 of	 raising	 the	 telephone	 handset,	implies	a	decision	to	put	a	belief	out	of	his	contemplation,	as	Stark	states423;	d)	whether	or	not	Parker	is	a	good	example	of	negligence	instead	recklessness	or	its	equivalence	to	wilful	blindness.	For	this	reason,	this	research	proposes	that	false	beliefs	 would	 be	 better	 analysed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 epistemic	 conditions	 of	 the	citizen	rather	than	through	notions	of	mens	rea.	
 
In conclusion, in those situations where the citizen shows indifference towards 
the task of updating his latent knowledge or, in any case, from stopping the on-going 
action altogether, he will be culpably ignorant. At the same time, a direct and relevant 
conclusion from this initial assumption is that in those situations where current 
knowledge was insufficient to trigger the need to search for additional information, 
the agent should be excused. This is the reason the ECCR introduces a second 
correction factor, the required standard of awareness as a status holder, to restore the 
potential unfairness that this first requirement could raise. This second requirement 
would determine when a citizen, whose doubts were not triggered during his 
perception process, can still be held culpably ignorant. 
 
b) The standard of awareness expected as status holder 
 
The first prerequisite of the ECCR raises a problem of fairness concerning the 
standard of awareness. This requirement would imply that the action of indolent 
citizens who have done nothing to ascertain the truth would be non-reproachable. This 
solution would bring about an unfair outcome in those cases where citizens have 
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made an adequate effort to ascertain the truth, but for some reason fall short. More 
importantly, a pure psychological approach would jeopardise the main aim of the 
criminal law: fostering interpersonal trust. If the validity of an institutional structure 
only depends on others users’ perception, our expectations would be vulnerable to 
them. Thus, if a normative model of orientation is essential for the effortless and 
frictionless interaction between strangers in an atmosphere of mutual trust, a 
normative corrector factor should be introduced in the ECCR. 
 
The suggestion here defended proposes that in order to secure the institutional 
identity of the society, the correction factor should rely on the status holder’s 
perspective. As aforementioned above, status424 is a salient concept in the institutional 
structure because its deontic framework guides both the institution’s user and those 
who interact with him. Our institutional concept of status rests on the fact that within 
our modern heterogeneous societies social institutions shape our ambit and extension 
of freedom. We learn the way in which institutional realities present in our societies 
function before we interact with others. Trustworthy social interaction can only take 
place within the deontic framework created by this function status.   
 
It was explained earlier425 that trust could be created in a binary or ternary 
trust-structure. The former is concerned with trusting in anyone whereas the latter 
refers to trusting someone to do something. Interweaving both trust-structures with 
responsibility, the status holder needs to configure their ambit of action both 
negatively and positively. Negatively, he is responsible for configuring his ambit of 
action, avoiding causal processes that jeopardise the planning of others or the natural 
environment (neminem laede principle); positively, the status holder is responsible for 
a deficient performance when interacting with others within the institutional 
structure.426 Here, the institutional expectation is not the creation of non-permitted 
risks but that the function status will be performed competently and proficiently. 
These two demarcations were categorised previously as an inactive and proactive 
dimension of status. 427  Finally, connected with this double dimension, a new 																																																								
424 Status would be constructed as the constellation of expectations related to a particular position. See 
chapter 2 for a more detail exposition 
425 See chapter 3 
426 See chapter 3 
427 See chapter 3 
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classification of offences was proposed: offences of disassociation were defined as 
those where the status holder does not live up to the institutional expectations 
generated by the inactive dimension of status. However, modern societies are also 
founded on active social interaction and cooperation. Criminal law, securing 
interpersonal trust, is not only concerned with the assurance of ambits of respect but 
also guarantees that cooperative institutional functions will be performed efficiently. 
The proactive dimension of status implies that planning our lives and interacting with 
others is necessary to secure the proficient and orderly development of the essential 
institutions. Offences of association bring together those criminal actions where the 
status holder does not live up to the institutional expectations generated by the active 
dimension of status.  
 
As a result, it sounds reasonable to require that the corrector factor should 
reflect this dual perspective in those cases where new inputs did not produce in the 
agent suspicions about his potential false beliefs. The active and inactive dimensions 
of status require a different level of social interaction, thus the standard of knowledge 
required should be different in both kinds of offences. Hence, instead of supporting a 
single corrector factor, the proposal defended in this research will suggest a binary-
appraisal methodology: for offences of disassociation the evaluation will be based on 
the ‘collateral institutional user test’, where for offences of association this paper 
defends what Gardner calls a “specialized standard”,428 in particular a version of the 
Bolam test.429  
 
The inactive dimension supports the first category of criminal responsibility 
and the first principle of trust. Institutional users have the expectation that in the 
exercise of planning our lives we will take significant choices affecting others. The 
first obvious comparative standard available would be the “reasonable person”. But 
as Gardner highlighted, “[…] the services of the reasonable person are in such heavy 
demand in the law, I will suggest, precisely because he sets extra-legal standards, and 
indeed extra-legal standards of a notably versatile kind.”430 Accordingly, it sounds 																																																								
428 J. Gardner “The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person” LQR (2015) 131:1 at  25 
429 The case of Bolam v Friend Hospital Management Committee established the typical rules for 
assessing the appropriate standard of reasonable care and negligence in relation to skilled 
professionals. 
430 J. Gardner ‘The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person’ LQR (2015) 131:1 at 3 
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more adequate then to implement a comparative standard that reflects particularly the 
set of expectations that an individual user of the institutional framework would have: 
a collateral institutional user test. This evaluation demands a more limited 
circumscription of knowledge than that usually required of the ‘reasonable juror’. 
Applying the test, judges or juries must restrict their assessment to the institutional 
framework where users are interacting investing themselves as institutional users. 
From this perspective, they should decide whether or not the accused has lived up to 
reciprocal institutional expectations in the particular case in front of them. Therefore, 
if new inputs do not trigger doubts in the agent about his beliefs what needs to be 
decided is whether the behaviour of the agent falls below the standard of the ordinary 
user in his situation or not. Where in the first ECCR’s requirement the appraisal was 
absolutely psychological, in this second requirement outlined a normative standard is 
used. In short, if the behaviour of an ordinary institutional user with similar 
knowledge and under similar circumstances to the defendant would have had the 
same (false) belief, the accused will be acquitted. 
 
Active social interaction has always been vital in human societies. This has 
become even more so in our globalised modern society. Fundamental configurations 
at the heart of our societies like political participation, social cooperation, financial 
transactions, or business trading would not be conceivable without securement that its 
implementation will be done competently. In a current world where, for example, 
more peer-to-peer platforms, like Ebay, Airbnb, and even crypto-currencies are 
popular, to trust unknown people is key. The proactive dimension of status requires 
securing the proficient and competent development of essential tasks, but also to 
know institutional frameworks. We need to trust the architect who designs our houses 
or bridges as much as they need to trust their dentist. The reasons for this ternary 
trust-structure were explained above in terms of efficiency. We cannot do everything 
on our own so we need to trust others in a particular domain so that we can focus on 
the things that are really important to us. We cannot waste our time technically 
assessing the structure of our buildings every time we use them. We need to trust the 
architects, builders, plumbers, etc. who construct the building. Only in this way can 
modern specialised societies thrive. Institutional users within that specific institution 
would be made responsible for a deficient performance of their institutional functions. 
Acting in the proactive dimension of status requires more skills and abilities than the 
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average institutional user; it thus follows that in cases of offences of association the 
test should be stricter than the collateral institutional user test.  The test applicable 
should therefore be in line with the standards required for a competent, skilful and 
proficient user of that particular institutional structure. But our opinion on what a 
competent and practiced use of the institutional structure is can differ from status 
holder to status holder. To solve this alternative standard I propose a solution in 
accordance with the function of the criminal law of endorsing trust. It should be 
enough to show that the decision taken protects users’ expectations regardless of the 
opinion of other users that could differ about the choice. As far as the expectations 
about the institutional structure are protected the choice should be admitted as 
adequate.  
 
c) Internal and external circumstances that diminish the capacity required for 
noticing the illicitness 
 Finally,	 circumstances	 related	 to	 personal	 capacities	 could	 exclude	 a	citizen	 from	 responsibility.	 The	 third	 requirement	 of	 the	 ECCR	 states	 that	 the	intellectual	 or	 physical	 capacity	 of	 the	 agent	 at	 the	 precise	moment	 the	 action	occurs	 could	 compromise	 or	 diminish	 the	 process	 of	 perception.	 	 In	 those	circumstances	where	 the	 citizen	 fails	 to	 form	 the	 appropriate	belief	 during	his	process	of	deliberation	as	a	result	of	his	lack	of	intellectual	capacities,	he	cannot	be	held	responsible.		
These conditions could alter the perception process of the agent affecting his 
judgement about the need to seek additional information or abort the on-going action 
altogether. Objective alterations like light reflecting or flashing, or external sounds for 
example, could affect the intellectual or physical epistemic capacities of the agent. 
Additionally, the personal conditions of the agent can also affect his responsiveness to 
the reality that surrounds him. Visual misperceptions, seizures or even migraines can 
affect the perception of reality. Diplopia (double vision), colour-blindness, hearing 
voices, drug-induced hallucinations, and even some types of medication can influence 
the agent’s perceived need to search for more information related to brute facts. In 
those situations where the perception process exposes doubts about his beliefs and the 
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accused fails to expand his initial knowledge and continues with the wrongful action 
he will be criminally responsible unless intellectual or external circumstances have 
distorted his perception process. This	is	the	current	position	sustained	by	courts	in	cases	 of	 awareness	 about	 a	 risk	 (recklessness)	 when	 the	 accused	 was	 not	 of	sound	mind	or	 lacked	the	capacity	to	think,	reason	and	understand	for	himself.	This	was,	for	example,	the	approach	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	R	v	Stephenson431.	In	this	case,	 the	appellant	started	a	 fire	 in	a	hollow	he	made	in	a	haystack.	The	fire	then	spread	and	caused	damages	to	the	amount	of	£3500.	The	appellant	was	convicted	under	section	1	of	the	Criminal	Damage	Act	1971.	However,	on	appeal	the	court	held	that	the	recklessness	test	is	subjective.	Accordingly,	although	for	a	person	of	 sound	mind	 the	 risk	of	 causing	damage	would	be	obvious	under	 the	circumstances,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 appellant	 had	 a	 history	 of	 Schizophrenia	prevented	him	from	forming	the	correct	belief	about	the	risk	of	causing	damage.	
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
No final judgment about the guiltiness of an accused can be properly delivered 
without appraising his epistemic condition. It should be extensively accepted that the 
most difficult cases of attribution of responsibility are precisely those where the 
citizen unwittingly does something criminal.  This chapter has attempted to provide 
an algorithmic solution for these unwitting situations. The main argument is that 
citizen’s responsibility for any unknowing conduct is related to the culpability for his 
own ignorance. A coherent framework, aside from tracing/non-tracing cases, has also 
been provided to establish culpable ignorance. The lack of consideration from legal 
scholars about cognitive conditions has allowed me to freely suggest an a priori 
workable but sui generis principled solution. The proposal attempts to also be 
consistent with the institutional conceptual framework defended in previous chapters. 
This coherence will be maintained in the following chapters where the ECCR will be 
put in practice across an innovative institutional classification of false beliefs beyond 
the error of law/fact current solution. Applying the ECCR to this new proposed set of 
false beliefs will be its acid test. In any case, the constraint of working within the 
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limits of the institutional framework previously proposed could also provide guidance 
in those specific cases where the ECCR would be short of resources. 
	
 
 
 
PART II 
	
In part I, after an extensive review of the fragmented and patchy theoretical 
framework surrounding false beliefs (chapter 1), this research discussed the reasons 
why a principled solution has been so evasive and problematic to achieve (chapter 2). 
To do so, the thesis scrutinised the dissimilar approaches taken towards the function 
of the criminal law by the legal moralist and legal positivist schools of thought. As an 
alternative (chapter 3) we proposed a more sociological orientated framework that 
implements an institutional approach to the legal phenomena. The legitimation of 
criminal law in this picture is defined as the guarantor that secures the institutional 
identity of society against conduct that contravenes the general normative model of 
orientation or guidance in social interactions that the institutional structure defines. 
The maintenance of institutional expectations legitimates the use of punishment as a 
means to guarantee the validity of the institutional normative framework. Only within 
this framework of reciprocal institutionalised expectations can we interact, cooperate 
and essentially trust others.  
 
What is salient about institutional structures is the deontic framework they 
create. This framework provides members of society with a reason to act in a 
particular way – the manner this particular society has collectively recognised to 
behave – but at the same time it discloses what others can expect from our behaviour, 
prescribing and outlining our ambit of responsibility. This expectation can only be 
sustained if the agent has the capacity to behave accordingly as a result of 
implementing his rational conditions; that is to say, by way of a deliberation process. 
Finally, Chapter 4 addressed the relevance of cognitive conditions in the deliberation 
process as highlighted in chapter 3, introducing the Epistemic Condition of Criminal 
Responsibility (ECCR). Giving continuity to the arguments defended in the previous 
part I, this second part of the thesis will attempt to categorise, systematically and 
analytically, the cognitive condition, placing the ECCR in practice. 
 
It was claimed in the previous chapter that the ECCR is an algorithmic, 
principled way to deliver a coherent and consistent solution for any kind of false 
belief. This position does not negate, however, a potential categorisation of false 
beliefs. Ontological structural differences between beliefs should also be taken into 
consideration in a systematic study of the topic. The defence of the ECCR does not 
imply that all false beliefs must be resolved identically. In contrast, some kind of 
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categorisation is not only convenient but also necessary. Appropriately classifying 
beliefs is essential because it enables the ECCR to supply customised practical and 
principled outcomes. That said, it is relevant to say that this categorisation must 
reflect the authentic qualities of the beliefs under consideration and not only 
functional or consequential criteria. Thus, the key point again is to determine a 
suitable differentiator. Only a categorisation performed from this premise will deliver 
a reliable and genuine one. 
 
The traditional and commonly accepted differentiator rests on a purported 
normative/factual dichotomy of false beliefs. The customary way to deal with the 
excusatory effects of false beliefs has been through the classical binary distinction 
between error of fact and error of law, the latter being amended by the “error of civil 
law” heading.432  This classification is simply inadequate and deficient. Categorising 
is a process where objects and ideas are recognised and differentiated based on their 
similar properties. This, in fact, is the success behind categorisation in natural 
sciences: categorisation makes the cognition of the world around us easier. The first 
problem with such a binary classification resides in the fact that it is sometimes 
difficult to ascertain whether the false belief is about a factual or a legal issue (see, for 
example, sexual consent). This is the argument held by Alexander who, in a debate 
with Husak on this issue, points out that the distinction would be arbitrary: 
“…because all legal prohibitions consist of facts–such as, that this legislative body 
passed this law that contains these words that have this intended meaning––and that 
because all mistakes of fact are also mistakes about whether the law prohibits a 
particular token of conduct, all mistakes of law could be looked at as mistakes of fact, 
and vice versa. … hunting law case: that prohibited hunting when a red flag flies over 
the Fish and Game department and allows it when a green flag flies. If a colorblind 
hunter mistakes red for green or green for red, has he made a mistake of fact or a 
mistake of law?”433 Husak, argues that Alexander’s approach could be overcome by 
categorising not as ‘cases’ of mistaken fact/law but ‘propositions’.434 Certainly, the 
use of fact and law as a differentiator can be ambiguous in some cases because it does 
not convey a suitable ground for differentiation. But also, and more importantly, the 																																																								
432 See chapter 1. 
433 L. Alexander “Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in 
Memory of Mike Bayles” Law and Philosophy (1993)12:33 
434 D. Husak Ignorance of law: A philosophical Inquiry (2016) at p105 
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use of error of law as a category encloses ideas and concepts with different normative 
properties. For example, in the description of criminal conduct institutional/normative 
factors are used. These factors, that are not an essential part of the commanded or 
prohibited conduct, can be mistakenly constructed by the agent. In such cases, should 
they belong to the same category as mistakes about commands or prohibition itself? 
Should a false belief about ‘ownership’ be classified in the same category as a false 
belief about the prohibition to vandalise properties belonging to others?435. As Smiths’ 
case demonstrates, it obviously should not. A classification made in this way becomes 
an inoperable categorisation. The result of this traditional arrangement is that in some 
cases mistakes of law could receive the same treatment as mistake of fact (or vice 
versa) without any coherent reason.  In addition, the binary solution provides a 
principled solution for false beliefs about defences. Are they mistakes of fact or 
mistakes of law? 
 
Regardless of the above arguments, the division between error of fact and law 
is widely accepted. Westen has provided a commonly established test for this 
differentiation: “an actor makes a mistake of law … if he is in need of the services of 
a good lawyer… An actor makes an error of fact … if he is in need of a good private 
investigator”.436  This bipolar description differentiates between empirical and legal 
facts. Unfortunately, reality is not as simple as Western pretends. First, no arguments 
are provided to justify why factual beliefs should be treated differently from legal 
ones.  Further, although it is acceptable that empirical facts (brute) form a 
homogeneous group; the non-empirical beliefs (legal/normative) are not a consistent 
unit. In this second group the categorisation defended by Westen includes two 
obviously dissimilar non-empirical elements highlighted above: on the one hand, 
under the heading of mistake of law, he refers to conduct which is legally prohibited, 
permitted or commanded; on the other, under the same heading it includes any 
definition of legal elements required in shaping this prohibited or commanded 
conduct. These complementary legal or institutional/normative components of the 
norm are not necessary by themselves. They are necessary merely to give form, shape 
or content to the prohibition or the conduct commanded in the criminal norm. 
																																																								
435 See R v Smith [1974] QB 354. 
436 P. Westen “Impossible Attempts: A Speculative Thesis” Ohio St. J. Crim. L. (2008) 5:523 at p535 
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Furthermore, this dual categorisation does not provide a genuine solution for false 
beliefs about permitted conduct (defences).  
 
Once the traditional incoherencies of the dual law/fact differentiator have been 
exposed, a sequence of examples could help to find a suitable differentiator in the 
categorisation of false beliefs.  We can take, for example, four dissimilar versions of 
the facts behind the Scottish case Clark v Syme.437 In the original case, sheep from a 
neighbouring property were in the habit of straying on to a farmer's land. The owner 
of the land delivered an ultimatum to his neighbour, stating that he would shoot the 
sheep if he continued to allow them to trespass. After a three day notice period, he 
shot and killed a sheep.438 In this original version of the case, Mr Syme’s false belief 
was about a purported permission. He falsely believed that after the notice he was 
legally entitled to defend his property killing the invasive sheep, under a 
misconception of what his legal remedies might be. Currently this false belief is 
treated as an error of law that usually does not exonerate an agent of criminal 
responsibility. 
 
In a second variation of this case, a farmer kills one of his neighbour’s sheep 
in his field, falsely believing it to be a red deer. In this case, the false belief may refer 
to imprudent or reckless conduct in confusing a sheep with a red deer.  This false 
belief encloses the conventional elements for an empirical mistake currently 
categorized as an error of fact. This kind of error currently exculpates the agent when 
it negates the mens rea element. 
 
A third variation shows the farmer killing a sheep falsely believing that he can 
lawfully kill any animal (domestic or wild) that trespass on his property as an exercise 
of vindication of his own rights of domain. In this case, the farmer may have the false 
belief that no criminal norm prohibits him from killing an animal that is grazing in his 																																																								
437 1957 JC 1, 5 
438 The farmer was charged with maliciously shooting and killing a sheep. The Sheriff-Substitute held 
that the presumption of malice was adequately displaced because the respondent believed that in 
the circumstances he had a legal right to shoot the sheep, and he found the respondent not guilty. 
It was held on appeal that no question of a presumption of malice arose in the crime of malicious 
mischief which involved either a deliberate and wicked intent to injure, or a wilful disregard of, or 
indifference to, the rights of others, and that a misconception of one's legal remedies did not 
render such action less criminal 
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field. This third case matches up with the requirements for those currently categorised 
as errors of law that do not currently exonerate the agent. 
 
Finally, in a fourth version of the case, the farmer kills the sheep, aware of the 
prohibition of killing animals that are not their own, but falsely believing he is a 
‘qualified owner’ of the sheep. In this case the farmer has a mistaken belief about the 
extension of the legal concept of ‘qualified ownership’. Under Scots law, wild 
animals and birds cannot be the subject of absolute ownership. But under the legal 
heading of qualified ownership some people can, in certain circumstances, be 
regarded as the qualified owner. Qualified ownership arises, for example, if a person 
lawfully takes and tames a wild animal. In this case the animal becomes the property 
of this person until it is released or it escapes. Another way to become qualified 
owner of a wild animal was established in the case of Blades v Higgs439 using the 
‘rational soil’ principle: any wild animal killed becomes the absolutely property of 
the owner of the land on which it dies. In this final version of the case maybe the 
farmer, misunderstanding the relevant property law about wild and farming animals, 
falsely believes that he can claim qualified ownership of any kind of animal killed on 
his land. And for that reason he (mistakenly) believes that he can lawfully shoot and 
kill the sheep. These kinds of mistakes, as discussed above, are currently treated 
sometimes (although arbitrarily) as an ‘error of civil law’ that exonerates the agent 
when the mental element of the crime can be said to be negated. 
 
The dissimilar nature of the false beliefs outlined above demands a dissimilar 
treatment beyond the dual fact/law classification traditionally accepted. Thus, 
consistent with the four categories highlighted above and within the institutional 
conceptual framework and terminology developed in previous chapters, this second 
part of the thesis will systematise and provide a principled account of false beliefs in 
four categories: a) false beliefs about brute facts; b) false beliefs about institutional 
facts; c) false beliefs about commanded or prohibited conduct, referred to here as a 
																																																								
439 11 H.L. Cas. 621, 11 Eng. Rep. 1474 (1865) 
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false belief about an institutional command; and d) mistaken beliefs about permitted 
or justified conduct (defences).440 
 
The purpose of any criminal norm is the prohibition, permission or command 
of particular conduct. In order to shape this prohibited, permitted or commanded 
conduct the lawmaker uses brute and institutional facts. Brute facts, as it was 
highlighted in chapter 3, are those disassociated from the perception or belief of the 
witness. They can be described with reference to physical or chemical properties (e.g. 
a person’s age). On the other hand, institutional facts are those phenomena related to 
the spectator’s awareness. They arise when members of a society collectively believe 
they exist and cannot subsist unless the community collectively recognises them as 
existing. In a sense, its nature is socially attributed and consequently changeable (e.g. 
sexual consent).  As pointed out above, these institutional facts are necessary merely 
to shape or describe the prohibition, the permission or the commanded conduct. They 
are not constitutive elements of the prohibition or command itself. The next chapter 
will deal with the categories of false beliefs about brute facts. A practical explanation 
of the manner in which the ECCR applies to cases of false beliefs about brute facts 
will be also provided. Thereafter, chapter 6 will illustrate the way that the ECCR 
operates in cases of false beliefs about institutional facts. Finally, chapter 7 will 
resolve those cases where a false belief about the commanded or prohibit conduct 
itself exculpates the agent according with the ECCR.  
																																																								
440 A full analysis of mistaken beliefs about permitted or justified conduct is beyond the aim of this 
project. For that reason, and although the research leaves open lines of argumentation about the 
topic, mistaken beliefs about defences are not going to be discussed in depth in this research. 
	
CHAPTER 5 
 
FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT BRUTE FACTS 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
I have claimed that the traditional mistake of fact/law dichotomy should be 
superseded by a new categorisation of false beliefs. This chapter expands and 
develops this argument applying the ECCR to false beliefs about brute facts. Before 
then, section 5.2 will criticise the outcomes distilled from the current mistake of fact 
category. Thereafter, section 5.3 discusses the feasibility of a sound distinction 
between brute and institutional facts within the framework of a criminal norm. To 
achieve this, the chapter endeavours to identify a critical differentiator quality that 
makes a cognitive difference in the responsibility of those who act under a false belief 
abut brute facts or institutional facts. Section 5.4 concludes with the view that the 
perception process of brute and institutional facts are entirely dissimilar. Adopting the 
terminology proposed by Kahneman concerning two systems that the brain uses to 
process information, brute facts are connected with the heuristic system 1 (fast 
thinking), whereas institutional facts are connected with the analytical system 2 (slow 
thinking). Sections 5.5 and 5.6 frame false beliefs about brute facts and puts the 
ECCR into practice. Finally, section 5.7 explains the two main reasons this thesis 
proposes an autonomous (from mens rea) solution for cognitive conditions: firstly, the 
controversy that the attachment of cognitive conditions to the mental element would 
bring about; and secondly, the conflict that this solution would introduce in the 
adjudication of strict liability offences.  
 
5.2 The “dead end” of the current solution about error of fact 
 
The retributivist conception that the function of the criminal law is punishment 
justification finds in this area of the law its strongest epitomic illustration. Most of the 
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judges, scholars and legislators must deal with this issue implying that the key 
purpose of the criminal law is to achieve retributive justice by punishing those 
morally culpable. In doing so, an evident substantive law issue – how the criminal law 
should deal with false beliefs – has been transposed to the adjudicatory level. Effort 
has been devoted to developing procedural mechanisms to solve the issue on a case-
by-case basis. In any case, the aim of this context-sensitive approach has been to 
ensure a higher number of convictions (particularly in sexual offences) instead of 
developing a fair, principled, coherent and systematic solution that can guide and 
protect citizen’s expectations. 
 
Before progressing to the development of the fresh approach proposed in this 
research, it would be helpful to scrutinise the dead end to which the leading current 
academic debate in common law jurisdictions, based on the elasticity of the mens rea 
element, has taken the solution for false beliefs about brute facts (errors of fact). It 
was pointed out in chapter 1 that criminal law has traditionally dealt with false beliefs 
about brute facts through the mens rea element and under the heading of ‘error of 
fact’. Accordingly, this solution does not operate as a substantive defence but as a 
failure to proof, also referred to as  ‘absence of an element defences’,441 ‘evidential 
defences’,442 or ‘denial defences’. The agent is exculpated because the prosecution 
fails to prove the required mental state element of the offence. There is an obvious 
procedural element implied here. The burden of proof lies on the Crown prosecutor 
who has to prove the requisite intent of the defendant. So, for example, the hunter 
who kills another hunter mistakenly believing them to be a red deer can use the 
defence of error of fact. This solution is based on the argument that murder implies 
the intentional or reckless killing of another human being. The prosecutor must 
therefore prove that the hunter’s intention was to kill a human being. As this is not the 
case, the hunter’s responsibility would be excluded because he does not have the 
mens rea for murder (he has the intention to kill a red deer). Since the conviction for a 
crime requires the actus reus and the mens rea element to be present, to convict the 
factually mistaken hunter would involve punishing him unlawfully.  
 																																																								
441 See P.H. Robinson “Criminal Law Defences, a Systematic Analisys” Columbia Law Review (1982) 
82:204 at 204. 
442 V. Tadros Criminal Responsibility (2005) at p103 
Chapter 5: False beliefs about brute facts 
 
	
144	
The scrutiny of two particular issues in the sexual offences field will be 
revealing about this policy. The first has concerns the topic of an ‘honest and 
reasonable belief’ about consent to intercourse.443 The second is understood under the 
generic term of statutory rape or, more precisely, strict liability offences as to the age 
of the complainer (under 13 years in Scotland).444 The initial inference that can be 
reached from the cases and legislation on these topics is the disregard that judges, 
legislators and scholars have had towards the human ability to be guided in our 
deliberation process by legal norms and, consequently, their disinterest to draft a 
cogent and precise description ex ante of the prohibited conduct. Once, and only once, 
the criminal conduct has been precisely defined, can and should a coherent principled 
adjudicatory solution for those situations where the agent acts with a false belief be 
prescribed. 
 
At first sight, the current framework for error of fact could imply that this is an 
uncontroversial field. However, disagreement has emerged firstly within the 
subfamily of false beliefs in the field of sexual offences, under the epigraph of 
‘reasonable belief in consent’445. Conversely, it has been discussed as an isolated 
adjudicatory topic and it is even difficult to conclude that the conclusions reached can 
be applied or extended beyond sexual offences. Finally, and remarkably, another 
subfamily of false beliefs within the sexual offences classification, offences against 
children under 13 years old, has been settled as a strict liability offence as to age 
without manifesting academic controversy or disagreement. The outcome of this 
approach is that there exists no defence of (reasonable) false belief about the age of 
the complainer. At this point, and as aforementioned above, a close scrutiny of the 
current treatment for these two subfamilies will be enlightening about the 
inconclusive and fragmentary state of this area. 
 
Let us start with the issues surrounding the requirement that a belief (generally 
speaking) should not only be honest but also reasonable in order to excuse. 
																																																								
443 A false belief about an institutional fact under my proposed categorisation.  
444 A false belief about a brute fact under my proposed categorisation. 
445 “DPP v Morgan” in P. Handler, H. Mares and I. Williams (ed) Landmark Cases in Criminal Law 
(2017)  
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Traditionally, it seems that in English law any mistake of fact had to be reasonable.446 
The problem with this approach is that unreasonable mistakes of fact may negate, in 
some cases, the proof of subjective intention or foresight maintained by the accused in 
some offences.447 The controversy was settled in 1975 in DPP v Morgan448 where the 
reasonableness requirement was replaced by the subjective “inexorable logic rule”.449 
In Morgan,450 it was held that if the mental element is absent for one of the conduct 
elements specified in the definition of a crime then, as a matter of inexorable logic, 
the agent should be exonerated. Demanding that belief about consent must be 
reasonable would convict the agent for something that in actuality he did not intend to 
do.451  
 
This leading case also clarified that a false belief about consent in rape was 
considered a denial of the required mens rea (intention), and not a substantive defence 
of rape. As Lord Hailsham explained: “Once one has accepted, […] that the 
prohibited act in rape is non-consensual sexual intercourse and the guilty state of 
mind is an intention to commit it, it seems to me to follow as a matter of inexorable 
logic […]. Either the prosecution has to prove that the accused had the requisite intent, 
or it does not. In the former case it succeeds, and in the latter it fails”. This passage 
reverses and distinguishes the rule established in Tolson452 and other cases that 
require the agent to have reasonable grounds for his false belief in order to use error 
of fact as an excuse. With this new approach, Morgan opened a well-known 
contentious debate about the reasonableness or not of mistake. After Morgan, judges 
seem only sometimes to firmly follow the “inexorable logic rule”,453 while on other 
occasions they opt for a more moralist or context-sensitive approach.454 Furthermore, 
the dispute about reasonable belief established in Morgan has extended the 
controversial reasonableness test to defences.455  																																																								
446 Rose (1884) 15 Cox CC 540. 
447 See Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 
448 (1976) AC 182. 
449 See A. Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (Ox 2009) at p218 
450 See L. Farmer “DPP v Morgan” in P. Handler, H. Mares and I. Williams (eds) Landmark Cases in 
Criminal Law (2017) 
451 DPP V Morgan [1976] AC 182 (HL) 210 B-C. 
452 (1889) 23 QBD 168 (CCR). 
453 See R v Kimber ([1983]1 WLR 1118; see also B v DPP [2002] 2 AC 428 
454 See Graham (1982) 74 Cr App R 235; 
455 Five years after the Morgan ruling, the Divisional Court modified the rule in Albert v Lavin (1981) 1 
All ER 628 (DC) arguing that the “inexorable logic test” would apply only to definitional 
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The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (and 2009 in Scotland) involved a change in 
the law from the honest belief test in Morgan (or Jamieson456 in Scotland) to a 
reasonable belief test457. In order to attribute responsibility, the assessment takes into 
account both the accused’s personal capacity to evaluate consent as well as its 
reasonableness.  If the defendant did honestly believe that consent was given, this 
belief must be reasonable. However, contrary to Morgan, it will be for the jury to 
decide whether a defendant’s belief that consent was given is reasonable or not. 
Although it may not seem so, this is not a completely objective (reasonable man) test 
as some of the personal beliefs of the defendant are relevant to a degree. However, 
both the final belief about consent and the modus by which the defendant has reached 
it is assessed in an objective way. This adjudicatory solution has apparently provided 
some resolution to this issue. 
 
Either way, the long academic-judicial debate about this topic has missed the 
point: a purely substantive law issue concerning how the criminal law should deal 
with false beliefs about a definitional element of an offence has been transferred to an 
adjudicatory level. The academic or judicial determinations only attempt to emphasise 
which test should be applied in court. This attitude tries to resolve in the adjudication 
process what has not been appropriately determined as a substantive law principle. 
The disagreement has been framed and reduced to a binary procedural assessment of 
objectivity versus subjectivity. This well-known twofold approach concerns a 
purported ‘elasticity’ of the concept of mens rea and, in the context of false beliefs, 
whether to negate the mental requirement the belief need only be honest or must also 																																																																																																																																																														
elements of an offence.  To be entitled to a defence, the agent must prove that his mistake was 
reasonable. This was a case of self-defence against an assault inflicted by a law enforcement agent. 
Here the definitional elements of the offence were present – intentional inflicted force – and thus 
the key point to be resolved by the judge was whether or not the assault was lawful.  Confronting 
this question, the Divisional Court ruled that force used on the basis of an unreasonable belief was 
unlawful force. Later, the Court of Appeal in Glaston Williams455 overturned the above Divisional 
Court ruling. In this case, the court understood that unlawfulness is an element of all crimes of 
violence, not merely a consideration for a defence as held by the Divisional Court. Therefore, the 
mens rea of assault is not ‘an intent to apply force and not more’ but ‘the intent to apply unlawful 
force to the victim’. As a result, an agent who falsely or mistakenly believes that the use of 
violence is lawfully inflicted to protect another from an attack should not be criminally liable. In 
short, the key question to unravel is whether the concept of mens rea should embrace 
unlawfulness as a definitional element of a crime or, as Simester defends,455 that only when both 
mens rea and actus reus are present can the conduct be typified as unlawful. 
456 Jamieson v HMA 1994 JC 88. 
457 Sexual Offences (Scotland ) Act 2009 Section 16 
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be reasonable. It also questions, in some cases, whether the defendant can be 
convicted without the need to prove mens rea at all in relation to one or more 
elements of the definition of a crime (strict liability offences). 
 
The outcomes are in any case inconsistent and divisive. On one hand, the 
subjective Morgan principle could be construed as a “rapist charter”458 that could 
embolden Adonis-esque males flamboyant of their own irresistibility and immunity 
against any conviction of rape.  On the other hand, the later legislative solution could 
convict an agent of intending to do that which in truth he did not intend to do.  In any 
case, neither of these perspectives recognise the real nature of the problem in its just 
terms: the need for a precise ex ante definition of the criminal offence, and thereafter 
a principled way to determine how false beliefs about definitional elements of the 
defined offence should be substantively answered. This failure to understand the 
essential features of the problem is more alarming in a case like Morgan where, as 
Farmer recognises, the problem was “[…] understood as one of principle, a matter of 
the academic structure of the criminal law”.459 This approach also raises not only 
circumstantial but structural methodological concerns about the way criminal legal 
theory can be developed in the courtroom.  
 
However, the final legislative solution stated in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
is neither suitable nor conclusive. In order to comply with the legality principle, 
lawmakers should have to provide a precise description of the actions or omissions 
considered criminal and which deserve criminal punishment. This description should 
include all the objective (actus reus) and subjective (mens rea) elements. The drafting 
of legal norms about rape or any other offence should be addressed to citizens in order 
to guide them in adjusting their (sexual) conduct to the meaning of the institution of 
consensual sex at a particular time. In doing so, special attention must be paid by the 
lawmaker to those institutional concepts (like consent) whose meaning is susceptible 
to change in the new legal framework. That suitable norm should include a cognisable 
and guiding description of those institutional elements of the criminal offence (like 
consent) that could be contentious or confuse. This involves a detailed description of 																																																								
458 T. Jennifer Rape and the Legal Process (2002) at p119 
459 L. Farmer “DPP v Morgan” in P. Handler, H. Mares and I. Williams (eds) Landmark Cases in 
Criminal Law (2017) at p247 
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the behaviour we should expect from others in sexual relations. Once, and only once, 
the prohibited conduct has been properly described and framed, the criteria of 
responsibility can be established in cases where, unknown to the agent, there exists a 
component or factor that constitutes a definitional element of a crime in his actions. 
This implies something more than the renaming of a reasonableness test in order to 
attribute criminal responsibility, which is precisely what the 2003 Act and previous 
case law seem to have done. This requires a resolute test or judgment that appraises 
the epistemic condition of the citizen.  
 
Another significant heading which evidences the currently inadequate and 
manifestly unfair situation surrounding false beliefs is statutory rape. Section 5 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003460 makes the penile penetration of a child under 13 years 
old an offence, with strict liability as to the age of the complainer. Thus, the act is 
criminal irrespective of whether or not the victim gave consent, and irrespective of the 
belief of the defendant regarding the victim’s age. The main justification for such an 
offence is that a child under 13 years does not have the legal capacity to consent to 
any form of sexual activity, under any circumstances. More about this case will be 
discussed at the end of this chapter when the impact of the ECCR in strict liability 
offences is considered. For now, it is important to highlight that, as demonstrated in 
the recent Scottish case of HMA v Daniel Cieslack,461 courts are also of the opinion 
that the approach taken in this area is flawed.462 The High Court in Glasgow took the 
decision not to sentence and instead absolutely discharge a 19-year-old boy who plead 
guilty of rape of a girl under the age of 13. A description of the facts of the case will 
illustrate that the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 is out of step. The 12-year-old 
victim travelled to Edinburgh to meet up with some friends. The complainer and her 
friends were drinking vodka in the Princes Street area and at around 3.30am the 
victim spent some time speaking with police officers who were looking for one of her 
friends. In court, the officers gave evidence that they had no concerns about the age of 
the victim whatsoever. Later, at 4am, the complainer met the defender in a taxi queue 
and they decided to travel together to a party in a student’s flat. The taxi driver 
testified that he had the impression that the victim was about 20 years old. Once in the 																																																								
460 Section 18 Sexual Offences Act 2009 uses similar terms to criminalise sexual activities with 
children under the age of 13. 
461 HMA-v-Daniel-Cieslak Unreported 17 March 2017 
462 In this case Lady Scott was in a position to reject the current law on the topic. 
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flat, the victim confirmed to the defender she was over 16. Even Judge Lady Scott 
asserted that “for what it is worth my impression from viewing the victim on the 
CCTV footage on assessment by appearance that the victim was over 16 years of age 
would be a reasonable one.”463 At some point during the night the victim and the 
defendant engaged in sexual intercourse. She left the flat the next morning without 
concerns or any sign of her being distressed. Lady Scott stated, “… I do not consider 
there is any need for, or public interest in, punishment. To do so would in my view be 
disproportionate given the nature of criminal culpability here.”464 This case clearly 
illustrates the potentially unjust outcome of a legal norm that convicts a defendant 
even though he is genuinely ignorant of one or more factors that made his action or 
omission criminal.  
  
In summary, the current solutions to false beliefs about a definitional element 
of an offence, range from draconian conviction to acquittal through absolute 
discharge, without a coherent rationale.  Beyond the potential arbitrary and unjust 
adjudicatory consequences there are two things that are judicially, legislatively and 
academically inconceivable: first, the indifference towards the relevance of a proper 
and comprehensive description of criminal offences. In its place, the emphasis has 
been on deciding what kind of test should be applied in order to attribute criminal 
responsibility on a case-by-case basis.  Secondly, the lack of a proper analysis of the 
different categories of false beliefs that empirically occurs. We can take both statutory 
rape and reasonable beliefs about consent as examples of this. Neither topic has been 
categorised as one of a false belief.465 Both are appraised separately but for the wrong 
reasons. They are in fact heterogeneous and not conceptually analogous, but the real 
reason of this dissimilar categorisation is not discussed, or even cited. The actual age 
of the complainer refers to a physical feature. It is a physically measurable temporal 
ratio from the date of birth to the day of the commission of the offence. It is a classic 
brute fact disassociated from the perception of the defender. On the other hand, the 
definitional element ‘sexual consent’ is an archetypal institutional fact that depends 
for its existence on (changeable) human agreement. Consequently, the meaning of this 
definitional element could and should change over a period of time. The nature of 																																																								
463 HMA-v-Daniel-Cieslak Unreported 17 March 2017 
464 Ibd 
465 A noticeable exception can be found in J. Chalmers and F. Leverick Criminal Defences and Pleas in 
Bar of Trial (2006) chapter 12 
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both types of definitional elements is clearly dissimilar. Due to this divergent nature, 
the perception process (and potential false beliefs about them) by a rule abider is also 
different. Where brute facts can be perceived instantaneously by our senses, 
institutional facts require a more intellectual process of perception or discernment. It 
requires a more detailed comprehension of the institutional framework we are dealing 
with. It also requires an updated knowledge about the current meaning (i.e. social, 
customary, normative) of the institutional fact. It is precisely this cognitive/epistemic 
variation that should compel a dissimilar academic/judicial scrutiny, treatment and 
outcome. 
 
5.3 A feasible distinction between brute and institutional facts in the 
criminal norm: searching for the “critical quality” 
 
To define the prohibited, permitted or commanded conduct, the lawmaker uses 
brute and institutional facts. Brute facts, for example a red deer or a human being, are 
those disassociated from the perception or belief of the witness. They can be 
described with reference to physical properties of the object, like biological age for 
example. On the other hand, institutional facts, for example sexual consent, are those 
phenomena related to the awareness of the spectator. They arise when members of a 
specific community collectively believe they exist and cannot subsist unless they are 
recognised as existing.  As highlighted above, these institutional facts or elements 
must be distinguished from the prohibition or command itself. They are necessary 
merely to shape or describe the prohibition, the permission or the commanded 
conduct that is the genuine core of the criminal norm. 
 
But this proposed distinction is not exempt from debate or discrepancies. Let 
me start by considering the argument that a feasible distinction between the different 
elements used in the description of a crime does not exist. That is, that a feasible 
distinction between brute and institutional facts or elements in the definition of a 
crime does not exist. Two opposite approaches will result from this hypothesis. The 
first assumption would imply that any element used in the wording of a norm that 
shapes the extension of a criminal offence are pure brute facts, descriptive in nature. 
The second would support the argument that any element or concept incorporated in 
the description of a crime becomes institutional. 
Chapter 5: False beliefs about brute facts 
 
	
151	
 
The first proposition would uphold that a prohibited or commanded conduct 
can only guide the agent if the criminal norm defines the material elements of the 
prohibition or command.  In drafting the criminal norm, the lawmaker portrays those 
factual or empirical situations that the norm commands or prescribes. Different 
elements or concepts can be used in drafting a norm. Some elements can be strictly 
comprehended by sensorial observation where others might require a more 
sophisticated intellectual understanding. But isolated, any particular element or 
concept included by the draftsman or judge in the shaping of the prohibited or 
commanded conduct is rigorously descriptive in nature. The (purported) institutional 
character belongs to the whole norm that shapes the prohibited or commanded 
conduct, and not to each of the particular fragments by which the criminal conduct is 
moulded. 
 
In contrast, the second approach suggests that any concept or element included 
in the description of the prohibited or commanded conduct is institutional in nature. 
Any fact, object or any natural, cultural or psychological phenomena used by the 
lawmaker becomes institutional. Its inclusion in the criminal norm transforms its 
quotidian (brute) meaning towards a new normative sense. Thus, in describing a 
prohibited or commanded conduct, two different types of concepts, facts or elements 
are initially used. For example, red deer or property are concepts with obviously 
different natures. But in some sense, their presence within a criminal norm transfers to 
them normative/institutional sensitivity. Take, for example, the term or element 
‘persona’: different disciplines have a different scope of the concept of ‘person’, but 
its institutional meaning in the criminal norm can only be properly grasped through 
the law as discipline, regardless of the meaning that this concept might have in other 
ambits.  Every particular discipline, like biology, ethnography or psychology secures 
its own limits of the concept of persona. Law does the same in its particular 
institutional way. The description of persona referred to in law could differ from the 
same element in biology. For example, the law recognises the succession rights of the 
nasciturus466, expanding the concept of persona beyond what biology could support. 
Also, the concept of death sustained in medicine or biology differs from the legal 																																																								
466An unborn child, if subsequently born alive, is to be considered as already in existence whenever it is 
to its own advantage, as with succession. 
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definition of death. The law regulates the donation or extraction of organs for 
transplant. Law also delimits when an organ can be extracted and regulates when a 
person that is not clinically or medically deceased has normatively lost their 
personhood and their organs can be donated. 
  
Thus, in short, it seems consistent to argue that once the element is 
incorporated into the definition of a criminal norm, a rigorous distinction between 
pure brute or institutional fact could be problematic. As discussed above, it could be 
possible to support the claim that any institutional element incorporated into a 
criminal norm has a brute nature. But it can also be defended that the law 
institutionalises any element incorporated to the criminal norm. Perhaps a sharp and 
conclusive framework will be difficult to construct especially in particular cases. But 
beyond this profound debate, at least intuitively, it looks evident that an essential 
difference exists between concepts like ‘red deer’ and ‘ownership’ even when 
incorporated into a norm. Hence, a different treatment should be provided for false 
beliefs about brute and institutional facts. In fact, as it will be defended later in this 
chapter, it is precisely the apparent differences in the perception process of both types 
of facts that justifies this dissimilar treatment. 
 
That said, developing a classificatory theory about this matter would exceed 
the aims of this thesis. In any case, what is salient for our purposes is to discover the 
way in which knowledge or awareness about brute or institutional facts might affect 
the cognitive condition of responsibility. Particularly, whether the ECCR would apply 
differently or with different outcomes in cases of false belief about a brute or 
institutional fact. In short, what is relevant for our research purposes is to find out if 
there exists a critical quality that makes a cognitive difference in the attribution of 
responsibility of the agent who acts with false belief about a brute or institutional fact. 
This critical quality could only be identified if the agent has a cognitive difference 
identifying brute or institutional facts. That is, if a cognitive difference in the 
perception of brute and institutional facts by the agent exists.  
 
However, could knowledge about brute and institutional facts be similarly or 
equally perceived? To answer this question we must evaluate the singular nature of 
brute and institutional facts. As stated above, both have an objective nature but only 
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institutional facts exist as far as (and to the extent that) they are collectively 
recognised within a social framework. So, it seems that according with its constitutive 
origin, an evident cognitive difference should occur in the perception process of both 
facts. Where a brute fact only requires an act of visual or sensory perception of the 
object or the idea (fast thinking),467 institutional facts, on the other hand, require a 
deeper understanding or comprehension of their social meaning (slow thinking).  
Whereas the perception of a brute fact is merely graphic and actual, the true 
perception of an institutional fact requires the understanding of the social/institutional 
meaning of the object or phenomena. It therefore follows that if there is a cognitive 
difference in the appreciation between brute and institutional facts, it becomes 
appropriate to argue that a false belief about brute or institutional facts used in the 
description of a criminal offence would affect the cognitive condition of responsibility 
dissimilarly. Consequently, a different principled outcome should be provided for the 
criminal responsibility of the agent who acts with false beliefs about institutional or 
brute facts present in the criminal norm. 
  
5.4 Perception process as the basis for the “critical quality” 
 
Traditionally, perception can be defined as the organisation, identification, and 
interpretation of sensory information in order to represent and understand the 
environment where we interact.468 In this research, we construct perception as a wider 
process founded in sensory inputs. To conform our opinions about reality and guide 
our human behaviour, we go through a process of translating impressions into a 
coherent and unified view of the world around us.   This process can be split into what 
Berstein labels as bottom-up and top-down processes:469 firstly, the agent processes 
inputs that transforms low-level information (stimuli) to higher-level information 
(bottom-up). Raw sensations are analysed into basic features, such as edges, colour, 
form, etc. After that, these features are recombined at higher brain centres, where they 
are connected with the agent’s concepts, knowledge and expectations (top-down). We 
recognise a red deer as a red deer because its features (four legs, size, grazing, etc.) 
match our perceptual category for ‘red deer’. In the top-down process, previous 																																																								
467 This terminology reflects the work in the field of Daniel Kahneman that will be explored later in 
this chapter. 
468 S. Daniel Psychology (2011) 
469 B. Douglas Essentials of Psychology (2002) at pp123-124 
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experience and knowledge of the world allows the agent to make inferences about the 
identity of stimuli, even when the raw information is poor. For that reason, a blur 
shape grazing in the dark forest can be recognised or identified as a red deer by a 
hunter because the stimulus occurs at a location where, according to his prior 
knowledge and experience, he would expect a red deer to be. 
 
This top-down processing (also called data-based processing470) is based on 
knowledge. Knowledge in this context is any internal information that the perceiver 
brings to the perceptive process (memories). Contrary to the external stimuli (bottom-
up) that provide the starting point for perception, the top-down moment condenses a 
person’s prior knowledge or expectations. This prior information is used to articulate 
a perceptual appraisal of the environment that surrenders us before action. The 
perceptual process starts with the stimulation of the external receptors and then the 
top-down moment gives the perceiver feedback based on previous experience or 
knowledge. These accounts of the perception process seem to reflect a standard that 
suggests that the aspects of perception work or fail equally for any perceiver agent. 
However, our perceptive abilities are also related to those qualities, features or duties 
related to our role as status-holders in our society. Thus, the previous knowledge or 
experience recognising a red deer is different for an experienced hunter than for a 
weekend tripper.471  
 
Now that the features of the perception process have been briefly outlined and 
explained we can flesh out the argument that perception processing, founded on 
epistemological considerations, is divergent in institutional and brute facts: where 
brute facts are perceptible directly by human senses, institutional facts require a more 
sophisticated comprehension process. The perception of the qualities and features of 
brute facts are usually actual and automatic; they require a sensorial perception or 
observation that takes place with minimum memory or reflexive effort. Its perception 
is effortless because this processing happens outside conscious awareness. For 
example, the perception that we are watching a red deer is actual and automatic. The 
reason for this spontaneous recognition resides in the way the bottom-up moment 
affects recognition or awareness. When we meet, for example, a new young girl or 																																																								
470 B E. Goldstain Sensation and Perception (2013) at p9 
471 Later in this section we will see how does affect the outcomes of the ECCR 
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boy, we receive external stimuli that we contrast with prior categorised information to 
formulate a perceptual evaluation of the individual. The knowledge that we bring to 
the situation can be information acquired years ago or recently assimilated, but an 
important quantity of knowledge is learned from our childhood and becomes part of 
our knowledge base. This knowledge influences our abilities to place our environment 
into categories. One of the categories we appraise is her/his age. Even more precise 
information, like age confirmation by the girl herself, helps our brain to construct our 
identification of the person’s oldness. This categorisation process about brute facts 
continues with age and experience. Brute facts are not contingent, and they are 
perceived according with stable physical properties. They are not disassociated from 
the perception or belief of the perceiver because its existence does not depend on 
collective agreement about his existence or scope. For all these reasons, perception 
and recognition of brute facts are instantaneous.472 
 
Not all the institutional facts used by the lawmaker in shaping criminal 
offences have the same level of normativity. Some graduation of institutional facts 
could be established. Some institutional facts just need a basic cultural or social 
evaluative judgement to be understood. Among this category of facts that require an 
extra-legal approach we can include concepts like immorality or dishonesty. To 
interpret them, the addressee of the norm should mainly use his vital experience. On 
the other hand, in the description of a criminal offence we can find institutional 
elements that require a more legal evaluative judgement. Some elements are regulated 
in private law disciplines like commercial or property law (e.g. ownership). Others are 
regulated by public law disciplines like administrative or constitutional law. Finally, 
some are regulated by the criminal law itself.473 However, beyond this categorisation 
what is significant here is that institutional facts require some complementary 
judgement of value and that its nature is variable. They are not perceptible merely 
through human senses like brute facts. The perception and comprehension of 
institutional facts always implies some intellectual exercise and a more sophisticated 
top-down process.  																																																								
472 This affirmation could be, in some cases, not as categorical as defended in the thesis. Certainly, we 
sometimes must take some time to study a person to work out how old they are; we may make an 
instant judgement but then we revise it as we look closer 
473 See the Sexual Offences Scotland Act 2009, sections 12-15 where the meaning, extension, scope 
and withdrawal are detailed 
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Indeed, the perception of institutional facts is not effortless, spontaneous or 
automatic. It needs a complementary valuable judgment and an intellectual 
implementation. This judgment of value scrutinises the meaning of the institutional 
concepts in the social institutional interaction. The agent confronting an institutional 
fact needs to appraise the changeable and contingent function socially assigned and 
recognised to the fact. This judgement requires a more reflexive process of 
comprehension associated with the level of socialisation of the agent. Take for 
example the concept of ownership or consent in sexual intercourse. The apprehension 
of what belongs to me or what belongs to others requires a deep understanding of the 
role that property plays in our institutional reality; it requires, certainly, a more 
reflexive judgement from the agent. Sexual consent is another institutional fact that 
illustrates dissimilar perception from brute fact. There is a big difference between 
consensual sex and rape, but this difference has been reformed over time due to the 
contingent nature of institutional facts. As it was mentioned above, institutional facts 
are valid and binding as far as members of a specific community collectively believe 
they exist. They cannot subsist unless society members recognise them. But 
institutional structures are in permanent change and transformation. And this 
transformation is transposed to the institutional facts in order to make the new 
operational framework within the institution clear for its users. In his recent book 
Making the Modern Criminal Law Farmer has highlighted, for example, how the 
social and scientific understanding of what counts as sexual offending has changed in 
the last century.474 This transformation has been transposed, for example, to the 
institutional fact ‘sexual consent’. As a result, a former model of ‘implied’ sexual 
consent is now constructed as ‘affirmative’ consent. 
 
At this point, it is relevant to introduce the influential proposal made by 
Kahneman, a Nobel Prize Winner in Economics. Both his dual model of thinking and 
its relation to bias are proposals applicable with (and supportive of) this part of the 
research. Concerning the two systems that the brain uses to process information, 
Kahneman adopts the dual model terms proposed by Stanovich and West:475 System 1 																																																								
474 L. Farmer Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (2016) chapter 9 
475 K.E. Stanovich and R.F. West Individual Difference in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality 
debate? Behavioural and Brain Sciences (2000) pp645-726 
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(fast thinking), is intuitive, unconscious, effortless non-statistical, gullible, 
stereotypical and emotional. It uses heuristic, mental shortcuts that focus on one 
aspect and ignore others. It solves, for example, 2 + 2. System 2 (slow thinking) is 
analytical, conscious, slow, controlled, requires effort, statistical and it is ‘costly to 
use it’. It solves, for example, 23 + 45.  System 1 forms first impressions and easily 
jumps to conclusions. System 2 does problem solving and deliberations. System 1 
runs automatically, creating snap judgements, impressions and suggestions for system 
2 that is involved only when we encounter something unusual that system 1 cannot 
intuitively process or solve. Nevertheless, system 1 is a storyteller. It seeks to build a 
coherent plausible story relying on pattern-matching and assumptions regardless of 
their quality or quantity. Sometimes a small set of non-representative information 
allows us to interact in the world as far as we are confident in its accuracy. An 
example from Kahneman’s book will be illustrative: “A bat and a ball together cost 
$1.10 dollars, the bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost?”476 If the answer you come up with was that the ball must cost 10 Cents you 
have used system 1 processing. Your brain has substituted the “more than” statement 
with an absolute statement that makes the maths easier but wrong: 10 Cents + $1.10 = 
$1,20. At this point, your system 2 processing takes the lead calculating and you 
realise that the ball costs 5 Cents and the bat (at a dollar more) $1.05 for a total of 
$1.10. 
 
Kahneman also exposes another relevant theory to explain human biases: we 
often make our judgements according to the information we have available without 
reflecting that there might still be things we do not know; we just emphasise what we 
do know. Kahneman even has an acronym for this phenomenon of jumping to snap 
deliberations on the basis of limited information: WYSIATI or “what you see is all 
there is”.477 We take decisions based only on the evidence in front of us without 
considering what information is missing. Therefore, the search of system 1 for a 
believable story based on available information can sometimes lead us to WYSIATI; 
making wrong judgements because we do not consider absent evidence, or we assign 
causal relationships where there is none, or simply we take decisions due to heuristics. 																																																																																																																																																														
 
476 D. Kanehman Thinking Fast and Slow (2011) at p79. 
477 Ibd at p118 
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Thus, system 1 can lead us astray if system 2 does not revise the judgement. These 
kinds of misjudgements are related to a type of bias frequently named the 
overconfidence effect. This effect is related to the extreme certainty of hindsight. 
Under this bias we promote excessive confidence that we know the truth. It also 
transfers excessive confidence in the accuracy of our beliefs. Overconfidence at the 
end is a miscalibration of personal probabilities where our confidence in our own 
judgements is bigger than the objective accuracy of those judgements. 
 
It appears self-evident to connect brute facts with system 1 and wrong 
judgements on the basis of limited information (WYSIATI). As described above, 
brute facts are perceived automatically by a pattern-matching process. It will later be 
discussed how these connections and biases can affect false beliefs.  For now, before 
expanding these arguments we need to consolidate the assumption that the perception 
process is different in both kinds of facts. However, this assumption does not by itself 
justify the critical quality unless it affects the cognitive condition of responsibility of 
the agent in dissimilar ways. Let me explain the undeniable reason whereby it does. 
The agent, before action, is aware of the reality that surrounds him. He additionally 
always has a base of previous knowledge acquired by his process of socialisation or 
experience. When confronting a particular situation, he acknowledges some factual 
context about the world around him (top-down processing). Over this previous 
knowledge the agent acquires new inputs before action that he assimilates in his 
deliberation process (bottom-up processing). It is this latent and updatable knowledge 
that should trigger in the agent the doubt or suspicion that his action requires that they 
should further increase this basic initial knowledge. If this is the case, the agent must 
search for more information or abort her on-going action or behaviour. Therefore, 
criminal responsibility would be attributed when, despite the agent’s base of previous 
and latent knowledge triggering in the agent the doubt that his action could be 
criminal, the agent does not use their capabilities to ascertain the truth, and they carry 
on with the action. In this case, the false belief does not exonerate the agent of 
criminal responsibility because he does not translate his doubts into further 
investigations. It could be deduced a contrario sensu that when the latent, previous 
knowledge is not enough to trigger in the agent the doubt that his action requires more 
inquiries, the agent is not criminally responsible. This conclusion is not as 
straightforward as it intuitively looks. This hypothesis will be considered later in 
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depth when the ECCR is put into practice. For now, and accordingly with the critical 
quality explained above, we are in the situation to conclude that the process of 
acquiring knowledge and making judgements is different for brute and institutional 
facts. As Kahneman illustrated, the perception and judgements of brute facts made by 
system 1 is instantaneous, effortless and involves the brain using heuristic techniques. 
This type of deliberative process is more prone to lead us to WYSIATI. The 
possibility of ignoring absent evidence is higher when appraising brute facts under 
system 1. As a result, it seems that, at least intuitively, a false belief about a brute fact 
must be easier to excuse than an error about an institutional fact that always requires 
deeper considerations. The evaluative judgement that an institutional fact demands 
makes it easier for the agent to trigger doubts that his action could be criminal. This 
argument supports the different model of attribution of responsibility for false beliefs 
about brute facts and institutional facts here presented. This is the aim of the next part 
where the ECCR would be applied first to false beliefs about brute facts and later 
(chapter 6) to false beliefs about institutional facts. 
 
5.5 False beliefs about brute facts 
 
The agent acts with false beliefs about a brute fact when, unknown to him, a 
component, factor or element that constitutes a definitional element of a criminal 
offence, exists in his action, this component being a brute fact. We can return to the 
red deer example to illustrate this concept. According to Drury v HMA,478 in Scots 
law murder occurs when a person takes the life of another person either intentionally 
or in circumstances where the accused exhibits a wicked recklessness as to whether 
the victim lives or dies. In this definition, taking the life of another person is an 
essential element of murder. So, if the agent shoots another person while hunting 
because of his false belief that he is shooting a red deer, he acts with a false belief 
about a brute fact, here the concept of “person”. There was, in his action, an essential 
component of murder. However, this brute fact was unknown to him due to his false 
belief that behind the bushes was a red deer grazing.  
 
																																																								
478 2001 SLT 1013 
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As highlighted above, the current solution for these cases (as a failure of proof 
defence) rests on the negation of the mens rea element. If the agent believed that 
behind the bushes there was a red deer instead of another person, this false belief 
precludes the mens rea of murder required in Drury. The only possible controversy in 
the attribution of responsibility could be whether or not the landmark decision in 
Morgan discussed above should be distinguished, that is, if reasonableness about 
consent is required. It was discussed above how in some cases the genuine and/or 
reasonable belief of the agent affects the required mens rea for murder. The only 
significant exception to this mens rea test arises in cases of false belief (mistake of 
fact) in crimes of strict liability. In these cases, the mens rea does not need to be 
proven in relation to the elements of the actus reus. Thus, the agent will be convicted 
even though he was genuinely unaware of one or more factors that made his conduct 
criminal. Few exceptions have been made to the rule of irrelevancy of mistake of fact 
in strict liability offences. One of these rare exceptions was a strict liability drink-
driving offence adjudicated in the Australian case DPP v Bone.479 In this case the 
accused had vodka mixed into his beer without his knowledge. As a result, the 
quantity of alcohol consumed by the accused was significantly greater than that which 
he believed he had drunk. For that reason, the court concluded that the defence of 
honest and reasonable mistake was not precluded by the mere possibility that the 
accused may have had the lower range of alcohol in his blood if the facts that he 
believed to be true were actually true.  
 Where	 the	 ECCR	 would	 work	 unequivocally	 alongside	 offences	 that	require	intention,	its	practicality	could	seem	prima	facie	more	intricate	in	those	instances	where	the	offence’s	definition	requires	some	degree	of	unjustified	risk-taking	 (recklessness/negligence)	 for	 conviction.	 The	 potential	 puzzlement	derives	 from	 the	 inherent	 epistemology	 of	 risk;	where	 there	 is	 a	 risk,	 there	 is	always	 something	 that	 is	 unknown	 or	 has	 an	 uncertain	 outcome.	 Thus,	awareness	 of	 risk	 is	 in	 some	way	 knowledge	 about	 lack	 of	 knowledge.	 As	 this	research	proposes	from	the	beginning	a	model	of	responsibility	based	jointly	on	volitional	 and	 cognitive/epistemic	 states 480 ,	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 potential	
																																																								
479 (2005) NSWSC 1239 
480 See introduction at p1 
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confusions,	 this	 area	 needs	 some	 clarification	 before	 fleshing	 out	 the	 ECCR	 in	practice.		The	majority	of	Anglo-American	systems	of	 criminal	 law	are	converging	around	what	 Stark	describes	 as	 the	 “Standard	Account”	 of	 culpable	 unjustified	risk-taking481.	This	 account	differentiates	between	awareness-based	 culpability	(recklessness)	 and	 inadvertence–based	 culpability	 (negligence)	 for	 unjustified	risk-taking.	The	disposition	of	 the	agent	 to	act	despite	his	awareness	of	the	risk	attendant	upon	his	behavior	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	standard	account	of	culpable	carelessness482.	 Some	authors,	 like	Husak483	and	Duff484,	 construed	 the	account	of	awareness	of	risk	in	terms	of	knowledge.	In	this	way,	knowledge	of	risk	is	at	the	 essence	 of	 recklessness.	 	 Others,	 like	 Stark,	 asserting	 that	 “a	 defendant	 is	aware	of	a	risk	when	she	believes	that	it	exist”	485	argues	that	nothing	more	than	belief	is	required	for	awareness	of	risk.	As	it	has	been	recurrently	claimed	in	this	research,	 I	 want	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 conditions	 of	 criminal	responsibility	 arguing	 for	 a	 broader	 approach	 that	 looks	 at	 the	 epistemic	conditions	 rather	 than	 narrow	 conceptions	 of	mens	 rea.	 For	 that	 reason,	 it	 is	beyond	the	aims	of	 this	research	to	scrutinize	or	engage	 in	the	development	of	matters	 that	 could	 contribute	 to	 make	 issues	 of	 risk	 (or	 its	 awareness)	complicated	 from	 an	 epistemological	 point	 of	 view.	 However,	 some	 of	 the	literature	 and	 cases	 discussed	 in	 the	 field	 of	 awareness	 of	 the	 risk	 discusses	central	issues	with	which	this	thesis	is	concerned.		In	 any	 case,	 the	 ECCR	 formulated	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 explicitly	recognized	that	“The	agent	who	performs	a	criminal	action	is	responsible	when,	
satisfying	 other	 conditions	 for	 responsibility,	 […]”.	 These	 other	 conditions,	 like																																																									
481 F. Stark Culpable Carelessness, Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law (2016) at p26 
482 Ibd at p90 
483 D. N. Husak  “Negligence , Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting” 
Criminal Law and Philosophy (2011) 5:199 at p208 
484 R.A. Duff, “Caldwell and Lawrence: The Retreat for Subjectivism” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
(1983) 3:77 at 80. It is relevant to point out about Duff’s proposals that although he classifies 
three levels of knowledge relevant to the discussion of awareness od the risk (explicit, tacit and 
latent) this concept does not have the same extension that latent knowledge in the ECCR. About 
“background beliefs” in relation with beliefs formation see also, V. Tadro Criminal Reponsibility 
(2005) p250 
485 F. Stark “Culpable Carelessness, Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law” (2016) at 
p140 
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mens	 rea	 or	 causation,	 also	 need	 to	 be	 satisfied	 in	 order	 to	 attribute	 criminal	responsibility.	This	proposal	does	not	challenge	the	requirements	of	the	different	levels	 of	mens	rea	 currently	 required	 for	 conviction.	What	 is	 vindicated	 in	 this	thesis	is	that	alongside	the	fulfillment	of	volitional	conditions	(whether	intention,	recklessness	or	negligence),	it	is	also	necessary	to	satisfy	an	epistemic/cognitive	condition	for	conviction.	Therefore,	in	terms	of	the	ECCR,	it	is	irrelevant	whether	the	 hunter	 who	 shoots	 another	 person	 because	 of	 his	 false	 belief	 that	 he	 is	shooting	 a	 red	 deer,	 acts	 intentionally	 or	 is	 aware	 (or	 not)	 of	 any	 risk.	 In	 any	case,	 he	would	 be	 exonerated	 if	 he	 does	 not	 fulfill	 the	 cognitive	 requirements	recognized	in	the	ECCR.		
 
The proposal made in this research does not rest on the appraisal of the mens 
rea element to decide when the agent is culpably ignorant. In its place, the ECCR was 
proposed as an autonomous, algorithmic and principled solution. The ECCR endorses 
that when the agent’s decision to act in the way he did reflects those reasons for 
action that constitute his will, he is fully responsible. However, in those cases where 
the agent acts unwittingly about some features of his criminal conduct, attribution of 
criminal responsibility can only be attributed if the agent was culpably ignorant. For 
those other (ignorant) cases, the ECCR includes a deontic element: the agent is not 
only criminally responsible when he is aware of the illicitness of his action but when 
he should be aware. Ultimately, the aim of this research is not only to raise a 
theoretical debate about epistemic considerations but also to deliver an operative 
device able to provide solutions for cases where the agent acts with a false belief. In 
this sense the ECCR is presented as a sort of compact algorithm able to ascribe 
criminal responsibility to the agent who was culpably ignorant about some features of 
his purported criminal conduct. In this sense, the ECCR has a pragmatic and practical 
ambition. It is time to see the ECCR in action. 
 
5.6 The Epistemic Condition on Criminal Responsibility in practice 
 
The reasons why false beliefs about brute facts are more prone to excuse than 
institutional ones were explained and defended above. The evaluative judgement that 
institutional facts require increases the prospects that doubts about the truth could 
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arise during the perception and subsequent deliberation process; suspicions which the 
agent must convert into further investigations in order to be excused.  On the other 
hand, the almost instinctive perception of brute facts and the WYSIATI influence 
made them easier for misconceptions and bias. Either way, a more specific and 
principled mechanism is needed for the appraisal of the agent who acts with false 
beliefs about brute facts. The proposal made in this research is the ECCR. In the rest 
of this chapter we will apply its requirements to false beliefs about brute facts. In the 
next chapter the criteria of the ECCR will be applied to institutional facts. Once this 
has been completed, we will have developed a solid theoretical support for the 
argument about its dissimilarity excusatory nature. 
 
It seems opportune at this point to recall the ECCR formulated in chapter 4: 
 
The agent who performs a criminal action is responsible when, satisfying 
other conditions for responsibility, he is either aware that the action was criminal or 
he was culpably ignorant about some feature of the criminal act when he should have 
noticed it considering: 
 
a) The latent and updatable information available to him. 
b) The standard of awareness expected as status holder.  
c) That internal or external circumstances do not diminish those individual, 
intellectual and physical capacities required to notice the need to update the latent 
knowledge. 
 
Thus, according to the ECCR’s first premise, criminal responsibility is directly 
attributed when the agent is aware of the criminality of his action.486 The rationale 
behind this statement is clear: when the will of a well-informed agent crystallises in 
the final result he is unquestionably responsible. He wants to commit a criminal act 
(aware of his illegality and knowing the truth about any factor or component related 
to his conduct) and he decides to do it, welcoming any result from his action. 
Criminality here has a double dimension; it refers to both awareness about the 
command, permission and prohibition, as well as the lack of false beliefs about brute 																																																								
486 An extensive discussion about this issue will be provided in chapter 7 
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or institutional facts.  
 
 Furthermore, the ECCR also provides a deontic solution for those cases where 
the agent is not aware that his action was criminal. In these cases, the agent will be 
responsible if he is culpable for his ignorance. The ECCR outlined when the agent is 
culpably ignorant of his behaviour. In these cases, three requirements or factors need 
to be considered in order to attribute criminal responsibility to the mistaken agent: his 
latent and updatable knowledge; whether or not his failure to notice falls below his 
standard as status holder; and finally, an evaluation of his physical and intellectual 
capacities. Transposing this requirement to cases of purported false beliefs about 
brute fact will be the purpose of the rest of this chapter.  So, at the end of this chapter 
we should be able to determine when the hunter who kills another human mistakenly 
believing them to be a red deer is criminally responsible for his action. 
 
a) The latent and updatable information available to him 
 
Human perception processes are subject to spatial and temporal limits. Every 
time we interact in the world we are aware of our surroundings; we are able to 
identify and interpret those objects or realities that are in our perceptive scope (spatial 
limit), during the time stimuli act over our senses (temporal limits), because we have 
memories. This knowledge and experience is at the heart of the adaptive success of 
humans as a species. Over this previous knowledge the agent acquires new inputs 
before action that the agent assimilates in his deliberation process (bottom-up 
processing). Knowledge allows us to foresee how natural phenomena can perform and 
consequently interact in a more efficient way to achieve our goals. Using the simile of 
a computer, human memory codifies, stores and retrieves data when we need it. 
Without a memory of the past we would be unable to interact or operate in the present 
or think about the future. Only by using memories and previously learned and stored 
knowledge can we interact successfully in the world around us. In	 similar	 terms,	Stark	asserts	that	the	formation	of	beliefs	is	founded	in	the	“information	gleaned	
from	perception	and	 the	defendant’s	background	beliefs”	487.	 However,	 as	 Arpaly	has	 pointed	 out,	 identifying	 perception	 as	 a	 form	 of	 belief	 formation	 is	 not	 a																																																									
487 See F. Stark “Culpable Carelessness, Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law” (2016) at 
p229 
Chapter 5: False beliefs about brute facts 
 
	
165	
straightforward	argument488.			
 
Before action, the agent is aware of the environment he interacts. Where he is, 
what he is doing, who is around… He has also got a ground of information and 
knowledge available from his memory. This knowledge is updated in the moment of 
action with new inputs or stimuli, such as object recognition, during the perception 
process. Our brain processes all this information and we finally recognize the object 
or the reality around us. Perception, recognition and action are functionally 
intertwined with behavioural response. Bearing in mind all this information, the agent 
decides to act, interacting in the environment around him or withdrawing or delaying 
his action. It is precisely this latent and updatable knowledge that should trigger in the 
agent the doubt or suspicion that his action requires him to further increase his 
knowledge basis. If this is the case, the agent must search for more information or 
abort his planned action altogether.  
 
The ECCR emphasises the relevance of this updatable knowledge or 
information to qualify the agent as culpably ignorant (or not). When the information 
available to the agent, updated with new stimuli, is enough to cast doubts or raise 
suspicions about his beliefs, he must scrutinise further the situation or stop the action 
altogether. The agent must use his aptitudes and capabilities to ascertain the truth. If 
the agent, ignoring or disregarding his suspicion, persists in performing the planned 
action, his conduct will be inexcusable. However,	as	it	was	defended	in	chapter	II,	the	agent	bears	a	burden,	not	a	duty,	to	search	for	more	information.	Thus,	only	in	 the	 hypothetical	 case	 where	 the	 information	 disregarded	 was	 sufficient	 to	recognise	 his	 mistake	 and	 to	 discern	 the	 truth	 can	 the	 agent	 be	 held	responsible.489	
 
 
We can return to the mistaken red deer hunter case to see how the ECCR 
works in practice. In a hypothetical first version of the case, before shooting, the 																																																								
488 N. Arpaly Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency (2002) at p53 
489 See chapter 1 and the discussion about the Scottish case William Roberts v Local Authority of Burgh 
of Inverness (1889) 17 R (J) 19 
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hunter has knowledge about the circumstances around him. He is aware that the gun is 
loaded. He is conscious that by pulling the trigger the bullet will travel towards the 
target. He has seen a red deer roaming and grazing behind the bushes. He is not 
currently aware that behind the bushes there is actually a mushroom forager. 
Additionally, when he arrived at the forest earlier he saw in the car park some people 
with wicker baskets with the apparent intention to collect mushrooms. Regardless of 
all this information, he mistakenly believes that behind the bushes there is a red deer 
grazing.  As a result, he shoots and kills a mushroom forager. In a hypothetical second 
version of the case, the circumstances are identical but without the hunter previously 
noticing signs of mushroom foragers in the car park.  
 
The current solution, based on the mens rea element, would declare the hunter 
excused in both cases. In both versions of the case the hunter does not have the 
required mens rea for murder. When the agent believes that the object he is shooting 
at is a red deer and not a human being, he will lack the mens rea of murder and the 
defence of error of fact would be available to him. He would be exculpated because 
the prosecution would fail to prove the required mental state element of the offence. 
Discussions could arise about whether or not the hunter had reasonable grounds for 
his mistake in reference to the Tolson versus Morgan disparity, but it seems coherent 
with the current judicial solutions to conclude that in both cases the prosecution will 
fail to prove the mens rea of the hunter. This is because, in fact, the hunter does not 
have the mens rea required for murder according to the subjective principles applied 
by courts in the context of mistake of fact.490 
 
The ECCR works from a different perspective. What is relevant, in terms of 
excusatory consequences, are the epistemic/cognitive circumstances of the hunter. In 
both hypotheses the hunter has previous knowledge about what is a red deer and a 
human being. Indeed, both hunters perceive new inputs during the hunting session, 
but in the first version of the case the hunter was also aware of other circumstances 
that surrounded his action, including the presence of mushroom collectors. This 
additional knowledge is not incriminatory on and of itself, but this existing knowledge 																																																								
490 For scholars that have disagree about this subjective perspective see: A. Duff “Answering for Crime” 
at 294. R. Tur “Subjectivism and Objectivism: Towards Synthesis” in J. Shuttle, A. Gardner and J. 
Holder (eds) Action and Value in Criminal Law (1993) 213. J. Horder “Rethinking Non-Fatal 
Offecendces against a Person” LQR (1990) 106:469 
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perhaps should be enough to elicit, during the perception process of recognition of the 
target, the need to update his initial knowledge or abandon the shoot (if the 
information available raises doubts). The hunter will potentially be culpably ignorant 
if, from the initial knowledge, it was possible to deduce that in the process of 
perception before action there may be inferred a doubt that reveals the need to expand 
this initial knowledge. When the citizen fails to expand his current knowledge or, in 
any case, fails to delay or stop the action altogether, he will be culpably ignorant. 
Even so, it could be plausible that neither hunter had doubts about his (false) beliefs. 
For that reason it looks at least intuitively opportune to introduce some new 
requirements to fine-tune criminal responsibility in cases where the new stimuli do 
not raise doubts in the citizen about his false beliefs. This will be the aim of the 
second requirement of the ECCR developed below. 
 
In conclusion, in those situations where the latent knowledge of the agent, 
updated with new inputs, produces in the agent suspicions about his beliefs, he must 
stop the action he is performing.  If the agent, ignoring or disregarding this suspicion, 
persists on performing the action, he will be fully criminally responsible for his 
behaviour. A contrario sensu, this assumption would imply that in those situations 
where the current knowledge is insufficient to infer the need to search for additional 
information, the agent should be excused. For those reasons the ECCR introduces a 
correction factor in the second requirement to amend the unfair advantage that the 
first requisite could raise. Hence, when new information does not raise doubts in a 
citizen during his perception process, can he still be held culpably ignorant?  
 
b) The standard of awareness expected as status holder 
 
The first requirement of the ECCR presents an obvious problem concerning 
the standard of awareness required of the agent in relation to the need to update his 
latent knowledge. The psychological approach of the ECCR’s first requirement is 
subjective and would imply that in those cases where the lazy or indolent agent has 
done little to ascertain the truth, his action would be non-reproachable. This approach 
would bring an unfair advantage to the carefree or neglectful agent. However, beyond 
that, it would conflict with the aim of the criminal law defended in this research of 
securing the institutional identity of the society.  A methodology based only on the 
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subjective approach of the citizen would detract the confidence that users of a 
particular institutional structure have if the institution only depends of other users’ 
perceptions. Institutional facts outline a normative model of orientation or guidance in 
social interactions. This normative model of orientation is essential for an effortless 
and frictionless interaction between strangers in an atmosphere of mutual 
interpersonal trust. To foster this environment of mutual confidence, criminal law 
must in some way protect institutional user’s expectations. 
 
The requirements of the ECCR should be consistent with this purpose of the 
criminal law. As defended in chapter 3, criminal law attains its material legitimation 
from the need to secure the institutional identity of the society against those actions 
that contravene the general normative model of guidance in social interaction that the 
institutional structure defines. Thus, in order to secure the institutional identity of the 
society, the correction factor introduced in the second requirement of the ECCR 
should rely on the status holder’s perspective. Status is a salient concept in the 
institutional structure here sustained because its extension (deontic framework) guides 
both the holder and those who interact with him. Status constructed in this research is 
built in the terms of the German-British sociologist Dahrendorf who differentiated 
between position and status–role. The former is the place that an individual occupies 
in the social structure, whereas status would be the constellation of expectations 
related to a particular position.491 Our institutional concept of status rests on the fact 
that within our modern heterogeneous societies we enjoy ordered freedom and our 
ambit and extension of freedom is precast by social institutions. We must learn how 
this institutional reality operates before interacting in it. Only within the deontic 
framework created by this function status can trustworthy social interactions take 
place.   
 
Status defines prospectively the objective responsibility of the holder in two 
ways: he is responsible negatively for configuring its ambit of action avoiding causal 
processes that, creating a non-permitted risk, jeopardise the ambit of action or 
planning of others or the natural environment (neminem laede principle); and 
positively, the holder is responsible for the deficient performance of any institutional 																																																								
491 See chapter 3 for a more detailed exposition 
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function when interacting with others in the institutional structure.492 These two 
demarcations were categorised previously as inactive and proactive dimensions of 
status.493 The inactive dimension involves the planning and performance of our 
conduct and actions accordingly with the functions inherent to our status without 
disturbing the planning and organisation of others. The proactive dimension, on the 
other hand, supposes that the holder, performing the functions assigned by its status, 
intentionally intervenes in the ambit of planning and action of others. In this relational 
attribute, the institutional expectation is not the creation of non-permitted risks but 
that the function status will be performed competently and proficiently. Finally, 
connected with this double dimension, a new classification of offences was proposed: 
offences of disassociation were defined as those where the status holder does not live 
up the institutional expectations generated by the inactive dimension of status. On the 
other hand, modern human societies are also founded in active social interaction and 
cooperation.  Criminal law, securing institutional order, is not only concerned with the 
assurance of ambits of respect but also with guaranteeing that cooperative institutional 
functions will be performed efficiently. Vital structures in our contemporary societies 
like political participation, social cooperation, financial transactions or business 
trading would not be possible without the securement that their implementation will 
be done professionally and competently. The proactive dimension of status implies 
that planning our lives interacting with others is necessary to secure the proficient and 
orderly development of essential institutions. The status holder has to guarantee the 
existence of the institution and its continuity. Offences of association bring together 
those criminal offences where the status holder does not live up the institutional 
expectations generated by the active dimension of status. As a result, it sounds 
reasonable to require that the corrector factor should reflect this dual perspective in 
those cases where new inputs did not produce in the agent suspicions about his 
potential false beliefs.  
 
The standard of knowledge should be different in both kinds of offences 
because the inactive and active dimensions of status require different levels of social 
interaction. This dissimilarity substantiates a different standard of awareness between 
the status holder in disassociation and association offences. Accordingly, instead of 																																																								
492 See chapter 3 
493 See chapter 3 
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advocating a single corrector factor, the proposal defended in this research suggests a 
dual approach: for offences of disassociation the appraisal will be based on the 
collateral institutional user test; whereas for offences of association the suggested test 
is similar to a version of the Bolam test.494 Each will be discussed in turn. 
 
The inactive dimension grounded in the neminem laede principle substantiates 
the first category of criminal responsibility and the first principle of trust. The 
expectation exists that in the exercise of our individual orderly freedom we will take 
significant choices respecting others. In this inactive dimension the first intuitive 
standard would probably be that the agent behaves as a reasonable person. Gardner 
has illustrated how controversial this regularly assumed standard could be.495 This 
anthropomorphic legal fiction, inheritor of the Roman bonus paterfamilias, represents 
the body of standards of care shaped by courts through case law. The reasonable 
person delineates a hypothetical person who exercises average judgement and care. 
Thus, it could serve as a comparative standard for determining criminal responsibility. 
However, this comparative standard reflects a majoritarian behavioural approach 
within a particular society and perhaps does not replicate the expectation that 
particular users of a particular institutional framework have. For that reason, it seems 
more acute to articulate a test that encompasses the minimum updatable knowledge 
required to interact legitimately in the institutional framework: a collateral 
institutional user test. In applying this test, judges and juries must take into 
consideration the institutional framework where users are interacting. In fact, they 
should position themselves within the institutional framework. From this perspective, 
as collateral institutional users, they must decide if the accused has lived up to 
reciprocal institutional expectations in the particular case under examination. 
Therefore, in those cases where new inputs do not trigger doubts in the agent’s 
perception process about his beliefs, the applicable test should be an institutional 
user’s standard. It should be decided through this objective/normative appraisal 
whether the behaviour of the agent falls below the standard of the ordinary user in his 
situation. Where in the first ECCR’s requirement the appraisal was absolutely 																																																								
494 The case Bolam v Friend Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582 established the 
typical rules for assessing the appropriate standard of reasonable care in negligence in relation 
with skilled professionals. 
495 For an extensive discussion about the reasonable person see: J. Gardner ‘The Many Faces of the 
Reasonable Person” LQR (2015) 131:1 
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psychological, taking into account any characteristic of the citizen, the test proposed 
in the second requirement outlines a normative standard. So, in those offences of 
dissociation where the citizen disregards suspicions raised during the perception 
process about beliefs of brute facts, the agent will be criminally responsible. Where he 
persists on performing the on-going action he will be criminally responsible for the 
results of his action. Furthermore, when the information available to the citizen 
(updated with new stimuli) is insufficient to cast doubts or raise suspicions about his 
beliefs, the citizen will only be exonerated under a normative test. This normative test 
states that an accused will only be exonerated if the conduct of an ordinary 
institutional user with similar knowledge and under similar circumstances to the 
defendant would have had the same (false) belief. 
  
Modern human societies are also founded on active social interaction and 
cooperation. Vital structures in our contemporary societies like political participation, 
social cooperation, financial transactions or business trading would not be possible 
without securement that their implementation is done professionally and competently. 
The proactive dimension of status implies that in planning our lives interacting with 
others or the natural environment it is necessary to secure the proficient and orderly 
development of the essential institutions. We need to trust the engineer who designs 
our car as much as he needs to trust his dentist. However, the status holder must also 
guarantee the existence of the institution and its continuity. For that reason, the status 
holder will be made responsible for a deficient performance of their institutional 
function(s). As a result of the above arguments, in this research we defend that in the 
case of offences of association the test should be stricter than the collateral 
institutional user test.  Acting in the proactive dimension of status requires more skill 
and ability than the average institutional user. Consequently, the test applicable in 
cases where new inputs did not give rise to doubts in the accused about his beliefs 
should be in line with the standards required for a competent, skilful and proficient 
user of the institutional structure. However, opinions about a competent and practiced 
use of the institutional structure can differ. In these cases the issue is again about the 
standard required. The solution should be in accordance with the function of the 
criminal law of protecting user’s expectations. Thus, it should be enough to show that 
the decision taken was reasonable in the circumstances, regardless that other users’ 
opinions could differ about the choice. As far as the expectations about the 
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institutional structure are protected the choice should be admitted as adequate. This 
approach differs in tempo from the test applicable to offences of disassociation: the 
test for the former type of offences has a descriptive nature; it is about ‘what was 
actually done’ and whether or not the standard show was proficient. In disassociation 
offences the test is normative. It is about what should be done in order to fulfil the 
standard. 
 
We are now ready to return to the red deer hunter example discussed above. 
First, we need to determine if we are facing an offence of disassociation or 
association. The conduct reproached in culpable homicide or murder fits into the 
inactive dimension of status: to cause the loss of life of another human being when 
organising our ambit or sphere of behaviour is contrary to the neminem laede 
principle. Murder and culpable homicide are therefore certainly offences of 
disassociation. In the case revised above, in order to determine whether or not the 
accused is culpably ignorant we need to go through the first ECCR requirement: if 
doubts arise during the perception process about his belief and he continues to 
perform the on-going action he will be held responsible. If doubts did not arise the 
next step is to apply the corrector factor defined in the second requirement and 
ascertain if he acted according with his standard as a status holder. In this case, being 
a disassociation offence, the assessment is whether or not an ordinary institutional 
user in the circumstances of the accused would act as he did. In the second 
hypothetical case proposed, where the hunter was not aware of mushrooms foragers in 
the car park, an ordinary user would probably behave as the hunter did. But in the first 
hypothetical case it would be sensible to conclude that an ordinary user aware of 
mushroom foragers in the area would consider the ‘absent evidence’ and abort their 
act of hunting. So, in this hypothetical case, the accused would be held culpably 
ignorant and hence responsible unless his intellectual and physical capacities 
modified the outcome.  
 
c) Intellectual and physical capacities 
 
 In some cases, the lack of revision and correction of the latent knowledge is 
attributable to the agent, but circumstances related to his capacities could exclude his 
responsibility. The third component of the ECCR refers to the intellectual or physical 
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capacity of the agent in the moment of action. In specific contexts the agent’s 
perception process could be impaired by external conditions. These objective 
conditions alter the perception process of the agent affecting his judgement about the 
need to search for additional information. Alterations in the environment between 
brute facts and the agent, e.g. light reflections or flashes, or external sounds, could 
affect the intellectual or physical epistemic capacities of the agent.  
 
On the other hand, personal conditions of the agent can also affect his 
responsiveness to the reality that surrounds him. Some perceptions can confuse the 
agent as a result of psychic perturbations, mental health conditions or malfunctions of 
sensory organs. A person can suffer from visual misperceptions, seizures or even 
migraines that affect their perception of brute facts. Diplopia (double vision), colour-
blindness, hearing voices, drug-induced hallucinations or some types of medication 
can obviously influence the need to search for more information related to brute facts. 
The recommended approach defended in this thesis about these impaired capacities 
more closely resembles the exculpatory consequences provided for intoxication in 
jurisdictions like Canada496, New Zealand497, or South Africa498 than the inculpatory 
approach held in Scotland,499 and in some way in England.500 Thus, unless the 
intellectual capacities have been deliberately diminished to weaken the perception 
process in order to commit a crime, the accused should be exculpated. It is worth 
pointing out that the legal solution proposed here relates only to situations where the 
perception process is not affected by circumstances that negate the mens rea element.  
 
																																																								
496 See R v Daviault [1994] 2 SRC 63 where the Canadian Supreme Court contemplated that 
intoxication (not induced) could be a defence in crimes of “basic intent”. See also s 33.1 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code which rejects as a defence self-induced intoxication when the accused 
departs from standard of care established in subsection (2) 
497 New Zealand has discarded the approach taken in DDP v Majewski [1977] JC 38 where it 
established a distinction between offences of ‘basic intent’ and ‘specific intent’ and held that in 
cases of the former, voluntary intoxication cannot form the basis for a defence even if the 
intoxication produces a state of automatism. See also footnote 56.  See R v Kamipeli [1975] 2 
NZL R610 
498 In S V Chretien 1981 (1) S.A. 1097 (A) it was held that intoxication could be considered a defence. 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1983 s 1(1) creates, in response to the intoxication defence, 
a new intoxication offence 
499 In Scotland, intoxication has inculpatory rather than exculpatory consequences. See F. Leverick and 
J. Chalmers “Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial” (2006) chapter 8 
500 In England, the case DDP v Majeswski is the landmark for intoxication. The case divides crimes 
into offences of ‘specific’ and ‘basic’ intent, allowing intoxication as a defence in the former but 
not the latter 
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In conclusion, in those situations where an actor’s perception process exposes 
doubts about their beliefs and they fail to expand their initial knowledge and carry on 
with their action they will be criminally responsible. If no doubts arise during his 
perception process, the next phase is to evaluate whether the agent behaved in 
compliance with the awareness required as a status holder.  That implies a dissimilar 
assessment in cases of offences of association and disassociation. If, finally, and 
according to the test suggested above, he did not act according with his status he will 
be held criminally responsible unless intellectual or external circumstances can be 
said to have distorted his perception process. 
  
5.7 The ECCR in crimes of strict liability 
 
It is particularly in strict liability offences where the ECCR introduces more 
provocative outcomes. Currently, in these types of crimes, even a reasonable false 
belief is irrelevant. The accused will be convicted even without fault or public interest 
in doing so. Perhaps it is redundant to point out here that strict liability crimes are an 
exception to the general rule of liability. The liability is said to be strict because an 
accused will be condemned even if he had false beliefs about one or more elements 
that made his action criminal. The strongest argument used to justify these types of 
offences is probably convenience.501 Most of the strict liability offences are regulatory 
offences, so providing financial resources for prosecutions of minor offences that do 
not involve serious harm might be inefficient. There are also procedural reasons for 
having them, like the vulnerability of the victim in the courtroom.502 The proliferation 
of strict liability/regulatory offences sustain the above arguments. However, serious 
crimes like statutory rape are considered strict liability offences as well. In any case, a 
consistent and comprehensive proposal about false beliefs needs to contrast its impact 
against the current criminal law framework where strict liability offences play a 
pivotal role.  
 
																																																								
501 See A.P. Semester and G.R. Sullivan Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law (2013) at p182 
502 There will be many cases where requiring a child under the age of 13 years to provide evidence 
about consent would be completely undesirable. 
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In the most recent comprehensive discussion about error of law/fact: 
“Ignorance of law: A philosophical Inquiry”,503 Husak openly defends “[…] that the 
mens rea of a criminal offense should be construed to require not only knowledge of 
the relevant facts but also knowledge of the applicable law”.504 This proposal, which 
contravenes the historical totemic maxim “ignorantia iuris neminem excusat”, is 
revolutionary to Lord Bridge who states: "… requiring not merely knowledge of the 
facts material to the offender's guilt, but also knowledge of the relevant law, would be 
revolutionary and, to my mind, wholly unacceptable”.505 This approach has been 
rejected in this research from the beginning. Following that route would have implied 
devoting the whole thesis to a discussion about the concept and extension of mens rea 
and whether or not it should include cognitive conditions. Instead, this research rests 
in a segregate study of knowledge, and consequently false beliefs, through the ECCR. 
For that reason, no proper discussions has taken place in this thesis about the concept, 
extent or levels of mens rea. Nor have we discussed whether the mental element 
should include volitional elements as well as cognitive ones. Operatively, only two 
kinds of coherent suggestions can be put forward to solve the problems facing 
cognitive conditions in a principled way. The first solution would be to implement, in 
addition to intention (volitional conditions), a cognitive dimension within the mental 
element of a crime. This is the proposal that Husak, based on the German dogmatic 
concept of ‘dolo malus’, defends. The other option would be to implement cognitive 
conditions outside of the mens rea element. This is the argument defended in this 
thesis. 
  
There are two main reasons to support an autonomous and independent (from 
mens rea) treatment of cognitive conditions: firstly, the enrooted conception existing 
in common law jurisdictions that knowledge about institutional facts and the relevant 
law are not part of the mental element. It was examined extensively in chapter I that a 
consensus exists in the criminal legal scholarship that the mental condition only 
includes volitional conditions. To attempt to include cognitive conditions within the 
mens rea would be, without a doubt, revolutionary. In fact, it was revolutionary and 
controversial in the German dogmatic to do so. The fiercer disputes in the German 																																																								
503 D. Husak Ignorance of Law: A philosophical Inquiry (2016) 
504 Ibd at p2 
505 Grant v Borg (1982) 2 All ER 257 at 263 
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dogmatic have been between defenders of the ‘dolo theory’ (that proposes a concept 
of dolus malus) and those of the ‘culpability (schuld) theory’ (who defend a concept 
of dolus naturalis). Thus, to persevere with the inclusion of cognitive conditions 
within the mens rea element, as Husak proposes, would require a solution much more 
intricate than supporters of this alternative can envisage.  
 
Secondly, to include cognitive conditions in the mens rea element would 
contradict the many thousands of strict liability offences currently in force in the UK. 
In a legal system without a well-developed administrative law, as in the UK legal 
field, strict liability offences play a valuable role in the defence and preservation of 
the institutional normative order. For that reason, in those cases it may be consistent 
with the ends of the criminal law not to require intention to commit the criminal 
conduct in order to be convicted. In fact, this is the policy used by the administrative 
law in continental jurisdictions without any scholarly criticisms. As a result of the 
pivotal role of strict liability offences this research seeks to evaluate the cognitive 
condition in addition to and outside of the mens rea element. This approach does not 
contravene the current regulatory framework, so it would be possible to prima facie 
attribute criminal responsibility to an accused without proof of mens rea (cognitively-
free), and later exclude responsibility because the accused lacks the epistemic 
conditions necessary for conviction. 
 
It will be instructive to introduce how the ECCR would work in cases of 
statutory rape (strict liability offence) of a child under 13 years. This was the case in 
G506 where a boy of 15 engaged in sexual intercourse with a girl of 12 whom he 
believed (because she had so informed him) to be 15 years old. As mentioned above, 
in these cases of statutory rape the false belief that the victim was old enough to have 
sex is irrelevant 507  and the outcome is always conviction. The result that the 
application of the ECCR criteria would deliver in this and similar cases would be 
different from the current solution. Once the volitional elements (mens rea) have been 
proved, an appraisal of the cognitive circumstances should be implemented. Thus, at 
the first instance, it should be assessed if the information and knowledge gathered 
during the perception process by G was enough to cast doubts or raise suspicions 																																																								
506 (2006) EWCA Crim 821 
507 See Section 5, Sexual Offences Act 2003 
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about his belief (that the victim was 15). If this was the case, G should be convicted. 
In case the facts did not raise doubts in G about the victim‘s age, it should be 
considered whether an ordinary institutional user (rape being a clear offence of 
disassociation) in G’s circumstances should have inferred that the girl was under 13 
years old. If this is the case, and no additional internal or external circumstance 
diminish G’s capacity to update his latent knowledge, G should be convicted of rape. 
But if an ordinary user in G’s circumstances would equally not have had doubts about 
the victim’s age, G should be acquitted. This outcome was reached in the above-
mentioned case, HMA v Daniel Cieslack, where the High Court in Glasgow took the 
decision not to sentence and instead discharge absolutely a 19-year-old boy who plead 
guilty of rape of a girl under the age of 13. The absolute discharge clearly illustrates 
the potentially unjust outcome of a legal norm that declares criminally responsible an 
accused even though he is genuinely ignorant of one or more factors that made his 
action or omission criminal.  
 
The ECCR approach differs and contradicts the rationale defended by 
Baroness Hale in G: the protection of minors from “[…] the harm, both physical and 
psychological, which premature sexual activity can do” and the purported reduction 
of protection that the excusatory effect of false beliefs will produce. It is beyond this 
research to discuss the good reasons why children aged 12 years old or younger 
should not engage in sexual intercourse. Beyond moral or good reasons to criminalise 
underage sexual intercourse, what is relevant is that as a society, this is the 
institutional deontic framework we expect to be respected from our fellow citizens. 
Perhaps it sounds impudent to suggest that where mechanical penetration of a penis 
into another person’s body is the pure brute fact, sexual intercourse between two 
consenting adults is the institutional fact, and thus, as a society we have 
institutionalized sex. As a result of this, we allow our kids and ourselves to socialise 
and interact with strangers, because we expect that our fellow citizens will respect this 
institutional deontic framework. Accordingly, the genuine function of Section 5 of the 
Sexual Offences Acts is not the protection of minors from “… the harm, both physical 
and psychological, which premature sexual activity can do” but to protect the 
expectation we have that the institutional deontic framework will be respected. 
Indeed, Section 5, as with any other criminal norm, is an exclusionary reason for 
action. It is a reason that every agent must take into consideration in his deliberation 
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process before action. When deliberating on whether to have sexual intercourse with 
someone else, the agent must consider Section 5 as an exclusionary reason not to have 
sexual intercourse with anyone under 13 years of age. Doing so, the agent entirely 
fulfils his responsibility as a law follower willing to do what is required.  
 
Hence, Baroness Hale’s argument is founded on the premise that the 
widespread function ascribed to the criminal law is mainly deterrence. This 
commonly accepted argument rests on the idea that the use of criminal punishment 
will prevent the convicted or others from committing a criminal offence. However, 
this rationale is more than questionable. First, because members of the society are 
possibly motivated not by criminal punishment but by their own convictions. It would 
be difficult to accept that those not motivated by their personal convictions not to rape 
would be motivated by criminal punishment. As it was discussed earlier in this 
thesis,508 the function of criminal punishment is not deterrence (or retributivism 
either) but the recognition that the institutional expectations will be maintained even 
in cases of violation of the deontic institutional framework. It is the reaffirmation that 
the institutional framework is still valid even in the case of misuse or violation. 
However, even accepting the deterrence argument, Baroness Hale’s rationale that 
accepting the excusatory consequences of false beliefs will reduce this purported 
protection could be illogical. It is incoherent because nobody can be deterred by 
something he is not aware of. Neither the accused in G nor anybody in his 
circumstances could be psychologically coerced or intimidated by the criminal 
punishment of underage statutory rape because the accused acts with the personal 
conviction that he is having lawful sexual intercourse. In cases like G the 
consideration that the victim is underage is not contemplated in the deliberation 
process of somebody in his situation.  It would therefore appear that a proper 
evaluation (through the ECCR) of the excusatory effects of false beliefs would be 
unlikely to undermine the purported deterrence of s5 (or any other criminal norm).  
 
 
 
 																																																								
508 See chapter 3 
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5.8 Conclusion 
 
The onus is always on those who wish to change a current and valid part of the 
law both to persuade others that reform is necessary, and to provide a new coherent 
proposal. I hope that both requirements have been sufficiently reasoned and 
articulated in the introduction of Part II and this chapter. A feasible differentiation 
between brute and institutional facts, in the norm definition, has been amply discussed 
and hopefully in a persuasive manner.   Also, the dissimilar perception of both types 
of facts justifies and supports a different model of attribution of responsibility for 
false beliefs about brute facts and institutional facts. Finally, the theoretical 
algorithmic ECCR has passed its first acid test, providing a coherent and fair outcome 
to false beliefs about brute facts, being respectful to the current scope of the mens rea 
element. So far the proposal to provide a principled fresh approach to false beliefs 
seems to have survived the first round. It is now time to demonstrate that the ECCR 
can also provide a principled solution for false beliefs about institutional facts. This 
will bring a new challenge, as the evaluative appraisal that the perception of 
institutional facts requires is more prone to catalyse false beliefs about the extension 
or interpretation of the fact itself. This challenge, and the feasibility of differentiating 
institutional facts from the institutional command, will be the aims of the next 
chapter. 
	
CHAPTER 6 
 
FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT INSTITUTIONAL FACTS 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter introduced the distinction between false beliefs about 
brute and institutional facts. The initial conclusion was that the perception process is 
different when considering each kind of fact: instantaneous in the former and 
evaluative in the latter. Chapter 5 started with a discussion about the 
differences/similarities between brute and institutional facts. This chapter will 
examine false beliefs about institutional facts. Section 6.2 will discuss the differences 
between false beliefs about institutional facts and false beliefs about the institutional 
command. By doing so, this section will discuss how the evaluative nature that 
knowledge of institutional facts requires affects false beliefs about them in a very 
particular manner: where false beliefs about brute facts deal with the existence of the 
fact, false beliefs about institutional facts deal with the extension of the fact. Once the 
difference between both kinds of false beliefs has been discussed and defended, this 
chapter will apply the ECCR to false beliefs about institutional facts. The first 
conclusion, as in the case of false beliefs about brute facts, is that criminal 
responsibility is directly credited when the citizen is aware of the criminality of his 
action. But the ECCR also provides a deontic solution when the citizen is not 
cognisant that his action is criminal: he will be responsible if he is culpable for his 
ignorance.  
 
The rest of the chapter will apply the three momentums already presented in 
the ECCR to false beliefs about institutional facts. According to the first, the citizen 
will be culpable of his ignorance when his latent knowledge about the extension of an 
institutional fact triggered a doubt or suspicion that his action could be illegal but he 
did not abort his action. Three situations, however, can aggravate or alleviate the lack 
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of suspicion that the action could be criminal: a) when the facts of the case are legally 
intricate; b) when the state does not discharge its burden to make the description of a 
criminal offence plainly accessible to citizens; and c) those cases where the state 
creates or modifies offences previously contemplated as standard without making 
citizens sufficiently aware of the change. In the second stage of the ECCR, it will be 
defended that some normative corrector element needs to be brought about to protect 
institutional user’s expectations. Accordingly, criminal responsibility would be 
attributed to the institutional user if the standard of demands according with his status 
or role has not been fulfilled. When a particular institutional fact is present in 
potentially illegal conduct and it does not trigger doubts or suspicions about its 
legality, criminal responsibility will be attributed if the citizen’s behaviour fell short 
of his expected standard as a status holder. Later in the chapter, a dual normative 
corrector approach will be introduced: for offences of disassociation the appraisal will 
be based on the collateral institutional user test, whereas for offences of association a 
test in line with a version of the Bolam test509 will be utilised. Both judgements 
encompass the minimum updatable knowledge required to interact legitimately in the 
institutional framework. Finally, the third ECCR step evaluates the intellectual or 
physical capacity of the citizen at the moment of action to determine whether or not 
they have altered his perception process, affecting his judgement about the need to 
search for additional information. 
 
6.2 Institutional fact versus institutional command 
 
In Chapter 5, it was highlighted that a citizen acts with false beliefs about a 
brute fact when, unknown to him, a component or factor that constitutes a relevant 
definitional element of a criminal offence, is present in his action. The citizen is not 
aware that a particular brute fact, which is a relevant part in the offence description, is 
present in his action. The hunter was unaware that there was a person behind the 
bushes. His false belief was about the existence of the brute fact “person”. In these 
cases, the citizen is wrong about particular circumstances of his action. The hunter 
was wrong about his target; he thought that it was a red deer when in fact it was a 																																																								
509 The case of Bolam v Friend Hospital Management Committee [157] 1 WLR 582 established the 
typical rules for assessing the appropriate standard of reasonable care in negligence in relation to 
skilled professionals 
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person. In truth, he did not know what he was doing: if asked a posteriori he would 
assert that he believed that he was shooting a red deer. As mentioned above, this false 
belief can also be about particular data, like the age of a young girl in cases of 
statutory rape. In these cases we also see that the citizen has a false belief about a 
brute fact: that the girl is underage. 
 
 Alternatively, or additionally to a false belief about the existence of a brute 
fact, the citizen can also have a hypothetical evaluative misjudgement about a brute 
fact itself. Instead of being mistaken about the presence of the brute fact in his action, 
the citizen could be mistaken about the extension or the reading of the brute fact. In 
this hypothetical case, the false belief would be about the genuine material meaning 
of the brute fact. The citizen would be cognisant that the performance of his particular 
action includes a brute fact, but he would be mistaken about the scope or extension of 
the fact. As a result, he would incorrectly deduce that his conduct is not criminal 
because his action does not match the extension of the brute fact contained in a 
particular offence.  For example, only in situations featuring an exceptional deficit of 
socialisation could someone believe that an illegal immigrant or an aboriginal are not 
a person.510  These kinds of mistakes about the extension of a brute fact would 
nonetheless be irrelevant in terms of criminal responsibility.  
 
On the other hand, the evaluative judgement that the knowledge of 
institutional facts requires brings a new perspective of perception to the topic of false 
beliefs. Where mistake about brute facts related to the existence of the fact itself in a 
particular action, relevant mistakes about institutional facts are more prone to be 
related to the extension or interpretation of the fact.  In these cases, the citizen is 
aware about the description of the prescribed conduct. He is also aware that a 
particular institutional fact is present in his action, but he misinterprets or 
misconstrues the scope of the institutional fact. The citizen falsely believes that his 
conduct did not fit the description of the criminal conduct or institutional command. 
																																																								
510 For example, an interesting case to discuss could be the status of aborigines in Australia before and 
after the Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967 Referendum. Before the referendum (and 
subsequent Act, aboriginals were not included in the census in Australia. Until 1967 they were 
excluded as objects of law of any act enacted from the Australian parliament, thus they were not 
in fact, legally speaking, persons. 
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Normally,511 the citizen constructs the material meaning of the institutional fact 
restrictively thus, he falsely believes that his action is not within the scope of the 
institutional fact present in the description of the criminal conduct.  
 
Remarkably, most of the current cases categorised as mistakes or ‘errors of 
law’ by courts or academics are in fact cases of false beliefs about the extension of an 
institutional fact. See, for example, the already mentioned Smith case512 where the 
accused was a tenant that, with consent of the landlord, installed in the conservatory 
some electrical wiring and speakers. Once the rental agreement expired the tenant 
removed this equipment in a reckless manner damaging the equipment that, unknown 
to him, were now fixtures belonging to the landlord. His false belief was about the 
extension of the institutional fact ‘belonging to another’. He believed that only those 
things that were in the property at the time of the initial renting agreement belonged to 
the landlord. Another well-known Supreme Court case, Morrisette v United States513 
also fits into this category. In this case, it was explained that the Government 
established a practice bombing range on a large uninhabited area of Michigan. At 
various places in the range, used bombing cases were stocked into piles. Morrisette, 
who was unsuccessfully hunting deer in the area, thought that salvaging some of these 
casings would be a good way to meet his expenses. He knew that to embezzle, steal or 
convert property of the United States was punishable by fine and imprisonment.514 
His defence (as he voluntarily, promptly and candidly told the authorities) was that he 
thought that the property was abandoned, unwanted and considered of no value to the 
Government. The false belief of Morrisette was clearly about the institutional fact 
concerning property belonging to the United States. Even a false belief about the 
extension of a custodial order would fit in this group. Take for example the case 
People v Flora515 where the accused was charged with a felony violation of a foreign 
child custody order (former Pen.Code, § 278.5, subd. (a)). In this case, the appellant 
was married with a son. The appellant was physically abusive towards his partner 																																																								
511 An expansive construction of the institutional fact could also be possible. In this case the citizen 
mistakenly believes that his action fits in a definitional institutional fact 
512 R v Smith (1974) QB 354 
513 342 U.S. 246 (1952) 1 
514 18 U.S.C. § 641 
515 The People, Plaintiff and Responder v Jess Flora, Defendant and Appellant No H006977 Decided 
February 20, 1991 
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who then left their residence and obtained a temporary custody order for their son 
from a Washington Court. Thereafter, she took their son to California to visit family 
and friends. At a later date the appellant abducted his son from California to South 
America, before the couple finally reconciled and the appellant returned to California 
where he was arrested for violation of a custodial order. The appellant’s defense was 
that he truly believed that the Washington order was invalid and not enforceable in 
California. In short, his false belief was not about the institutional command or 
prohibition; the appellant knew that the violation of a child custody order could be 
prosecuted as a felony or misdemeanor. His false belief was about the extension of the 
institutional fact ‘foreign child custody order’ granted by a Washington Court. He 
falsely believed that a custody order granted in Washington could not be enforced in 
California.  
 
This extensional perspective pointed out above brings to the categorisation 
defended in this research a potential confusion: the evaluative perception process 
required to acknowledge institutional facts is obviously also necessary in the 
perception of the institutional command itself. Awareness about the legal institutional 
command also requires a similar evaluative judgement. Thus, this 
extension/evaluative dimension of mistake about institutional facts could put into 
question the categorical distinction between false beliefs about the institutional facts 
and false beliefs about the institutional command. If the evaluative perception 
between both categories is identical, the categorisation loses reliability. This 
conclusion also raises the question about whether false beliefs about the extension of 
institutional facts should be solved in the same way as mistakes about the command. 
In any case, this potential ambiguity or inexactness needs to be discussed and clarified 
before moving the argument forward.  
 
It has been widely defended here that knowledge of institutional facts requires 
a standard of understanding of the social framework at an institutional user level. To 
do so, a rational internalisation or evaluation of the institutional facts are essential. 
This judgement of value scrutinises the meaning of the institutional concepts in the 
social institutional interaction. The citizen confronting an institutional fact must 
evaluate the contingent function socially assigned to the fact, a judgement that 
requires a process of comprehension associated with the level of socialisation of the 
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citizen. Furthermore, not all the institutional facts used by the legislative in shaping 
the framework of a criminal offence have the same level of normativity. Some 
institutional facts can be understood with a basic cultural or social evaluative 
judgement (an extra-legal fact).516 Others, however, require a more legal evaluative 
judgement. Among this latter group, some are delimited and demarked by the 
criminal law itself. Additionally, awareness about the scope of the command also 
requires an evaluative judgement. For that reason, it seems prudent to consider 
whether or not an analytical difference between awareness about institutional facts 
and the command itself genuinely exists. Or more accurately, whether the perception 
process of both concepts is analogous or unrelated. It is only if the perception process 
is dissimilar that a distinctive categorisation of false beliefs about institutional facts 
and institutional commands makes sense.  
 
To solve this potential conceptual collision between mistake about the 
institutional command and mistake about the extension of an institutional fact we can 
start from a purely formal analysis of two dissimilar normative momentums: on the 
one hand, institutional facts are essential elements included by the legislator in the 
description of criminal offences. Clearly, institutional facts are integrated in the 
description and shape of the institutional conduct by the lawmaker. This description 
rules out the illegality and subsequent responsibility of conduct that does not contain 
the elements required for the unlawfulness of the behaviour, for example destroying 
or vandalising our own property. Also, conduct can incorporate all the elements 
required to be criminal but there exists an additional element that makes the action 
tolerable: permission. To destroy property belonging to another to save the life of a 
person could be justified. In both cases the user of the institutional framework acts 
within the limits of a tolerable institutional frame. Thus, according to these arguments 
even false beliefs about the extension of an institutional fact are part of the definition 
of the crime.  
 
On the other hand, belonging to a completely different momentum are the 
judgements, appraisals or evaluations that a conduct (previously defined) is or not 
outside the institutional framework recognised and expected by institutional users, 																																																								
516 See chapter 5 
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that is, that it is criminal. Here, the conduct fell short of institutional users’ 
expectations. Users of the institutional framework do not expect such anomalous 
conduct. Apparently, this formal scrutiny does not raise conceptual collisions between 
awareness of institutional facts and awareness about the illegality of the conduct. 
From a strict, formal perspective, both categories seem coherently and consistently 
branded without any visible confusion between them. If the citizen has a false belief 
about the extension of the concept ‘own property’, for example, it should be 
categorised as a false mistake about an institutional fact. Another example would be 
the situation where the citizen ignores that the taking of property they find could be 
illegal if no reasonable steps are taken to establish whether the property has an owner. 
This second case involves a mistake about the institutional command.  
 
However, the potential conflict might better be explained in terms of the likely 
impact that a mistake about the extension could have to the citizen’s awareness and 
knowledge about the scope of the institutional command. The conundrum revolves 
around the fact that some institutional facts are authentic circumstantial proof of 
illegality or criminality. Thus, a false belief about its extension would blur the 
categorical distinction between such facts and the institutional command. To flesh out 
this argument we need to differentiate two epistemic steps in the citizen’s perception 
process before action. In the first epistemic step, the citizen, who has some initial 
knowledge about the factual environment where he interacts, recognises and identifies 
the elements of the reality that conform to the world around him (top-down 
processing). Over this prior knowledge the citizen acquires new inputs that he 
incorporates in his internal deliberation process (bottom-up processing). Thus, the 
citizen must appropriately identify the facts that shape his action according with his 
initial normative/institutional knowledge. This identification implies recognising what 
he is actually doing. The object of this (first) epistemological step revolves around the 
account or description of conduct that includes brute and institutional facts. On the 
second epistemological step, once awareness of the real facts present in his action are 
noticed, perceived and recognised, the citizen has to consider in his deliberation 
process whether, according with his updatable knowledge, the action could be 
illegal/criminal. This second step implies evaluating whether his future behaviour 
would be outside the institutional framework expected from other users. In both 
epistemological steps the citizen can have false believes. If the mistake arose in the 
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first epistemic step, the false belief would be about a brute or institutional fact. If it 
arose in the second step, it would be about the institutional command. In both cases, if 
the latent and updatable knowledge triggers in the citizen the doubt or suspicion that 
his action requires furthering this basic initial legal knowledge, he must translate his 
doubts into further investigation. If not, he will be unable to excuse his conduct under 
a false belief about the law.  
  
An example will clarify this proposal. The legal debate about freedom of 
choice and privacy of morality behind, for example, the decriminalisation in the 
1960s of homosexuality and prostitution (that many assumed had been settled) has 
recently re-emerged. Last year, the National Crime Agency and Border Force seized 
123 child sex dolls that people were trying to import into Britain.517 The possession or 
manufacturing of these objects in the UK is not a criminal offence. However, a 
prohibition on the import of indecent and obscene objects has existed since the 
Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (CCA). Section 42 of the CCA makes it illegal 
(although not criminal)518 to import any obscene print, books, paintings or other 
indecent or obscene articles. Further, section 170(2) of the Customs and Excise 
Management Act 1979 (CEMA) criminalises the attempt of evading the prohibition 
(c) of any provision of the CCA; in this case indecent or obscene articles. According 
to the Cheshire Constabulary, the first man convicted of an attempt to import a child-
like sex doll was recently jailed for two years and eight months.519 The CCA does not 
define the institutional facts of “obscene” or “indecent”, therefore these extensions of 
institutional facts are open to interpretation. Recently, Judge Simon James from the 
Canterbury Crown Court dismissed a claim made by the accused, an ex-primary 
school governor David Turner, that the child sex doll he imported was not obscene,520 
arguing that “any right-thinking person” would find the doll obscene.521 On the other 
hand, lawyers for the accused had argued the doll was not covered by the CCA so the 
doll could not be considered an obscene or indecent object. Interestingly, Stopso, a 																																																								
517 D. Shaw “Child Sex Doll and Obscene Item, Judge Rules” BBC (2017) 
518 More about this will be issue will be discussed in the last section of Chapter 7 
519 L. Dearden “Man Sentenced for Importing Childlike Sex Doll from Hong Kong” The Independent 
(2017) 
520 R. Spillet “Former school governor, 72, faces jail after admitting having sex with an 'obscene' life-size 
child doll as border guards report a surge in the number of the sick robots flooding in from China” 
Mail Online (2017) 
521 D. Shaw “Child Sex Doll and Obscene Item, Judge Rules” BBC (2017) 
Chapter 6: False beliefs about institutional facts 
 
	
188	
charity that aims to prevent sexual offending through therapy, is calling for the so-
called 'child sex dolls' to be made available free on prescription for paedophiles522.  
 
It would be perfectly realistic to conceive that someone, aware of the 
prohibition of importing obscene material, falsely believed that a child-like sex doll is 
not an indecent or obscene item criminalized by the s 170(2) of the CEMA. In fact, 
this was the argument in David Turner‘s case. In this case, the false belief fits in the 
first epistemic step described above. The (false) belief should be categorised as a 
mistake about the extension of the institutional fact ‘obscene’. The citizen, aware of 
the prohibition, falsely believes that a child sex doll is not an indecent object. 
However, could a false belief about the extension of the institutional fact ‘obscene’ be 
instead considered a mistake about the institutional command? Well, it could be 
coherent to defend that the mistaken construction of the extension of the institutional 
fact ‘obscene’ impedes awareness about the potential criminality of the conduct. But, 
what the institutional framework defines by the above rules deals with the import of 
indecent sexual objects or articles. This is what the institutional command forbids in 
this particular case. Thus, when the citizen falsely believes that a specific prohibition 
on the import of (indecent or obscene) sexual objects, like those established by the 
CCA and the CEMA, does not exist his mistake would be categorised as a mistake 
about the institutional command. Of course, there could be cases where the citizen has 
a false belief about both the extension of an institutional fact and the institutional 
command, but even in these cases a categorical distinction would be feasible. 
 
Finally, and before explaining the ECCR in practice, it is relevant to point out 
a final feature of institutional facts (in contrast with brute facts). Brute facts are value-
neutral; they do not suggest or advance the illegality or criminality of the conduct. 
They are only relevant when the citizen knows the illegality of the conduct. The 
meaning and evaluative nature of some institutional facts, on the other hand, in some 
way, identifies and insinuates the potential criminality of the action. They quite often 
have a value-negative nature. The inclusion in the offence definition of institutional 
facts like ‘obscene’, ‘indecent’, ‘dishonest’, or ‘belonging to another’ implies some 
kind of value judgement. They (partially) insinuate or suggest the potential 																																																								
522 R. Revesz “Paedophiles 'Could be Prescribed Child Sex Dolls' to Prevent Real Attacks, Says 
Therapist” The Independent (2017)  
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criminality of the conduct. So, in practice, it is an argument that could blur the 
distinction between the description of the criminal conduct and awareness of the 
institutional command. Awareness about the scope of the institutional command 
perhaps requires a more “inclusive” evaluative judgment. Thus, it could be defended 
that some institutional facts partially suggest the criminality of the conduct. However, 
it should be the wide-ranging awareness of the institutional command that provides 
the citizen with the whole perception of the criminality of the behavior. In conclusion, 
although a degree of confluence exists between elements forming the two concepts, 
some differences are also evident and worth emphasising. In any case, all these 
categorical aspects will have a proper and specific response below when the ECCR is 
put in practice.  
 
6.3 The Epistemic Condition on Criminal Responsibility in practice: 
Institutional facts 
 
 The category of institutional facts proposed in this research does not 
exist as such in an academic or judicial environment as it is usually adverse to any 
strict analytical categorisation. False beliefs about institutional facts are 
unsystematically treated as mistakes of fact, mistakes about non-criminal law, 
mistakes about consent, “collateral mistake about non-penal status”,523 etc. and they 
are always dealt through the mens rea. In some cases, like Smith,524 discharge of 
criminal responsibility requires a subjective mens rea judgement. On other occasions, 
like in cases of mistake about consent in sexual offences, the mens rea test is strictly 
objective (honest and reasonable belief). We can therefore conclude that in the 
academic criminal debate the lack of principled rationalisation of the different issues 
relating to false beliefs is a common practice. As with the last chapter’s approach to 
brute facts, the rest of this section will attempt to provide a principled and clear 
approach to false beliefs about institutional facts, applying the ECCR defended in this 
research: 
 
																																																								
523 See People v Meneses (Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California. No. A113017. 
Decided: August 19, 2008) where the case People v Flora (Defendant and Appellant No H006977 
Decided February 20, 1991) was discussed 
524 R v Smith [1974] QB 354 
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“The citizen who performs a criminal action is responsible when, satisfying 
other conditions for responsibility, he is either aware that the action was criminal or 
he was culpably ignorant about some feature of the criminal act when he should have 
noticed it considering: 
 
a) The latent and updatable information available to him. 
b) The standard of awareness expected as status holder.  
c) That internal or external circumstances do not diminish those individual 
intellectual and physical capacities required to notice the need to update his latent 
knowledge.” 
 
As discussed above, criminal responsibility is directly credited when the 
citizen is aware of the criminality of his action. In those situations where the citizen 
knows that the action he is performing matches the description of a particular criminal 
offence he is fully responsible. That includes awareness of the institutional command 
as well as both brute and institutional facts present in his action. In these 
circumstances, if the mind of a sound, informed citizen nevertheless results in the 
action he is incontestably responsible for his actions; he is willing to commit a 
criminal act and he decides to do it welcoming any result from his action at least 
recklessly. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the ECCR also provides a 
deontic solution when the citizen is not cognisant that his action is criminal. He will 
be responsible if he is culpable of his ignorance. The rest of the section will discuss 
the criminal responsibility of the citizen who acts with a false belief about an 
institutional fact. 
 
a) The latent and updatable information available to him 
 
Before action, the citizen is conscious of the environment in which he 
interacts. This knowledge is updated with new inputs during his perception process. 
Additionally, he has got a ground of legal/institutional knowledge available from his 
memory. As we explained above, perception, recognition and action are functionally 
intertwined with the behavioural response. It is precisely this latent and updatable 
institutional/legal knowledge that actually trigger in the citizen the doubt or suspicion 
that his action requires furthering this foundation of knowledge. If this is the case, the 
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citizen must search for more information or abort his action altogether. This updatable 
knowledge or information is key to qualifying the citizen as culpably ignorant (or 
not). When the information available to the citizen, updated with new stimuli, is 
enough to cast doubts or raise suspicions about his beliefs, he must scrutinise further 
the situation or refrain from acting. The citizen must use his aptitudes and capabilities 
to ascertain the truth. If the citizen, ignoring or disregarding his suspicions, persists on 
performing the planned action, his conduct will be inexcusable. However,	 as	defended	 in	 chapter	 II,	 the	 citizen	has	 a	burden	 (and	not	 a	duty)	 to	 search	 for	more	 information.	 Hence,	 only	 in	 the	 hypothetical	 case	 that	 the	institutional/legal	 information	disregarded	had	been	sufficient	 to	 recognise	his	potential	mistake	and	ascertain	the	truth,	the	citizen	could	be	held	responsible.		
 
Brute facts do not need collective recognition in order to exist. They are 
present outside of any human institution. Institutional facts, on the other hand, can 
only exist within an institutional framework. They need the collective recognition of 
the institutional users to exist. In fact, the attribution of functions to people and 
objects, that cannot be implemented merely by virtue of their physical structure 
(outside the institutional framework), are at the essence of institutional facts. This 
intentional collective recognition informs the material meaning of institutional facts. 
Thus, the scope of the institutional fact ‘indecent’, for example, exits insofar as 
people collectively recognise some behaviours as ‘indecent’. It goes without saying 
that this collective recognition could and is, in some cases, legally defined and 
delimitated. However, the legal norm will be adequate for (and tolerated within) the 
particular society only to the extent that the legal norm reflects the scope of collective 
recognition. What is relevant then, in terms of excusatory consequences, are the 
epistemic circumstances of the citizen: whether or not his latent knowledge about the 
existence/extension of an institutional fact have triggered the doubt or suspicion that 
his action could be illegal.  
 
Although the above guidelines sound straightforward, there are three 
situations that can influence the levels of suspicion in a citizen that their action might 
be criminal which require distinctive consideration: a) when the facts of the case are 
legally intricate; b) when the state does not discharge its burden to make the 
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description of a criminal offence plainly accessible to citizens; and c) those cases 
where the state creates or modifies conduct previously contemplated as standard 
without making citizens properly aware of the changes to this conduct. 
 
a) When the citizen has no apparent doubts about the extension of any 
institutional fact but the details of the case are legally intricate, the citizen must 
always consult or search for legal advice about the material meaning of the 
institutional fact to avoid criminal responsibility. We can scrutinise how this 
consideration works in practice analyzing the case of State of Louisiana v Pamela 
Rabalais.525 In this case Pamela Rabalais received a lump-sum payment from a job 
and used the money to buy a trailer and some land. All the properties, however, were 
purchased in the name of her partner Jason Rabalais before the couple married. Later, 
Jason agreed to share ownership of the properties by an act of donation. Pamela 
accepted the joint ownership of the said properties. However, a year later, when Jason 
was charged with rape and aggravated battery against Pamela, he signed a 
“Revocation of power of attorney” that allowed his brother Steve to switch the title of 
the truck (Chevy S-10) to his name. With a new certificate of title on hand, Steve 
Rabalais (Jason’s brother) went to the Sheriff office and requested assistance in 
retrieving the truck from the possession of Pamela. After several disputes about the 
possession of the truck, Pamela removed it from Steve Rabalais’ property and was 
later charged with committing theft. The mistake in this case was treated in relation to 
what affect it had on the mens rea, at both at trial and appeal. She was convicted 
although her sentence was quashed on appeal. The appeal court decision was based on 
the fact that the state had failed to prove the element of intent beyond a reasonable 
doubt: the honest belief that she owned an interest in the truck precluded a finding 
that she intended to take the  property of somebody else (an essential requirement in 
theft). The issue underlying this case is clearly a false belief about the extension of the 
institutional fact ‘belonging to another’. Pamela was aware of the Louisiana Revised 
Statutes 14:67 that defined theft as the misappropriation or taking of anything of value 
which belongs to another. According to the courts of appeal of Louisiana, Pamela was 
finally acquitted simply on the fact that the state had failed to prove the element of 
intent essential in the crime of theft. No epistemic considerations were taken into 																																																								
525 State of Louisiana v Pam Rabalais, Defendant-Appellant, No CR 99-623, Decided: January 26, 
2000 
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account by the court. 
  
The ECCR would assess this case from an epistemic perspective. The Court of 
appeal reasoning that “[…] the honest belief that she owned an interest in the truck” 
was enough to preclude Pamela’s intention to steal property belonging to another is 
frail. What should be relevant in the case is Pamela’s epistemic position. Beyond 
Pamela’s intention, the intricate legal facts involved in this case (a donation followed 
by a revocation of power of attorney, plus a change in the title of the truck) should 
have triggered in Pamela the doubt or suspicion that her action could be illegal and, 
consequently, only if a lawyer or official had advised her about the legality of her 
action, could she successfully claim that she was under a false belief about an 
institutional fact. In cases of a complex legal nature the burden is always on the 
citizen to search for advice, even if the facts do not activate doubts or suspicions 
about the scope of an institutional fact included in the definition of an offence.   
 
b) The state bears the burden of legislating in a way that the description of any 
criminal offence is accessible and comprehensible to citizens. We can examine the 
facts in the case of People v Marrero526 as an example where this burden was 
probably not discharged. Julio Marrero, a federal correctional officer, was arrested for 
the unlicensed possession of a pistol in violation of the New York Penal Law § 
265.02. The accused falsely believed that, as a federal corrections officer, he could 
legally carry a loaded weapon without a license based on the express exemption from 
criminal liability under Penal Law §265.20(a)(1)(a) to "peace officers". According to 
a press report, he came to this conclusion, he said, after having read several New 
York penal statutes, and after he had consulted with fellow correction officers, a law 
professor and a weapons dealer.527 The statutory definition of "peace officer" was 
established in CPL 2.10(25) as any correction officer of any state penal correctional 
facility or of any penal correctional institution. The problem was that Marrero was a 
federal officer when the statute only exempted state correction officers. Thus, he 
concluded erroneously that, as a corrections officer in a Federal prison, he was a 
"peace officer" and, as such, exempt from the express terms of Penal Law 
§265.20(a)(1). At trial, the court rejected the defendant's argument that his personal 																																																								
526 Court of Appeals of New York 507 N.E. 2d 1068 (1987) 
527 E.R. Shipp “Divided Court Upholds and Old Principle” The New York Times (1987) 
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misunderstanding of the statutory definition of a “peace officer” was enough to 
excuse him from criminal liability under New York's mistake of law statute (Penal 
Law §15.20). The court of appeals of the State of New York upheld the conviction.  
 
It is not difficult to share the views of Philip L. Weinstein, Chief of the 
society’s appeals bureau, who proclaimed that the above statute was ambiguous528 
and Marrero’s conviction should have been quashed. This statement introduces 
another special consideration in terms of the information available to the accused: the 
states obligation to make the law reasonably accessible. Nothing in the facts of 
Marrero proves that he was not a law-abiding citizen. As it was reported, after his 
doubts about the potential criminality of his behaviour, he asked for legal advice. 
However, the extension of the institutional fact “peace officer” was contradictory, 
even confusing. This puts some responsibility on the state in those situations where 
the knowledge of the citizen is distorted by deficient legislative practices. As 
Ashworth affirms, “[…] if the law is to serve as a guide to conduct, at least to the 
extent of allowing citizens to apply their minds so as to avoid becoming subject to the 
criminal sanction, it should be reasonably accessible”.529 In order to achieve this, the 
state has the obligation to make its criminal norms clear-cut, certain and prospective. 
Fuller also makes the same claim when he stresses the importance of making laws 
available to citizens.530 This maxim, which derives from the principle of fair warning, 
was also referred to by Justice Holmes in McBoule v United States when asserting 
that a “[…] fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common 
world will understand”.531 Norms have to be written in a way that does not confuse 
(or even ambush) citizens. The wording has to be precise in the description of both 
brute and institutional facts so that citizens can regulate and adapt their conduct and 
social expectations to the institutional mandate. This burden of the state should imply 
that in those situations where a false belief about the extension of an institutional fact 
is due to an ambiguous definition, the citizen’s responsibility should be discharged.532  
 																																																								
528 Ibd 
529 A. Ashworth Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (2015) at p20 
530 L. Fuller The morality of law (1969) 
531 283 US 25,27 (1931). 
532 Ambiguity in this context could be a controversial concept. If the standard is set too low, it could 
make the defence easily accessible for underserving citizens. This research accepts Ashworth’s 
requirement of being reasonably accessible as an acceptable standard.  
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c) Finally, another issue directly associated with the consciousness of 
institutional facts is legal stability. This feature is stressed by Ashworth when he 
declares that, as a direct result of the principle of legality, legal norms (especially 
those of the criminal law) must be clear, stable and not retrospective in their 
operation.533 It could also be added that legal stability is even more important to 
common law jurisdictions where the stare decisis principle is the cornerstone of the 
judicial criminal system. Legal stability is interwoven in authorities or precedents. 
This stability is guaranteed by previous cases that have either a binding or persuasive 
effect when a court decides about subsequent cases with similar facts. However, 
although stability, or at least “reasonable stability” as per Allen534, is an undeniable 
characteristic of the criminal law, the law is required to embrace, and needs a capacity 
for, change. Law changes as a result of transformations in the social institutional 
framework. As Pound in his sociological jurisprudential approach famously claimed, 
“the law must be stable, but it must not stand still.”535 And this capacity to balance 
continuity and stability or change and innovation is certainly seen by the legal 
community as one of the strengths of the common law systems.   
 
Citizens must adapt their behaviour to a stable yet evolutionary institutional 
framework defined by legal norms. They should act within a framework of what is 
recognised as a fixed and legitimate institutional and legal standard. Those recognised 
behaviours are understood as valid and, in any case, citizens do not need to doubt or 
suspect about their validity before action. Indeed, the burden lies with the state to 
reassure that any change in what citizens recognise as standard is made well known. 
And this implies for the state not only to properly publish the new standard, it implies 
that the state has to use the resources available in a 21st century society to make 
citizens aware that the institutional and legal framework has changed and the standard 
expected behaviour has been altered.  
 
As an example of the above argument we can examine the case of State of 
Idaho v Milton R. Fox536, where on January 1991 the appellant was charged with one 
count of possession of ephedrine, a controlled substance. In Idaho, ephedrine is listed 																																																								
533 A. Ashworth Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (2015) at p66 
534 M.J. Allen Textbook in criminal law (2017) at 2 
535 R. Pound ABA Journal (1958) at p544 
536 No 19778 Supreme Court of Idaho, Idaho falls, April 1993 Dec 28, 1993 
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as a Schedule II substance in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act 1988. I.C. §37-
2707(g)(1)(b), but compounds containing ephedrine could be sold over-the-counter 
until November 1990, when the Idaho Board of Pharmacy designated ephedrine as a 
prescription drug. During the trial, the accused tried to introduce as a defence that 
magazines from out-of-state (and apparently a Magazine from Idaho as well) included 
advertisements for mail orders like the one he had made. The Uniform Controlled 
Substance Act states537 that it is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled 
substance unless it was obtained directly from a valid prescription. During the 
hearing, the court held that knowledge that possession of ephedrine was illegal was 
not an element of the offence. The appeal court highlighted that in this case Fox did 
not claim that he did not know he possessed ephedrine, rather his claim was that he 
did not know ephedrine was illegal. Indeed, it was legal two months before he ordered 
it. In short, Fox asserted a claim of mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact. 
Accordingly, as a mistake of law was not a valid or recognised defence the court 
simply affirmed the district’s court decision.  
 
Fox’s false belief actually concerned the extension of the institutional fact 
‘controlled substance’. Ephedrine is a drug commonly used for medical purposes. Fox 
knew very well what the substance was, but he claimed that he did not know it was 
listed in the statutes as a controlled substance. In fact, it was legally available in other 
states and available in Idaho two months before his purchase. Furthermore, he ordered 
the ephedrine by calling the toll-free number of a national outlet. In doing so, he was 
executing a standard and regular behaviour. However, was the change of the 
stereotyped behaviour properly published? Unless the State of Idaho made it 
adequately known to its citizens that ephedrine had become a listed substance, the 
lack of doubts manifested in Fox should be fairly expected. More about this issue will 
be analysed later in the next requirement of the ECCR, where the standard of 
awareness as a status holder will be evaluated. There, this issue of legal stability and 
standardised behaviour will be considered from the perspective of both types of 
offences; offences of dissociation and offences of association. 
 
 																																																								
537 I.C. § 37-2707(c) 
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b) The standard of awareness expected as a status holder 
 
Fostering and protecting mutual trust between strangers who share the same 
institutional normative framework is the main function of the law. It has been 
vigorously defended in this research that to promote mutual confidence among 
citizens, criminal law must protect institutional user’s expectations. Only in this way 
can frictionless interaction between citizens (civility or social order) take place. But 
this confidence would be inconsistent if users’ expectations depended only on the 
perceptions of other particular users.  Some normative corrector element needs to be 
brought about to consolidate and guarantee trust. Additionally, the account of criminal 
responsibility proposed must reflect this claim. Criminal responsibility should be 
attached to our expectation that strangers will behave within the common and 
recognised deontic institutional framework. Thus, criminal responsibility is attributed 
to the institutional user if the standard of demands according with his status or role 
has not been fulfilled. Therefore, when a particular institutional fact is present in 
potentially illegal conduct and it does not trigger doubts or suspicions about its 
legality, criminal responsibility will be attributed if the citizen’s behaviour fell short 
of his expected standard as a status holder. 
 
 It was previously claimed that status defines prospectively the objective 
responsibility of the holder both negatively and positively. In accordance with the 
former, he is responsible for configuring his ambit of action avoiding causal processes 
that jeopardise the ambit of action or planning of others (neminem laede principle). 
Likewise, and for the latter, the holder is responsible for the deficient performance of 
any institutional function when interacting with others in the institutional structure.538 
These two demarcations were categorised previously as an inactive and proactive 
dimension of status. 539  Finally, connected with this double dimension, a new 
classification of offences was proposed: offences of disassociation when the status 
holder does not live up the institutional expectations generated by the inactive 
dimension of status, and offences of association when the status holder does not live 
up the institutional expectations generated by the proactive dimension of status.  																																																								
538 See chapter 3 
539 See chapter 3 
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In the previous chapter it was stated that instead of advocating for a single 
corrector factor, the proposal defended in this research suggests a dual approach: for 
offences of disassociation the appraisal is based on the collateral institutional user 
test, where for offences of association the suggestion is one which takes inspiration 
from the Bolam test.540 Both tests have been explained in the previous chapter and it 
would be redundant to explain it here again. However, a review of different cases will 
illustrate how the standard of awareness as status holder contemplated in the ECCR 
could achieve different (but principled) outcomes over the current solution based on 
the mens rea element modified by a mixture of inconsistent and unprincipled criteria.  
 
To illustrate how awareness as a status holder touches on criminal 
responsibility we can scrutinise the case of People v Meneses.541 an interesting case 
where the Court of Appeal also deliberated about several other cases of potential 
ormative and/or factual mistake (for example: People v Flora). In the case, a jury 
convicted Rolando Meneses of, among other crimes, stealing public records in 
contravention of Gov. code 6200. Later, the Court of appeal of California confirmed 
the judgment. The accused admitted that he operated a lawyer referral business in 
which law firms and chiropractors would pay him a fee for introducing injured people 
for services. Initially Meneses used information from inside a hospital but later he 
obtained traffic collisions reports from the San Francisco Police Department. The 
reports were sold to him by someone who got the reports from a clerk-typist at the 
police department. At trial, Meneses testified that he used the reports to contact the 
innocent party in the accident and suggest that they contact a chiropractor and a 
lawyer, as well as to claim insurance compensation. He added that accident reports 
are public records that anybody is entitled to access to, asserting that he used to obtain 
police records when he was working in a lawyer’s office. Meneses’ defence contains 
three relevant facts for our purposes: he described himself as a salesman; he had 
obtained a business licence for his business; and he operated under the name of Legal 
Network Services.  
 																																																								
540 The case of Bolam v Friend Hospital Management Committee [157] 1 WLR 582 established the 
typical rules for assessing the appropriate standard of reasonable care and negligence in relation to 
skilled professionals. 
541 Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California. No. A113017. Decided: August 19, 2008 
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On appeal the accused claimed that the trial court had a duty to instruct the 
jury on mistakes of law and fact “sua sponte”. The Appeal Court rejected this claim, 
stating that mistake of law is rarely a defence and the court duty to instruct sua ponte 
arises only where the accused relies on such a defence, circumstances not satisfied by 
the accused. The court acknowledged the difficult distinction to be drawn between 
mistakes of fact and law, especially when the accused has a false belief about a legal 
status or rights as in the case of People v Flora.542 In Flora, the Court considered if 
the false belief that a foreign child custody order was unenforceable in another state543 
was a mistake of fact or law. Opening the door to a hypothetical defence in the case, 
the court recognised that “[…] Arguably, the claim could be understood as a mistake 
of fact defense-defendant claimed he was mistaken about the fact of the legal status of 
the custody order, not the existence of a law requiring compliance with court 
orders”544. In the next line, the court considered that it could also be a collateral 
mistake about a non-legal status of police records, in short a mistake of law.545 In any 
case, both Courts of Appeal supported the decision upheld at first instance without 
any appraisal of the accused’s knowledge requirements. In Flora, the court’s 
argument was that the appellant’s conduct was not indicative of good faith. Acting as 
a fugitive, the appellant only succeeded to demonstrate his consciousness of gilt. The 
reason behind the outcome in Meneses was an evidential one; the lack of reliance on 
the purported defence at first instance proved fatal to his appeal.  Hence, although at a 
glance the issue in both cases was an epistemic one – whether or not the respective 
accused were aware of the extension of the institutional facts ‘police report’ and 
‘custodial order’ – remarkably both trial courts and both Courts of appeal disregarded 
any epistemic aspect in their consideration. 
 
The ECCR evaluates specifically the epistemic conditions of the accused. In 
the above cases, the accused claimed that he was not aware of the illegality of his 
action due to a false belief about what would fit in the definition of an institutional 
fact. Both claimed that they were mistaken about the extension of the concepts ‘police 
report’ and ‘custodial order’. According to the ECCR, to determine whether or not the 																																																								
542 In this case the court constructed the claim as a mistake of law defence, which was later rejected. 
However, the claim could be constructed as a mistake of fact about the status of a custody order 
543 See People v Flora  
544 See People v flora discussion about mistake of law 
545 See People v Meneses discussion about “General principles of mistake of law and mistake of fact” 
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accused were culpably ignorant we need to evaluate if their initial knowledge as status 
holders should have triggered the doubt about the legality of their respective actions. 
As the standard test for offences of association and disassociation is different, we 
must first decide which type of offence has been committed. Meneses was accused of 
stealing public records through his licensed business. He was acting within the 
proactive dimension of the status as a salesman, so he can be said to have committed 
an offence of association. Flora, on the other hand, was accused of a felony violation 
of a foreign child custody order.  In committing this offence the accused failed to live 
up to the institutional expectations generated by his inactive dimension of status. 
Although Flora has the status of father, a fact which could lead us to interpret the case 
with a potential proactive dimension, the provision does not stipulate that only fathers 
can commit the felony.546 Thus, the felony Flora was accused can be categorised as an 
offence of disassociation.  
 
Now we can review the facts in Meneses to determine the outcome of the case 
that the ECCR’s requirements would deliver.  In this case the appellant claimed a 
false belief about the extension of the institutional fact ‘public records’ included in the 
description of the offence of stealing public records.547 He admitted that police 
accident records are a public record because everybody could get them. However, he 
also believed that police accident records were open to the public and could lawfully 
be purchased. For those reasons, he believed that police accident records did not fall 
within the concept of ‘public record’ criminalised by the criminal code. According to 
the criteria of the ECCR, Meneses was not aware that his action was criminal, 
therefore, criminal responsibility cannot be attributed unless he is culpable for the 
ignorance from which he acts. The accused claimed that he “did not think he did 
anything wrong”,548 thus it can be inferred that the knowledge he had before acting 
did not trigger any doubts about the criminality of his action. However, should 
Meneses have been aware that buying police accident records fits within the 
institutional fact of ‘public records’ criminalised by the code? More specifically, 																																																								
546 Section 278.5 provides: “(a) Every person who in violation of the physical custody or visitation 
provisions of a custody order, judgment, or decree takes, detains, conceals, or retains the child 
with the intent to deprive another person of his or her rights to physical custody or visitation shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years, a fine of not 
more than ten thousand dollars. 
547 Gov. code 6200. 
548 See People v Meneses 
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should the accused have been aware of this fact, considering he was performing a 
commercial activity holding the status of a businessman in this sector, as he testified?  
We are evaluating an offence of association therefore, where the accused had 
represented himself as having more knowledge or expertise (businessman) than the 
average citizen, it is expected that the standard must be in accordance with a 
responsible body of opinion, even if others would diverge on the opinion. In short, if 
Meneses had acted within the acceptable standard of a responsible body of 
businessmen (if any) undertaking this kind of activity, he should be acquitted. It could 
be presumed that the practice of any responsible body of lawyers or chiropractic 
referral businesses would require their members to know the legality surrounding 
their practice and, specifically, to ascertain if the sources of information they are 
using have a lawful origin. Thus, if the argument behind the refusal of Meneses’ 
defence of mistake of law by the court of appeal was evidential (the lack of reliance 
on the purported defence) our proposal would determine that after assessing the 
epistemic circumstances of the case the ECCR has been satisfied. As a result, 
Meneses’ claim of false belief about the extension of the institutional fact ‘public 
record’ should have been declined.  
 
On the other hand, People v Flora (the other relevant case discussed by the 
court in the Meneses’s ruling) was, as highlighted above, an offence of disassociation. 
As a result, the appropriate test here proposed in the ECCR is the collateral 
institutional user test.  The test encompasses the minimum updatable knowledge 
required to interact legitimately in the institutional framework. If we review the facts 
in Flora, the accused who was charged with a violation of a child custodial order 
claimed that he thought that a custody order granted in Washington was 
unenforceable in California. Thus, his false belief was about the extension of the 
institutional fact ‘child custody order’. In fact, during their deliberations at trial, the 
jury required the court to answer the question: “[…] Is the restraining order issued in 
the State of Washington, Clark County, dated 21 December 1988, valid in the State of 
California, County of Santa Clara?” The court responded to the question in the 
positive, supporting its ruling in the Civil Code section 5162,549 the United States 																																																								
549 “The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court of 
another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in 
accordance with this title or which was made under factual circumstances meeting the 
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Constitution and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to which both California 
and Washington are signatories. Thus, it is relevant to note that even the jury was not 
fully aware of the enforceability or validity of the Washington order in California. As 
a result, we could infer that the accused, according with his knowledge, similarly had 
no motives or reasons to doubt the potential criminality of his conduct. Thus, only if 
he was culpable of the ignorance from which he acted could criminal responsibility be 
attributed to his action.  
 
It is here where the ECCR collateral institutional user test makes a difference 
utilising the standard ‘reasonable person test’. If we were to apply this test, the fact 
that even the jury was unsure about the enforceability of the custodial order in 
California might make us infer that Flora should be excused. If the members of the 
jury acting as an ordinary person with an average level of awareness were unaware of 
the enforceability of the custodial order, it could be presumed that a higher standard 
of awareness should not be demanded from Flora. According with this appraisal, the 
judge or jury must disregard the standard reasonable man test for a more institutional 
user orientated judgement. Thus, they must take into consideration the institutional 
framework where the users are interacting. In fact, they should position themselves 
within the institutional framework. From this perspective, as collateral institutional 
users, they must decide if the accused has lived up to reciprocal institutional 
expectations in this particular instance.  
 
In our modern societies we have demarcated an institutional framework that 
structures the rights and privileges that underpin the interactions between a child and 
either of the child’s parents or adults with significant roles in the child’s life. This 
framework is usually referred to as Parental Responsibilities (PR) and includes 
matters of contact (or visitation in the US) and residence. It is only when the 
expectations of other users within the institutional framework (like the custodial 
parent or the child themselves) are guaranteed that interrelations and relationships are 
frictionless. This essential, smooth relationship between users of the institutional 
framework can only be achieved when everyone’s expectations are protected.  This 																																																																																																																																																														
jurisdictional standards of the title, so long as this decree has not been modified in accordance 
with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this title” Calif. Civil Code s 5162. 
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implies that any institutional user should be aware of the extension and content of the 
Parental Responsibilities framework.  In this way, the parent who holds residence 
rights, for example, will not impede the parent with contact rights from exercising that 
right, and vice versa. It is worth highlighting that the appeal in Flora was based on the 
false belief that a foreign child custody order could not be enforced in a different 
state. Regardless, the collateral institutional user test requires the members of the jury 
or judges to evaluate the potential false belief of the accused, taking into account the 
reciprocal expectations that operate within the institutional frame’s demands. That is, 
they must consider what the minimum updatable knowledge required is to lawfully 
interact in the institutional framework. By doing so, they will establish the minimum 
threshold that will decide the potential culpable ignorance of the citizen. Taking these 
arguments into account, perhaps, it would not be difficult to support the idea that any 
user of this institutional framework could expect that the violation of a child custody 
order in a particular state could be recognised as a felony in a different state. 
Therefore, although the application of the reasonable test in this case could 
hypothetically lead to a successful defence of false beliefs about an institutional fact, 
the collateral institutional test would attain the opposite outcome.  
 
c) Intellectual and physical capacities. 
 
Finally, as it was explained in reference to mistakes about brute facts, the last 
component in the ECRR test relates to those specific capacities or circumstances that 
could exclude responsibility. This third step appraises the intellectual or physical 
capacity of the citizen at the moment of action. In specific contexts the citizen’s 
perception process could be impaired by external conditions. These objective 
conditions could alter the perception process of the citizen, affecting his judgement 
about the need to search for additional information. These personal conditions of the 
citizen can also affect his responsiveness to the reality that surrounds him. Some 
perceptions can confuse the citizen as a result of psychic perturbations, mental health 
conditions or malfunctions of the sensory organs. A person can suffer from visual 
misperceptions, seizures or even migraines that affect the extension of an institutional 
fact. Diplopia (double vision), colour-blindness, hearing voices, drug-induced 
hallucinations or some type of medications can obviously condition the need to search 
for more information related to institutional facts. 
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In conclusion, in those situations where the perception process of a citizen 
exposes doubts about their beliefs and the citizen fails to adequately expand his initial 
knowledge, continuing with the action he will be criminally responsible. This 
psychological appraisal does not imply that the accused is completely exonerated of 
the consequences of his action. If no doubts arise during his perception process, the 
next phase is to evaluate whether the citizen behaved in compliance with the 
awareness required as a status holder.  That implies a dissimilar assessment in cases 
of offences of association and disassociation. If, finally, and according with the test 
suggested above, he did not act according with his status, he will be held criminally 
responsible unless intellectual or external circumstances can be said to have distorted 
his perception process. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Providing a fresh coherent legal proposal is not an easy undertaking. The 
prospect (or risk) of introducing contradictory or conflicting arguments is always 
present. Previous chapters contended that our perception of brute and institutional 
facts is dissimilar. This chapter introduced the idea that false beliefs about brute facts 
usually concerns the existence of the fact, whereas false beliefs about institutional 
facts are concerned with the extension of the fact. However, false beliefs about the 
institutional command also require a similar evaluative judgement. Thus, the natural 
conclusion of this extension/evaluative dimension introduced has the potential to 
jeopardise the categorical distinction between false beliefs about institutional facts 
and those about the institutional command proposed. This has chapter has hopefully 
clarified this potential incoherence enough to avoid contradictory or overlapping 
arguments. 
 
After the categorisation of false beliefs about institutional facts was 
sufficiently defended, this chapter applied the ECCR in similar terms to its application 
to false belief about brute facts in the previous chapter. However, three objective 
circumstances that could affect the outcomes of the ECCR were identified. The first 
set ups a duty on citizens and the other two create duties on the state. The citizens’ 
duty to search for legal advice in intricate cases has little significance beyond false 
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beliefs. However, those that recognise duties on the state have huge legal 
transcendence. Supporting the idea that the state has a duty to make the law accessible 
to citizens by legislating in an unambiguous way (especially when changes to 
stereotyped behaviour are introduced), implies an open recognition that the aim of the 
criminal law is to guide citizens. It recognises that criminal norms are conditions 
taken into consideration in deliberation, implicitly recognising as well that others will 
behave according to the expectation they have that criminal norms will be followed. 
These are admittedly assumptions that not every reader of this thesis will likely 
support.  
	
CHAPTER 7 
 
FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONAL 
COMMAND 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
A false belief about the institutional command or prohibition arises when a 
citizen, aware of all the factual elements of a criminal norm (both brute and 
institutional), ignores that the conduct has been prohibited by the criminal law. The 
last two chapters have attempted to frame the extension of brute and institutional facts 
used by lawmakers to define the prohibited, permitted or commanded conduct. This 
chapter will discuss those excusatory situations where the citizen has the false belief 
that his conduct does not infringe or transgress a recognised institutional framework. 
We shall first discuss the epistemic requirement demanded of the citizen who has 
potentially infringed a particular institutional framework. Thus, we must determine 
what kind of (standard) knowledge is required to determine that the citizen acts with 
full awareness of the recognised institutional framework. In other words, what level 
of knowledge is necessary to demand from a citizen in order to disregard the 
excusatory significance of a false belief about an institutional command or 
prohibition. Three forms of awareness will be discussed here: knowledge about the 
immorality of the conduct; knowledge only that the conduct is illegal; and a more 
specific understanding that the conduct is criminal. Later in the chapter, the ECCR 
will again be put in practice in cases of false belief about the command or prohibition. 
The application of the ECCR to false beliefs about the command or prohibition, and 
the evaluative judgement required, is analogous to false beliefs about institutional 
facts discussed in the previous chapter. Criminal responsibility will be attributed 
when the citizen knew, or his latent knowledge (according with his role as a status 
holder) have triggered the suspicion, that his conduct could be criminal.  
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The chapter will conclude with the discussion of a general topic that applies to 
any type of false belief revised in previous chapters. The ECCR established that in 
those cases where the citizen has suspicions about the criminality of his action, he 
ought to reflect or seek advice or abort his action altogether.550 However,	we	have	yet	to	consider	the	measures	the	citizen	must	take	in	order	to	discover	the	truth,	or,	more	 importantly,	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 information	 that	 could	 exonerate	 him	(even	 if	 he	 is	 later	 proved	 wrong),	 or	 when	 the	 duty	 to	 corroborate	 the	information	received	begins	or	ends.	Thus,	the	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	determine	
the	point	of	inflection	where	the	burden	of	seeking	advice	about	the	law	becomes	a	
right	to	rely	on	a	trustworthy	source.	
 
 
7.2 Knowledge that precludes exculpatory consequences to false beliefs 
  
The previous chapter defended excusatory consequences for false beliefs 
under specific circumstances. In fact, the first precept of the ECCR reaffirms that 
responsibility be attributed when the citizen was aware that his action was criminal. 
However, what does it mean to be aware that an action is criminal? What kind of 
knowledge is required? Is awareness about the immorality of the conduct sufficient to 
conclude that the citizen knew the action was criminal? Or must the citizen also be 
aware about the illegality of the conduct? The extension of this precept will be 
discussed in this section. We shall then examine if, in order to be aware that their 
conduct is criminal, a citizen requires: a) knowledge that the conduct was morally 
wrong; b) knowledge of the illegality of the conduct; or c) awareness that the conduct 
was explicitly criminal. The direct consequence of the outcome of this discussion 
would be that those citizens who know that their action is criminal would be unable to 
claim any excusatory effects from their false belief, precisely because the ECCR 
establishes that the citizen is fully responsible when he is aware that his action is 
criminal. 
 
																																																								
550 These questions are more pertinent in cases of false beliefs about institutional facts or about the 
institutional command or prohibition, than in those of brute facts. Brute fact, by their nature, do 
not usually require the citizen to search for information about them from third parties.  
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The legal moralist tradition understands criminal law as a subspecies of moral 
theory focused on moral wrongs or different levels of wrongdoing rather than on legal 
norms. According to this approach, what the criminal law must demand from citizens 
is to abide by the law not because it is legally valid but because the conduct is morally 
wrong. The concept of wrong becomes essential to both the process of criminalisation 
and the function of the criminal law itself. In this context criminal norms have the 
subordinate purpose to declare the wrongfulness of the prohibited conduct, and the 
purpose of the criminal law is to achieve retributive justice by punishing those who 
are morally culpable in the doing of some wrongful action. These arguments flow 
from Bishop’s verdict that the “law was written in our hearts”,551 to the version of 
‘public wrong’ expressing community sentiment as defended by Duff, through to the 
idea defended by Devlin that “crimes are sins with legal definitions”.552 From this 
moralistic tradition, the mere awareness that the conduct could be harmful, immoral 
or wrong would be sufficient to rule out any excusatory effects of false beliefs. Those 
citizens aware of the immorality or wrongful nature of their action are precluded from 
claiming any excusatory effect for a false belief about the institutional command or 
prohibition.   
 
On the other hand, for those of the legal positivist perspective knowledge of 
legal validity and its relevance in our practical reasoning before action is salient.  The 
law is not “written in our hearts”. The guidance view, as it has been referred to in this 
paper,553 is an ability of the law to rise above merit-based discussions and guide 
citizens ex ante. Any legal system must have cognoscible rules of action for guiding 
conduct.554 This forward-looking guidance for ordinary people was highlighted by 
Hart when he states that “law […]be concerned with the ‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant 
man’ who is willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what it is”.555 
Finally, Joseph Raz’ position in his recognised theory of rules as “exclusionary 
reasons” 556  summarises the legal positivist approach towards this issue: mere 
awareness about the illegality of the conduct should be enough to rule out any 																																																								
551 See chapter 2. 
552 P. Devlin The enforcements of morals (1965) p27 
553 See JoJ.P. Bishop Commentaries on the Criminal Law (1858) at Chapter 2  
554 J.P. Shofield and J. Harris (eds) The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Legislator of the World: 
Writings on Codification, Law and Education (1998) 
555  H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (1994) at p39 
556 J. Raz Practical Reasons and Norms (1975) 
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potential excusatory effect of a false belief. Knowledge that the conduct is illegal 
should be enough reason for the citizen to avoid it. 
 
In this research a third and different perspective towards this issue has been 
proposed and defended. The thesis recognises the persuasiveness of the legal 
positivism standpoint, particularly in the exclusionary motivational557 effect of a 
general prohibition. However, it is insufficient to state that plain awareness about a 
general prohibition precludes excusatory effects of false beliefs: only the citizen’s 
awareness about the criminality of his conduct could preclude a potential excusatory 
effect of a false belief. Without a doubt, knowledge that the conduct is immoral or 
illegal could be an indication or warning that the conduct could be criminal, but the 
levels of motivation of a citizen are higher (even different) when the institutional 
framework is criminalised. The attachment of criminal punishment to the criminalised 
conduct brings a different perspective to state intervention. Criminal courts and 
procedures are involved which provides a higher degree of incentive to act within the 
institutional framework. Also, and in terms of protection of other citizen’s 
institutional expectations, criminalisation has a higher level of reassurance that the 
institutional framework will be respected, fostering trust between strangers and social 
order. 
 
The child-like sex dolls example discussed in the previous chapter provides a 
good illustration to elucidate the above argument.558 As we saw, s42 of the CCA 
made it illegal to import any obscene prints, books, paintings or other indecent or 
obscene articles. This general prohibition was later criminalised by section 170(2) of 
the CEMA. At first instance it seems obvious that the potentially immoral nature of 
importing “obscene” or “indecent” material should be irrelevant to the epistemic 
citizen’s attitude before action. Indeed, even the basic awareness that the conduct is 
illegal should not prevent the excusatory consequences of a false belief. Precisely for 
that reason, the lawmaker specifically criminalised such conduct under s170(2) of the 
CEMA. This is because criminalisation adds a higher level of motivation to act within 
																																																								
557 See chapter 2 
558 See chapter 6 
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the institutional framework. It also reassures other potential users that the recognised 
framework would be protected even in cases of its violation.559  
 
In contrast to the problem exposed above, the ECCR emphasises precisely in 
its wording that only when the citizen was aware that his conduct was criminal can 
any excusatory effect be precluded. The ECCR literally states that “The citizen who 
performs a criminal action is responsible when, satisfying other conditions for 
responsibility, he is either aware that the action was criminal or he was culpably 
ignorant about some feature of the criminal act when he should have noticed it […].” 
Accordingly, in those situations where the citizen was merely conscious about the 
immorality or mere illegality of his conduct it cannot be directly assumed that the 
citizen acts with awareness of the institutional command or prohibition. 
 
7.3 The Epistemic Condition of Criminal Responsibility in practice: False 
beliefs about the command or prohibition. 
 
 This section of the chapter will attempt to provide a principled 
approach to those situations where the citizen, although aware of all the factual 
elements of a criminal norm (both brute and institutional), ignores or is misled about 
the negative institutional appraisal and consequent prohibition of his conduct. The 
recent cases R v Thomas560 and R v Beard561 provide examples of false or mistaken 
beliefs about a prohibition. In the former case the accused admitted having sexual 
intercourse with a girl of 17 who had previously been under his foster care. The 
sexual activity only took place once she had left the foster family. The accused was 
convicted of sexual activity with a child family member contrary to s25 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003. The accused was unaware that his conduct was criminal. The two 
relevant considerations of this offence for our purposes are: first, that it applies where 
the child is under 18562 (when the normal age of consent to sexual intercourse is 16 
years); and second, that according to s27 of the 2003 Act it can be committed by a 
person who is or has been the foster carer of the child.  
 																																																								
559 A different issue is whether or not the importation of childlike sex dolls should be criminalised at all 
560 [2006] 1 Cr App R (S) 602 
561 [2008] 2 Cr App R (S) 32 
562 s25(1)(e)(i) Sexual Offences Act 2003 
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In Beard, the police found 78 tear gas canisters, 66 of which were prohibited 
under s5 of the Firearms Act 1968, during a search of the appellant’s residential 
caravan. The appellant expressed remorse, claiming that the offence had been 
committed unknowingly and had resulted from carelessness and ignorance. He 
claimed not to have knowledge of the ammunition. He also indicated that he was not 
aware that the possession of the canister was criminal and testified that the cartridges 
had been left several years ago by a friend. He was also functionally illiterate and 
could not read the label that, although mainly in German, indicated in English that 
they contained tear gas. His false belief was not about the extension of an institutional 
fact used in the description of a crime,563 nor was it a mistake about a brute fact. In 
both Beard and Thomas, the accused had a false belief about the criminality of their 
behaviour: they were not aware that their conduct contravened the institutional 
prohibition established in the pertinent criminal norm.  
  
This chapter started with a discussion about the required standard of 
knowledge to rule out the excusatory effects of a false belief. It was concluded that 
mere awareness that the conduct is immoral or illegal does not automatically imply 
knowledge of the command or prohibition.  We must therefore determine when or 
under which circumstances a citizen who acts under a false belief about a command 
(or prohibition), or is completely ignorant of the command, can be excused by means 
of the ECCR: 
 
“The citizen who performs a criminal action is responsible when, satisfying 
other conditions for responsibility, he is either aware that the action was criminal or 
he was culpably ignorant about some feature of the criminal act when he should have 
noticed it considering: 
 
a) The latent and updatable information available to him. 
b) The standard of awareness expected as status holder.  
c) That internal or external circumstances do not diminish those individual 
intellectual and physical capacities required to notice the need to update his latent 
knowledge.” 																																																								
563 The section is clear about the prohibition of such canisters 
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a) The latent and updatable knowledge 
 
The evaluative judgement that the knowledge of institutional facts requires 
makes the application of the ECCR to false beliefs about the command or prohibition 
quite similar to false beliefs about institutional facts, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. As in those cases, criminal responsibility is straightforwardly attributed when 
the citizen is aware of the criminality of his action and has the requisite intention 
(mens rea) to perform it. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the ECCR also 
provides a deontic solution when the citizen is culpable for his ignorance. As with 
false beliefs about institutional facts, the key element to assess is the initial 
knowledge that the citizen has about the command or prohibition. This latent and 
updatable institutional/legal knowledge triggers in the citizen the doubt or suspicion 
that his action requires furthering this knowledge. If this is the case, the citizen must 
reflect, search for advice, or abort his action altogether. If the information available to 
the citizen was enough to cast doubts or raise suspicions about his beliefs, he must 
scrutinise further the situation or refrain from acting. When the citizen, ignoring or 
disregarding his suspicion, persists on performing the planned action, his conduct will 
be inexcusable. Thus, what is relevant in terms of excusatory consequences are the 
epistemic circumstances of the citizen: whether or not his latent knowledge about the 
command or prohibition should have triggered the doubt or suspicion that his action 
could be illegal. This was apparently the situation in the Thomas and Beard cases. It 
would be difficult, for example, for the accused in Thomas to claim that he did not 
know that the law of sexual offences prohibits familiar sex or incest. However, it 
would not be ridiculous to assume (it might even be a priori reasonable) that he had 
no doubts about the criminality of his action in circumstances where the sexual 
relations took place with: a) a former foster child who is b) over the age of sexual 
consent. The same conclusion could be reached in Beard where the accused indicated 
that he was not aware that the possession of the canisters was criminal and testified 
that the cartridges had been left several years ago by a friend. 
 The	three	situations,	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	which	can	disturb	
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the	lack	of	suspicion	that	the	action	could	be	criminal,	also	affect	or	apply	to	false	beliefs	about	the	command.	When	the	citizen	has	no	doubts	about	the	criminality	of	his	action	but	the	facts	of	the	case	are	legally	intricate,	the	citizen	must	always	consult	or	search	for	 legal	advice.	 In	cases	of	a	complex	legal	nature	the	citizen	always	bears	the	burden	of	searching	for	advice.	As	a	law-abiding	citizen	who	is	willing	to	do	what	is	required,	he	bears	the	burden	to	ascertain	the	legal	quality	of	 his	 action,	 even	 if	 prima	 facie	 the	 facts	 do	 not	 create	 doubts	 or	 suspicions	about	the	criminality	of	his	action.				
In the same way, the burden that the state has to legislate in a way that makes 
criminal offences accessible and comprehensible to citizens affects false beliefs about 
the command. Statutes and other sources that set out the criminal law need to be 
explicit and unambiguous. Legal norms must be written in a language that the 
common world will understand and in a way that does not confuse citizens. This 
burden implies that in those situations where a false belief about the prohibition is due 
to ambiguous drafting, the citizen’s responsibility should be relieved. Finally, another 
issue directly associated with the knowledge of the prohibition or command is legal 
stability. Legal norms in general, but criminal norms in particular, must be clear, 
reasonable and not retrospective in their operation,564 permitting citizens to adapt their 
behaviour to a stable but evolutionary institutional framework. This reasonable 
stability is even more critical when the framework of a particular stereotyped conduct 
becomes criminalised. Citizens should not need to doubt or suspect validly 
recognised, socially stereotypical conduct. Otherwise the flow of interaction within 
institutional frameworks would be disrupted. However, this argument shifts the 
burden to the state in the case of new legislation. Thus, in those cases where 
previously lawful stereotyped conduct is criminalised and the state fails to discharge 
its obligation to properly publicise the changes, the citizen’s responsibility should be 
only partial. The same mitigating solution should be established for those cases where 
the information about the new offence has not been properly circulated between the 
potential users of the institutional framework.  
 
 																																																								
564 A Ashworth Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (2015) at p66 
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b) The standard of awareness as status holder 
 
In the same way, the normative corrector element introduced to reinforce the 
interpersonal trust present in institutional or brute facts is effective here. Criminal 
responsibility should attach to our expectation that strangers will behave within the 
common and recognised deontic institutional framework. In other words, criminal 
responsibility should be attributed to the institutional user if the acceptable standard 
of demands, according with his role, has not been fulfilled. Thus, when embarking on 
potentially illegal action, if the citizen’s conduct does not trigger doubts or suspicions 
about its legality, criminal responsibility will be attributed if the citizen’s behaviour 
fell short of his expected standard of behaviour as a status holder. The dual approach 
defended in cases of false beliefs about institutional facts also holds here: for offences 
of disassociation the evaluation will be based on the collateral institutional user test, 
whereas for offences of association a version of the Bolam test565 will be used.  
 
The ECCR specifically evaluates the epistemic conditions of the accused. For 
example, in the two cases discussed above the accused claimed that they were 
unaware of the criminality of their actions. Both claimed that they had no suspicions 
about the criminality of their behaviour. Thus, to determine whether the accused was 
culpably ignorant or not we should evaluate if his initial knowledge as a status holder 
should have triggered doubts about the legality of the action. To do so, we need first 
to identify if we are evaluating a disassociation or association offence. Thomas was 
accused of an offence of sexual activity with a child family member contrary to s25 of 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003. He was acting within the proactive dimension of the 
role of a (former) foster carer, thus his conduct amounts to an offence of association. 
On the other hand, Beard was accused of possession of a weapon subject to the 
general prohibition under s5 of the Firearms Act 1968. Committing this offence 
implies that the accused has not lived up to the institutional expectations generated by 
his inactive dimension of status. Beard’s offence should therefore be categorised as an 
offence of disassociation.  
 																																																								
565 The case Bolam v Friend Hospital Management Committee established the typical rules for 
assessing the appropriate standard of reasonable care in negligence in relation with skilled 
professionals 
Chapter 7: False beliefs about the institutional command 
 
	
215	
The requirements for being a foster carer extend beyond just having a spare 
room in your house. You need to demonstrate strong family relationships within your 
own family to provide a stable environment for young people so that they can 
flourish. You must also be prepared to work in partnership with other people that are 
involved in the foster child’s life. Approved carers are also trained in the skills 
required to provide secure and high-quality care. This training includes pre-approval, 
induction, and on-going courses. Even then, a foster panel must also make a decision 
on whether the candidate is a suitable care giver. Thus, in evaluating the offence of 
association of sexual activity with a child family member, it could be expected that 
the standard must be in accordance with the status or role of the accused (here a foster 
carer). It is expected that the standard must be in accordance with a responsible body 
of opinion. If, finally, the appellant had acted within the standard of a responsible 
body of foster carers (if any) engaging in this kind of activity, he should be acquitted. 
In the Thomas case, Lord Rose highlighted that “the gravamen of this offence, as it 
seems to us, lies in the abuse of the relationship with a child. It is to the family 
relationship as defined in section 27 of the 2003 Act that this offence is directed”566. It 
could be inferred that the opinion of any responsible body of foster carers would 
demand their members to avoid ‘abuse of the relationship’ with a foster child by that 
foster carer. Indeed, it also sounds logical to assume that a foster carer should be 
aware of any legal framework that applies even after the exercise of his 
responsibilities or once the child has left his supervision or guardianship. As a result, 
it sounds coherent to require knowledge of the criminality of sexual relationships with 
a former fostered child over the age of sexual consent, but under the age of 18. 
Therefore, after assessing the epistemic circumstances of the case under the test here 
proposed for offences of association, Thomas’ claim about his false belief about the 
prohibition should have been declined. The outcome would probably be different 
from that produced under a standard honest/reasonable test.567 It could be defensible 
that the particularities of the offence highlighted above could support excusatory 
consequences for the ignorance of the prohibition. This potential divergence 
demonstrates the importance to provide a normative corrector element connected with 
the accused’s standard of awareness as a status holder. 
 																																																								
566 [2006] 1 Cr App R (S) 602 
567 The conclusion would perhaps be different if the test was ‘reasonable for an experienced foster carer’ 
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Beard, on the other hand, relates to an offence of disassociation. As a result, 
the test proposed for these cases by the ECCR is the aforementioned collateral 
institutional user test.  The test encompasses the minimum updatable knowledge 
required to interact legitimately in the institutional framework. It requires from judges 
or jury members to evaluate the potential mistaken belief about the prohibition of the 
accused, taking into account the reciprocal expectations that interact within the 
demands of the institutional framework. From this perspective, as collateral 
institutional users, we must decide if the accused has lived up to reciprocal 
institutional expectations in the particular case under examination. Every society has a 
different institutional framework about the control of firearms. The UK has some of 
the most stringent firearms controls in the world568. Legislation from the 1960s has 
been amended to restrict gun ownership. Handguns are prohibited and require special 
permission or a certificate from the police for ownership, of which a number of 
requirements, like the reasons to possess the requested weapon, must be provided. In 
particular, the UK has very restrictive legislation about the possession of tear gas and 
pepper spray which is widely available in the rest of Europe. In fact, jail sentences for 
possession of tear gas are not uncommon in our jurisdiction.569 For these reasons, it 
seems sensible to argue that the collateral institutional test would require from the 
accused a minimum updatable knowledge that the possession of the tear gas canisters 
were criminal. 570  However, the intellectual capacities of the accused might 
nevertheless excuse his conduct.  We shall consider this possibility in the next section. 
 
c) Intellectual and physical capacities 
  
Finally, the last component of the ECRR test relates to those specific 
capacities that could exclude responsibility. This third step appraises the intellectual 
or physical capacity of the citizen in the moment of action. In specific contexts the 
citizen’s perception process could be impaired by external conditions. These objective 
conditions could alter their perception process, affecting their judgement about the 
need to search for additional information. These personal conditions of the citizen can 																																																								
568 Pistols Act 1903, Firearms Act 1920, Firearsm Act 1937, Firearms Act 1968 
569 BBC News  “Essex Man Jailed over Stunt Gun  and CS Gass Possession” BBC (2015) 
570 On the basis that criminal prosecutions for possession of such canisters have been publicised in the 
media in the past 
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also affect his responsiveness to the reality that surrounds him. Some perceptions can 
confuse the citizen as a result of psychic perturbations, mental health conditions, or 
malfunctions of the sensitive organs. In Beard, it was highlighted that the appellant 
worked in the family business of renting caravans and breeding and racing horses571. 
Furthermore, the prosecution did not challenge the accused’s argument that he did not 
know he was in possession of the canisters. Indeed, they asserted rather that he ought 
to have known. He said that an unnamed friend had left the gas canisters in the 
caravan several years before. He believed that they could be blanks. Photographs of 
the canisters shown in court proved that they were very small and thus it was entirely 
reasonable to think that they were blanks. They also showed that there was, in fact, a 
warning on the box of canisters that they contained CS gas, but the appellant was 
functionally illiterate and could not read the label that, although mainly in German, 
indicated in English that they contained CS gas. We have argued that in situations 
where the perception process of the citizen exposes doubts about his intellectual 
capacities to raise hesitations about the legality of his action, he should be exculpated. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeal appear to have taken Beard’s circumstances into 
consideration when it quashed his mandatory sentence of five years, replacing it with 
two years’ imprisonment. The position defended in the ECCR would have acquitted 
Beard instead of merely mitigating his sentence. 
 
7. 4 Beyond suspicion:  Personal reflection and reliance on third party 
advice 
  
The discussions held in Part II of this research have been focussed on the 
definition and demarcation of false beliefs about brute and institutional facts as well 
as the institutional command/prohibition. Thereafter, the ECCR has been put into 
practice. Like an algorithmic test, different situations (cases) have been passed 
through the ECCR to ascertain if the accused should be held criminally responsible 
for his conduct. Criminal responsibility, we have shown, would only be attributed 
when: a) the accused knew the criminality of his action; or b) he was culpably 
ignorant about his false belief. The key issue concerns the latent and updatable 
knowledge of the citizen and whether this knowledge triggered, or should have 																																																								
571 (2008) 2 Cr App R (S) 32 
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triggered, a suspicion that the action could be criminal. If this is the case, the accused 
has three options: to reflect, to seek advice, or to abort his action altogether. However, 
nothing has been discussed with regards to neither (1) the measures the citizen must 
take in order to ascertain the truth nor, more importantly; (2) the quality of the 
information that could exonerate him even if a posteriori the belief is proved wrong; 
or (3) when the obligation to corroborate the information received ends. This is 
precisely the aim of the rest of the chapter: to determine the point of inflection where 
the burden of seeking advice becomes a right to rely on a trustworthy source.  
 
The rationalisation of the ECCR in this thesis has proven that criminal 
responsibility is directly attributed to the citizen aware of the criminality of his action 
with the corresponding intention to carry it out. It also provides justification for guilt 
when a citizen, not aware that his action was criminal, should have known it. The 
potential distrust that this second subjective test, only based on other user’s 
perception, would bring to the institutional framework is amended in the ECCR with 
a normative correction factor. This normative factor, focused on the status holder’s 
perspective, protects institutional user’s expectations and reassures mutual confidence 
between strangers because the extension of the status guides both the holder and those 
who interact with him. All the arguments in the previous three chapters have been 
constructed to ascertain when the citizen is or should have been aware that his belief 
was false. However, we have yet to discuss the criminal responsibility of the citizen, 
who, suspicious about the criminality of his behaviour, reflects on his action or seeks 
advice from a third party before embarking on a course of action as a result of that 
mistaken advice or personal conclusion. Is the seeking of advice or self-reflection of 
the mislead citizen enough to exonerate them? Could personal reflection exonerate the 
doubtful citizen who, after research about the criminality of his actions, acts 
mistakenly? Who can be categorised as a trustworthy source of advice? Finally, 
should the mislead citizen be held responsible in cases of reliance on a trustworthy 
source of counsel? If so, when? 
 
No direct transposable academic debate about these issues can be found in 
current criminal law literature. However, the topic known as reliance on official 
advice, collaterally or partially relates to the questions presented above. Furthermore, 
this debate about reliance on official advice probably includes the largest academic 
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literature supporting exculpatory effects in cases of ‘error of law’.572 Therefore, 
before fleshing out the above interrogations it would be illuminating to analyse the 
current academic (and judicial) arguments about these situations where the citizen has 
relied on a mistaken interpretation or advice provided by officials. The rationale 
behind this recognition as a defence of this category of ‘error of law’ are well 
examined by Chalmers and Leverick in their book about criminal defences. The 
authors point out three lines of argument in support of the introduction of the defence. 
First, the “estoppel” argument573, Ashworth574, for example, argues that in order to 
maintain the integrity of the criminal justice process, the courts should not convict a 
person whom their officers have advised otherwise. The second line of argument rests 
on due process, constitutional principles,575 and principles of fairness. Overall, the 
argument supports the idea that citizens should be given due notice about actions or 
behaviours that are criminally appraised. Finally, the third argument is a moral one 
which states that the citizen who relies on mistaken official advice when embarking 
on a course of conduct is not morally blameworthy.576 The topic of reliance on official 
advice has also been discussed in more depth by Ashworth,577 who identifies four 
rationales supporting the defence. First, an excuse-culpability based rationale upholds 
that this kind of conduct is something the state ought to value and foster as 
responsible and reasonable behaviour. The citizen behaves well by abiding with the 
advice given and should therefore be excused. Secondly, Ashworth connects the claim 
of a substantive defence with the principle of legality. The fair warning element, 																																																								
572 See J. Chalmers and F. Leverick Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006) paragraphs 
13.25-13.34; A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal 
Justice” in S. Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General 
Part (2002); A. Ashworth “Official Advice and Mistakes of Law” Crim L R (1998) 435. S.D. 
Billimarck “Reliance on an Official Interpretation of the Law: The Defence’s Appropriate 
Dimensions” University of Illinois Law Review (1993) 565-588; J. Parry “Culpability, Mistake 
and Official Interpretation of Law” American Journal of Criminal law (1997) 25:1-78; T. White 
“Relience on Apparent Authority as a Defence to Criminal Prosecution” Columbia Law review 
(1977) 77:775-806. 
573 See J. Chalmers and F. Leverick Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006) at p278 
574 A. Ashworth “Excusable mistake of law” Criminal LJ (1974) p652 
575 J. Chin, R. Griffith, N. Klingerman, and M. Gilkey “The Mistake of Law Defense and an 
Unconstitutional Provision of the Model Penal Code” North Carolina Law Review (2014) 93(1):5. 
576 A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice” in S. 
Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at p305; 
S.D. Billimarck ”Reliance on an Official Interpretation of the Law: the Defence’s Appropriate 
Dimensions” University of Illinois Law Review (1993) 565-588 at pp 577; J. Parry “ Culpability, 
Mistake and Official Interpretation of Law” American Journal of Criminal law (1997) 25:1-78 at 
p21 
577 A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice” in S. 
Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002)  
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inherent to the principle of legality, would be contravened if a citizen that breaks a 
law that he was unaware of is convicted even where he has been conscientious 
enough to follow official advice. The third rationale rests on the procedural 
mechanism of an estoppel argument: the state should be precluded from prosecuting 
someone to whom it has previously given official yet mistaken advice.578 Finally, and 
related to the third rationale, the conviction of a citizen erroneously advised by an 
official highlights self-contradiction within the criminal justice system, compromising 
its integrity and unity. 
 
The approach to this issue taken by British courts and tribunals is not 
conclusive either. Courts have taken a contradictory and unprincipled approach 
towards this issue. In Arrowsmith,579 for example, where the accused received a letter 
from the Director of Public Prosecutions informing that his prospective conduct did 
not contravene the Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934, the defence of reliance in 
official advice was rejected at both trial and appeal. In other, older cases like Cooper 
v Simmons,580 Roberts v Local Authority of Inverness,581 and Cambridgeshire and Isle 
of Ely CC v Rust,582 tribunals have also rejected the defence. In other instances, 
reliance has been held not to exculpate, but rather mitigates the sentence, as in Howell 
v Falmouth Boat Construction co583 or Surrey v Battersby.584 The same principles 
apply to reliance on a judicial decision which is later overruled, as in Younger.585 Nor 
has it been a valid defence in situations where the accused relied on ultra vires 
legislation.586 On the other hand, in cases like Postermobil v Brent LBC,587 where 
members of a planning department advised a company that their action was not 
illegal, a procedural defence was allowed. In this case, the prosecution was stayed as 
an abuse of process. American and Canadian Courts,588 on the other hand, have 																																																								
578 A. Ashworth, “Excusable mistake of law” [1974] Criminal LJ 652 
579 (1975) QB 678 
580 (1862) 7 H H& N 707 
581 (1889) 2 white 385 
582 (1972) 2 QB 426 
583 (1951) AC 837 (HL) 
584 (1965) 2 QB 194 (DC) 
585 (1973) 101 ER 253 
586 Cambpbell (1972) 1 CRNS 273 
587 (1998) Crim LR 435 
588  The defence is recognised in the United States since the case of Long v State A.2d 489 (1949); See 
also Raley v Ohio 360 US 423 (1959). The Supreme Court of Canada recognised the defence of 
“officially induced error of law” in R v Jorgensen [1995]  4 S C R; See also the recent case Levis 
(city) v Tetreault 2006 SCC 12; and J. Chin, R Griffith, N. Klingerman, and M. Gilkey “The 
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accepted the defence of “officially induced error”589 in some cases under the due 
process argument. In fact, this argument has crystallised in some offences of 
association. Relevant is the recognition of the defence by the Model Penal Code in 
section 2.04(3)(b), providing exculpation where a citizen relies on an erroneous 
statement of the law provided by a person or body responsible for the administration 
or interpretation of the law. Finally, the UK legislative body, in some instances, have 
enacted a substantive defence, as in section 3(4) of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 
where a defence to the offence of disposal of unlicensed waste is provided to those 
who inform themselves from persons who are in position to provide information. 
Courts considering the same line of argumentation, however, have been very strict. In 
Shaw v DPP,590 for example, where the appellant published a ladies directory which 
listed contact details of prostitutes for a fee, the accused was convicted of conspiracy 
to corrupt public morals under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 irrespective of the 
fact that a lawyer advised him before embarking on the business that such an offence 
did not exist. In fact, the offence was created by the House of Lords to protect the 
Public majority’s morals. Neither reliance on legal advice from a paralegal agent, like 
in Brockley,591 or incorrect advice from a licensed attorney, as in Hopkins v. State,592 
can form the basis of a mistake of law defence. In any case, neither doctrine nor 
courts have extended the potential excusatory effects or had a supportive approach to 
reliance on a private lawyer. Guy-Arye, for example, warns of the social cost of 
allowing the defence,593 and Hall and Seligman warn that if recognised, lawyers could 
provide (unfair) immunity from prosecution or conviction for their clients.594  
 
The weakest point of all these arguments, already highlighted by Ashworth,595 
is precisely that a purported procedural defence based on estoppel (i.e. abuse of 
process or integrity of the Criminal justice system) would exclude reliance on private 																																																																																																																																																														
Mistake of Law Defense and an Unconstitutional Provision of the Model Penal Code” North 
Carolina Law Review (2014) 93(1):5 
589 See R v Cancoil Thermal Corporation (1986) 52 CR (3d) 188. 
590 Shaw v DPP (1962) AC 220 
591 (1994) Crim LR 671 (CA) 
592 Edward Hopkins v State of Indiana No 49S02-0302-CR-54 Decided February 10, 2003 
593 Guy-Arye, “Reliance on a lawyer‘s mistaken advice: should it be an excuse  from criminal 
responsibility?” 2001-2002 American Journal of Criminal Law 455-480. See also J Chalmers and 
F. Leverick Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006) at pp285-6 
594 L. Hall and S. Seligman “Mistake of law and mens rea” University of Chicago Law Review (1940) 
41(8):652 
595 A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice” in S. 
Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at p306 
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lawyers or agencies. The advice of private lawyers or legal information provided by 
independent agencies would not be sufficient to stay proceeding because the 
information is not provided by an official or civil servant.596 This flaw implies 
founding the construction of the purported defence not just on the subjective 
‘reliance’ element, but also (and crucially) “on the source of the advice relied 
upon”.597 Although nobody can dispute that one of the most relevant duties of a 
lawyer is providing legal advice, due to this assumed twofold argument of the defence 
the excusatory effects of reliance on non-official advice does not enjoy academic 
support. This is despite the fact that advice provided by prominent legal academics or 
lawyers should be more reliable than a medium or low-grade government official.   
 
However, beyond excluding reliance on private lawyers, a detailed scrutiny of 
the estoppel argument demonstrates the real flaw of this rationale.  The estoppel 
doctrine derives from the Roman law principle “venire contra factum propium non 
valet” defended by Ulpian’s resposta in the Digest.598 In this resposta, Ulpian argues 
that a father cannot claim the nullity of the testament of his deceased daughter based 
on the nullity of her emantipatio, when it was the father himself who emancipated her 
with unreserved capacity. Basically, it implies that a person cannot act against his 
previous pronouncements in order to limit the rights of another person that with good 
faith had trusted in, and relied upon, the initial assertions. The justification for 
establishing a limit to the autonomy of the citizen who has created a reasonable 
expectation in other people’s behaviour is the protection of trust and good faith. Thus, 
estoppel was born in the private law field where the advantages of avoiding citizen’s 
self-contradiction are imperative. However, to require the same level of self-
consistency between a planning officer and the court which considers a case is to take 
things slightly too far. Beyond that, considering that the official of a council belongs 
to the same entity (the state) as a judge in the High Court is more than questionable. 
But, in any case, the function of the criminal justice system is not to indirectly 
(through a defence) attribute responsibility to the state, but rather to directly attribute 
(or excuse) responsibility to the citizen charged with a particular crime. Further, and 
paradoxically, it is the support of the estoppel argument that could undermine the 																																																								
596 The issue could be arguable because in England and wales layers are “officers of the court” 
597 A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice” in S. 
Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at p309 
598 Digest 1,7 25 [1] 
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integrity or reputation of the criminal justice system. Criminal responsibility must be 
attributed according to the personal involvement of the accused in the criminal action. 
Certainly, the existence of a provocateur agent (public or private) should be 
considered, but the straight acquittal of an a priori guilty accused would undeniably 
undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system by imposing a burden that does 
not correspond to his action(s).599  
 
Instead, the rationale that should be highlighted, in order to support a potential 
defence based on the reliance on erroneous official advice, should be legal certainty. 
The massive number of offences of association existent in our modern societies 
implicate that nobody is able to know and actualise knowledge about them. It could 
be assumed that legislative bodies are aware of that; they accept that they cannot be 
expected from ordinary citizens full knowledge of the current law and any legal 
updates. This duty is, however, expected from lawyers, officials, notaries, law 
societies, and even legal academics. This argument is at the basis of our massive body 
of criminal norms.  It is the reason that justifies thousands of criminal laws coexisting 
in our legal system. The administration does not have the expectation that citizens 
have specific knowledge about all criminal norms. The only expectation that is 
legitimate for the state to have, is that in cases of doubt about the illegality or 
criminality of an action, the citizen, before embarking on potentially criminal 
conduct, will seek legal advice from a trustworthy source. Once the citizen has sought 
advice from a trustworthy source, to some extent, the criminal responsibility swings 
to the reliable source.600 The state assumes that the possibility that the criminal law 
could be infringed shifts from the citizen to those third parties who provide advice. 
Regardless if they are officials or private lawyers.  
 
Furthermore, modern societies need quick and efficient institutional 
frameworks where interaction between citizens take place in an environment of 
frictionless trust. An essential part of this framework is the conviction that the state 
and its officials (or private lawyers) provide reliable advice and information about our 
legal system. We cannot demand of our fellow citizens to verify from a second or 																																																								
599 A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice” in S. 
Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at p319 
600 This statement should not be understood literally in terms that the person providing the (incorrect) 
advice becomes criminally liable 
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third source the validity or correctness of the advice provided, otherwise the normal 
development of our civil life would collapse. Neither can the state expect that citizens 
should embark on actions with the suspicion that they will be prosecuted or convicted 
if the information provided turns out to be erroneous. For those reasons, what is 
required is to establish a normative ‘threshold of minimum requirement’. Of course, 
this objective threshold could always, in theory, be overcome because it is 
subjectively possible to ascertain the truth about legality. However, the point is that 
the puzzled citizen who has sought advice from a trustworthy source (and maybe has 
received misleading advice about the criminality of his conduct) has done enough.  A 
different issue is the description or delineation of this threshold, or under which 
factors the citizen should challenge the quality of the information or advice provided. 
We now therefore consider the measures the citizen must take to ascertain the truth, 
the quality of the information provided, and finally the obligation to confirm or 
authenticate the information received. 
 
7.5 Normative threshold of minimum requirement601 
 
The approach taken in this research differs from the debate summarised above. 
Our principled approach will not consider reliance cases as an instance of ‘mistakes of 
law’, more prone to be successful as a defence. Instead, official reliance will be 
treated as a one component or element for the threshold from which criminal 
responsibility will not be attributed in some cases. As it has been systematically 
defended in this research, what is crucial are the personal epistemic conditions of the 
citizen: when he has doubts or suspicions about the criminality of his action he must 
use any resource available to him to overcome any false belief. To achieve this, the 
citizen has only two alternatives: a) to reflect and investigate and consult statutes by 
himself to resolve his doubts; or b) to seek advice from third parties.  
 
The complexity of the legal system as well as the massive number of valid 
offences of association would certainly make it challenging for a citizen to recognise 
the legality of his action by research. However, the possibility should not be ruled out 
that in satisfying specific conditions, the citizen who consistently and meticulously 																																																								
601 This normative threshold applies in a different way to false beliefs about the existence of a brute 
fact than institutional facts or prohibitions, due to the particular nature of these cases 
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has attempted to ascertain the extension of an institutional fact or the law applicable, 
could be excused even if his final conclusions were mistaken.  Two factors should be 
taken into consideration evaluating whether the effort of reflection reaches a 
minimum threshold that can justify a defence or not.  The first factor is associated 
with the personal circumstances of the citizen. The appraisal should be focused on the 
cognitive intelligence of the person to learn, rationalise, deduce and make the right 
connection as well as the individual’s abilities to project future plans, designs or 
strategies. Significant considerations to consider in evaluating the above abilities 
would be age, profession, education, and the cultural level of the citizen. Other 
important components to consider are the comprehensibility and unambiguousness of 
the institutional framework scrutinised.602 It is mainly regulative environments that 
are open to more than one interpretation which could puzzle a citizen willing to act in 
accordance with the law. Thus, the citizen who, after conducting meticulous research 
about the extension of an institutional fact or the prohibition of his conduct, acts, for 
example, according with a line of argumentation held by recent case law, should 
successfully be able to claim excusatory consequences for his action, should it turn 
out to be criminal. In any case, all the considerations described above do not have 
autonomous significance by themselves. The fact that a law student in his final year 
erroneously embarks on criminal conduct after a meticulous study of an unclear area 
of the law, does not automatically exclude his criminal responsibility. However, both 
the personal circumstances of the student and the intricateness of the legal framework 
should be taken in consideration by the judge or jury when evaluating the criminal 
responsibility of the accused. 
 When	 the	 personal	 reflection	 and	 investigation	 of	 the	 citizen	 is	 not	enough	 for	 clarification,	 he	 has	 the	 alternative	 option	 of	 seeking	 advice	 from	third	parties.	This	alternative	brings	about	the	matter	of	characterisation	of	the	normative	 threshold	 of	 the	 ‘minimum	 requirement’	 noted	 above.	 In	 practical	terms,	it	implies	determining	the	point	of	inflection	where	the	burden	of	seeking	advice	becomes	a	right	to	rely	on	a	trustworthy	source.	Three	areas	need	to	be	considered	in	order	to	provide	content	to	this	threshold:	a)	the	qualifications	of	
																																																								
602 In R v Cancoil Thermal Corporation (1986) 27 CCC (3d) 295 at 303 it was proposed that ambiguity 
in the law might be a relevant factor to take in account when advice is sought.  
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the	third	party	who	gives	the	advice;	b)	the	qualification	of	the	advice	itself;	and	finally	c)	the	potential	corroboration	of	the	information	received.	
 
In our highly regulated modern societies with endless institutional 
frameworks, the legal system requires reliable or trustworthy bodies and/or 
individuals able to advise and guide fellow citizens about the current legal 
framework(s). This duty cannot only be attributed to officials who, in fact, should be 
paying more attention to the administration and enforcement of the law than 
providing public advice. For that reason, this paper argues that officials, but a priori 
also lawyers, academics, in-house lawyer, notaries, as well as bodies like the law 
society, Chambers of Commerce, Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Federation 
of Small Business (FDB) or similar bodies could be trustworthy sources of advice. 
Obviously, the person or body should be formally involved in the administration or 
management of a particular legal area. However, the reliance on these sources does 
not require from the citizen an inquisitorial approach toward the person or body 
requested. In general, it could be assumed that the citizen who has doubts about a 
particular area of the law will be unable to evaluate the capacity or qualification of a 
person or body questioned. This point diverges from the position held by Ashworth 
who suggests that advice provided by a junior official or an official that does not work 
in the right department should not be trustworthy or reliable.603 Nonetheless, this is 
the position not surprisingly assumed by the courts. In the aforementioned 
Postermobil case, the Divisional Court held “it was not as though they had requested 
planning from one of the council’s gardeners”.604 The same approach was assumed in 
the Canadian case of Jorgensen,605 when it was stated that an “official involved in the 
administration of the law in question, would be considered appropriate officials”.606 
The only requirement explicitly demanded from the citizen in order to consider or 
challenge the trustworthy advice given is that the guidance must be explicit and 
unambiguous. In practice, this means a sharp pronouncement about the legality of the 
conduct. In case the adviser presents any doubt or hesitation about the issue, the 
citizen has the obligation to corroborate the advice. This last point makes reference to 																																																								
603 A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice” in S. 
Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at p305 
604 See discussion of the case in A. Ashworth and J. Horder Principles of Criminal law (2013) at p223 
605 R v Jorgensen (1995) 4 SCR 55 at 50 per Lamer CJ 
606 Ibd at p30 
Chapter 7: False beliefs about the institutional command 
 
	
227	
another situation where the advice received should be challenged. As Ashworth, for 
example, suggests, in those situations where the citizen is also an expert and knows 
that the advice is probably wrong the citizen should not rely on the advice given, or 
they should corroborate it.607  
 
Trustworthy assurance also requires an appropriate process of deliberation by 
the adviser, grounded in an honest description of the circumstances by the citizen who 
seeks counsel. The citizen must portray honestly and accurately the circumstances 
that he believes to be relevant when making a decision on the issue. A one-sided or 
misleading description of these circumstances can elicit incorrect advice and, in such 
cases, the information provided cannot be considered trustworthy and the citizen 
should bear some degree of responsibility. However, and at the same time, a confused 
citizen who seeks advice cannot be expected to question the cogency of the 
methodology employed by the adviser as far as it is formally or apparently reliable. It 
is the responsibility of the third party to inform the citizen about situations or 
circumstances that could be relevant in establishing the informative statement, but not 
the other way around. Obviously, any suspicion by the citizen of personal interest by 
the adviser in the implementation of the conduct will make the representation 
fraudulent. However, and to summarise, any information is trustworthy when, 
provided an accurate description of the circumstances involved has been provided by 
the requester, it emanates from one of the reliable sources mentioned above without 
any suspicion of personal interest or bias in the information giver.  
 
Finally, it remains to be discussed under which situations the information 
received requires a second opinion or corroboration by a different adviser. In theory, 
any potential wrong information or advice is susceptible to corroboration or further 
scrutiny. However, as mentioned above, although it is always possible to search for 
advice from a second, third, or perhaps even more sources to corroborate the certainly 
of advice given, this would jeopardise the daily social interactions that the law aims to 
regulate. Thus, only in very specific situations does initial advice received from a 
reliable source require authentication. One example would be in situations where a 
citizen embarks on manifestly illegal actions under the shield of official advice. This 																																																								
607 A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice” in S. 
Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at p305 
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group of official reliance cases might be categorised under the doctrine of superior 
orders.608 The case United v Barker609, where the accused was authorised (and 
encouraged) by White House officials to steal information from an office as part of 
the Watergate scandal, provides a very a good example of these cases.610 In these 
cases, the assurance or advice requires corroboration to be trustworthy in the terms 
defended above.  Another area that could require authentication is in situations where 
the advice provided is manifestly morally blameworthy or harmful to third parties.611 
Equally, when the citizen is aware of divergent legal opinions about the information 
given corroboration could be mandatory. Finally, those assurances where the adviser 
proposes a deceitful or dishonest course of action would require corroboration by 
alternative sources in order to fulfil the requirements of reliability and trustworthiness 
above established.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
Two significant issues have been settled in this chapter. First, it has been 
verified that only actual knowledge about the prohibition or command of conduct can 
preclude excusatory effects for a false belief. This attitude reinforces again the strong 
aversion manifest in this thesis to intertwine moral and legal concepts. It also 
reaffirms the paramount significance of the principle of legality in the criminal law 
domain (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine previa lege) sustained in this research: 
beyond moral appraisals, criminal responsibility can only be attributed to conduct 
formally categorised as criminal at the moment the action took place. Only 
criminalised conduct can be an exclusionary reason for action while generating 
normative expectations in others. 
 
Finally, this chapter discussed how the vast range of criminal law in common 
law jurisdictions, compared for example with civil codified jurisdictions, affects its 
knowledge. This considerable amount of criminal legislation has even been referred 
to as a problem of “over-criminalization”. Nevertheless, both common and civil law 																																																								
608 Ibd at p306 
609 546 F 2d 940 (1976). 
610 A. Ashworth “Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice” in S. 
Shute and A. Simester (eds) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at p305 
611 See J. Horder Excusing Crime (2004) at p271 
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jurisdictions regulate more or less the same range of conduct. The reasons why 
common-law jurisdictions have preferred to rely on criminal law instead of 
administrative law, for example, is obviously beyond the aims of this research. 
Rather, the discussion is whether this should be considered a problem, and if so its 
potential solutions. In any case, the fact is that we have a substantial amount of 
conduct regulated through the criminal law.612 Lawmakers are aware of this situation 
and they do not expect citizens to know all regulatory frameworks. This duty is only 
expected from lawyers, legal academics or officials. The only legitimate expectation 
lawmakers can have is that before embarking on potentially criminal conduct, citizens 
should seek legal advice from a trustworthy source.  
 
																																																								
612 See chapter 3 
	
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
"Following Hume I might say to my grocer: 'Truth consists in agreement 
either to relations of ideas, as that twenty shillings make a pound, or to matters 
of fact, as that you have delivered me a quarter of potatoes; from this you can 
see that the term ("truth") does not apply to such a proposition as that I owe you 
so much for the potatoes. You really must not jump from an "is" - as that it 
really is the case that I asked for the potatoes and that you delivered them and 
sent me a bill - to an "owes" ' ”.613 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to provide a principled solution for those 
situations where citizens acting under a false normative belief unwittingly commit a 
criminal offence. My aspiration has been to provide an operative and principled 
approach to this issue by developing an account of what I have called the epistemic 
condition of criminal responsibility. Of course, epistemic conditions are not the only 
conditions that matter to criminal responsibility, but this thesis has argued that 
knowledge of the law, traditionally neglected, should be placed on the same level as 
other conditions of criminal responsibility like mens rea or causation. In doing this, I 
ruled out the strategy of offering just a set of exculpatory exceptions to ignorance of 
the law. Instead, I have looked to the relevance of knowledge of the law and 
introduced a fresh conceptual institutional framework. Within this conceptual 
framework, the ECCR has developed around the concepts of brute and institutional 
facts. Within the contours of this new account of the criminal law, trust has been 
identified as the central aim of the criminal law.  
 
My argument has been that for purposes or functions beyond mere biological 
or physical structures (brute facts) we collectively attribute certain status(es) to 
persons, objects or other entities. The institutional structure derived from this status 
function grants a waterfall of rights and duties that provide those within the 
institutional framework with a common reason for action in our practical reasoning. I 
claim that institutional facts guide us, but also disclose to others what they can expect 
from us. Only within normative frameworks of reciprocal institutionalised 																																																								
613 E. Anscombe “On Brute Facts” Analysis (1958) 18(3):69-72 
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expectations can we interact, cooperate and trust strangers. This is possible because, 
as rational thinkers, we not only have the ability to conform our behaviour to reasons, 
but also to take into account the mental states of others. We have the capacity to 
recognise that the deliberation of others will depend on expectations about what we 
will do. Thus, we can build up our plans on the expectation of the responsiveness of 
others. This is the essence of interpersonal trust that I argue the criminal law 
underlies. However, in some cases, normative institutionalised expectations also need 
a mechanism of reassurance. Criminal punishment performs this function against 
conduct that could jeopardise the institutional configuration of a society: criminal 
punishment underlies institutional trust reassuring citizens that the institutional 
framework is still valid even in cases of isolated violations. 
 
Within this institutional conceptual framework, the unsettled traditional 
mistake of fact/law distinction has been substituted for the coherent and consistent 
trilogy of false beliefs about brute/institutional facts and institutional commands. 
Furthermore, the ECCR has proved to be an autonomous (from mens rea) algorithmic 
test able to effectively distinguish culpable from non-culpable ignorance in all of the 
above false beliefs. Starting from the latent (but updatable) knowledge that the citizen 
has before action, the ECCR has evidenced that, as reason responsive agents, we 
should only be held responsible when we disregard the suspicion that our conduct 
could be criminal. Additionally, the ECCR, introducing the status holder’s 
perspective, has provided a coherent mechanism to resolve those cases where the lazy 
or indolent agent has done little to ascertain the truth. The range of real cases 
discussed in this thesis and the principled conclusions provided by the ECCR have 
demonstrated its practicality and coherency in dealing with the controversial and 
difficult problem of adequately recognising the exonerative effects of false normative 
beliefs.  
 
My approach is clearly different from current works about the topic, which are 
focussed mainly on justifying excusatory arguments for ignorance of the law. As this 
thesis has argued, a principled solution will be difficult to achieve without a thorough 
discussion of two particularly interconnected topics: the relevance of knowledge of 
the law; and the model of criminal responsibility. Any commentator on common law 
jurisdictions who aspires to provide a coherent solution for ignorance of the law needs 
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to consider to what extent knowledge of the law is relevant. This discussion can only 
be understood in the context of the conditions of criminal responsibility, because it 
seems difficult to justify the significance of knowledge of the law without recognising 
its impact on the ex ante deliberation process of the citizen. Knowledge of the legal 
rules can only be relevant within a reason-responsive account of criminal 
responsibility. In this version, responsibility is attributed by virtue of our capacity to 
respond and be guided by legal reasons. Criminal responsibility would be attributed 
only when the citizen fails to exercise his capacity as a reasonable and responsible 
agent.  
 
The above argument could, I suspect, cause difficulty for legal moralists who 
categorise law as a subcategory of morality. For them, citizens only need to be guided 
by moral reasons because only culpable wrongs provide a desert base argument for 
punishment. Thus, criminalising certain conduct is completely irrelevant because it 
does not introduce new arguments for desert. Within this account, ignorance of the 
law is immaterial for punishment. This is due to the difficulties that the moralists have 
in reconciling their arguments with the demands of the principle of legality, 
particularly with the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali constraint. 
To them, it would be manifestly unfair to punish a citizen for breaking a purported 
criminal rule that could not have been considered as a reason for their action. It seems 
then that legal moralists need to first accommodate their moral base desert to the 
demands of the principle of legality in order to recognise that knowledge of the law is 
key to criminal responsibility.  
 
Alongside this argument about the importance of knowledge of the law, and 
closely connected with its consequences, is the proposal about the function of both 
criminal law and punishment suggested in this thesis. Justification of criminal 
punishment has been a controversial topic for decades among criminal theorists. For 
those focussed on forward-looking considerations, punishment is instrumentally 
justified, whereas for those who emphasise backward-looking considerations, 
offenders simply deserve punishment for their crimes. Both retributivist 614  and 
consequentialist approaches have faced objections and thus hybrid proposals for 																																																								
614 See J. Rawls “Two Concepts of Rules” Philosophical Review  (1955) 64:3–32; see also H.L.A. Hart 
Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1968) pp8–12 
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criminal justification have also emerged.  In any case, it seems like the function of the 
criminal law and the function of criminal punishment are in some way treated as 
convergent, as though the aims of the criminal law could be reduced or distilled into 
the aims of criminal punishment.  
 
Of course, punishment is an important institution requiring justification, but it 
is equally important to identify the main function of punishment. Institutions are end 
orientated and only by isolating the function of criminal punishment can its actual 
success be evaluated. In any case, not everything can be explained in terms of 
punishment in criminal law, and the function of the criminal law cannot merely be 
understood in terms of the function of criminal punishment. Furthermore, a sharp 
differentiation needs to be established between criminal punishment and the criminal 
behavioural rule whose infringement justifies that punishment. It seems obvious that 
the aims of both concepts are different and in fact, as is the case, divergent. This 
differentiation is key because, as it has been defended in this thesis, it is these 
behavioural rules which underly interpersonal trust. For that reason, knowledge of the 
behavioural rules is essential to our interaction with others.  
 
In identifying the function of the criminal law with the function of 
punishment, we restrain the scope of the criminal law from the very beginning. 
Criminal law is not a body of laws intended solely to target criminals or potential 
offenders as, for example, corporate law relates solely to the rights and relations of 
companies and business. Indeed, criminal laws are not only addressed to those 
citizens who have the temptation to commit a crime; their scope is wider. Rather, 
criminal laws are addressed to society as a whole, which includes a majority of 
citizens who do not have a propensity towards the commission of crimes but want to 
live in a secure institutional environment. As social creatures, citizens who live in 
institutionalised frameworks need norms, rules, policies, and procedures to ensure 
seamless and efficient interaction with others. These norms guide citizens, letting 
them know how to behave and interact with others. Legal norms also frame and 
institutionalise the expectations we have from others. Civil order is only possible 
within an institutionalised framework. It is only within this secure framework that we 
can plan our daily lives with the expectation that others will comply with these legal 
norms. Only within this institutional framework can we trust others. For this reason, 
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the ex ante communicative function of criminal behavioural legal norms needs to be 
recognised and heightened. It is for this reason why knowledge of the law is of 
particular relevance. 
 
Criminal laws also communicate in advance that the expectation of the 
stability of legal norms will be maintained by criminal punishment, even in cases of 
violation. The function for punishment proposed in this thesis (endorsing institutional 
trust) is perhaps the weakest part of the institutional framework here defended. The 
idea that criminal punishment reinforces trust in the institutional structure itself, 
although requires a deep scrutiny about its implications, does not seem inconsistent. 
However, the argument that the convicted accused must suffer the consequences of 
punishment in order to reinforce the institutional structures is the frailest part of the 
institutional framework here proposed. This communicative function would certainly 
contradict the Kantian “end-in-itself” categorical imperative to treat human beings as 
an end in themselves and requires further research.   
 
In any case, the central inference about the significance of trust in the 
functional account of the criminal law is that both criminal behavioural norms and 
punishment play a key communicative role. This communicative character 
emphasises the values and requirements of the legality principle in the criminal law 
arena. Thus, criminal laws need to be accessible, certain, foreseeable, and predictable. 
It is essential that citizens are able to know from the wording of the relevant criminal 
laws what acts or omissions will make others liable and what penalty will be imposed. 
This accessibility to the law allows citizens to organise their life within the 
institutional framework, while also providing awareness about the ways in which his 
expectations are protected by criminal norms. Evidently, the wording of statutory 
laws cannot be absolutely clear-cut to avoid excessive rigidity. For that reason, some 
laws are inevitably couched in expressions which are vague and will require 
interpretation based in practice. However, these potential grey areas do not render the 
laws incompatible with the requirements of accessibility and foreseeability.  
 
As it was mentioned in this thesis, this requirement of certainty or 
predictability could be fulfilled even if the citizen has to investigate or take 
appropriate legal advice to evaluate the outcomes which a given action may entail. 
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This is particularly true in cases of offences of association where the citizen is 
expected to take special care, appraising the risk that a particular activity could entail. 
However, in any system of law, there is always an unavoidable element of judicial 
interpretation. This role of adjudication entrusted in the courts is even more manifest 
in common law jurisdictions. In any case, interpretation on a case-by-case basis needs 
to be consistent with the essence of the offence, and the outcome needs to be 
reasonably foreseeable. Finally, and according with the communicative role of 
criminal punishment, the predictability requirement should apply to the elements of 
the offence/defence but also to the applicable penalty. 
 
This thesis has not dealt with those situations where a citizen´s conduct is 
criminal because he mistakenly believes that it is permissible. However, although the 
approach here defended applies directly to false beliefs it would have further 
implications in addressing other areas of the criminal law like for example mistaken 
beliefs.  I can’t develop this in topic in full here, but I shall say something brief about 
it. Currently these situations are discussed under the heading of mistake about a 
defence or putative defence. Among putative defences, mistaken beliefs about self-
defence in particular is a highly controversial topic that has attracted an enormous 
amount of academic attention. Within the epistemic approach of this thesis it would 
be perhaps more appropriate to categorise such circumstances as mistaken beliefs 
about a justification. This is because according with the reasons-responsiveness 
account of responsibility defended in this thesis, mistaken beliefs are only feasible 
with respect to justifications. Only justificatory conditions form part of the 
deliberation process of the agent, thus mistaken beliefs can only arise in this domain. 
Mistaken beliefs about an excuse are unrealistic because the nucleus of any excuse is 
the impairment of the citizen´s deliberative mechanism.615 For that reason, in cases of 
insanity, coercion, drunkenness, or non-age, the cause of exoneration is that the 
accused cannot respond to reasons because his ability to respond and be guided by 
reasons is damaged or diminished.   																																																								
615 The excuse/ justification debate goes beyond the scope of this research but, within the reason-
responsiveness account of criminal responsibility defended here, justifications are reasons 
balanced in the deliberation process by the citizen as, for example, in cases of self-defence, 
consent, and some types of necessity. Excuses, on the other hand, are situations not considered in 
the deliberation process. In fact, excuses are granted because the deliberation process of the 
citizen was somehow diminished or damaged, as in cases of coercion, insanity, automatism, and 
non-age. 
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I have intentionally avoided this topic (which probably requires a thesis by 
itself) in the present thesis, and I am going to avoid the temptation to direct any future 
research towards it within the institutional framework here proposed. In any case, I 
would like to illustrate that both the institutional framework suggested in this thesis 
and the trilogy of false beliefs proposed can accommodate mistaken beliefs about 
justifications. The mistaken belief in this field could refer to three kinds of situation. 
In the first kind, the citizen mistakenly believes that a particular course of action 
could be justified: his mistaken belief is about a ‘non-existent’ justification.616  The 
second situation could arise when the citizen knows the legal framework, and is aware 
that a particular valid justification exists, but his mistaken belief is about the extension 
of the particular defence. In the final hypothetical situation, the citizen’s mistaken 
belief would be about factual (brute) elements of the justification. In this situation the 
citizen’s mistaken belief is about the existence of objective elements or requirements 
of the justification. The best example could be the so-called putative self-defence. In 
short, both the institutional conceptual framework and the trilogy of false beliefs 
suggested in this thesis can provide (with proper discussion) a solid basis for further 
investigation about mistaken beliefs about justifications.  
																																																								
616 The case of Clark v Syme (1957) JC 1,5 mentioned in chapter 5, where a man threatened to (and 
then did) kill his neighbour’s trespassing sheep, believing he had a legal right to defend his 
property after giving due notice provides a good example.  
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